

AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT SAFETY CHALLENGES

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Abstract

The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk. ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to make safety assessments based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? What are the design implications for the USA's 'Next Generation Air Transportation System' (NextGen) and Europe's Single European Sky ATM Research Programme (SESAR)? ATM accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller workload, miscommunication, and lack of up-to-date information. Can these accident precursors confidently be 'designed out' by (eg) better system knowledge across ATM participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than voice communication? Future potentially hazardous situations could be as 'messy' in system terms as the Überlingen mid-air collision. Are ATM safety regulation policies fit for purpose: is it more and more difficult to innovate, to introduce new technologies and novel operational concepts? Must regulators be more active, eg more inspections and monitoring of real operational and organisational practices?

1. Introduction

Air Traffic Management (ATM) is the part of the aviation system that is most likely to be developed through new paradigms. This is a definition of ATM from an ICAO – International Civil Aviation Organization – document.

“Air Traffic Management is the dynamic and integrated management of air traffic and airspace, safely, economically and efficiently, through the provision of facilities and seamless services, in collaboration with all partners.”

Note the emphasis on partners: airlines and airport operators play a big role. The following list shows some of the features of ATM. .

- Safety
- Air Traffic Control – ATC
- Airspace design & routes
- Technology

Most of the following deals with commercial, passenger and freight carrying, aviation in developed countries.

The primary goal of the Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is to control accident risk. ATM safety has improved over the decades for many reasons, from better equipment to additional safety defences. But ATM safety targets, improving on current performance, are now extremely demanding. Safety analysts and aviation decision-makers have to make safety assessments based on statistically incomplete evidence. If future risks cannot be estimated with precision, then how is safety to be assured with traffic growth and operational/technical changes? What are the implications for proving that new ATM systems designs are 'safe'?

The text is divided into a number of sections; the abbreviations are explained later:

- 2 Technical Background
- 3 Decision-making on Safety Improvements
- 4 ATM Safety – Systems Theory
- 5 Tightly-coupled Sub-systems: Separation Minima
- 6 Loosely-coupled Sub-systems: STCA and TCAS Decisions
- 7 Future ATM Systems
- 8 New Paradigms
- 9 Safety of New ATM Paradigms
- 10 Rational – but Sick – Decision Processes
- 11 How to do Safety Assessment for New Paradigms?
- 12 Key Safety Assessment and Management Messages

The first two thirds of these Sections use aviation material to draw out general and interesting lessons, eg about decision-making, data, risk models, as well as lessons for aviation itself. In the final third, the focus is more specifically on new ATM paradigms – which are known as Nextgen and SESAR.

2. Technical Background

Where are we now? The present ATM system has evolved over the last 80 years or so. Over the same period, aviation safety culture has changed, because society's safety culture generally has changed dramatically.

During the 1920s and 1930s there were technical and organisational changes that improved operating efficiency and safety. Radio telephony began to be used. There was 'Wireless Traffic Control' by 'control officers'. The airspace around the major aerodromes started to have restrictions placed upon its use ('control zones').

The Second World War led to huge changes in aviation: many of them fed into civil use. The present ATM system has several distinct components in its operational concepts and technology infrastructure – Figure 1. Air traffic controllers are important decision-makers. They communicate through radiotelephony; they use flight plans agreed with pilots; they monitor highly processed secondary surveillance radar – SSR – data. These data flows are embedded in 'safety structures', eg with well-defined controlled

airspace and formal rules for control such as the minimum separation permitted between aircraft.

Navigation has developed enormously from the wartime systems. The system has moved from point source beacons to satellite-based aids, mainly GPS, which are incredibly accurate. In the UK, there are ground-based short-term conflict alert – STCA – systems available to warn controllers of aircraft coming into close proximity. Commercial aircraft now carry a Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System – TCAS – which actually tell pilots what to do to avoid another aircraft that has lost separation.

The crucial change, in terms of both its current benefits and potential for system development, is SSR. The controller sees displayed aircraft symbols, callsign and height information, which have been passed down from aircraft transponders. This innovation was a huge step, because it meant that operational information could be passed from the aircraft to the ground system. It is a huge potential step for the future because the aircraft effectively has the equivalent of a telephone number, and information can be sent from air to ground and vice versa. In the technical jargon, this is 'datalink' – but it is basically text-messaging between all the active aviation parties.

What safety performance does aviation deliver? There are plenty of statistics one can examine. Figure 2 shows worldwide fatalities for people travelling in airlines over the last sixty years. It does not include the effects of terrorism or the deaths of third parties on the ground. The long-term trend of total fatalities is slowly downwards; over the last twenty years it has averaged about 1100 a year. Over the sixty years, air travel has expanded dramatically, typically doubling every decade. Mid-air collisions are a small fraction of the total.

Using figures for Great Britain, the 1995–2004 average rates of fatality per billion passenger kilometres, across the passenger carrying modes, shows that air has a good relative historical record – Table 1 – compared to the other modes.

3. Decision-making on Safety Improvements

But what has produced the progressive improvements in safety? And can the system go on improving safety? These are actually two very different questions. The first is answered by examining a variety of important safety changes as they actually happened. But before that, it is necessary to cover some aspects of ATM safety decision-making and the systems theory underpinning ATM safety. It is important to keep asking three questions about safety decision-making.

First, what motivates the need to make decisions? Why is there a need for the people in charge to make a decision? Why did they decide that 'Do nothing' was not the best option?

Second, what are the analytical/political decision processes that are followed? What data has to be gathered? What quantitative assessments have to be constructed? What comparisons have to be made? What are the actual decisions? Who has to be convinced? If there is a 'Go' or 'No Go' choice, is 'Further work' an option? Figure 3 illustrates a possible decision process, simplifying to four phases: Analyse, Debate, Decide, and Implement.

Third, what are the resource implications? What are the constraints? Who has to be persuaded or instructed to spend money on new equipment/training?

Many safety-related decisions are not in fact 'big decisions'. The system performs well because of the sum of all the 'small' engineering and operational decisions made by aviation professionals. People want to make things safer. Professionals learn from mistakes – the UK aviation industry is generally very good at keeping data on hazardous incidents. Thus safety, as well as effectiveness, improves over time by what might be called 'Good Systems Engineering'. This includes elements such as:

- rigorous planning of procedures for design inspection and review
- quality assurance based on a wide range of targeted tests
- continuous evolution by adaptation of products already in widespread use
- deliberate over-engineering

This particular set of good practices actually comes from a famous paper 'How did Software get so Reliable without Proof?' (Hoare, 1996) about software development. Thirty years ago, quite a lot of people believed that aviation would suffer very badly from computer hardware and software failures – but it has not happened in aviation or other industries to the extent they feared (but see CSTB, 2007). Could future ATM systems be more susceptible to such problems?

4. ATM Safety – Systems Theory

Quantitative Safety models can produce useful results if:

- There are known types of regularities in sub-system failures/error modes/faults etc

- One can find data to estimate the frequency of these regularities with some precision

- BUT it is not possible to validate or test models completely

- BUT a model based on current knowledge produces – at best – approximate safety estimates for a postulated future ATM system

This leads on to the systems theory underpinning ATM safety. A useful way of thinking about potential ATM accidents is to construct two broad categories according to the kind of technological and human system structures that are being employed to ensure safety. These are called tightly- and loosely-coupled. These terms originated with Weick (1976), and were subsequently used by Perrow (1984) to analyse accidents.

Perrow in fact defined two important dimensions: interactive complexity and loose/tight coupling:

Interactive complexity refers to the presence of unfamiliar or unplanned and unexpected sequences of events in a system, either not visible or not immediately comprehensible.

A tightly-coupled system is highly interdependent, with each part of the system being tightly linked to many other parts, so a change in one part can rapidly affect the status of

other parts. So tightly-coupled systems respond quickly to perturbations—but this response may be disastrous.

