

Appendix 1

Profile of the Republic of Malta and its Government

Malta – a brief outline of its geography, history and economy

Malta is a democratic republic consisting of three main inhabited islands (see **Figure 1** below) – Malta, Gozo and Comino – located south of Sicily in the centre of the Mediterranean Sea. The archipelago, which derives its name from the largest of the three islands, covers a land area of 315.59 square kilometres and, in September 2002, had a resident population of 386,200 (Economic Planning Division, 2002).

Figure 1 - Map of the Maltese Islands



Malta's history dates back to around 5000 BC, which, according to archaeologists, is the time when humans first set foot on these islands. Since then, and probably due to its strategic geographical position, the archipelago was dominated and governed by successive Mediterranean powers including the Phoenicians (800 – 400 BC), the Carthaginians (480 – 218 BC), the Roman Empire (218 BC – 395 AD), the Aghlabite Arabs (870), the Byzantines (1048), the Normans (1090), the Swabians [Germans] (1194-1266), the Angevins [French] (1266 – 1283), the Aragonese [Spanish] (1283 –

1530), the Order of St. John (1530 – 1798), the French [under Napoleon] (1798 – 1799) and, finally, the British (1799 – 1964) (<http://www.doi.gov.mt/en/islands/location.asp> ;<http://www.doi.gov.mt/EN/islands/dates.asp>, 14 November 2002)

Although subject to the British Empire for almost two centuries, the Maltese enjoyed varying degrees of representation in the administration of the Islands over successive periods of time. Probably among the most notable were the first elections of a minority representation to a Council of Government in 1849, followed by the first form of self-Government in 1921 and 1947. In both the latter cases, control of the Islands was, for a short period of time, vested in a diarchical system of government, that ensured autonomy of internal affairs in the Maltese-led Government, but which left matters such as defence, immigration, nationality, and foreign treaties reserved in the hands of the British-appointed Governor-General (<http://www.doi.gov.mt/en/islands/ages.asp>, 14 November 2002).

Malta finally gained its full independence on the 21st September 1964. Ten years later, on the 13th December 1974, it became a sovereign republic with its first President replacing Queen Elizabeth II as Head of State.

Malta's economy has traditionally survived on the provision of services. From the mid 16th century through to its independence in 1964, the islands served as a fortress colony and the economy was heavily dependent upon the provision of support services to its rulers, most notably, to their military and defence needs. However, with the gradual withdrawal of the British military forces in the fifties and sixties, and with Malta's proclamation of neutrality and non-alignment in its 1964 independence constitution, the need for diversifying the country's economic activity became a priority for the islands' economic policy makers (Warrington, 1995: 2). Throughout the sixties and the seventies, Maltese governments followed the developmental orthodoxy current at the time, by promoting manufacturing industry, notably in clothing and, latterly, in the assembly of electronic components (Warrington, 1995: 2). At the same time, direct Government intervention in the economy, both as employer and investor, was very high, continuing also well into the eighties.

The focus on productive industrial activity started to change in the late eighties, with the nineties experiencing an upsurge in tourism and other market services¹. The economic policies of Government also changed radically; rapidly moving from a philosophy of nationalisation, import substitution and monopoly trade, to one of privatisation and market liberalisation.

Today, market service activities provide the largest contribution to the economic activity of the country, providing employment for 36.8% of the gainfully occupied labour force and contributing to 48.8% of the Gross Domestic Product (at factor cost) as at September 2002 (Economic Planning Division, 2002: 227, 35).

With 136,964 gainfully occupied people, out of a total labour supply of 144,484 (Economic Planning Division, 2002: 227), the country's GDP at factor cost for the period January - September 2002 stood at approximately Lm 1,072 million (\$2.4 billion) (Economic Planning Division, 2002: 225).

The Government of Malta

Since gaining independence in 1964, Malta has enjoyed a parliamentary system of democracy with its government and administration approximating the Westminster model (Warrington, 1995: 3). The country's written Constitution provides for a separation of powers through the establishment of a Parliament, a Judiciary and an Executive.

The Constitution of Malta provides for a legislature that consists of a single chamber – the House of Representatives – which is currently composed of sixty-five members elected from thirteen electoral divisions upon the principle of proportional representation. Unless dissolved earlier, a Parliament is re-elected at five-year intervals.

The judiciary is composed of superior and inferior courts presided by judges and magistrates respectively. Judges and magistrates are appointed by the President in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister, and can only be removed from office on grounds of proven misbehaviour or proven inability to perform one's

¹ Including transport and communications, wholesale and retail trade, insurance, banking and real estate, property income and private services (Economic Planning Division, 1999: 31).

functions, and only following a resolution by Parliament supported by not less than two-thirds of its members.

