

Title: From Accidental Project Manager to Intentional Project Leader: A Reset Whose Time Has Come

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Abstract

This essay revisits the enduring figure of the “accidental project manager” and questions its continued relevance in today’s increasingly complex and politicized project environments. While the concept remains a useful metaphor in some sectors, the profession must now reckon with deeper shifts in power, conflict, and contested notions of performance. Drawing on past work on power and politics in projects, as well as emerging evaluations of megaproject governance, the piece critiques the field’s overcorrection towards harmony and collaboration, arguing that conflict is not only inevitable but essential to effective project delivery. It further challenges prevailing assumptions about project performance, proposing that success is a negotiated and political construct rather than an objective outcome. The essay ultimately calls for a reimagining of the project professional — from accidental manager to political actor and leader — equipped to navigate the realities of today’s turbulent and multi-stakeholder environments.

Introduction

For many of us, the notion of the “accidental project manager” remains a useful shorthand to describe earlier generations of professionals who found themselves managing projects without prior intent or formal training (see Bourne, 2005; Chadwick, 2025; Pinto and Kharbanda, 1995). It captured a very real and widespread phenomenon — the teacher leading a school renovation, the engineer suddenly heading up a transformation initiative, the civil servant running a major program. It was a compelling archetype that reflected the ad hoc and often chaotic nature of how projects were managed in many sectors (Darrell, et al., 2010). Moreover, it offered some (admittedly anecdotal) evidence as to reasons for the commonly experienced problems of project delays, cost overruns, and benefit shortfalls. After all, if untrained and poorly prepared managers were constantly being thrust into the crucible of on-the-job training of the most chaotic sort, was it any wonder that our practice rarely reflected advances in theory and prescriptions for improvement? We note also that if the role of “project manager” had predominantly been associated with more technical work (e.g. engineering, construction, IT), it is now more broadly applied to a much wider range of organizational change and

transformation initiatives, as well as start-ups attempting to deliver a new product or service. Wald et al. (2025) note the increasing professionalization of both work and career models. Even if some of these are not labeled “projects,” the economic significance of project professionals is increasingly recognized, together with the concomitant shortage of individuals with the required skills. “Hoping it will work out” just won’t do.

As the discipline has matured, become more structured, and increasingly professionalized — thanks in no small part to associations such as IPMA — it’s worth asking: does this archetype still apply? Or, more provocatively, have we allowed ourselves to hold onto the comfort of the accidental manager narrative for too long, missing deeper changes in the way project work is now conducted? In short, within many organizations, the accidental project manager has served as a convenient (though not wholly inaccurate) archetype for the continued struggles they face in dealing with repeated overruns and poor project performance.

This essay does not argue that the accidental project manager phenomenon is obsolete; indeed, literature still points to its persistence in modern project organizations (cf. Chadwick, 2025; Darrell, 2010). Nor is it our purpose to over-dwell on the emergent problems when untrained, poorly prepared technical or administrative personnel are thrust into the pressure of one of these roles. Rather, it proposes that the profession is overdue for a broader and more critical re-evaluation of the behavioral forces that continue to shape project management today — particularly around power/political behavior, stakeholder behavior and conflict, and our ongoing, evolving understanding of performance. We frame some of the ideas that are inherent in the role in terms of the challenges (complexities) managers face. Specifically, Maylor and Turner (2017) identify *structural complexities* (associated with planning, coordinating and executing the work), *socio-political complexities* (associated with people, power and politics), and *emergent complexities* (associated with uncertainty and change). Without meaning to try and create too simplistic a caricature, project managers’ initial foray into their new role may have been supported by some basic training in structural tools, but this can at best be considered “necessary but not sufficient” in terms of development.

If the accidental project manager was a central figure of the last era with a continued presence in many modern organizations, perhaps now it’s time to turn our focus to a modern incarnation — the political actor as the project professional who navigates ambiguity, competing stakeholder agendas, and increasingly complex landscapes, particularly in the context of megaprojects. As

IPMA celebrates its 60th anniversary, the setting seems highly appropriate for taking stock of our understanding of these key issues, as well as projecting our expectations forward.