Loosely-coupled systems have less tight or fewer links between their parts, so they are able to absorb failures or unplanned behaviour without destabilization

A tightly-coupled design generally uses traditional engineering methods, with bits of electronic kit, aircraft construction, software, etc. Tightly-coupled systems can survive failures, but only if that kind of failure has been anticipated and provided for in the original design. Designers of tightly-coupled systems must therefore invest effort and thought into anticipating failure modes and providing safety features to permit survival and recovery. In contrast, loosely-coupled systems tend to accommodate failures through adaptive responses.

A loosely-coupled system allows some ‘play’ in the system stabilizing (negative) feedback loops—a little over-correction, followed by some under-correction. Loose systems are more adaptable, have more tolerance for error, but can have much longer reaction times. If what happens in one part has little impact on another part, or if everything happens slowly, eg on the scale of human thinking times, the system is not tightly-coupled. Loosely-coupled systems tend to be open and continually interacting with the outside environment.

It would be dangerous to construct a safety-critical system with both interactive complexity and tight coupling. In such systems, an apparently trivial incident can potentially cascade in unpredictable ways that cannot be remedied, and hence produce severe consequences. But ATM does not fall into this category (eg Marais et al, 2004). In general, much of ATM system design is deliberately de-coupled in order to increase safety. Thus, large minimum separations are required between aircraft, so that mistakes by pilots or controllers can be remedied; hence loosely-coupled. This is in a system containing independent and engineering-redundant safety defensive layers.

It must also be noted that system safety performance necessarily depends on *organisational* safety performance. Sorensen (2002) notes:

“There is a widespread belief that safety culture is an important contributor to safe operations...The commonly accepted attributes of safety culture include good organizational communications, good organizational learning, and senior management commitment to safety. Safety culture may be particularly important in reducing latent errors in complex, well-defended systems.”

Safety culture aspects are seen as increasingly important for European ATM, eg Eurocontrol (2006).

Some sub-systems of the ATM System are designed to be tightly-coupled. The key element is that the range of expressed ‘failure modes’ is comparatively limited and well defined. Thus, the sub-system acts in a ‘programmable’ or routine fashion (with specific designated functions). These kinds of approximately tightly-coupled systems would include navigation of well-defined route systems, altimetry and instrument landing systems. In such cases, Human Factors ‘failures’ can be sufficiently regular in nature to permit a simple accident model to be used. For example, it may be possible to measure

the frequency of a straightforward error in inputting flight level or North Atlantic track data into an aircraft computer. The operation of these kinds of tightly-coupled designs can therefore usually be modelled quantitatively.

In contrast, loosely-coupled ATM sub-systems would include the pilot flying the aircraft away from airport runways and ATC/pilot interactions in sectors. Loosely-coupled ATM designs use much more complex information sources. For example, the controller's job requires visualization and situational awareness skills.

The ATM system's safety defensive layers combine a variety of tightly-coupled and loosely-coupled sub-systems – Figure 4. Together, they act systematically to reduce mid-air collision risk. The purpose of the system layers is to reduce the 'end product risk'. Thus, each defensive layer should scale down the probability of a potentially hazardous situation. This leads to two kinds of qualitative/quantitative safety model:

Tightly-coupled models — Accident risk is a function of specific failures, e.g., gross navigational errors or a restricted set of Human Factor failures occurring comparatively regularly. Risk can be numerically quantified in terms of a limited number of key failure modes using collision risk models.

Loosely-coupled models — Safety is provided through a structure of defensive layers: risks occur if these layers perform poorly and do not filter out potentially hazardous situations. In some circumstances, risk can be roughly numerically quantified, based on past defensive layer performance.

'Collision risk model' – CRM – here means analytical frameworks on which are 'hung' empirical and statistical data about rates at which errors occur, recovery mechanisms, and failure probabilities. The earliest models were constructed to deal with aircraft simply relying on accurate navigation to avoid other aircraft. The collision risk could be estimated as the product of the frequency of a gross navigational error, ie bringing the aircraft across another flightpath, and the probability that this crossing aircraft would then pass very close to the aircraft on that flightpath (Reich, 1966).

5. Tightly-coupled Sub-systems: Separation Minima

It is easy to list some successful (tightly-coupled) CRMs (details of the references are given in Brooker (2006a)):

- Navigation beacon defined routes
- Longitudinal North Atlantic separation
- North Atlantic Track System
- Radar separation
- Precision Runway Monitor
- Vertical separation
- Area navigation parallel routes

These models are effective because they involve changing one or two sub-system parameters, and using probabilities of gross error events; they do not usually involve major changes to controller or pilot tasks.

The result of these studies is that various separation standards – separation minima is the formal phrase – were reduced. A very important recent example – implemented several years after the risk sums were done – was in fact the reduction in the vertical separation standard from 2000 feet to 1000 feet for aircraft flying above 29,000 feet. In most cases, the change examined is of a single operational parameter.

But why were these separation minima reduced? What was the motivation for this? The main motivation is to deliver operational benefits from investment in improved equipment. Better navigational kit on the aircraft or new radars on the ground enable the elimination of some of the 'deliberate over-engineering' referred to earlier. Thus, the aim is to introduce new technologies and ways of operating in what can reasonably be justified as safe system improvements. This is very different from the situation where new technology is introduced simply to achieve some safety benefit. These 'safety benefit cases' do exist in ATM: the obvious examples are STCA and TCAS, which are examined later.

So what would be safe system improvements? Figure 5 shows the key arguments. The first question asks about the acceptable risk in order to derive the Safety Target – the abbreviation TLS, target level of safety', is often used. The two components are the way that risk is to be measured and a *value judgement* about acceptability. But somewhere in the process there has to be a value judgement about accidents and deaths, eg about the rate of safety improvement. The second question asks about the actual risk that would follow a change. To quantify the future risk level, it is first necessary to develop a sufficiently comprehensive model of the processes and factors that contribute to this risk level. The key mechanisms that generate risk consequences need to be established. The significant causal factors and the associated risk probabilities must all be examined, albeit that not all can be quantified.

The model then has to be used to predict risks. *Data* on the risk mechanisms – equipment failure, human beings' failure rates – needs to be input into the model. These sorts of data may sometimes be immediately available, more often measurement exercises will be needed, but it may well be difficult or impossible to collect all the kinds of data to establish adequate statistical confidence.

The third component is validation. Is the model OK? Is the data input OK? How can its accuracy be tested? These can be exceedingly difficult tasks. Much of the problem is with the extremely tight targets that are now placed on aviation safety.

Validation is inherently a major problem. Historically – 40 or 50 years ago – the focus was on equipment failure modes, so that low risk rates could be achieved through equipment redundancy and monitoring. Today – and presumably in the future too – the focus is much more on abnormal events, in which human factors can play a major part.

Returning to the first part of Figure 5, establishing Safety Targets requires some quantitative measure of risk. For ATM, the metric used in the UK has been ‘fatal aircraft accidents per 10^7 aircraft flying hours’. The choice of the number of aircraft accidents rather than the number of deaths was made because ATC handles aircraft rather than individual passengers. (A constant safety rate would correspond to an increasing number of people killed each year.) A fatal accident is one in which at least one person in the aircraft is killed. Aircraft flying hours matches ‘exposure’ to the ATC service, which is provided over the duration of the flight.

The next step is to determine the safety target to be used in system design, against which prediction of the effects of system changes can be compared. The method chosen is to extrapolate safety performance – which historically has improved over time – to some ‘design year’ in the future. Figure 6 illustrates the method – the statistically fitted trend line is of negative exponential or similar form (although tending to flatten out for recent years). Boeing Commercial Airplane (2007) shows both the flatness of the statistical trends and how tight the collision risk targets need to be. For example, over the last decade there were 89 fatal accidents to commercial jets, of which two were mid-air collisions.

The trend line method essentially maintains current overall trends towards safety performance. It must be stressed that the target is based on a progressive improvement on achieved performance rather than some ‘absolute’ figure.

The next step is to move from aircraft accidents in general to targets for mid-air collisions. This process is ‘risk budgeting’ – essentially the setting of minimum design targets for the contributory types of accident (eg see Brooker (2004b) for more detail and references). The risk budget philosophy attempts to break down accident risk into sub-categories. Each sub category has its own risk budget, which can then if required be broken down into further sub- sub categories. The risk rate is measured in terms of accidents per exposure measure.

