

Protecting Publicly Accessible Locations from Terrorism: Towards a strategic framework for Kenya

1. Introduction

Protecting publicly accessible locations (PALs) and critical infrastructure from a myriad of security challenges has emerged as an important research and policy area over the last 20 years, predominantly because of a sizeable number of low sophistication-high impact terrorist attacks in public spaces (McIlhatton et al., 2020; Lehr, 2019). Terrorist attacks in recent times have targeted civilians in areas that are considered crowded with many examples evident. Major cities in Europe faced an upsurge of civilian centric targeting in Nice, Paris, Manchester, and Barcelona between 2015 and 2017. All these attacks that wrecked death and destruction were claimed by individuals linked to the Islamic State terrorist organisation. Outside Western contexts, there has been a notable increase in terrorist activities in Africa with the targeting of civilians becoming prominent (Mustafa et al, 2018). PALs have become a focal point for attention with terror attacks occurring in marketplaces, sporting events, busy shopping malls, hotels, and areas of traffic convergence, especially in the cities. Notable attacks included those carried out by the Al Shabaab in Kenya including on Westgate shopping mall where 67 shoppers were killed in the upmarket facility in 2013, 14 Riverside Drive Complex attack where 22 lives were lost, and the Garissa University College attack which led to the deaths of 148 University students (BBC, 2015; BBC, 2016; STARTS, 2013; and US (United States) Department of State Country Terrorism Reports, 2019; NY Times, 2013). Indeed, the Global Terrorism Index 2023 ranks Kenya at position 20 in the world in terms of vulnerability to terrorism (GTI, 2023).

While most of the attacks have involved the use of firearms and improvised explosives devices (IEDs), contemporary terrorists' tactics have shifted in terms of tactics and methodologies (Hoffman, 2017; Laws, 2016). Increasingly, 'low-tech' terror attack methods employing knives, axes, vehicle ramming have become as effective as or even deadlier than IEDs and firearms especially when executed in public spaces (Jenkins and Butterworth, 2018). These attacks have resulted in significant loss of life, socio-economic loss, property destruction, and reputational damage, particularly in the context of a city's status as a safe place to live, visit, learn, work, and socialize – at the international level (McIlhatton et al., 2018). In parallel, they have also posed challenging questions for policymakers regarding how best to enhance the resilience of these locations from terrorism threats as well as ensuring that such places are able to function as originally intended (Coaffee, 2018; Friedman, 2017; McIlhatton et al., 2020).

The events of 9/11 catalysed how international governments approached counterterrorism protective security (Fink, 2012), with the protection of critical infrastructures like power plants, hospitals, and water systems from terrorism gaining traction in mainstream counterterrorism policy. Overtime, legislative and policy frameworks, designed to minimize exploitation and exposure of vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, were formulated and implemented in many Western countries (DHS, 2019; McIlhatton et al., 2020). Following an upsurge on attacks on PALs, protective security measures emerged as a response in the West with more attention being placed on protecting these spaces from terror attacks.

In response to the increased number of terror attacks in PALs, many countries have adopted a 'guideline approach' that embeds protective security measures within national counterterrorism strategy frameworks or plans with those in the UK (United Kingdom), Australia, and the US providing recent examples (Monaghan and McIlhatton, 2020). Many of these guidance documents have therefore emerged from government taskforces to help organizations prevent or mitigate terror related risks. Initially, these documents were to inform businesses of already existing PALs and crowded places, however, they have since provided direction for new developments (Monaghan and McIlhatton, 2020). For instance, the UK's Crowded Places Guidance 2017 and Australia's Strategy for Protecting Crowded Places 2017 enumerates the importance of protecting PALs considering impactful recent terror attacks at the international

level (Christensen, 2019; McIlhatton et al., 2020). In the US, they are encapsulated in the U.S (United States) Department of Homeland Security *Soft Targets and Crowded Places Security Plan Overview* and *Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places-Resources Guide* in response to evolving terror threats (DHS, 2018; DHS 2019; McIlhatton et al., 2020). At an international level, the United Nations has evolved a specific guide on the *Global Programme on Countering Terrorist Threats against Vulnerable Targets (critical infrastructure and 'soft targets')*. The guide considers major sports events, urban centres and touristic sites, threats posed by unmanned air systems, religious sites, and places of worship as such. Additionally, the Global Counterterrorism Forum's *Antalya Memorandum on the Protection of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism context* has elaborated a series of good practices to inform the memberships' responses to the attacks on PALs. A review of these guides elaborates on how lessons learnt from the policy responses in these jurisdictions could potentially be applied to the African context and, more specifically, Kenya. It also recognises how international actors have responded to the vulnerability of PALs to terrorism and evolved a slew of good practices that could catalyse global practice. While Kenya's response to terrorism is still evolving, the lack of an overarching protective security framework this far, could be considered an enabler to the attacks.