For the purposes of our discussion, the phenomenon of the accidental project manager offers a lens through which we can examine some of the important sea changes in the practice of project management, as expanded theory and a better understanding of significant elements of managing projects over the past six decades have demonstrated that the rules continue to change. That is, when accidental project managers were originally thrust into their ad hoc roles, the way we understood projects and the best ways of governing their development led to very different challenges than we face today. In effect, yesterday's accidental project manager faced a simpler/narrower and better-defined (though by no means comprehensive) set of challenges as our knowledge of what a project was and how it was best managed was far more unidimensional than it is in the present day.

The goal of this essay is to reflect on some of these important changes – through focusing on the accidental project manager – as they affect the best practices for managing projects and their implications for the current generation of accidental project managers. It is not our intent to identify anything like the whole set of duties of modern project managers so much as to observe some of their critical responsibilities and contrast them to that simpler age, lacking the current advances and their implications for better practice. In short, the problem continues but the challenges are much more difficult. With one of us having authored an earlier work on the accidental project manager phenomenon from 30 years ago (Pinto and Kharbanda, 1995), and another having a first career in that role in a major engineering organization, we thought it would be professionally advantageous (as well as personally illuminating!) to examine the much more complex set of challenges faced by modern accidental project managers. As an organizing mechanism, we have framed various sub-sections around some illustrative quotes acquired through years of teaching executives and consulting with project organizations struggling to transition from their accidental roots to a more systematic, method-enabled operating approach.

The Problem on the Ground – “We didn’t know what we didn’t know.”

Accidental project managers came about as a natural result of the gap between our aspirations and available skills. As project-based work proliferated, predominantly in more technical organizations, the need for trained project managers to pursue these ventures never came close to equaling the numbers needed. Hence, for years, project management remained the domain

of the naïve willing (or unwilling), tasked with finding the best way forward. High project failure rates, particularly in industries such as IT and software, were the easily predicted result of these “next person up” selection processes. At the same time, this approach did little to burnish the reputations of professional project organizations, with larger analyses such as the CHAOS reports (2020) noting steady rates of poor project outcomes year after year.¹ Project management was in danger of being perceived as a discipline that preached a future perfect state while delivering consistent mediocrity. As a potential career choice, this is clearly not ideal for aspiring managers (a career ladder once described as lacking rungs!). Ironically, even in cases of success stories, theorists such as Hirschman (1967) noted that these happy results often arose out of the ashes of initial failures and unexpected synergies that led to coining the name, the “Hiding Hand.”

Early books and articles in the field reflected these teething pains, as authors tended to cluster in two groups: academic scholars who predominantly focused on operational research problems set within project formulations such as PERT, CPM, and resource leveling (Pinto, 2022) and practitioner authors, offering prescriptive, “how to” articles that were typically long on practical suggestions, but woefully short on theory or empirical evidence. Bodies of Knowledge themselves were hardly helpful, as they were developed independently by different professional organizations that could not agree on the essential nature of the field, or the set of responsibilities and duties project managers were expected to undertake. As a result, they were limited, exclusivist, or lacked useful knowledge (Morris, 2001). For example, Peter Morris pointed to PMI’s body of knowledge as nearly wholly lacking in a variety of managerial elements, including critical people and organization elements such as conflict handling, team building, or leadership. As he noted, “The situation, in short, was somewhere between being intellectually and professionally inadequate and, at best, being in need of urgent revision” (Morris, 2001, p. 22).

Arguably, these were not simply the growing pains associated with the efforts in creating cadres of professional project managers, but of a larger discipline as well. As theory expanded and more diverse industries embraced project management, so too did the need to revisit the thinking and reassess a field that lay fallow, with little “new” theory and practice formulated since the development of PERT, in the 1950s (Goldratt, 2017). The expansion of theory and techniques in project management in the past 30 years has been remarkable, but it does raise

¹ In fairness, a study by Jørgensen & Moløkken-Østfold (2006) argued that while poor, the original CHAOS failure rates from 1994 were over-stated due to a biased sampling method.

the question: how much of this is affecting the selection, training, and skill sets of accidental project managers? Expansive theory that fails to improve success rates for projects is of questionable utility. Continual, public, noisy, spats over whether waterfall, agile or hybrid are the right way to work are generally unhelpful and do not help the inexperienced take to their new role with confidence. Professional development is therefore vital, especially when considering competence assessment. IPMA's focus on people, practice and perspective (IPMA, n.d.) is thus a valuable contribution to this challenge.