The Head of State is the President of Malta. Although formally vested with the executive authority of the country, the President's ability to act on his own deliberate judgement is only limited to certain functions as prescribed by the Constitution. With exception to these, the exercise of any other executive function is done in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or a Minister acting on its behalf (Laws of Malta, 1999, Article 85, Subarticle (1)). It is in fact Cabinet, which consists of the Prime Minister and a number of Ministers (thirteen, as at November 2002), that is vested with the general direction and control of the Government of Malta (Laws of Malta, 1999, Article 79, Subarticle(2)). In exercising their functions, Ministers are charged with the responsibility for various departments and agencies whose role it is to administer the business of government as directed by Cabinet through the same Minister. In performing their duties, Ministers may be assisted by Parliamentary Secretaries appointed by the President in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister from among members of the House of Representatives, and / or by Permanent Secretaries appointed from among public officers by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister, after consulting the Public Service Commission.

As at November 2002, the administration of Government was divided into fourteen portfolios, each one led by a member of Cabinet. The portfolios include the following:

Portfolio	Entities / Areas of Responsibility
Office of the Prime Minister	Armed Forces; Oil Exploration; Public Service; Information; Government Information Technology Services; Government Printing Press.
Ministry for Social Policy	Social Security; Family and Social Welfare, the Elderly, Women in Society and Housing; Industrial Relations, Labour, Employment and Training, and Co-operative Systems; Housing, Construction and Maintenance; Parliamentary Affairs.
Ministry of Education	Education; Science and Technology Policy; Libraries and Archives; Museums; Culture, the Arts, Theatres and Mediterranean Conference Centre; Youth and Sports; Public Broadcasting Services.

Ministry for Resources and Infrastructure	Capital Construction Projects; Public Cleaning, Drainage, Waste Management; Malta Resources Authority; Building Industry Consultative Council.
Ministry of Finance	Budget Office; Accountant General's Office; Inland Revenue; Customs and Excise; Indirect Taxation; Public Lotto; Central Bank; Malta Financial Services Centre; Malta Stock Exchange; Contracts
Ministry for Tourism	Tourism.
Ministry for Transport and Communications	Civil Aviation; Malta Maritime Authority; Public Transport Authority; Traffic Planning, Arterial and Distributory Roads; Vehicle Licensing and Inspectorate; Postal Services Regulator; Wireless Telegraphy; Telecommunications Regulator.
Ministry for Economic Services	Small Business and the Self-Employed; Industry; Malta Development Corporation; Institute for the Promotion of Small Enterprises; Malta Freeport Corporation; Economic Development Policy; Technical Assistance; Statistics; Import and Export Trade; Consumer Protection; Competition Policy; Industrial Property; Malta Standards Authority; Malta Export Trade Centre Organisation; Government Investments (including Air Malta plc, Maltacom plc, Malta International Airport plc, Drydocks and Shipbuilding, Water Services Corporation, and Enemalta Corporation).
Ministry for Agriculture and Fisheries	Agriculture; Horticulture; Fisheries; Aquaculture
Ministry for Home Affairs	Police; ID Cards; Immigration; Civil Protection; Airport Security; Security Services; Office of Commissioner for Refugees; Correctional Services; Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs; Notary to Government; Government Property Division (Land, Estate Management, Joint Office); Land & Public Registry Division (Land Registry, Civil Registration - Passports, Public Registry); Malta Environment & Planning Authority.
Ministry for Gozo	Gozo Affairs.
Ministry for Health	Health
Ministry for Foreign Affairs	Relations with the European Union; Relations with Foreign and Commonwealth Countries; Relations with International Institutions.
Ministry for Justice and Local Government	Attorney General's Office; Courts of Justice; Justice; Local Government; Quality Services Charters; Data Protection.

The content of Ministerial portfolios almost invariably changes after every new election and some element of 're-shuffling' also typically occurs mid-way through an Administration.

As at the end of September 2002, total employment in the public sector stood at 47,651 or 34.7% of the total gainfully occupied people in the labour force (Economic Planning Division, 2002: 227). Employment in the civil service accounted for approximately 64% of all public sector appointments, or 30,349 jobs (Economic Planning Division, 2002: 227). The Ministry of Education is the largest employer, with just over 7,500 civil servants, followed by the Ministry of Health (just under 5,800) and the Ministry for Resources and Infrastructure (approximately 3,900) (Budget Office, 2003).