While key lessons have been learned from the attacks globally, very few countries in Africa have evolved national counterterrorism plans or strategies and have adopted a state-centric approach to combatting terrorism with emphasis placed on law enforcement and military operations. In Kenya, the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) opined that the country lacks policies, legislation, guidelines, and institutional frameworks governing counter terrorism protective security (NCTC, 2019). However, the enhancement of physical security measures, including investment in more and better trained security guards, use of handheld scanners, policy consideration for arming private security guards has been receiving attention in recent times (Al Jazeera, 2019). These measures have, however, been reactive to attacks, with little emphasis on proactively including protective security measures at the earliest stage of development (Deepak, 2018; NCTC, 2019; Odipo 2015). Furthermore, the sizable number of PALs makes it difficult for policymakers and practitioners to adequately consider every location (Odipo, 2015). As such discourses within the practitioner context advocate for prioritization and proportionality. There is also increasing exhortation for integrated approaches encompassing more actors in the counterterrorism architecture, community engagement and mainstreaming of preventative methods (Odipo, 2015; Gatuiku, 2016; Habiba, 2018; Mwangi, 2018; Kamau, 2021). This study is informed by the absence of an overarching protective security framework for the protection of PALs in Kenya.

The paper is divided into five sections. The first part provides a background and rationale for by contextualising the study by exploring how publicly accessible locations have become important within policy and practice communities following an upsurge of terrorism in those spaces. The second section discusses the methods for this study exploring how a unique co-design strategy has been employed through a qualitative approach in the development of a protective security framework for PALs in Kenya. In the third section, results from the study are presented in response to the main research question which was: how do we protect publicly accessible locations from terrorism in Kenya? The section identifies key interventions that have been evolved in the protection of PALs while presenting the 5P framework as an overarching protecting security framework for the locations. In the last section, a conclusion is presented detailing the academic and policy contributions that this research claims.

2. Methods

The aim of the study was to develop a framework that enhances our understanding for the consideration and inclusion of protective security measures in the protection of publicly accessible locations in Kenya. As such a qualitative design was appropriated for this study given it was best suited in teasing out the context, culture, understanding and architecture of

Kenya's CT protective security and the examination of sensitive topics such as protective security within a CT context. Furthermore, since qualitative approach allows the researcher to gain a holistic view of the study, including the perceptions of the participants, it enabled an understanding of the way people act and account for their actions within a CT protective security environment. The inquiry proceeded from the main research question: how do we protect publicly accessible locations from terrorism in Kenya? From this question, responses would be linked to the gaps on protective security and the protection of publicly accessible locations.

As such to develop this framework, primary data from the insights of key contacts among them security agents, private security service providers, scholars to address the academic deficit gap, counter-terrorism researchers, practitioners, relevant ministries involved with urban planning, and stakeholders in the private sector in Kenya were identified as participants using in-depth semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In all six focus groups were constituted and 44 interviews conducted. The determination of the population was informed by their knowledge about the subject matter and their relevant expertise in the determination of the required data. The participants were carefully chosen to demonstrate and provide depth for the study as well as capture the complex interdependencies and relationships between the core participants and the wider community. Additional consideration was made for a detailed understanding of the phenomenon under study, experience among other issues. To determine the sample population, purposive and snow balling methods were also used to gain deeper insights and practical approaches to the protection of PALs from terrorism.

In developing the framework for the protection of PALs, Kenya was determined as a case owing to previous terror attacks on PALs and a desire to provide an understanding of Kenya's protective security landscape more so its responses to terrorism in such spaces. The novelty of Kenya's case is informed by gaps on African CT in general vis-à-vis the protection of PALs and is original in the sense that a study of this nature has not been conducted before.

Relatedly, the study used a unique co-design approach that encompassed knowledge development of the framework from both the researcher and the participants. The strategy enabled an understanding of their perspectives vis-à-vis the protection of PALs, including interviewing around the roles, and responsibilities of the identified stakeholders and how they would be engaged within the developed framework. This was done with a view to gain deeper insights on the governance and accountability structure that seeks to mitigate attacks on these spaces. Using the problem solution mode, it also allowed for the identification and production of security intervention measures in PALs. Methodologically, the co-design also allowed for a different approach where interventions are included in the earlier stages as opposed to a reactive stance that has characterised many approaches. Further, the existing knowledge base has indicated that PALs vulnerability to terrorism necessitates a preventive stance. In determining the vulnerability of PALs within the practice of protective security, it is important to capture broadly an understanding of what a framework to protect PALs from terrorism is and looks like, and what it should be anchored on. As indicated, the concept of readiness is key and an anchor of the framework. As this is an exploratory study, this allowed the scoping out of the nature and extent of 'readiness' as a construct; what is readiness, how is readiness ensured and why readiness.