“Time, cost, and quality – you only get to pick two”

The title of this section comes from a humorous cartoon attached to the wall of an engineer's office, who was routinely pressed into service managing projects in his department. When questioned about it, he cheerfully admitted that a key to maintaining his sanity was to recognize “the utter futility of achieving the triple constraint.” With limited training, looming deadlines, and a string of immediate crises to contend with, he found comfort in lowering his sights and limiting his goals. While it may be true that achieving these project management metrics is a challenge in juggling competing demands or even abandoning some of them entirely (Atkinson, 1999), it has never been the case that the original, inward-focusing triple constraint implied a willingness to sacrifice one goal for another. Indeed, recognizing the trade-offs between the elements and optimizing for the project's priorities is beneficial (Maylor et al., 2015), and this knowledge might have helped alleviate our engineer's stress.

We are in the midst of a massive sea change in how we understand and attempt to measure project performance. Recent work on the topic (Ika and Pinto, 2022; Müller and Jugdev, 2012) has charted the evolution of our understanding of project success, from the original iron triangle, so named by Martin Barnes, circa 1969 (Barnes, 1988) to modern reconfigurations that offer a wide variety of additional metrics – some relatively easily measured and others not so much – for consideration. Themes of sustainability, benefits, strategic alignment, value capture, and so forth provide arguably a much broader and more appropriate, but also more complicated, way to assess project performance. Complications, for example, filter over into other current topics, such as megaproject overruns and their effects. Ongoing debates on the performance of such megaprojects have generated enormous literature on likely potential causes (e.g., planning fallacy and behavioral biases, per Flyvbjerg (e.g. 2021), versus error, per Love, Ika, and associates (e.g., Ika, et al., 2023)). Moreover, this literature has spawned its own

set of remedial responses to these assumed, though not longitudinally proven, causes, including perhaps the best known, reference class forecasting (RCF).

Data are only as good as they are representative of the broader population of projects and in the case of project performance data, we face a clear challenge. Narrow, predominantly economic project performance data of the type collected by Flyvbjerg (cf., Flyvbjerg and Ansar, 2016) on cost overruns and benefits shortfalls can lend support to promoting remediation methods of which RCF is best known. After all, if project classes historically overrun their budgets as determined by the outside view, it makes sense to suggest adding in some inflator value as a form of post hoc smoothing. These confidence intervals (based on likelihood of staying within budget and percentage uplift required) can be found in public administration policy documents, such as the UK's Green Book (2025). However, it has been suggested that this argument presupposes several mutually conflicting dynamics, most especially that modern projects, particularly for megaprojects and those having multi-year life cycles, applying finite, economically-based metrics such as cost overruns to complex projects simply misses the point (Pinto, 2023). When stakeholders or funding agencies value more long-term success metrics such as sustainability or value creation, we automatically create a form of Type II error by failing to detect a critical difference when one truly exists; that is, we cannot employ short-term assessments to long-term goals. Doing so will result in future generations of Sydney Opera Houses, simultaneously known as ground-breaking achievements and project management disasters, raising, it must be admitted, a fair question regarding the usefulness of the professional training we are supplying a new generation of college students (Borg and Scott-Young, 2020a). In short, if our timing is inadequate, our data are, ipso facto, wrong.

Oversimplifying performance has resulted in a welcome and recent pushback against this phenomenon in our theory-building and evolving understanding of project complexity. And yet, despite the movement toward “complexifying” project performance (Ika and Saint-Macary, 2023), it is disheartening to note the number of journal articles and books still being produced that employ the most basic success criteria as their dependent variable. Although modern frameworks have expanded the definition to include stakeholder satisfaction, benefits realization, and strategic alignment, there remains a lingering supposition that performance can be clearly defined, objectively measured, and universally agreed upon.