Civil service departments, of which there are around 50, are staffed by career public officers who are appointed, disciplined and removed from office by the Prime Minister. Civil servants are organised into numerous occupational grades falling within 20 pay scales or classes. Although recruitment remains largely a centralised function, residing within the Management and Personnel Office of the Office of the Prime Minister, and subject to the scrutiny of a Public Service Commission², some elements of decentralisation are occurring.

Further information on Malta and its Government can be found on its official website: <http://www.gov.mt>

² An autonomous and independent body established by Article 109 of the Constitution of Malta.

Appendix 2

Research Design

In large measure, the choice and selection of a research methodology³ is based on the nature and content of the issue being investigated and on the objectives or outcomes that a study is seeking to achieve. Equally important is the need to give due consideration to the preferred philosophical perspective (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), the type and form of data that is available or that is being sought, and the scope of the study itself. These elements can come together in a number of different ways, with each different combination prescribing a different and unique paradigm. It is this paradigm, and not solely one of its constituent elements, that should guide decisions on the choice and selection of research methodologies.

1.0 The Research Paradigm

1.1 The Approach

One way of defining the different approaches to research is to categorise them into three main classifications – pure, applied and action research – distinguished primarily by the outcomes that are assumed to emerge from the study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991: 6). Pure research is primarily intended to lead to theoretical developments. It is about discovering new things, inventing new approaches to existing constructs, or applying what is already known in new or different contexts. In contrast, applied research is more focused on leading to the solution of specific problems, and is less concerned with the development of theory as an end in itself. Action research builds upon the position adopted by applied research to incorporate change itself as part of the objective and outcome of the study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991).

Approaches to research may also be distinguished on the basis of their theoretical grounding (Gill and Johnson, 1991). Two categories emerge. The first, known as inductive research, is based on an approach that leads to the formation of abstract concepts and generalisations after observing, reflecting upon, and explaining, concrete experiences that include facts and/or behaviours (Gill and Johnson, 1991). The second approach – deductive research – starts where the other ends. It begins

³ Defined as “the analysis of how research should or does proceed, as opposed to *methods* of research, which are the actual techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data” (Blaikie, 1995: 7) [*italics added for emphasis*].

with the formation of an abstract construct, developed *a priori* by the researcher or by others, and subsequently moves to apply and test it, so as to examine the implications of the conceptualised theory (Gill and Johnson, 1991).

This research is driven by a motivation to seek a solution to a current problem, with the expectation that this will provide the opportunity for effective change. As such, it has little in common with pure research and shares greater affinity with the principles and objectives of applied and action research. Furthermore, given that the research is not based on an existing hypothesis of what constitutes success or failure in policy implementation but, rather, aims to investigate an existing phenomenon by building data 'ground-up', the approach of this study is essentially inductive in nature.

1.2 The Philosophical Basis

"Philosophy is the study or creation of theories about basic things" (Collins Cobuild English Dictionary: 1237).

There are a number of methodologies that, based on specific ontological and epistemological positions, prescribe how researchers should philosophise. The ontological assumptions can be viewed as realist (reality is external and objective) or constructivist (where reality is produced and determined by the meanings given to it by persons and society), while the epistemological positions of a research are either external (outside of, and independent from, what is being researched) or internal (the researcher interacting with the subject of the study to gain inside knowledge of the phenomenon being researched) (Blaikie, 1995: 202). Using these constructs, two methodologies – Positivism and Interpretivism – are particularly distinct from one another.

Originating in the natural sciences, the positivist view can be regarded as being ontologically realist and epistemologically external. In the first instance, it prescribes the use of objective, structured methods for examining, recording and calculating the deterministic response of the object under investigation. In the second, it is based on the belief that knowledge can only be of significance if it is derived from factual data and observation that is free from the biases or value-laden beliefs of the researcher and / or the subjects researched (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991). Because of these reasons, the positivist philosophy seems most suited to situations where the subject of the research is an inert object, and when it is possible to isolate

and independently manipulate the variables determining its behaviour with the physical world, without affecting the natural interaction and relationship of its constituent elements. Because of this same logic, the application of positivism to research in the social sciences has received a fair amount of criticism by proponents of the interpretivist (phenomenological) view.