2.1 Co-design sessions

Given the two modes of data collection, the researcher gravitated between the semi-structured interviews and the focus groups depending on the availability of the participants. To make the participants at ease with the task, the researcher sought their concurrence on the venues for the meetings. Board rooms were used for all the focus groups given the numbers involved. In keeping with the co-design strategy, the participants were introduced to the study to establish rapport and make them feel comfortable in the sharing of insights on the study. The

standardised interview guide acted as a direction to the participants. However, what the researcher emphasised was to the co-design process where ideas were generated in a problem –solution format especially in the Focus Groups.

There was greater flexibility in the semi-structured interviews given that some of the participants were recruited based on their expertise for example in urban planning and design and were deemed influential in pushing some recommendations. One recurrent observation amongst policymakers was evaluation of existing mechanisms and how to strengthen preparedness and more enduring interventions. An opportunity was provided at the end of the interview for the respondents to contribute innovative ideas or perspectives that had not been covered within the research questions and where possible relevant documentation that would strengthen observations and contributions made by a respondent.

3. Results

3.1 Protective Security

Participants attested to the difficulties in a structured, organized, and sustainable approach to public security delivery. Longstanding divergences between government and the public over what security provision entails remained a barrier to the realization of a safe and secure country. Even though, there existed broad policies and an architecture to address crime and insecurity, ineffective implementation had affected security provision and delivery. Despite the evolution of security legislation to address existing gaps, including the contextual threat environment, the non-compliance and cherry-picking of what to apply and not, had affected their utility.

Relatedly, there was a lot of expectation on governments' role vis-à-vis the protection of PALs with many respondents not recognising the limitations of government on the matter and their role within any protective security architecture.

3.2 Understanding threat, vulnerability, and impact

Within the urban spaces, respondents identified general crime activities as the most predominant. Whereas terrorism though uncommon, was the most important of the threats highlighted, petty crime such as mugging and pickpocketing, violent robbery in crowded places, security breaches, unauthorised access, and burglaries were also identified as considerable. Other threats included Covid pandemic an aspect of health insecurity, Chemical, Biological, Radiation and Nuclear (CBRN) materials in the public space and stampedes. The predominant terrorism threat was from mass shooting and grenade attacks in the PALs as was experienced in the Westgate Shopping Mall, Garissa University College, and 14 Riverside Drive Complex incidents. However, discussants in focus groups noted that disrupted VBIED attacks, recoveries of suicide vests and IEDs (Improvised Explosive Devices) indicated plans by terrorists to exert maximum casualties within such spaces.

There was a recognition of the vulnerability of PALs to terrorism. Vulnerability was conceptualised as the weaknesses within PALs that threat actors exploit to further their criminal activities. Vulnerabilities were also linked to the motivation of the actors. With respect to terrorism, vulnerability was linked to the target's attractiveness and potential to deliver a message to a wider public. They included the very nature of these locations as open and accessible, weaknesses such as the lack of skills by place custodians, lack of awareness on the threat, lower levels of security and situational awareness, the numbers of PALs that it is not entirely possible to provide safety and security guards for all of them. The most outstanding was a lack of security culture across the stakeholder spectrum. Given the strategic benefits of carrying out attacks in PALs, it was highly unlikely that terrorist actors would refrain from carrying out such attacks. Moreover, in many PALs, it was also recognised that there were inadequate counterterrorism interventions within those sites.

In terms of impact, terrorism was highlighted given that it has catalysed many security interventions within PALs because of lives lost, injuries and destruction wrecked by threat actors. Terrorist activity had further impacted the reputation of the city, led to economic losses especially for business facilities affected and wider ramifications on disruptions including travel advisories that affected tourism, a major forex earner for the country. Psychologically, it had impacted how people relate to the PAL (Publicly Accessible Locations) with fear manifest especially in high-risk locations.

3.3 Protection of publicly accessible locations from Terrorism

To protect publicly accessible locations from terrorism in Kenya evolved two divergent but complementary approaches: Whole of society and whole of government. However, there was recognition too that addressing systemic challenges that contribute to crime would translate to an overall better security delivery. Indeed, counterterrorism protective security has contributed to improved security. Despite this, structural deficiencies continue to impede policing, security provision and delivery. Moreover, corruption, incomplete security policy and regulatory processes, and external factors have contributed to insecurity and criminality. Outstanding issues such as the ongoing security sector reforms would also provide a boost for crime prevention and management. Specifically, the following issues were highlighted.

3.3.1 Protective security as a risk management approach

The study appreciated that organisations are facing a rapidly evolving risk environment posing threats to businesses, assets, and employees. The recognition that it is entirely impossible to plug all vulnerabilities within PALs leads to a risk management approach that takes cognisance of the inherent threats and their potential impacts and or consequences. It also centralises proportionality with the mitigations being linked to the threats and the adoption of the most appropriate of interventions within the locations. There was recognition of a variety of risk management approaches/ tools including vulnerability assessments, security surveys, security drills and simulations carried out involving tactical units and private security providers especially in some of the PALs. Other measures observed included crime hotspots and trends analysis. The realisation of a risk management approach would also enhance readiness aspects such as emergency responses and the incorporation of safety features within the PALs. Despite the diverse approaches, a minority of the respondents called out for specific and standardised risk assessment tools for consideration in the protection of PALs.