That's a dangerous assumption, as it influences how we train our project managers. Project performance is fluid, contested, and contextual (Maylor et al., 2023). A project may meet every

contractual obligation and still be judged a failure by the community it affects. It may create short-term efficiency but undermine long-term resilience. It may serve one stakeholder group while marginalizing others (Gil and Fu, 2022). These dynamics are magnified in megaprojects (Gil, 2023), where the stakes are higher, the actors more diverse, and the narratives more politicized. Interestingly, much of the recent literature on stakeholder management has shifted emphasis from “power” to “interest” - suggesting that project outcomes are increasingly evaluated not just by those with formal authority, but by those who care most deeply about the results, including marginalised and non-traditional actors (Freeman et al, 2025; Nguyen and Mohamed, 2018; Winch, 2017). This reframing challenges project professionals to rethink who truly matters in determining success. PMI (2024, p.9), in recognizing the difficulty here, have adopted the definition of project success as “The consensus view across intended beneficiaries, other stakeholders and project participants that a project was perceived to have: Delivered value that was worth the effort and expense.” This is a wholly different viewpoint from Barnes’ iron triangle but recognizes that success is likely to be “messy,” and managers need to be comfortable with this reality.

Performance isn’t settled, and that’s the point. In short, “performance” is a construct — shaped by narratives, power structures, and political imperatives. As project managers, we must learn to interrogate performance claims more critically. Who defines what success looks like? Whose voices are included (or excluded) in post-project evaluations? What unintended consequences are overlooked in pursuit of KPIs? Equally importantly, as Gil and colleagues have shown, the process of managing competing stakeholder expectations and finding a way through the maze calls for political and networking sensitivities of the highest caliber (Gil and Fu, 2022; Gil and Pinto, 2018), actions that are notably lacking in much of the more prescriptive project management offerings.

By recognizing performance as a political concept — not just a technical one — we create space for more honest conversations, more adaptive learning, and more responsible delivery. We also acknowledge the profession’s role in shaping the future, not just tracking the past.

Reclaiming the Political Project Manager

“The goal of project managers is not to make every stakeholder happy. You can’t. The goal is to ensure that everyone is minimally irritated with you.”

- Quote by an Engineering VP at a Fortune 500 Company

Our accidental project managers, perhaps with some knowledge of tools and techniques, may not immediately realize the role of socio-political complexities in causing them difficulties. Maylor et al. (2013) identify some of the common barriers, including lack of senior sponsorship and support, and the importance of making sure stakeholders are aligned and have a realistic understanding of the work. Herein lies one of the problems for our manager. Gaining recognition in the “harder” technical requirements is well-established, with a wide range of exams and credentials. The softer aspects of stakeholder engagement are often as important, if not more so, yet these cannot be evaluated so readily. As educators, students’ understanding of activity duration estimates using PERT is easy to test; determining their understanding of interpersonal skills is far less so, despite the latter likely being much more important in practice. Stakeholder management is vital both to get things done in the project (Maylor and Turner, 2017) and, as discussed above, for the result to be evaluated as successful (Davis, 2017).

This pressure for project professionals to be “stakeholder savvy” appears to be an increasingly prevalent theme within the literature as its significance is recognized. It is also noted within practitioner discourse, texts, and education offerings with the increasing usage of the term “project leadership” (as opposed to management) and extensive coverage of the key human and behavioral aspects.

This movement raises an interesting point with regards to the accidental project manager. As Pinto and Kharbanda (1995) note, some managers from a technical background are commonly put into leadership positions despite being “singularly unprepared to manage people” (p.48). They may be wholly lacking in critical influencing skills, and “novice project managers are rarely clued into this important bit of information until it is too late” (p.42). This point has been regularly highlighted over the subsequent decades. Understanding and employing political acuity in balancing these competing demands and negotiating among the desires of key stakeholders is a sine qua non of modern project management (Dayan, et al., 2011; Pinto, 2000). Moreover, research suggests that political acumen operates both as a team-level behavior and at meta-levels, where politicking is a necessary element of successful stakeholder management (c.f., Gil and Fu, 2022).

Despite this movement, we increasingly note an alternative accidental project manager narrative. Across all sectors, experienced leaders are put in charge of projects, programs and initiatives based on their success in other roles. Major pieces of critical work can be entrusted

to senior staff with sufficient political acumen, yet without the requisite understanding of project-based delivery. This can be seen in the public sector, where staff can rotate to new roles every few years and be put in positions of authority based on more general, rather than specific, expertise. Smart people can, and do, learn on the job, but on a multi-year project the cycle will likely repeat with the next incumbent. Participants, of course, recognize this, but changing established ways of working can be glacial.