Interpretivists consider a constructivist ontology and an internal epistemology as the suitable approach for social science research (Blaikie, 1995). They oppose the principles and application of positivism primarily because of the fundamental differences between the subject matter of the research. Quoting Laing (1967), Gill and Johnson (1991: 34) state that, “persons (the subject of a social enquiry) are distinguished from things in that persons experience the world, whereas things behave in the world”. It is therefore the meaning that people ascribe to things or to situations that makes action intelligible. This, and not the gathering of facts or the measurement of how certain patterns occur, is what constitutes knowledge. By acknowledging that reality is socially constructed, and that it is as objective as it is objectified (Hatch, 1997: 42), the task of the researcher is to understand why people have different experiences by gaining a direct understanding of it.

Insofar as this DBA research is concerned with understanding a ‘gap’ in what is essentially a human relationship (individuals that formulate policy, *interacting* with those who implement it), it is believed that, for the reasons mentioned above, an interpretivist enquiry that uncovers the meaning that people attribute to current and past happenings provides deeper insights to the root cause of the problem, than would otherwise result from adopting a positivist approach. Furthermore, by immersing the study in the social context of the problem being investigated, it is believed that any recommended solutions will ultimately gain greater acceptance by decision makers and implementers alike, as these proposals will be the mere articulation of solutions of their own rendition.

1.3 The Data Source

As previously concluded from the literature review, there currently exists limited information on policy implementation and, specifically, on the factors influencing success or failure. Furthermore, the extent to which these factors are present in, and/or applicable to the Maltese context, also seems to be empirically unexplored.

Therefore, while due consideration is given to existing knowledge imparted in the literature, this study predominantly relies upon information generated from primary data.

1.4 The Size of the Investigation

To be meaningful, it is critical that the research is based upon a detailed inquiry of the issue of interest, and that it adequately addresses considerations of research validity and reliability. There are two basic elements to consider – the depth of the study, and its breadth. The extent to which each is applied is a reflection of the research question and the objective of the study.

Generally speaking, breadth is an important consideration for studies that either attempt to test some hypothesis, or that aim to extend the validity of some theory or empirical finding beyond the context of the research from which they emanate – i.e., studies that generally test the universal applicability (external validity) of some given statement or concept. On the other hand, studies that aim to explore and make sense of some observed phenomenon are likely to gain more from in-depth studies, as these tend to focus more on discovering and attributing the meaning behind the various elements of such phenomenon. By so doing, these studies ensure that the development of theoretical considerations that explain the observed phenomenon are more comprehensive in nature and deeper in significance.

Given the variables of the research paradigm defined so far, the scope of this research places far greater emphasis on depth, than it does on breadth. The reason for this is that the emphasis of the research is on developing an *understanding* of the current perceived inability to translate policy into effective strategic action⁴. By examining an example of successful and unsuccessful policy initiatives, the study attempts to develop a theoretical framework that explains what contributes to success and failure – the prime objective of this research. Using this framework as a reference point, further research can then be directed towards examining the generalisability of the proposed concepts in different policy settings and in different socio-political contexts. It is at this point that comparative assessments arise and that considerations of breadth become more important than depth.

⁴ Section 1.3, page 11.

As shall be explained later, this research is based on the application of the case study technique. Two case studies of policy implementation in Malta were examined. The chosen policies were considered to be representative of failure and of success and were selected following an interview process. To reduce the potential of sampling bias, the subject policies were selected from different sectoral organisations within government.

2.0 Choosing The Research Methods

Given that this study;

- seeks a solution to a problem;
- is concerned with exploring and explaining the cause and meaning that people attribute to particular situations and events;
- is largely dependent on first-hand investigation; and
- is focused on events across different organisational boundaries;

the position adopted by this study should consider APPLIED or ACTION research, an INTERPRETATIVIST philosophy, reliance on PRIMARY research investigation, and an IN-DEPTH, CROSS-SECTIONAL approach.

The choice of research method(s) must be guided by these elements.

2.1 Quantitative vs Qualitative Methods

There are different methods for conducting research, but these can generally be classified into two categories – qualitative research and quantitative research. The distinction between the two is not always clear, but comparisons may be possible depending on the approach used in collecting and analysing data (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991: 116).

In **qualitative** research, data collection and analysis, involving data reduction, display and conclusion drawing, is often a continuous and iterative process (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 12). A researcher may collect data through primary or secondary means and begin to analyse the data so as to uncover patterns, concepts, events etc. In the process, he / she may be intrigued by what emerges, prompting further data collection and further analysis. This may especially happen

when the researcher is only guided by an indicative agenda or no agenda at all. In qualitative research, data collection and analysis are not generally limited by pre-established boundaries of action and a researcher is normally free (and encouraged) to probe into as much detail and in as many directions as deemed necessary.