3.3.2 Public Private Partnerships

Globally, multiple actors and agencies have been recognized as key in protective security discourses (UN, 2022). There is a burgeoning public/private sector partnership geared at the protection of PALs. In this study, the choice of study participants was informed by the need to get a multi-stakeholder perspective and input in the design of the framework and incorporate hitherto excluded demographics in security policymaking. The partnership leverages government/ state capacity and expertise, for instance, through the provision of counterterrorism training and creation of public awareness and sensitisation around the protection of PALs. The private sector, on its part, provides the wider communities bearing scholars, analysts, practitioners, corporates, organisations that can offer support and training towards this goal.

There are two divergent approaches on the protection of PALs. Within the national security space, there is preference for a '*whole of government*' approach that incorporates and co-opts security and non-security actors in addressing crime and insecurity. This approach leverages collaboration within government agencies and departments. There was widespread recognition of the multi-agency approach in dealing with insecurity, countering, and responding to terrorism but also its possibilities in engendering a collaborative '*whole of government*' approach to national security. Its guiding philosophy is to address insecurity, improve coordination and entrench intelligence led policing as a proactive crime management strategy (Abdiaziz, 2020). There was unanimity in the focus groups of its effectiveness in

responding to crimes in PALs and terrorism, as well as inculcating a cooperative, coordinated, and integrative response framework to insecurity in general.

On the other hand, the '*whole of society*' approach incorporates an expanded range of stakeholders from the wider community, including the decentralization of security knowledge and expertise through a lens that views security as a public good. This approach also targets structural causes of a problem using non-coercive methods. Both approaches are centered on preparedness and have differing utility in the protection of PALs.

This study affirmed the place of the citizenry in protective security discourses. As far as preventive CT measures are concerned, the public are a critical component of enhanced partnerships between state and non-state actors (Gatiuku, 2016; Opalo, 2019). As such, there is need to educate the populace on what public spaces are, identification of suspicious behavior, awareness to engage and respond to command of law enforcement. Notably, the support infrastructure for the partnerships between the police and the public could be through the *Nyumba Kumi*, community policing initiative which was canvassed among the respondents.

3.3.3 Lessons Learned perspectives

As part of best lessons learnt, there has been notable progress in their incorporation within responses and in developing a proactive security architecture. Practitioners stated that after action review (s), post-mortem and pre-mortem have been conducted after serious security incidences and breaches to inform improvements and consolidated action. Furthermore, security drills and simulations have been normalised and post incident scene management enhanced to aid investigations and prosecutions. There has also been increased training and sensitisation programmes for law enforcement agencies, public officers, and managers as well as private security providers for a unified approach to the protection of PALs. Amongst PSPs (Private Security Providers), there is a training manual for basic counterterrorism training while security agencies have initiated beginner trainings on new and existing security threats and refresher courses for older officers.

3.3.4 The Utility of Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and Crime Prevention through Environmental Designs (CPTED)

The research confirmed Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) practical approaches to the protection of PALs under the guiding principle that some of the techniques can restrict terror opportunities. These approaches have influenced protective security measures in the country. Notably, CCTVs (Closed Circuit Television), access control, lighting, perimeter walls, electric fences and installations, extended guardianship, and surveillance were the more obvious manifestations. There are requirements that users/ patrons leave their identity card and details to access some locations. Patrols by uniformed police were evident. To hasten on responses, tactical teams had been deployed near High-Risk Targets.

The NPS (National Police Service) had integrated facial recognition technology into the Critical Incident Management Suite (CIMS) the camera surveillance system. The initial setup allowed law enforcement officials to identify license plates of motor vehicles and motorbikes in different sections of the capital. CIMS was also designed to alert police officers of disturbances within public spaces (Misra, 2018). This deployment followed a policy directive to increase patrols as a form of extended guardianship in places of worship, public events, and shopping malls especially in Nairobi and Mombasa. There were also other directives revolving around target hardening. In response to potential vehicle bomb attacks, the government directed the erection and maintenance of barriers to limit access to important administrative buildings like the registrar of persons and companies, immigration, among others.

3.4 5P Framework

There was broad consensus for a framework amongst most of the participants. Its proponents argued that it would unify all the disparate, ad hoc initiatives or measures currently in use, provide a coherent structure to strengthen security provision and address security issues, and importantly, enhance readiness and preparedness. It would provide a synergized, formalized, and collaborative approach to security delivery and management. However, just like in the West, the way the guides are contextualised within a country's CT strategies, this framework should be contextualized within wider and ongoing national initiatives such as the National Security Strategy and Policy, National Counterterrorism Strategy, Critical Infrastructures Act, and National Counter Violent Extremism strategy.