A top-level version of this is Figure 7. Here the subcomponents are the phases of flight for an aircraft: takeoff, en-route and landing, with exposure being measured by flying hours.

One more detailed breakdown is that for en-route separation minima, shown in Figure 8. The rate will be for fatal aircraft accidents (passenger fatalities in both aircraft producing two fatal aircraft accidents).

It is important to note the nature of the ‘Other...’ box at the bottom of Figure 8. This covers such risks as errors in coordination between the aircraft crew and ATC, leading to an aircraft occupying a flight level other than that intended by ATC, or errors in ATC instructions leading to a similar consequence. The complementary ‘Loss...’ box relates to inaccuracies in height keeping, which leads to an erosion of the vertical separation minimum.

The boxes do *not* describe ‘causal factors/events’ – did a particular piece of equipment fail, did a pilot mishear a controller, did the navigation system being used fail to provide accurate information, etc, although these kinds of events will occur ‘in’ the boxes.

An example of a safety target is the ICAO figure of ' 1.5×10^{-8} fatal aircraft accidents per flying hour' as the rate corresponding to mid-air collisions – for any reason and in any spatial dimension – in en route flight in controlled airspace. This is a target for *total system design* to an assured level of safety, ie all (*sic*) types of failure, mechanical, procedural and human, which generate a risk of collision will be accounted for.

6. Loosely-coupled Sub-systems: STCA and TCAS Decisions

So tightly-coupled sub-systems can potentially be modelled with some confidence, if certain conditions (mainly regarding data) are met, ie accident rates can be expressed in terms of sub-system failure rates. But what about loosely-coupled parts of the total system? The system relies on safety defences in depth—a multiplicity of formal, technical and human safety defensive layers—to deliver the necessary safety. But they cannot usually be modelled quantitatively with great precision. So the safety target and modelling arguments will not work: the problem is that it is not possible to estimate the safety consequences of loosely-coupled elements with precision (Brooker, 2006a). There are just too many options, too large a potential for adaptive response and flexibility, too many probabilities to estimate, and not enough 'accurate' data available. It is actually easy to do the sums by standard hazard analysis techniques, but the problem then is assessing how good the sums are; what kind of precision can be attached to risk estimates?

Simply making lots of 'cautious' assumptions generally tends to produce over-pessimistic risk estimates, and hence is of little value for safety decision-makers. Does 'expert judgement' solve the problem? To quote Moray (1990) (in response to Dougherty (1990)):

"The use of 'expert judgement' is a polite name for 'expert guesses', and we do not have data to validate the accuracy of the guesses."

Safety for loosely-coupled operational sub-systems is improved – purportedly "to meet safety targets" – by an on-going process of safety feedback plus the introduction of additional safety-related defensive layers and engineering redundancies, eg STCA, TCAS, error-free aircraft Flight Management System databases, etc. The key thing to ensure safety is that the ATM safety layers work effectively enough together to produce the necessary corrective action. For example, there is a need to focus attention on circumstances and geometries when STCA and TCAS do not provide large amounts of extra protection or when the geometries/velocities mean that they induce risk.

But how did anyone decide to introduce loosely-coupled operational sub-systems like STCA and TCAS? Different countries have different decision processes – the following is the UK experience.

First, STCA in the UK: in the UK's National Air Traffic Services (NATS) version of STCA, a computer system continually monitors secondary surveillance radar (SSR) data and alerts air traffic controllers if it detects a situation where two aircraft are in danger of approaching too close to one other. STCA is concerned with potential conflicts in projected flight paths (Figure 9 – the overlapping discs for cautiously projected flightpaths). The goal is to provide a warning – with special symbols on the controller's radar display – around 90 to 120 seconds before the Closest Point of Approach (CPA) of the two aircraft. This gives them time to redirect the aircraft if they

judge it necessary. STCA alerts do not imply specific mandatory action by the controller. He or she is presented with the extra information as part of the normal AC task.

The algorithms in the STCA computer software are specifically tailored for the varieties of airspace and separation rules. The STCA software contains a large number of parameters, whose values have to be fixed by extensive safety testing.

STCA does not 'know' the intentions of the pilots or air traffic controllers who may be aware of a potential conflict and already be taking measures to avoid it. As STCA must make cautious predictions, there are necessarily nuisance alerts as well as genuine alerts. There is a trade-off between genuine and nuisance alerts: if the software eliminated all the nuisance alerts, then it would also fail to identify many genuine alerts. But if there were too many nuisance alerts, it would be difficult to maintain the controllers' confidence in STCA. The right balance has to be struck.

So was STCA introduced through some rational process involving safety targets and benefits? No, it was not. Twenty years ago, there were some serious incidents involving aircraft coming too close together, at much less than the separation minimum. These incidents were known then as Airmisses, now as Airproxes. One involved a blunder by a controller sequencing traffic from two of the holding stacks north of Heathrow: the aircraft flew towards each other.

The Chairman of the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) and the head of NATS had a conversation about the Airprox. It went on the lines:

"Controllers sometimes make these very bad blunders. What's stopping a mid-air collision?"

"ATC Supervisor plus chance."

"That's a guarantee?"

"No."

"There must be something else."

"We could try implementing the STCA in the ATC computers."

"You do that - and soon."

The NATS STCA system became operational for parts of UK en route airspace in 1988. An essential ingredient for its introduction was the bringing on stream of a new generation of secondary surveillance radars with much better accuracy and performance. There had been some in-house research going on into STCA, but it had not been top-priority for implementation until the Chairman had made his views very clear. The research, development and implementation costs included the optimisation of the software (eg re nuisance alerts), design of screen displays and interfaces, production of training packages, and individual STCA training briefings and simulations for several hundred controllers.

TCAS actually works on very similar principles to STCA. TCAS is an aircraft system using SSR transponder signals to provide advice to the pilot on potential conflicting aircraft that are also equipped with SSR transponders. It operates independently of ground-based equipment. TCAS produces Traffic Alerts (TAs) and vertical Resolution Advisories (RA): Figure 10 shows TAs in yellow and RAs in red.

Based on the horizontal and vertical closing rates, TCAS calculates dynamic protective volumes around its aircraft. If the closing intruder is assessed as a threat, then a TCAS system proposes an RA to the pilot as a Vertical Avoidance Manoeuvre. The system can coordinate its RA with the intruder aircraft, if it can generate an RA, so that the manoeuvres are complementary. Corrective RAs require the pilot to change the flightpath of the aircraft; preventive RAs require the pilot to keep the aircraft on that flightpath. TCAS's RAs are generated much nearer to the predicted CPA – Closest Point of Approach – than are STCA alerts. Typical threshold times are between 15 and 35 seconds before predicted CPA, ie they are much closer to the CPA than STCA alerts to controllers.

So was TCAS introduced through some rational process involving safety targets and benefits? No, it was not. It followed a political decision by the USA. One of the main causes was the Cerritos, California, mid-air collision in 1986. An Aeromexico DC-9 with 64 passengers collided with a private Cessna aircraft carrying a family of three. The DC-9 crashed into a neighborhood and destroyed 18 homes and killed 15 people on the ground. MIT (2007) provides some history of mid-air collisions in the USA. It comments that “mid-air collisions have the effect of raising public awareness and causing a great deal of interest and pressure from the press and the public to ‘do something’”. Early versions of TCAS had in fact been under development for at least a decade before the Cerritos accident (Williamson and Spencer, 1989).

In December 1987, the Congress of the USA enacted Public Law 100-223, which ‘requires the administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to complete the development of the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS II) and ensure that it is installed on all airplanes with more than 30 passenger seats by December 1991’. Thus, TCAS has been mandatory in USA airspace since 1991. It became mandatory in Europe in 2000, and there has been an ICAO world-wide mandate operating from 2003. ICAO concluded that the use of TCAS would reduce markedly the risk of collision. ICAO recognised that TCAS is not a panacea: it cannot resolve all possible collisions; it may increase some risks of collision.