In contrast, in **quantitative** techniques, the process of data collection becomes distinct from analysis (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991: 116). Data collection is usually structured and focused on specific issues, rather than being broadly defined, or not defined at all. It aims to explore, describe or explain relationships between the elements under investigation, but normally does so within the confines of the questions or statements that direct the research itself. Quantitative research methods normally employ highly structured techniques, such as questionnaires and surveys, which by nature are designed to focus (limit) the pursuit of new routes for discussion so that deviations from the central theme of an issue under investigation are restricted. Such techniques do not normally provide the researcher or the interviewee with the immediate opportunity of probing further into an issue that may arise during the interview itself. The data analysis that follows is thus very standardised. It is prescriptively based on rigorous norms, patterns and techniques, is very often concerned with measuring the frequency of occurrence of an event, and is normally directed at achieving an objective, external measurement of the elements of the study (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991). Consequently, it is not normally aimed at providing an interpretation of the *meanings* that construe the elements under investigation, as happens with qualitative research.

As such, quantitative and qualitative research methods are suitable for different research paradigms. Studies that are large or broad in scope and that seek to obviate or minimise the intervention of the researcher in data collection and analysis, will favour quantitative research methods because of the high standardisation of data collection and analysis, and the limited role of the researcher's subjectivity. On the other hand, qualitative research is more suitable for relatively small-scale enquiries, where it is both possible and desired that the researcher's mode of engagement is personal, interventional and in depth. Furthermore, quantitative methods may be more suitable for deductive research that particularly aims at testing pre-defined hypothesis or theories (Gill and Johnson, 1991). In contrast, the flexible approach to data collection and analysis employed by qualitative methods provides more scope

for inductive research that is aimed at exploring data and constructs for the formation of practice-based theories.

This DBA research is about uncovering and explaining people's interpretation of issues and events in a specific context. Rather than being concerned with the testing of some theory or hypothesis, it is focused on identifying concepts and constructs that may inductively lead to the generation of a theory that gives meaning to the phenomena under study. Relying upon quantitative research methods is likely to limit this purpose and a predominantly qualitative approach⁵ is therefore considered more suitable. To this end, participant observation, action research and case study research, were considered as being potential qualitative methods for this research.

2.2 Participant Observation

Participant observation has its roots in ethnographic research (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991). Applied to management research, this method is used by researchers to study different aspects of an organisation's culture and social relationships.

The field research of participant observation may follow any one of four different approaches (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991: 96). As defined by Easterby-Smith et al (1991), the first is complete participation, where the researcher gains full access to the organisation and works in it as a member of staff alongside other employees. This approach allows the researcher to become totally immersed in the social context of the organisation, thereby allowing him / her to gain 'first-hand' experience of the phenomenon under study. The researcher's role may be hidden, or made explicit, depending on how the firm's management and employees are likely to perceive the researcher, and how this may hinder the 'natural' setting of the organisation's daily operations. The second option is for the researcher to participate in the organisation as an observer. In this case, the researcher works alongside other employees, but his / her role as an 'outsider' is made known to everyone. While this approach may overcome the ethical issues of working with people in a covert manner, it has the disadvantage of potentially disrupting the

⁵ An element of quantitative research is also employed in the study (towards the beginning of Project 3).

natural setting of a particular social context, which is what the research itself is trying to examine. The third approach is for the researcher to observe an organisation in an interrupted fashion by moving in and out of it over different periods of time. In this case, the researcher's role is explicit, and direct participation in the organisation's work is replaced by external observation and occasional interviews. Finally, the researcher may choose to adopt a complete observational role. Under this option, the researcher's role is totally external and interaction with the subjects of the research is avoided. As such, however, it is criticised as a qualitative methodology and it is considered of little, if any, use to researchers interested in a social constructionist view.

In the context of this DBA, participant observation as a research method would have limited application. Firstly, participant observation is primarily driven by an interest to study a contemporary issue through the observation of current and live relationships and interactions. As judgments of success or failure in policy implementation can only be made post-event, it would not have been possible to select, *a priori*, examples of successful or failed initiatives to be observed in a live setting. Secondly, as a research method, participant observation seems to focus more on the examination of some group behaviour than of individual action. In contrast, the DBA research is primarily concerned with issues pertaining to person-to-person relationships, as well as the thoughts, values, actions and influences of different stakeholders. As such, establishing a direct interaction with stakeholders on a personal one-to-one basis is believed to lead to more meaningful information than would result from observation.