3.4.1 Using the 5P Framework to protect PALs in Kenya

The understanding of the vitality of the PALs as a space to work, live, visit, and socialise without disruptions necessitated this study as part of wider discourses in (counterterrorism) protective security. Through a unique co-design strategy, a protective security framework was developed for PALs built on the interests and experiences of the study participants. The 5P framework as an outcome of the study encompasses key components of any protective security architecture that include principles and a governance structure that delineates responsibility and accountability across the stakeholder spectrum. The 5 principles are problem, people, procedures, proportionality, and performance.

1. 'Problem' explores the threats (and their evolution), vulnerabilities (including future or emergent), and examines how previous attacks shaped the various interventions for the protection of PALs in Kenya (impacts).
2. 'People' maps out the actors or stakeholders involved (potential), their roles and responsibilities - interests and influence in the protection of PALs and why they are considered so. It goes further to understand their levels of capacities - bringing out the various needs or requirements in the protection of PALs.
3. 'Procedure' is defined as the institutionalised arrangements aimed at strengthening protective security and delivering enduring security as a product.
4. 'Proportionality' refers to the appropriateness of the protective security measures that have been developed to respond to crime in the PALs by organisations and institutions as well as their owners and operators. This is informed by the assessment of the threat, risk and level of the PAL and varies from one to another. It provides justifications for the measures, including why they are deemed as appropriate in addressing the attendant risks and vulnerabilities of those spaces.
5. 'Performance' is: How do we know that it (this) works? Performance speaks to the effectiveness of the framework in addressing insecurity in the PALs. It also assesses the efficacy of the intervention measures.

4. Conclusion

The 5P Framework in the Kenyan context was conceptualized as a proposal that links key components (co-designed with stakeholders) to better protect PALs. The 5P canvasses a comprehensive approach to this thinking by advancing readiness across the Problem (Do we have a good understanding of the threat, vulnerability, and its impact?). Have we identified the right, responsible and accountable individuals, or institutions (People)? Have we developed the right practices/security culture (Procedures)? Are they appropriate (Proportionality)? Have we assessed their effectiveness (Performance)? The framework is both a knowledge in resource but it is also an action kind of guideline to enhance the protection of publicly accessible locations. The realization of the complex network of stakeholders that inform the protection of these spaces, partnerships were identified as the governing fulcrum amongst the 'responsibilised' individuals. The recognition of the incapacities amongst the stakeholders also

necessitated need for their empowerment and building of capacity and sensitization and awareness within and around the framework and importantly, users of such spaces. It was also recognised that a lot needed to be done to bring everyone on board given that the level of understanding of risks and dangers of terrorism is low despite past attacks within such spaces.

Despite the evolution of protective security measures, there is a lack of an overarching framework to act as a referent, especially in Kenya. This framework could be the starting point of bringing together the disparate measures domiciled within different organisations or the various stakeholders in an expanded (in) security environment. Whereas there is a broader understanding of what security should do or not do in practice, a lack of codification was identified as a barrier to inculcating security conscious culture and reaping the benefits of a safe and secure environment. This may have roots in the differing interpretations of security in the Kenyan context across geographical regions/ spaces, religious lens, and classes in the country.

This research is important given ongoing discourses on counter-terrorism protective security amidst the increasing attacks on civilians in PALs globally. Whereas the increasing vulnerabilities of urban cities in the West have seen necessary responses in mitigating the threats, Africa seems to lag as far as CT protective security is concerned. This research addresses this gap from an African perspective where despite rising terror attacks on PALs there is a distinct lack of literature on counter-terrorism protective security. By using Kenya as a case, this research sought to address the dearth of literature on this topic given the little insight from non-Western contexts. Additionally, the logic of protective security as lived and practiced in the West is not one hundred percent relevant and appropriate in non-Western contexts thus the need to explore its everyday evolution and realities in Africa. There is also a lack of discernible planning evident in African cities including structural difficulties in re-modifying African public spaces/ PALs (Odipo, 2015). Additionally, this research contributes to the knowledge base for both practitioners and academics on protective security measures and the safety of public spaces to meet the gap especially in Kenya where such considerations have not featured much or are not organized or have not gained the required traction in terms of policy considerations.

An important claim that this study makes is that we cannot divorce the protection of PALs from the historical, social, political, economic, and developmental discourses, underscoring in the process, how context is important in understanding and deciphering global approaches methods and tools in the burgeoning CT international architecture. Indeed, Kenya's response which mimics the various trends post 9/11 demonstrates and confirms the development of softer approaches after the initial hard and militaristic ones that have been assessed on CT discourses as ineffective, defeatist and of limited utility.