It took quite a long time to move from the initial USA Public Law to world-wide introduction. Airlines were in fact buying TCAS kit well before it was mandated. Was there some kind of safety cost benefit analysis? There were some attempts to do this, but the focus on what is termed the ‘Risk Ratio’:

Risk Ratio: the net improvement in safety arising from TCAS implementation. If the probability of a Near Mid-Air Collision is $P(\text{NMAC})$, then the ratio of $P(\text{NMAC})$ when TCAS is used to $P(\text{NMAC})$ without TCAS is the Risk Ratio. Properly-used TCAS will successfully resolve most potential mid-air collisions, but some will not be resolved; and an additional fraction will be ‘induced’ (as some non-critical encounters are converted into critical ones).

Carpenter (2004) is a good source for the history of this work. Risk Ratios depend on the kinds of conflicts that occur. As there are very few mid-air collisions, potential future conflicts have to be estimated by simulating realistic aircraft encounters. These conflicts use real traffic events and then vary their parameters realistically, eg seeing the effects of putting aircraft closer to each other when some manoeuvre occurs. The key point is that the Risk Ratio is essentially an experimental measurement of projected performance, not a simple output from purely mathematical calculations or computer science. The development work through States and ICAO over the decades has focused on improving the Risk Ratio and reducing the induced risks.

Interestingly, the final stages of the USA TCAS mandate did involve cost/benefit considerations of the kind envisaged by Evans (2005). The final mandate (FAA, 2003) was specified in terms of airplane weight and performance characteristics, and had the consequence of covering larger cargo aircraft. [NB: TCAS installation costs of the order of €200,000 per aircraft and the aircraft operator incurs significant ongoing maintenance costs.] The justification for the inclusion of cargo aircraft included a safety cost benefit analysis that estimated the frequency of different kinds of mid-air collision, the costs of installation, the costs of lost aircraft, plus a valuation of 'avoided deaths'. To quote: "...it is assumed that a midair collision will result in fatalities for all passengers and crew, rather than some percentage attributed to various classifications of injuries. The value per averted fatality is estimated to be \$3.0 million." (This figure is taken from USA Department of Transportation recommendations.) Thus, while the initial TCAS policy decision was political, the final details incorporated formal risk analyses and safety costings: the weighing of costs and benefits did affect the installation decision for cargo aircraft.

7. Future ATM Systems

The introduction of TCAS was essentially the last safety layer in the current ATM system. The system is expected to continue evolving in future years, with safety lessons being learnt and engineering systems being improved. So why are 'new paradigms' being suggested? What indeed is meant by a new paradigm? Paradigm was used originally in the History of Science to refer to a theoretical framework. Researchers in many different fields now often see themselves as developing new paradigms. Paradigm is a buzzword or a key concept, depending on one's attitude to adapted words (paradigm actually derives from a Greek word meaning 'to compare').

For ATM systems, the main current safety paradigm – the prevailing view of things – is that it is the air traffic controller's task to prevent mid-air collisions. A new paradigm would move substantial parts of this control workload to either or both aircrew and computer assistance, usually requiring a considerable enhancement of the data available for decision-making. Why move the workload? The need to do this reflects peoples' views that the present controller-based paradigm is in one or several ways 'reaching its limits', so its continued evolution will not solve future problems effectively.

If you are going to make changes, it is vital to develop a clear picture of the intended end-product. How to establish the characteristics of that picture is the problem. Answering technical questions is important in getting to that picture – but it is vital to try to work out what really are the full range of questions that need to be answered. It is essential to frame the 'Key Tests' that will enable the full picture of the future ATM

system to be established. In analysing a potential major system change, it is important to try to break down the problems to be resolved into several distinct types of issue. A simple formal division into five key test areas, not in any particular order of importance, is:

- Safety Credibility
- Technological Feasibility
- Operational Concept
- Benefits and Costs
- Transition Path

The focus is on some aspects of just three of these: Safety Credibility, Operational Concept, and Transition Path.

Safety is always the top priority in the introduction of new aviation systems. Key questions would be:

What sorts of quantitative tests would be needed to prove that a new system is sufficiently safe?

What safety management performance is necessary before the safety regulator would be convinced?

Does the new system pass the safety regulator's tests?

Even 'simple' sub-system changes, from a whole system point of view, require extensive data collection and analysis before they can be accepted. This would be a much harder job with linked and integrated communications, navigation and surveillance systems. Automation routes require, as a foundation, a complete logical structure for ATC decision-making – against all eventualities. Then the hardware and the software design would have to be demonstrated as providing the necessary reliability and safety critical integrity.

The phrase Operational Concept means no more than a clear picture of how the future system would operate:

Who uses what information to do what things?

What are the responsibilities, and on whom do they rest?

How are decisions made?

The present operational concept has evolved over the decades. In safety terms, it is sequentially 'overlaid' on to the immediately previous concept, rather than being a clean sheet redesign. Many in commercial aviation believe that the current system is too rigid, with flights not always being able to use preferred routings and profiles (often termed 'free routing').

There has to be a realistic transition path from the present system! Does the transition path make sense in both safety and business terms? Transition risks at old/new airspace boundaries? Formal processes involved in international development, testing

and certification are lengthy – TCAS and major separation minima changes took 10-15 years to reach substantial operational implementation

At the heart of the present Operational Concept are the controller and the work that has to be done in handling aircraft. Control workload is a multi-dimensional concept encompassing both the difficulty of tasks and the effort – physical and mental – that has to be brought to bear, plus a personal dimension – Figure 11. The aim is not to make theoretically "optimal" decisions but rather to prevent bad decisions from ever being made. The controller has to act in real time, so the systems designers have to make sure there is as much of this available to the controller as is necessary for the critical tasks.

One crucial question is always the extent to which a system improvement changes the air traffic controller's tasks. Airspace capacity is in many instances – very much so in Europe – the leading constraint on traffic throughput. This capacity is largely determined by the acceptable workload on sector controllers. To gain capacity in a block of airspace, the controller tasks have to be made 'easier' – by computer assistance – or some tasks have to be eliminated – Figure 12. These eliminated tasks could be automated or transferred to the flight deck, ie to the pilot. In a complementary fashion, to prevent the pilot from being over-burdened, aircrew tasks need to be eliminated or cut down. Hence, some pilot voice communication would be replaced by electronic data communication. But tasks added to the flight deck need to have all the on-board systems to perform them safely.

Controller and pilot errors are by far the main 'causes' of hazardous ATM incidents, which are the precursors of accidents. A vital tool in learning about ATC safety is data from Airproxes. An Airprox is formally defined as 'a situation in which, in the opinion of a pilot or a controller, the distance between aircraft as well as their relative positions and speed have been such that the safety of the aircraft involved was or may have been compromised'.

Figure 13 shows some statistics – unofficial – from recent UK Airprox Board (UKAB) Reports. The aim was to find any with 'root causes' beyond immediate human error/misjudgement etc. Thus, the Airspace category focuses on incidents with airspace design and/or operational procedures that raise questions about ways of de-conflicting traffic features. If these issues could be satisfactorily dealt with, then this would prevent reoccurrences of this kind of Airprox in the particular locality. 'Incorrect readback' means that the pilot incorrectly read back ATC instructions and this was undetected by the controller. The three 'Technical' incidents are those where equipment was involved. They were consequences of sudden cabin decompression, the misreading of a navigational chart, and the failure of flightdeck procedures to detect an incorrect setting on the flight computer.

What are the lessons from actual ATM accidents? Figure 14 sketches a very recent one, the mid-air collision tragedy that happened five years ago at Überlingen on the Swiss-German border. Here is a selection of human-related elements, but there were several technical problems too, with STCA not functioning properly and the telephone network used by the controller completely out of order. There are safety regulation issues. From the accident report, it appears that the controller tried extremely hard to get everything sorted out – but he failed. The situation that he had been placed in just

did not give him much of a chance to resolve things. He was murdered by a relative of several of the passengers. In September 2007, four managers of the Swiss ATC firm were found guilty of manslaughter.