An intentional thread running through our essay is to examine just a small subsection of the ways in which projects and project manager roles have changed over time, set within the context of a recurring problem – the accidental project manager. Unfortunately, trying to simply reframe the project challenge by assuming that the secret is better training programs quite misses the point. It's time to expand our professional imagination by recognizing that accidental project managers served an important historical role in our profession, as an archetype that held up to the light the product of poor training, low maturity and ad hoc processes, and a variety of bad assumptions about what made a good project manager. Undoubtedly, that identity still resonates in certain contexts, but as project management continues to evolve, we need new archetypes — ones that reflect the complex, political, and value-laden environments in which we now operate.

This pursuit does not mean abandoning collaboration or stakeholder engagement. It means seeing them not as neutral techniques, but as strategic tools that must be deployed with political awareness. It means embracing conflict as a signal of relevance, not failure. It means recognizing the behavioral dynamics of stakeholders as active agents in shaping project trajectories. And it means treating performance as a dynamic conversation, not a fixed scoreboard.

In doing so, we not only advance the profession — we align it more closely with the challenges of our time, especially those posed by the growing prevalence and scale of megaprojects. Reclaiming and teaching the essential nature of the political dimension of project work may be uncomfortable, but it is necessary. The future of project management depends on our ability to confront complexity, contest power, and deliver meaningfully in a turbulent world.

From Managing Risk to Recognizing Uncertainty

“We don't know what to do when we don't know what to do.”

- Quote by a Senior Public Sector Manager

The quote above came from an experienced manager fully acquainted with his organization's risk management systems, and with a track record of successful delivery. His concern (echoed by many) was that he was still impacted by the unexpected and was unsure how to respond effectively under these circumstances. We know that emergent complexities occur in both the structural and socio-political domains, and the field of risk management is well-developed, codified, and deployed. Nonetheless, things go wrong. We note that in definitional terms, "risk is the odds of a future event occurring given adequate data on its past occurrence, and uncertainty is a judgment about whether a future event might occur based on inadequate or unmeasurable data" (Winch and Maytorena, 2009, p.197). Thus, uncertainty will always weigh on the mind of the project manager for, despite sundry efforts – effective or not – to identify challenges as a precursor to formulating remedial strategies, uncertainty, by its definition, will inevitably frustrate proactive planning (Winch, 2023; Winch & Maytorena, 2011).

Maylor and Turner (2017) suggest that flexibility is suitable response to uncertainty. Plan as best as you can, but the ability to respond to the challenge with a wide range of options is beneficial. They recommend more exploratory "entrepreneurial actions" (p.1085) rather than relying on existing processes. This is far from prescriptive, but some way removed from any concept of "one best way" of managing. Recent research has accommodated ideas of resilience in project systems that are subject to disruptions (Naderpajouh, et al, 2020; Naderpajouh et al., 2024; Unterhitzenberger et al., 2024) and Usher et al. (2024) consider the idea of antifragility, with a range of practical strategies that the project manager can draw upon. For the accidental manager, it may be uncomfortable that the established tools and techniques (good as they are) are acknowledged as being inadequate.

So, What's to be Done? (or, Transitioning Away from Accidental Project Managers to Well-rounded Project Leaders)

"Congratulations, you somehow managed a project. Now, go and do it again."

- Quote heard in every project organization

Given the need to steer the project through the challenges of multiple stakeholders and both anticipated and unforeseen challenges, we can see how the term "project leader" has emerged as a better descriptor of the modern role in place of the traditional "manager" title (see Coleman

and Bourne, 2018). The issue of the competencies these individuals require already comprises an extensive literature (see, for example, the work of Müller and Turner, 2010; 2011), but there are some broad issues that we can identify. Balancing domain knowledge, stakeholder skills and a tolerance for uncertainty seem foundational bases or developmental targets for any aspiring leader or for those thrust into the role. How, though, do we understand their interplay? Where does the project “magic” lie?

To answer this question, we draw on the recent work of Winch and Hajikazemi (2025). They discuss the practical wisdom (*phronesis*) of project leaders. Their Project Leadership Model (PLM) has two axes. The first is *enabling*, which covers *sensemaking* (dealing with uncertainty and complexity) and *relating* (stakeholders and teams). The second is *action*, covering *creating* (innovating and designing) and *projecting* (storytelling and narrating). The central part of the model is *judging* (value/s). Winch and Hajikazemi (2025) argue that this practical wisdom involves decision-making in a particularly unique context, to deliver value in the form of project benefits. Much of this process is necessarily intangible, supporting the idea that project leadership is not – and indeed cannot be – fully prescriptive. Instead, it is about crafting the particular solution required in its evolving context. Practical wisdom in this framing draws not only on technical competence, but also on intuition and accumulated experience (cf. Klein, 2017), framed by a commitment to delivering project value underpinned by ethical considerations and socially grounded values. There is a necessary place for art as well as science.