Additionally, this study veers from a decidedly reactive approach that has characterised responses to a proactive one which advocates readiness across the range of identified stakeholders in the PALs, including the building of a security culture. Fundamentally, it argues that in the protection of PALs should not be considered in isolation but should, in the case of Kenya be entrenched within wider cross cutting security discourses linked to CVE (Counter Violent Extremism), CT and national security strategies, and that long standing structural deficiencies in policing and security provision and delivery to be addressed. Moreover, it canvasses for inclusivity in the process by the incorporation of the citizen and wider community in such discourses to ensure ownership, support for and a critical mass in enhancing vigilance and reporting behaviours to vested and responsible authorities for prompt and timely action to be taken. In sum, the study advances the philosophy that protective security is multidimensional and requires close policy, institutional and operational coordination. The 5 P Framework from this study could herald and mainstream such debates in Kenya.

REFERENCES

Abdiaziz, Maalim Hassan. (2020). *Role of Intelligence Led Policing on Counter-Terrorism Measures in Kamukunji Sub-County, Nairobi County, Kenya* Master of Science in Governance, Peace and Security Nairobi: Africa Nazarene University

Abdinasir Abass Gafow. (2021) *Assessment into the Level of Preparedness for Worship Institutions to Respond to Terror Attacks Within Nairobi Central Business District* Master of Science in Governance, Peace and Security Thesis Nairobi: Africa Nazarene University

Akwiri, J. (2014). 'Kenya needs better security coordination after Westgate: report' [Online] available from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-security-idUSBREA1O0XP20140225>

Al Jazeera (2019). "Show of resilience as attacked hotel reopens in Nairobi" [Online] available from <https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2019/8/1/show-of-resilience-as-attacked-hotel-reopens-in-nairobi>

Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee (ANZCTC). (2017). Australia's strategy for protecting crowded places from terrorism. *Canberra: Australian Government*. [Online] available from <https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Securityandyourcommunity/Pages/australias-strategy-for-protecting-crowded-places-from-terrorism.aspx>

BBC.com (2016) "Istanbul Ataturk airport attack: 41 dead and more than 230 hurt" [online] available from < <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36658187> >

BBC.com. (2015) "Garissa University College attack in Kenya: What happened?" [Online] available at <<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-46888682>>

BBC.com. (2016) "Nice attack: What we know about the Bastille Day killings" [online] available from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-36801671>

BBC.com. (2019) "Kenya attack: "21 confirmed dead in DusitD2 hotel siege" [online] available at [<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48621924>]

Bryden, M., & Bahra, P. (2019) "East Africa's terrorist triple helix: The Dusit Hotel attack and the historical evolution of the jihadi threat". *CTC Sentinel*, 12(6), 2-11. [Online] available from <https://ctc.usma.edu/east-africas-terrorist-triple-helix-dusit-hotel-attack-historical-evolution-jihadi-threat/>

Cannon, B. J., & Ruto Pkalya, D. (2017) 'Why al-Shabaab Attacks Kenya: Questioning the Narrative Paradigm'. [Online] *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 1-17. Available from <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3061635>

Christensen, P.H. (2018). "Where are we now? Understanding the current considerations of counter terrorism protective security when developing crowded places in Australia". [Online] available at <https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/130913>

CNN.com (2015). "147 dead, Islamist gunmen killed after attack at Kenya college" [online] available from <https://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/02/africa/kenya-university-attack/index.html> [24 May 2021]

Coaffee, J. (2018). "How do we defend against threats without turning our cities into fortresses?" [Online] available at <https://www.policyforum.net/designing-against-terror/>

Deepak Sinha (2018) "The Counter Terror Dimension to the Planning of Smart Cities" [Online] available at: <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325416896> Conference Paper · May 2018

DHS. (2018). *U.S. Department of Homeland Security Soft Targets and Crowded Places Security Plan Overview* [online] available at https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DHS-Soft-Target-Crowded-Place-Security-Plan-Overview-052018-508_0.pdf

DHS. (2019). *Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency: Security of Soft Targets and Crowded Places-Resources Guide* [online] available at <https://www.cisa.gov/publication/securing-soft-targets-and-crowded-places-resources>

DHS. (2019). *Department of Homeland Security Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence* [online] available at https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0920_plcy_strategic-framework-countering-terrorism-targeted-violence.pdf

Friedman, R. (2017). *How can we better protect crowds from terrorism?* [Online] available at <<https://theconversation.com/how-can-we-better-protect-crowds-from-terrorism-78443>>

Gakuo, O.M. (2017) Neo-elitism and counterterrorism operations in Kenya, *African Security Review*, 26:1, 12-25, DOI: 10.1080/10246029.2016.1264436

Gakuo, O.M. (2018) How Kenya is managing security 20 years after the Nairobi blast [online] available from <https://theconversation.com/how-kenya-is-managing-security-20-years-after-the-nairobi-blast-101143>

Gathii, S.W. (2018). *Assessment Of Disaster Preparedness against Terror Attacks in Boarding Secondary Schools: A Case Of Public Boarding Secondary Schools In Githunguri Sub-County, Kiambu County, Kenya* [Online] MA thesis Available from <http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/105577>