So, for a markedly different ATM system to deliver safety, the entire system (people, equipment, procedures) has to be designed to help prevent human error and capture the inevitable errors before they result in a collision. To quote Kim Cardosi: “People make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, and well-intentioned people make mistakes.” In the 2007 Wimbledon Final, Roger Federer Double-faulted or made an Unforced Error roughly every six minutes. The average USA physician kills two people by accident during his/her career (Dekker, 2006). Some examples of controller and pilot mistakes, from Airprox Data, are:

“Controller did not monitor aircraft 1’s progress – he was bandboxing and had been concentrating on traffic situation elsewhere.

ATC occupied with other traffic, did not spot high descent rate.

Controller gave *‘erroneously and essentially unforced descent instruction’* to aircraft 2.

The aircraft 2 crew read back the wrong heading and level instructions, which went undetected by the controller.”

Future systems designs have to prevent these kinds of errors happen or deal with them safely.

Future potentially hazardous situations could be as ‘messy’ in system terms as the Überlingen mid-air collision. ATM accident precursors arise from (eg) pilot/controller workload, miscommunication, and lack of up-to-date information. Can these accident precursors confidently be ‘designed out’ by (eg) better system knowledge across ATM participants, automatic safety checks, and machine rather than voice communication?

8. New Paradigms

So what is being proposed? SESAR is Europe’s ‘Single European Sky Air traffic Research system’. NextGen is the USA’s ‘Next Generation Air Transport System’ [previously known as NGATS]. SESAR and NextGen are developments targeted at post 2020. Neither of them is fully developed, so their current descriptions still include different options for achieving safe and cost-effective systems. In particular, the degree to which control tasks are transferred to the aircraft/aircrew and to ground automation (and the transitional steps involved) are questions that will need to be definitively answered.

The common SESAR and NextGen vision is to integrate and implement new technologies to improve air traffic management (ATM) performance – a ‘new paradigm’. SESAR and NextGen combine increased automation with new procedures to achieve safety, economic, capacity, environmental, and security benefits. The technical systems do not have to be identical, but must have aligned requirements for equipment standards and technical interoperability.

Figure 15 shows a very simplified picture of NextGen. It creates a 'cooperative surveillance' model for civil aircraft operations, where aircraft are constantly transmitting their position, flight path intent, and other useful aircraft parameters (ADS-B – Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast). Both expect aircraft position to be determined using a satellite navigation constellation, such as GPS or Galileo.

The operating concept for NextGen is summarized in Figure 16. The basis for planning and executing system operations is an aircraft 4D trajectory, which is the aircraft path, three space dimensions plus time, from gate-to-gate, including the path along the ground at the airport. Data on the planned and actual trajectories are exchanged between air and ground. Digital satellite communication constellations report positions to ground facilities. All other communication is through this constellation as well. So, gate-to-gate 4-D trajectories are broadcast and, if necessary, so are voice communications. Thus, Communications, Navigation and Surveillance functions are much less ground-based than the current system.

Figure 17 is summarised from an early 2007 description of SESAR concepts (EC, 2007). Very recently, the SESAR Consortium has issued its 162-page ATM Target Concept (SESAR Consortium, 2007), which *inter alia* shows the complexity of the concept. It notes that:

“The ATM Target Concept is not about one size/one solution fits all; it offers different concept features which can be tailored to the specific local needs to meet the local performance objectives and their evolution in the life time of SESAR.”

SESAR currently appears to be more general than NextGen. The main difference shown in Figures 14 and 15 is that NextGen additionally uses automation through the Evaluator function to analyze these trajectories to ensure aircraft remain at safe distances from one another. The Evaluator uses the extra information and communication power to enable safe and efficient decisions to be centralised but system-wide.

Regarding transferring some tasks to pilots (independent autonomous decision-making), the terms ADS-B and ASAS are widely used. ADS-B is 'Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast' and ASAS is 'Airborne Separation Assistance System'. Some brief explanations:

ADS-B: aircraft periodically broadcast details of their position, altitude, velocity and other flight data via a digital data link.

ASAS can transfer the responsibility of maintaining separation between two aircraft from ground ATC to the airborne side when feasible.

Aircraft transmit their position via a data link.

These data are presented on the traffic display in the cockpit.

ASAS alerts and advises the crew.

Separation maintenance is the responsibility of the cockpit crew.

There are lots of different interpretations and schemes for the use of ASAS, some tactical, others more strategic. ASAS's safety depends on retaining large separation minima (*inter alia* restricting traffic density), and introducing more sophisticated conflict

detection algorithms and cockpit displays/automatic warning systems. So they are inter-related concepts – but basically rely on airborne text messaging.

A key jargon phrase in NextGen and SESAR discussions is 'Net-centric': 'A networked collection of capabilities that empower end-users to pull the information they require from any available source, with minimal latency to support the mission at hand'. An internet-like network carries a common real-time information set. This 'net-enabled information' has to be accessible, usable, and secure for all ATM system decision-making parties. Information is 'pushed' to known users, and available to be 'pulled' by new users. Everything operating in the system is part of NextGen. Aircraft are mobile 'nodes' within a larger information network. Aircraft use and provide information, and are also able to route messages/information sent from another aircraft or ground source.

Will NextGen and SESAR be implemented in the way that people are currently envisaging? The investment side of things is a major challenge: even early cost estimates for the systems are in the tens of billions of Euro/dollars, and stakeholders will need to be convinced that the benefits outweigh the costs.

9. Safety of New ATM Paradigms

'Safety Philosophy' is a very hard problem at the heart of the safety assessment process for a new paradigm. The final system must be safe, and so must all the transitional stages. The problems are with the ideas behind designing a safe system and those of proving it to be safe. If the system safety defences change their nature considerably, then where will the evidence come from to substantiate claims of a safe system? Political decisions, eg concerning TCAS, had a great impact on change in the past, but could politicians really be expected to be the main safety decision-makers on the acceptability of large-scale 'new paradigm' system changes?

This leads to a long list of both generic and specific questions:

- Can a safe 'new paradigm' ATM system be designed?
- Can an ATM system be implemented in safe stages?
- Can all the interim and the final ATM systems be proved safe?
 - o Resilience against extreme events?
 - o Human Factors?
 - o Software/Hardware?
 - o Safety philosophy?

NextGen has the potential to be very safe. Most current accidents and serious incidents are caused by a 'lack of reasonable intent' rather than equipment failures or software errors. Reasonable intent essentially means that aircraft are committed to sensible flightpaths. But sometimes a pilot decides to climb or descend for no strong reason; an urgent problem may hold the controller's attention to the detriment of new developing problems; airport staff can drive on to an active runway they believed was shut etc. These precursors of accidents arise out of workload, miscommunication, and lack of up-to-date information. NextGen could potentially eliminate these precursors by the common knowledge of 4D trajectories, safety checks through the Evaluator, and machine communication rather than voice messages.

But there are few publications as yet on the safety of NextGen. One very interesting one is by Andrews et al (2005): it is mainly intended to highlight where further work is needed. Two issues about extreme technical events they note are:

Aircraft fly 4D trajectories using their Flight Management Systems (FMS). But sometimes the flightpath will not conform to the specified trajectory, eg because of engine failure, extreme turbulence, FMS performance limits. This 'control fault non-conformance' is a key fault type. What improvements in FMS performance will be needed?

Ground computer systems covering large areas may fail or be shut down to respond to anomalous events ('outages'). The suggestion is that structured recovery planning can handle this 'troubling question'.

NextGen and SESAR must successfully deal with Human Factors issues, but this work is very much in its early stages. A sample of issues from Sheridan (2006) and Sheridan et al (2006) is:

- Who (human) or what (computer) has authority at different stages of flight.
- What network information would be 'pushed' (mandatory display to human operators), what would need to be 'pulled' (explicitly requested), etc.
- Problems of robustness, reliability and operator trust in computer decision support tools/control.
- Control instabilities resulting from closed-loop time delays, eg due to ATC time-sharing of attention.
- Operator error in 'automation mental modelling' and situation awareness of what the automation has done, is doing, or will do.