What Now – Quo Vadis?

Celebrating the 60th anniversary of IPMA, one of the key professional project management organizations in the world, offers opportunities to make critical assessments – observing the state of our field in theory and practice and appreciating the massive progress we have made in these decades, as project management moved from the operations research backwaters into a critical discipline in its own right and as the key to enormous value-added in modern organizations.

Alongside the steady progress in discipline development, one of the still-extant archetypes of our field has been the existence of the accidental project manager, a figure that evoked both rueful acknowledgement as a source of underperformance while serving as a template for establishing roadmaps to improve our practices. Although these accidental project managers

remain a feature of far too many project-based organizations, we can take some comfort in recognizing that they serve as the impetus for critically examining our best practices, educating and “professionalizing” practitioners, and charting the content and delivery of new education initiatives. Accidental project managers may remain a part of modern organizations, but they are not obligated to remain uniformed, hidebound, or practicing a form of project management that is decades out of date.

Yet, as this essay has repeatedly argued, technical knowledge alone is no longer sufficient. Put another way, our discipline is likely to only improve marginally if our focus remains on training new generations of managers in technical project skills while continuing to ignore the intuitive, political nature of the career. The politics of projects — who holds power, whose interests are prioritized, and how value is negotiated — are inescapable realities that must inform how we train, credential, and support project professionals. The accidental project manager may have lacked formal preparation, but even our “intentional” managers will struggle if we do not also prepare them to operate as political actors in contested, stakeholder-rich environments. The future of our field must not only embrace complexity, but actively equip professionals with the critical, ethical, and political sensibilities required to navigate it.

Steps toward a better future:

1. Continue to modernize our Bodies of Knowledge – A coherent and shared lexicon is vital to professionalization, yet texts must do more than consolidate — they must inspire. The risk lies in institutional inertia: revision committees, often weighted toward practitioner experience, may unintentionally constrain the adoption of critical scholarly insights. As a result, conceptual breakthroughs in areas such as complexity, governance, and behavioral dynamics take years to appear in educational standards and credentialing frameworks. We do not argue for theory at the expense of practical relevance — but we do call for a more agile, inclusive, and academically engaged process. The pressing question remains: is our professional knowledge base advancing the field, or merely rearranging its furniture? At worst, we then run of risk of scholarship and practice operating merely as two increasingly diverse streams of professional activity, waving to each other when we chance to make occasional contact.
2. Reimagine the project education pipeline – We must take a critical, forward-looking view of how our educational systems — from undergraduate curricula to professional training — are equipping future project leaders. The requirements have changed:

today's leaders must demonstrate not only technical competence but also political sensitivity, emotional intelligence, and strategic narrative skills. These are not "soft" skills — they are success skills in today's project environments. We must be willing to challenge the boundaries of conventional instruction. Replacing the outdated "Project Management 101" syllabus with programs grounded in behavioral science, stakeholder theory, and ethical leadership would mark a decisive step toward preparing leaders fit for the real-world complexities they will face.

3. It's time to embrace artificial intelligence (AI), warts and all – Expanding on our point #2, AI has rendered many of the most common project management practices we routinely engage in (and teach) superfluous. Reimagining "Project Management 101," as we put it, is critical considering the many duties we need no longer concern ourselves with. We don't wish to belabor the myriad ways AI has altered the duties project leaders must take on, but it is necessary that we fully understand that along with the change from accidental project managers to intentional leaders, part of this metamorphosis will consist of reconfiguring the responsibilities and day-to-day activities that project leaders and their teams will undertake. Hint: the changes will be massive.

It is unlikely that we will witness the end of the accidental project leader phenomenon. The needs are too significant, the demand is too strong, and the resource pool is still too shallow. Our goal with the essay is not to decry the existence of these accidental project managers, but to reflect on what our past 60 years have led us to and the opportunities that exist for new generations of successful accidental project leaders, provided we are clear-eyed in our training approaches, understanding of what skills they will need, and have the ability to shape and nurture their performance.

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