Gatuiku, P.V.G. (2016.) *Countering Terrorism in the Horn of Africa: A Case Study of Kenya*. (Master's Thesis, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, [online] available from <http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/99276>

GCTF. (2017). The GCTF Soft Target Protective Initiative. Antalya Memorandum on the Protection of Soft Targets in a Counterterrorism Context. *Global Counterterrorism Forum*. [Online] available from <https://www.thegctf.org/Portals/1/Documents/Links/Meetings/2017/Twelfth%20GCTF%20Coordinating%20Committee%20Meeting/GCTF%20-%20Antalya%20Memorandum%20on%20the%20Protection%20of%20Soft%20Targets%20in%20a%20Counterterrorism%20Context.pdf?ver=2017-09-17-010844-720>

Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) (2023) Global Terrorism Index [online] available from <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GTI-2023-web-170423.pdf>

Grosskopf, Kevin R. (2006) "Evaluating the Societal Response to Antiterrorism Measures," *Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management*: Vol. 3: Iss. 2, Article 1. DOI: 10.2202/1547-7355.1170

Guardian, (2010) Uganda bomb blasts kill at least 74 [online] available at <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/12/uganda-kampala-bombs-explosions-attacks>>

Hoffman, Bruce. (2017) (3rd Ed) *Inside Terrorism* New York: Columbia University Press

Home Office (2012) *Protecting Crowded Places: Design and Technical Issues* online available from <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97992/design-tech-issues.pdf>

Home Office. (2018) CONTEST The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism June 2018 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/716907/140618_CCS207_CCS0218929798-1_CONTEST_3.0_WEB.pdf

Hussein, Gure Diriye. (2015). *The Effect of Terrorism On Tourism in Africa in The 21st Century: A Case Study of Kenya* [Online] MA Thesis Nairobi: University of Nairobi. Available from < <http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/94826>>

International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. (2021). Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness online available from <https://icct.nl/handbook-of-terrorism-prevention-and-preparedness/>

Jenkins, Brian Michael and Butterworth, Bruce R. (2018). "An Analysis of Vehicle Ramming as a Terrorist Threat" Mineta Transportation Institute Publications.

Jeremy Lind, Patrick Mutahi & Marjoke Oosterom (2017) 'Killing a mosquito with a hammer': Al-Shabaab violence and state security responses in Kenya, *Peacebuilding*, 5:2, 118-135, DOI: [10.1080/21647259.2016.1277010](https://doi.org/10.1080/21647259.2016.1277010)

Kamau, J. W. (2021) 'Is counter-terrorism counterproductive? A case study of Kenya's response to terrorism, 1998-2020'. [Online] *South African Journal of International Affairs*, 1-29. Available from <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10220461.2021.1924252> [01 August 2021]

Kibusia, Joseph Kalyamoi. (2019) *Contribution of the Multiagency Approach to Security in the Fight against Terrorism in Kenya: Case of Disciplined Forces* Master of Science in Governance Peace and Security Thesis Nairobi: Africa Nazarene University

Law, Randall D. (2016) (2nd Ed) *Terrorism: A History* Cambridge: Polity Press

Lehr, P. (2019). Archipelagos of Fear: CT Technology and the Securitisation of Everyday Life: A Critical Assessment available at DOI: [10.1007/978-3-319-90924-0_12](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-90924-0_12)

Leting, M. (2021). Counter-Terrorism Security Interventions in Kenya: Effect of Public Security Screening on Social Relations in Nairobi County. *International Journal of Sociology and Anthropology Research*, Accessed on 20th Sept 2021 <https://ssrn.com/abstract=3799192>

Manchester Arena Inquiry. (2021). An independent public inquiry to investigate the deaths of the victims of the 2017 Manchester Arena terror attack [online] available from <https://manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk/>

Martin, Paul. (2019). *The Rules of Security: Staying safe in a risky world* Oxford: Oxford University Press

McIlhatton, D., Chapman, J. D., Christensen, P., Berry, J., Cuddihy, J., Monaghan, R. (2018) 'Protecting Crowded Places from terrorism: An analysis of the current considerations and barriers inhibiting the adoption of counter terrorism protective security measures. [Online] *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Available from <<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2018.1507311?tab=permissions&scroll=top>>

McIlhatton, D., Monaghan, R., Berry, J., Cuddihy, J., Chapman, D., & Christensen, P. (2019). Protecting Commercial Real Estate and Crowded Places from Terrorism. *Journal of Real Estate Literature*, 27(1), 103-116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2019.12090494>

McIlhatton, David and Monaghan, Rachel. (2021). Protecting Publicly Accessible Locations from Terrorism [online] available from <https://crestresearch.ac.uk/comment/protecting-publicly-accessible-locations-from-terrorism/>