Software and hardware become much more important in the new paradigm systems, because they are much more tightly-coupled and safety-critical in decision-making than the present ATM system. But it is a fantasy to believe that either software or hardware can be proved 'correct' (whatever that may mean – eg see Cohn (1989), MacKenzie (1991)). Modern thinking (eg Thomas, 2004; McDermid and Kelly, 2006)) warns that the safety critical software industry 'falls far short of the standards expected from a mature industry developing very complex and highly critical systems', in particular:

"...it is impractical to have sound evidence that a system has achieved a pfh [probability of dangerous failure per hour [pfh] of 10^{-5} or lower and that the safety

assurance of safety-related systems is therefore inevitably a matter of judgement.

To show that some system met the targets for SIL 1 [Safety Integrity Level 1] ([ie] $10^{-6} < \text{pfh} < 10^{-5}$) would involve testing the system continuously for more than ten years, under operational conditions, with no unsafe failures and no modifications to the system (Littlewood and Strigini, 1993)."

10. Rational – but Sick – Decision Processes

Earlier, Figure 3 illustrated a possible decision process. A good decision process concludes – there is a 'Stopping Point'. But real decision processes may not produce implementation, or may deliver it after a very, very long time indeed.

People sometimes use the phrase 'Road Map' to describe the process involved in getting to a new ATM system. But this analogy is badly flawed. A Road Map exists *only if* somebody has explored all the territory thoroughly. A better analogy is an exploration, in which one starts from somewhere and hopes one has a good idea about what the goal ought to be, but then one has to explore different kinds of progressively more and more unfamiliar territory.

Figure 18 illustrates a 'Rational – but sick' decision process. The main horizontal chain of four phases is the same as before, but now the diagram is a great deal messier. The diagram shows a variety of things that can damage the effectiveness of the process.

Analyse: The evidence to support a decision may be lacking; there may be insufficient data; the mathematical or simulation models may not be able to cover some possibilities or have too many unknown parameters.

Debate: The challenge and peer review processes may be ineffective (eg lack of independent critical analyses) and/or over-effective (eg focus on second-order issues). Professional inputs, however well intentioned, may produce 'Process Paralysis'. Examples of the kinds of things one may *not* hear very often are:

Mathematical modellers: 'Pointless trying to produce a complicated model with lots of Greek symbols and subscripts. We can never get the data to fill in all those unknown parameters. I've got a simple model that gives an approximate answer.'

Human Factors folk: 'Oh yes, I agree totally. You've covered all the potential HF error modes. It's all perfectly safe. Absolutely my last word.'

Computing experts: 'No problems. We totally understand the requirement specification – foolproof. Formal methods and testing on your enormous program will guarantee the software fault density is < 0.01 per KLoC and we'll achieve SIL 4.'

The problem is that there are usually very few ways of speeding up the safe changes but many ways of slowing them down.

Decide: The key question is whether or not there are clear criteria, preferably 'Go' and 'No Go' choices. If the aim is to meet some specific criterion or numerical target then the question is simple: is it met or is it not? If there is not a hurdle, then judgement comes in – but whose judgement? Do many – even any – of the decision-makers really follow what has happened in the previous two phases? Can a few participants block a decision, as in old-fashioned dramas about jury trials? Is the debate 'academic' in the bad sense of the word: nitpicking, asking for more and more information, never getting to decisions?

Do further work: If the process does not get beyond the Debate or Decision stage, the usual consequence is asking for further work to be done. That is sensible if the iteration gets the process to a conclusion. If it does not, then there is the potential for many iterations back to the Analyse and Debate stages, as shown in Figure 18.

The whole process complexity means that the likelihood of Implementation fades away. There is never a Stopping Point. How can this be prevented? How can 'worthwhile' things be implemented – whilst making sure that 'non-worthwhile' things be ruled out? At least some of the problem is to do with the use of words like worthwhile and non-worthwhile. Staying solely in the safety context, a worthwhile change is one that at least ensures present safety levels. But how can the decision-makers be confident that this has been *proved*? 'Proof' is the key word here.

One complication is that the 'Who?' in the Decide box is actually composed of a variety of people. Even if they all behave rationally and responsibly, they may have very different ideas about what would actually constitute 'proof'. It is very unlikely that they would simply be fed a *fait accompli* by the Debate box: some of the quantitative outputs and qualitative assessments, even after long periods of analysis and debate, will be based on incomplete information.

What dangers could there be? The answer is you get *Stasis*. This was a word used by the ancient Greeks to mean many different things: civil war, arguments between factions, 'a stoppage'. Today, it generally means a cessation of progress or change. It would be worse than that, because one consequence would be a great number of safety and human factors analysts producing increasingly elegant mathematical models and unverifiable complex calculations – but which do not convince decision-makers about practical 'Go/No go' choices. Thus, the 'Downside Potential' is 'Safety Analysis Paralysis': highly intellectual activity with lots of entertaining conferences and seminars, but no conclusive outputs.

The solution – and it is by no means a painless one – is to get agreement at the outset of the process on decision-making. It is essential to create 'Safety Innovation Strategies' that deliver workable decision-making processes. *If* it is possible to agree early on criteria for proof *and* good ideas about the means by which such criteria might be met, then the Analyse and Debate boxes become much more tractable. The same kinds of problems occur with collective choice decisions in public policy (eg Buchanan, 1986).

11. How to do Safety Assessment for New Paradigms?

So what would be an appropriate way forward? What would lead in practice to the right kinds of data collection, modelling, analysis, etc? Three strategic elements for a change producing each new system phase towards the final ATM system, are suggested, with some explanations to follow:

Is the estimated safety level of the new ATM system about the same as the present ATM system?

Does the new ATM system prove resilient in 'Human-in-the-Loop' simulations to a wide variety of incentivised novel system challenges?

If unsafe 'emergent properties' and new kinds of HF error are to be detected/corrected quickly in operation, there needs to be increased emphasis on automatic detection systems.

Before exploring these further, it is necessary to put some limits on what could be a 'new system'. It cannot simply be a jump to the final stage of a NextGen or SESAR development. There are two reasons for this:

The estimated performance characteristics of such an end-product will be very imprecise until data have been gathered about the sub-system components performance. Adding the effects of a large number of imprecise estimates produces a very imprecise estimate of the final system performance.

Emergent properties mean that it will not be possible to understand all the failure modes of the final system merely from characteristics of the present system plus software/HF modelling.

The first of these is the problem at the heart of general Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) methods when used to analyse ATM systems (Brooker, 2006a, 2006b). In a PSA approach, the risk of accidents is estimated by analysing all the sequences of events that could produce an accident: the 'causal chain' (eg Apostolakis, 2004). At each stage, the probability of an event's success or failure in safety terms has to be quantified. Statements about a 'final ATM system' require failure probabilities to be estimated for its 'human components' – the task of Human Reliability Analysis (HRA).

A PSA/HRA assessment of a final ATM system is necessarily a very complex (and no doubt formally correct) model, but which at best would produce usable answers at some indefinite point in the future rather than now. Much of the data required is just not there. This is why PSA/HRA has been so heavily criticised in the nuclear power plant industry, which is a less complex system than ATM. If somebody believes that PSA/HRA will produce useful results, then the onus is on them to demonstrate that it actually delivers the goods; that the precision of its answers is of known quality.

Some DNV work illustrates the problems of PSA very clearly. As stressed already, ATM safety analysis necessarily requires sequences and probabilities to be estimated for failure events involving 'human components'. It is very difficult to produce estimates of these generally infrequent events – ie 'tails' of probability distributions – particularly for errors of commission. A collection of 'cautious' assumptions produces over-pessimistic – and hence not practically usable – risk estimates. To quote the DNV (2003) report:

“Using hazard analysis and associated techniques to estimate the tails has been tried in the past with inconclusive results. The uncertainties associated with such approaches are large and the benefits for this particular scenario relative to extrapolating known data are unclear.”

The second reason is the nature of 'emergent properties', sketched in Figure 19: useful references are Johnson (2006) and Chalmers (2006). A good – and very relevant – example of a weak emergent property is found in mobile phone text messaging. It started as a message service, allowing operators to inform all their own customers about things such as problems with the network. SMS (Short Messaging Service) was not initially meant to communicate from consumer to consumer. But Texting took off when it found its natural markets: teenagers attracted to pre-paid phones; *and* when cell phone users could send SMS to someone on a different operator. Initially, some networks did not even charge for SMS.