2.3 Action Research

In a certain way action research may be seen as an evolution of the method of complete participant observation. Like the latter, it is motivated by a social constructionist philosophy and places emphasis on the need for the researcher to become immersed and integrated in the social context of what is being examined. However, in addition to this, action research also places great importance on the adoption of a collaborative style of enquiry, wherein the subjects of the study themselves share the role of 'co-researcher' and become fully immersed in the research (Reason, 1994: 325). In this way, action research aims

“to help the individual practitioner develop skills of reflective practice and [the] organisation and community members [to] develop a culture of open enquiry as part of their work life” (Reason, 2001).

The researcher’s role in action research, and his / her degree of involvement, may however extend beyond the principles of the social constructionist approach.

“For Interpretivism, the social world *is* the world perceived and experienced by its members, from the ‘inside’. Hence, the task of the social scientist is to discover and describe this ‘insider’ view, not to impose an ‘outsider’ view on it” (Blaikie, 1995: 176) (emphasis in original text).

However, it is this same ‘intrusion’ by the researcher, coupled with the active involvement of the subjects of the research that gives this method its distinctive character. Action research is based on the belief that maximising everyone’s involvement in a research study will enrich experiences, will yield more varied interpretations of the phenomenon under study and, consequently, will generate more knowledge. Applied to a management context, this provides organisations with a better opportunity to learn about themselves and how the knowledge gained can be used to benefit their interaction with the world (Kemmis and McTaggart, 2000). As a mode of social enquiry, action research is therefore

“a move away from a primarily reflective science about action .. toward critical inquiry-in-action, in individuals, groups, organizations and the wider community” (Reason and Torbert, 1999: 7).

Reason (1999) identifies three research strategies; first person research, second person research and third person research. What differs between each of these strategies is the mode and extent of engagement of the persons involved in the research. First person research is concerned with developing a self-reflective attitude to one’s own actions so as to assess one’s relationship with the outside world. It is therefore focused on the individual. Second person research extends this inquiry to include other people through face-to-face or one-to-one relationships. The aim is to share experiences and interpretations of oneself and the surrounding environment. In third person research, this is further extended through the engagement of larger groups and communities. At each successive level, the individual, the small group and the organisation / community are learning about themselves and others through reflective action and inquiry. They are learning about what action, or inaction, leads to productive social behaviour and positive

relationships, and what action is eroding social interaction and producing negative outcomes. With this knowledge, corrective action can be taken to alter current behaviours in a way that life in general is improved.

It is fair to state that all types and forms of research pursue knowledge. Furthermore, research (at least that done for altruistic purposes) aims to indicate ways by which the application of such knowledge can be used to change current social behaviour so as to improve life. However, it is not expected that all research will necessarily lead to change. The information made available by a researcher to an individual, group or organisation may or may not gain his / their / its acceptance. The results of the research may also be disbelieved and abandoned, or may be accepted as correct but are not taken seriously and pursued. As such, the changes that conventional research methods propose may remain unimplemented.

Action research does not follow this trend. Unlike other modes of research that aim to inform behaviour and promote avenues for change, action research is intended to mobilise behaviour that delivers change (Eden and Huxham, 1996). The individual, group or organisation that would normally be required to implement change on the basis of the knowledge generated by someone's research study, does not need to be informed of what changes are required to address a particular problem and how these will effect him / it. Nor do they need to be motivated to induce the proposed change. Having been actively involved in the study, they have pro-actively contributed to generating such knowledge, they are already aware of how this can improve their social life, and they are therefore self-motivated to implement the necessary changes.

The characteristics and potential outcomes of action research should attract a lot of attention and support for management research. However, it may not always be possible to mobilise the extent and level of support required so that the individuals in an organisation become fully engaged in this mode of research. Some people may be totally sceptical of the approach. Some managers may view this as an erosion of their power and authority, while some employees may simply not be interested in improving or changing their current behaviour and work relationships. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that one of the key features of action research is its emergent quality, where the facilitator's job is to help an organisation and its members develop the capacities they require to be a learning, inquiring system

(Reason, 2001), possibly by engaging in 'double-loop' learning or self-reflective practice (Morgan, 1997). As such, action research may, in the long run, mobilise support. This may suit some research projects, but not others, where time constraints are another key limiting factor. The investment in time and effort required to make such participative action fruitful may exceed the researcher's limitations. Furthermore, even if support is immediately forthcoming, it may then not be possible for the researcher to manage this mode of enquiry. The size of the investigation could be too large to handle and / or the resources required to manage it are not available.