Misra, A. (2018). Australia's Counter-Terrorism Policies Since September 11, 2001: Harmonizing National Security, Independent Oversight and Individual Liberties. *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 42, Issue. 2, pp. 103-118, Accessed on 11th Sept 2021. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2018.1439325>

Mogire, Edward & Mkutu, Agade Kennedy. (2011) Counter-terrorism in Kenya, *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 29:4, 473-491, DOI: 10.1080/02589001.2011.600849 To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02589001.2011.600849>

Mohamed Ali. (2021). *Evaluation of Effectiveness of Counter-Terror Measures to National Security in Kenya* MA Thesis in Diplomacy and Foreign Relations Eldoret: Moi University

Momanyi, S. M. (2015). *The Impact of Al-Shabab Terrorist Attacks in Kenya* (Master's thesis, UiT Norges arktiske universitet). Available at <<https://munin.uit.no/handle/10037/9848?show=full>> [18 July 2021]

Monaghan, Rachel and McIlhatton, David. (2021). Prevention of Bomb Attacks by Terrorists in Urban Settings: Improvised Explosive Devices in *Handbook of Terrorism Prevention and Preparedness* <https://icct.nl/app/uploads/2021/10/Chapter-23-Handbook-.pdf> [12 August 2021]

Musoma, A. L. (2021). Multi-Agency Response to International Terrorism in Kenya: A Comparison of Dusit D2 and Westgate Terror Attacks. *African Journal of Empirical Research*, 2(1&2), 68–84. <https://doi.org/10.51867/ajer.v2i2.23>

Musoma, Albert Lusiola. (2021) "Structural and Legal Frameworks Guiding Multi-Agency Operations and Countering Terrorism in Kenya" *International Journal of Advances in Scientific Research and Engineering* (ijasre) E-ISSN: 2454-8006 DOI: 10.31695/IJASRE.2021.33962 Volume 7, Issue 1 January - 2021 www.ijasre.net Page 36 Licensed Under Creative Commons Attribution CC BY-NC

Mustafa Yusuf Ali, Mumo Nzau and Hassan Khannenje. (2018). *The Changing Dynamics of Terrorism & Violent Extremism: An Analysis Vol.1* Nairobi: HORN Institute

Nasongo, Joseph Wamocha. (2018). The Effectiveness of Kenya's Counterterrorism Measures Since 1998 *International Journal of Research Science and Management* DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.1341658

National Counter-Terrorism Centre (2019) "Strengthening Civil and Business Security of High Risk Targets for National Continuity" unpublished paper (Nairobi: NCTC)

New York Times. (2013) Gunmen Kill Dozens in Terror Attack at Kenyan Mall [online] available from <https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/22/world/africa/nairobi-mall-shooting.html> [16 August 2021]

Nzau, Mumo and Guyo, Mohammed (2018). "The Challenge of Securing Kenya: Past Experience, Present Challenges and Future Prospects," *The Journal of Social Encounters*: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, 37-59. Available at: https://digitalcommons.csbsju.edu/social_encounters/vol2/iss1/4

Odipo, G.O. (2015). *The Nexus between the Built Environment and Counter-terrorism Measures in the Urban Areas: A Case Study of the City of Nairobi since 1998*. MA Thesis Nairobi: University of Nairobi. [Online] available at <<http://erepository.uonbi.ac.ke/handle/11295/101859>>

Opalo, K. (2019). "How corruption and impunity are aiding terrorism in Kenya" Daily Nation [Online] available from <<https://nation.africa/kenya/news/how-corruption-and-impunity-are-aiding-terrorism-in-kenya-139084>>

Sinha, D. (2008). The Counterterror Dimension to the Planning of Smart Cities [Online] ORF Issue Brief May 2018 issue No.241 available from <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/325416896/>>

Sorcha, Gabrielle Clarke. (2019). *Protecting Crowded Places from Terrorism: The Potentiality of the Urban Planning System in Counter Terrorism Practice* PhD thesis Ulster University Ulster: Ulster University

START. (2013). Al-Shabaab Attack on Westgate Mall in Kenya [Online] available from <https://www.start.umd.edu/publication/al-shabaab-attack-westgate-mall-kenya>

Sundoko, H., Akbar, R., Zulkaidi, D., & Argo, T. (2018). Perception of Terror Risk and the Security of Counter-Terrorism Design in Public Spaces. *International Journal of Technology*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Accessed on: 29th Aug 2021. <https://dx.doi.org/10.14716/ijtech.v9i3.1931>

United Nations (2021). Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) Virtual open briefing of the Counter-Terrorism Committee on "Protection of 'soft' targets against terrorist attacks" [online] available from <https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ctc/news/virtual-open-briefing-counter-terrorism-committee-%E2%80%99Cprotection-%E2%80%99soft%E2%80%99-targets-against-terrorist>

United Nations (2022). Global Programme on the Protection of Vulnerable Targets [Online] available from <https://www.un.org/counterterrorism/global-programme-protection-vulnerable-targets>