An expert, defined as somebody who is very bright and genuinely knowledgeable about a system's workings, would be much less likely to be surprised by unexpected system occurrences following a change than would a routine performer. But the expert could not *prove* there would be no significant emergent properties when systems were changed significantly. Human experts are not omniscient. Even the most expert system modellers and HF experts could not guarantee that their understanding of the final ATM system would encompass all potentially important emergent behaviours. NextGen and SESAR are very likely to exhibit emergent properties because the responsibilities of intelligent people in the ATM system are changed considerably *and* there are new tools for them to use and adapt.

So the tasks are to:

- examine each of the step-by-step phases of the progressive transition to the final ATM system,

- assuming that the changes, particularly to loosely-coupled subsystems, can be modelled adequately,

- that failure etc probabilities can be estimated for the bulk of the HF elements, and

- that emergent properties in each phase can be detected somehow.

It appears that the best hope of carrying out these tasks is through 'Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) simulations. HITL, often called 'real-time' simulations, put controllers and pilots into simulated ATC environments. A typical large-scale ATC centre HITL simulation is essentially a mock-up of a control room, and the controllers carry out the same tasks that they would for real traffic – in simulations the traffic data is generated by computer and voice communications generated by the simulation's support staff. Aircrew HITL

simulations are usually cockpit simulators, with the most advanced kinds being able to move the 'aircraft' around in an imitation of climbs, turns, etc.

There have already been significant studies into the generation of human reliability data for ATM, eg see Gibson et al (2006), Kirwan et al (2007). These studies have shown the feasibility of collecting human error probability data from HITL simulations. This key data collection process could create a sound basis for HRAs of the new paradigm phases, and help to calibrate other human error estimates obtained from other industries (eg see 'HEART' generic task categories in Embrey (2004)).

But what safety calculations should be done? Trying to produce estimates of the *absolute* safety level would be lengthy and probably highly unproductive. The most straightforward – but still complex in practice – calculation would be to estimate *relative* safety changes. Figure 20 shows the idea. The change to a new system, ie the next ATM system phase, has two effects: some of the safety issues in the old system are removed and additional safety issues are created. The difference between the two impacts is represented in Figure 20 as a 'Seesaw' diagram. If the additional risks are less than the risks that have been removed, then the implication is that it would be acceptably safe to move to the new system. This is not actually as demanding as the safety target ideas discussed earlier, because that additionally involves some degree of safety improvement, although much less so than in the past because of the flatness of the accident rate curve.

But this Seesaw approach is not likely to work every time for most of the phases towards the final ATM system. It may not produce Go/No Go decisions. The problems are the difficulty of making precise estimates of very small risks, and then saying with confidence that one group of risks is less than another group. This goes right back to the basic safety model statements: are there known types of regularities in sub-system failures/error modes/faults etc, *and* can one can find data to estimate the frequency of these regularities with some precision?

Consider a Seesaw calculation like Figure 21. The two sides of the Seesaw *approximately* balance. The confidence in the estimates' precision is low– unless the calculations are for very simple one-parameter Collision Risk Model (CRM) changes. Slight changes in assumptions and parameter values swing the Seesaw up or down, shown by the angled positions of the crossbeam. The swings show the risk estimates of the left and right hand sides varying between the upper and lower confidence bands on the two sides. These confidence bands are shown by the vertical dumbbells against central risk estimates. In part, the confidence bands are there because of a lack of perfect understanding of regularities and causal factors; in part they are there because parameters have to be built from limited quantities of data, so they necessarily have statistical uncertainty.

If the decision-makers insist that the Seesaw is firmly down on the right hand side, ie that the modelling of the new system *guarantees* that it is safer, then few of the phases in the progression to the final system would ever be judged 'safe'. Should decisions on new systems simply be based on this modelling exercise? The assertion here is that they should not: it places too rigid a test on safe innovation. So the answer is that the Seesaw modelling test should be a *filter*. It should actually be about broad

comparability: does the modelling of the new system show that it does not introduce a significant level of *extra* risk?

There is a problem here: ICAO and Eurocontrol current safety regulation policies. Andrews et al (2005) safety analysis of NextGen has already been noted, where systems get two orders of risk reduction by taking account of the safety benefits from TSAF (an intent-based short-term conflict alert system) and TCAS (airborne collision avoidance). But ICAO and Eurocontrol safety policy would consider aspects of these calculations invalid, because currently the policy is that a system has to be 'proven safe' without the use of these aids. It is not obvious why such a 'policy' is needed, given aviation's tradition of rational safety testing.

There has to be a willingness to recognise the fact that STCA and TCAS are intrinsic to the ATM system delivering its current high safety performance, rather than considering them as little more than 'optional extras'. Figure 22 sets out the rationale for Ground and Air Protection layers being included in hazard analysis. Future ATM System Safety depends crucially on both these kinds of protection. To treat them as a risk 'bonus' is to prevent safe improvements to cope with increased traffic.

Returning to the general innovation process, most decision-makers would certainly want more than this quantitative modelling filter. They would also want to know what protection is being offered against risks arising from 'un-thought of' HF failure modes and general emergent properties. There are two avenues for responding to this concern, one prior to implementation, and the second afterwards.

HITL simulations are usually carried out to test the feasibility of a system or to demonstrate that its normal operations are workable (eg Felder, 2006). But HITL simulations can potentially be much more valuable in testing how *resilient* the system is to errors, faults, blunders, etc; resilient meaning that the system does not become unsafe. This mode of testing can be called *seeded errors*. The concept of seeded error originates in software analysis, where automatic analytical tools are used to help in software verification. If a potential analytical tool does not spot an error that has been manually or randomly inserted into the software, then the reasons for the tool's failure need to be explored (eg Owen et al, 2006) and the system design corrected and/or the risk potential mitigated. Realistic HITL simulations that show resilience against seeded errors build confidence in the real system design's resilience. [NB: Resilience engineering is a wide field, eg see Woods et al (2006).]

The analogy here is a tank with 'impenetrable' armour. By impenetrable is meant that, under battlefield conditions, the tank's personnel do not suffer major injuries and that the tank can keep operating. How is this proved before the tank goes into service? First, obviously the tank's armour must be designed in scientific and engineering ways that render it potentially impenetrable. Second, and this is what actually sells tanks to military customers, tanks in simulated real operations must come out operationally unscathed from an attack by a large range of missiles and antitank weapons.

This is the kind of thing that has to be done to *prove* the new ATM system's resilience. HITL simulations must be seeded with unusual, but realistic, failure modes. But the failure seeds necessary could be substantial: for example, if the system is not resilient against understaffing/equipment outages, then these problems need to be solved.

As a start, the HITL simulation needs to be seeded with key features observed in past accidents and stressed further by increased traffic levels. For example, the Überlingen accident involved, inter alia, staffing problems in the ATC centre and issues in the cockpit about how to respond to TCAS alerts. The questions for the simulation include: “Has the new system ‘designed out’ these possible failure modes? Do the pilots/controllers react in different ways from the past – with what consequences? Are there straightforward improvements that could be made to the new system concept?” If the new system does not meet these challenges, it must be redesigned so that it does.

But simply re-solving past problems is not enough. The new ATM system has to prove resilient to a wide variety of *novel* system challenges. Generating a sufficient variety of novel challenges is an interesting challenge. One way of doing this is by incentivising a group of challengers – paying them significant amounts of money for identifying potential system weakness.