Action research would be a suitable approach for this DBA study as the active involvement of the people who are party to the policy-strategy cycle is likely to deliver conclusive change for the reasons mentioned above. However, a number of constraints limit the use of this approach. Firstly, like the limitation with participant observation, action research is directed at a current or future event. It is not possible to make *a priori* judgments of which current policy initiatives will turn out to be successful or not and, therefore, the ability to select the units of analysis is impaired. Secondly, while the DBA sponsor is supportive of a study that will investigate the possible causes creating a performance barrier in the policy-strategy cycle of the Public Service, the study itself is not intended as an instrument or measure to deliver change. Thirdly, it is not possible for the researcher to become 'fully immersed' in the study⁶. The researcher is a consultant to the Public Service and the time spent with and in the organisations from which the units of analysis would be drawn is constantly changing. Fourthly, while the key stakeholders may be supportive of the research study, they are unlikely to have the time or inclination to be *actively* involved in it.

2.4 Case Study Research

While it may not be possible to engage in a fully action-oriented mode of research, it is nonetheless imperative that the study is practice-based. There are two reasons for this. The first is that this is an intrinsic requirement of the study's terms of

⁶ Some proponents of action research argue that this research strategy can be equally effective if facilitated from 'outside' an organisation. I would disagree with this, concurring with other equally authoritative proponents in the field who argue that such a position runs counter to the very fundamental epistemological position of action research; i.e., FULL participative democracy (Reason, 1994).

reference. Although, as mentioned earlier, the research is not intended to deliver conclusive change, it is expected to propose a solution that could either serve decision-makers as a potential blueprint for change, or that provides valuable insights as to what tangible action is required to overcome the problem, and how this could be undertaken. The second reason for undertaking a practice-based approach emerges from the distinctive nature of the research itself. As an example of 'management research', it:

"is concerned not only with 'knowing what', but goes beyond this to consider questions associated with 'knowing how'. It is concerned to build a body of knowledge which documents, codifies and articulates a problem and solution-set concerned with understanding and improving the practice of management". (Tranfield and Starkey, 1998: 346).

The concept of generating knowledge within a context of application underscores the philosophy of grounded theory. Coined by Glaser and Strauss (1967), grounded theory is prescriptive of inductive research whereby theory is created or discovered through observation and reflection of particular factual cases and events. As such, the theory that is developed is 'nothing more' than the codification of knowledge that exists in reality, but the existence of which is probably tacit and unexplored. The researcher's job is to identify incidents that give meaning to a phenomenon; to code these cases in comparative categories; to examine their characteristics or properties; and to offer propositions for their inter-relationship (Partington, 2000). As a result of this, a series of hypothesis or theories may emerge that explain the phenomenon.

Case study research is particularly apt for the generation of grounded theory. Like other qualitative research methods, it relies on continuous data collection and analysis. However, unlike other traditional methods, it is more flexible, typically combining different methods of both qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques, such as archives, interviews, questionnaires and observations (Yin, 1994).

As a research strategy, it can follow the traditional norms of grounded theory relying upon the emergence of data categories, concepts and theoretical constructs solely from gathered evidence (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 33). In this case the researcher starts 'from scratch', trying to make sense of a situation by observing events and scouring through various sources of information to gather data that may or may not be relevant and / or related. However, case study research has also been

successfully used when *a priori* tentative constructs exist, or are defined by the researcher, to help shape the initial design of theory-building initiatives (Eisenhardt, 1989: 536). This approach helps to bring a sense of order and direction to what otherwise is a highly unstructured process.

It may also be possible to design case study research so that it draws upon the 'good practices' of other research methods. The case study may be structured in a way that promotes different levels of subject participation at different points in time, using multiple data collection and analysis techniques (Eisenhardt, 1989). For example, data collection regarding a particular current issue can be collected through one-to-one in-depth interviews, while an attempt to attribute meaning to a past event may be explored 'through the analytical eyes' of a number of people using a group interview setting. The former approach would be particularly suited for situations where a significant level of trust already exists between the researcher and the interviewee, such that the latter does not feel threatened from an in-depth discussion that may lead to the divulgence of sensitive information. In contrast, a group interview has a number of advantages in different situations. First, individuals who may feel threatened by person-to-person interviews may not feel so in a group setting and would therefore be more prone to discuss various issues. Second, a group interview may serve to provide further evidence obtained from a single person, and / or may help to correct the false or biased recollection of past events that may arise in a one-to-one interview setting (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe et al., 1991). Third, it may provide an opportunity for people to sit down together and share different thoughts and perspectives on an issue – an opportunity that may never arise 'on the job'. Fourthly, it provides the researcher with the opportunity to examine multiple interpretations to the same phenomenon, in parallel. And, finally, it may help the researcher to gain a better appreciation of the group dynamics that may influence the issue being investigated and its occurrence.