The second element in detecting ‘un-thought of’ HF failure modes and general emergent properties is through much more rigorous monitoring than at present. Currently, some knowledge about hazardous incidents is gathered from monitoring systems, eg NATS’ Separation Monitoring Function detects when separation minima have been breached. Other incident reports, such as Airproxes, rely on aircrew or controller to initiate a report, which is then investigated. In future, if unsafe emergent properties and new kinds of HF error are to be detected quickly, there would need to be an increased emphasis on automatic incident detection systems. For example, if responsibility for separation were delegated to aircrew, ie without controllers routinely monitoring flightpaths, then it would be necessary to have cockpit systems that monitor automatically for (eg) separation breaches and retain evidence of aircrew actions and equipment performance leading up to the breach. A ‘spy in the cab’ idea might well be initially unattractive to aircrew. But this kind of increased operational scrutiny would be needed: thus, pilots, controllers, managers and regulators must be active in monitoring and inspecting real operational and organisational practices in the new system phases.

12. Key Safety Assessment and Management Messages

So what are the key messages for Safety Assessment and Management? What really does matter? The tough challenge is to turn a new paradigm into something real. General safety lessons are:

- Achieving and proving safety for NextGen/SESAR is an enormously tough challenge
- Will not be done by employing current patchwork of methods focused on tightly-coupled sub-systems
- Need rational, evidence-based and realistic modelling for Risk Assessment of the Total ATM system
- Need to cover system resilience, human/automation issues, software/hardware performance, ground/air protection systems
- Need to set out safety decision-making process systematically very early on
- Need for confidence building programmes re system design/resilience

These are all very simple and obvious, but it would be essential to work through the consequences in a disciplined fashion.

Three ideas for strategic elements are proposed, which respond inter alia to statistically incomplete evidence. The aim is to prove each system phase safe and resilient.

Quantitative safety filter: is the estimated safety level of each new ATM system about the same as the present ATM system? [Try to use CRMs if possible]

Does the new ATM system prove resilient in 'Human-in-the-Loop' simulations to a wide variety of incentivised novel system challenges?

if unsafe emergent properties and new kinds of HF error are to be detected/corrected quickly in operation, there needs to be increased emphasis on automatic incident detection systems.

This is a high cost process, given the investment required in high-fidelity HITL simulations, but probably the most cost-effective option in terms of implementing safe ATM systems in a reasonable time. But do these strategic elements have logical flaws? What would be the best set of *statistically rational* and *feasible* Safety Innovation Strategies?

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Controllers and pilots – people are an *integral* part of the whole system

Formal Rules for the control of traffic, eg minimum separations allowed between aircraft

Radio Telephony

Controlled Airspace – broken down into sectors handled by controller teams

Flight Progress Information – flight plan computing

Radar – processed SSR: displayed aircraft symbols, callsign and height information, passed down from aircraft transponders

Computer Processing of radar and flight data.

High Quality Aircraft Navigation – Point source beacons to INS [Inertial Navigation Systems] through to satellite-based aids

Conflict Alert (STCA) – the computer processing system can analyse SSR tracks to predict if aircraft might come into close proximity and warn the controller by radar screen messages

Traffic alert and Collision Avoidance System TCAS – on board collision avoidance system based on detection of other aircraft in the vicinity carrying SSR transponders

Figure 1. The Current System's Evolved Safety Defences




Figure 2. Worldwide Airline Fatalities 1947-2006. Taken from Airline Safety Network Statistics, <http://aviation-safety.net/statistics/period/>

Mode	Fatalities per billion Passenger km
Air	0.00
Water	0.3
Bus/coach	0.3
Rail	0.4
Car	2.8

Table 1. Passenger fatality rates by mode in Great Britain 1995-2004 Average. (Source: Department for Transport 'Road Casualties 2005 Great Britain', 2006)




Figure 3. Possible Phases for a Rational Decision Process

Safe Route Design	Formal Safety Controlled Airspace
Technical Infrastructure	Radio Telephony
	Radar
	High Quality Aircraft
	Computer Processing Flight Progress Strips
Planning	Controller
Flying	Pilot
Controlling	Controller
Ground Protection	STCA
	Controller and Pilot
Air Protection	TCAS
	Pilot

Figure 4. ATM Safety System Layers




Figure 5. ATM Decisions – Safety Target Philosophy




Figure 6. Fatal aircraft accident rate data and trend – *illustrative*




Figure 7. Risk Budget – simple phases of flight




Figure 8. Risk budgets down to separation minima TLS (continuing Figure 7 down to the next level)




Figure 9. Short Term Conflict Alert - STCA



Figure 10. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System - TCAS




Figure 11. Aspects of Control Workload



Datalink to reduce Communication Tasks?

Computer Assistance & better Ergonomics?

Transfer some tasks to Pilots?

More Controllers?

Figure 12. Control Workload Problem




Figure 13. Airprox 'Causes'

[From a sample of 117 recent UK Airproxes (mid-2003 to mid-2006) involving commercial flights. Eliminated: Airproxes in 'uncontrolled' airspace (Class F/G), military zones, North Sea; military aircraft, parachutist, balloons, sighting reports.]

- 1st July 2002
- Flights Bergamo to Brussels and Munich to Barcelona
- B757 and Tupolev-154
- Aircraft on converging course at flight level 36,000 feet
- Air traffic control + STCA + TCAS did not resolve the conflict
- The aircraft crashed
- All the people on the aircraft died

How? Why?

- Managers/Regulator allowed (?) just one controller working the radar screen
- Controller monitored two different display workstations
- Controller became preoccupied handling the approach of an aircraft to an airport
- Controller did not realise phone system was not functioning
- Regulatory system did not ensure that pilots would respond to TCAS alerts consistently

Controller murdered

Four Swiss ATC managers found guilty of manslaughter

Figure 14 Überlingen Mid-Air Collision: Facts and some human elements




Figure 15. NextGen

- User-selected flexible 4D trajectories from gate-to-gate
- Agreed-upon trajectory contracts flown with approved variances
- Variances in flightpaths managed by exception
- Seamless airspace across current or projected boundaries, so no need to distinguish between airports/terminal area/en route airspaces/boundaries
- Network centric system-wide perspective with information shared by all users: datalink – *ie text-messaging between all parties* – is vital

Figure 16. NextGen Operating Concept

- **Operations based on better forecasting**
Change from *reactive ATM* to *anticipatory ATM* – to reduce operational pressure on human operators
- **Better anticipation of problems**
Collaborative decision-making procedures – stakeholders share and negotiate relevant information
Merge the different "trajectory" representations into a single one established by the on-board computers
Accurate monitoring of the scheduled 'trajectory' by means of extremely accurate satellite navigation
- **Efficient telecommunications network**
Network of ground-to-air data links to enable accurate 'trajectory' information exchanges
All stakeholders to have effective and simultaneous access to flight information status
- **Optimisation of the use of airports**
'Smooth' approaches to reduce noise and gaseous emissions during landing
Better forecasting and detection of turbulence phenomena
- **Increased automation of air traffic control tools to assist operators**
Share workload between the air traffic controller on the ground and the pilot
Trajectory negotiation planning and support tools
Cockpit tools to visualise surrounding traffic

Figure 17. Some SESAR Features (extracted from EC, 2007) [excludes weather, security elements]




Figure 18. 'Rational – but Sick' Decision process

An Emergent property of a complex system is a behaviour that surprises its designers

Strong emergent properties occur if the system exhibits behaviours that cannot be identified through functional decomposition – the system is more than the sum of its component parts.

Weak emergence properties are unexpected simply because of the degree of difficulty that the designer has in deducing them from his/her understanding of the component parts (*Compare 'Interactive complexity' concept for system coupling*)

Figure 19. Emergent properties




Figure 20. Classical Seesaw safety calculation




Figure 21 'Confidence band' Seesaw safety calculation

- All systematically applied safety defences should be considered as full parts of the integrated ATM safety system
- This includes STCA and TCAS
- Hazard analysis calculations incorporating STCA and TCAS provide a measure of the true risk potential in the real world
- Excluding them puts an extra burden on risk estimation: the calculations will tend to be even more cautious – and hence more pessimistic about the value of new concepts
- This is *backward-looking*: it retards the introduction of acceptably safe systems embodying novel operational concepts – it has become more difficult to *prove* their safety

Figure 22. The rationale for Ground and Air Protection layers being included in hazard analysis.



DSPACE

<https://dspace.org/>

Air traffic management safety challenges

Brooker, Peter

2007-10

<http://hdl.handle.net/1826/1966>

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