To some extent, the principle of action research to maximise people's involvement in a study may also be possible in a case study setting through the formation of a research team composed of the researcher and a number of the organisation's staff, working together. This approach is particularly possible and suited for case within case situations, time and resources permitting.

Adopting a case study approach has the potential to overcome various aspects of the limitations of the other research methods as explained in the context of this DBA research. It is a particularly suitable strategy for the following reasons.

Firstly, as case study research is applied in its approach, the managers who may ultimately review the results of the research are likely to evaluate its methodology favourably or, at least, with less scepticism than if reviewing some of the more traditional research methods. The probability of implementing one or more of the propositions that arise from the study is therefore higher.

Secondly, it allows a flexible approach to data collection, meaning that different people can be approached to contribute to the research in different ways, depending upon their different organisational commitments and personal preferences. It is likely that this approach will maximise feedback and enrich the study.

Thirdly, it provides for the use of multiple sources of evidence, which will enable convergent lines of inquiry and improve the construct validity of the study.

Fourthly, involving different people in the organisation for data collection and analysis purposes ensures that the results of the research have been correctly interpreted and reflect reality, thereby contributing to the study's internal validity. This is further improved through the use of different research techniques to achieve methodological triangulation.

In view of the above considerations, and the belief that to build dense, well-developed, integrated and comprehensive theory requires an interplay of methods (Strauss and Corbin, 1998: 33), this research adopts a case study strategy and framework that selects, and makes use of, the most appropriate technique(s) through successive stages of the research program.

Appendix 3

Cognitive Mapping

To understand the domain of cognitive mapping, it may be useful to first examine the meaning of 'cognition' and 'maps'. Some definitions may be useful:

Cognition is the mental process involved in knowing, learning and understanding things (Collins Cobuild, 1995, p304).

A map is a drawing that gives special information about an area (Collins Cobuild, 1995, p1016).

If cognition is described as the thoughts or abstractions about oneself and one's surroundings with the intent of making sense of them, or ascribing meaning to them, and if a map is a sketch to communicate a sense of place, some sense of 'here' in relation to 'there' (Weick, 1990, citing Wilford, 1981, p7), then cognitive 'mapping' may possibly be defined as the process of ordering one's thoughts and perceptions on some particular issues in search for explanations about them and their relation with one's self. As such, cognitive maps provide a frame within which experiences can be highlighted, understood, and appreciated in depth (Weick, 1990, p5). In this context, they provide a useful tool that allows the reader to move back and forth between an understanding of the whole and its reduction and analysis by parts (Huff and Fletcher, 1990, p404). Cognitive maps can also serve as a reference point for persons to alter their behaviours and experiences by examining different constructs or orderings of the social world around them and for stimulating action to search for different routes to explore the same territory (Weick, 1990).

While research on cognition spans various fields, like anthropology, linguistics and speech communication (Huff, 1990, p11) and serves different purposes, such as the study of attention, memory, knowledge representation and learning (p12), it is its application in the field of strategic management and the domain of problem solving that is of particular relevance to this study.

Huff (1990) distinguishes between five generic 'families' of maps that tend to fall along a continuum demanding increasing interpretive input from the researcher (p15). These include:

- maps that assess attention, association and importance of concepts;
- maps that show dimensions of categories and cognitive taxonomies;
- maps that show influence, causality and system dynamics;
- maps that show the structure of argument and conclusion; and

- maps that specify schemas, frames and perceptual codes.

The different maps serve different purposes and research constructs, although the boundaries between each approach are somewhat permeable and in practice map makers often use more than one approach to mapping (p16).

This research is concerned with identifying the factors that curtail the successful implementation of public policy, as perceived by a number of key players in the field. In this context, the application of Huff's third dimension of cognitive mapping techniques (causality) most probably provides the most suitable method to explore the players' perception of the problem.

The working assumption is that causality is the primary form of *post hoc* explanation of events (Huff, 1990, p28) and that causal mapping is concerned with representing cognition as a set of causal interactions (Jenkins, 1994, p2). Therefore, it is possible to apply causal mapping as a technique for examining the concepts or elements that are perceived to lead to failure in policy implementation, and for exploring the way in which they are seen to inter-relate. Furthermore, it is possible to apply this at both an individual and collective level. While the drawing of a causal map for each person interviewed provides the basis for examining the internal dynamics of individual cognition, it is also possible to make comparisons across the maps of various individuals. This may possibly enrich conclusions and better stimulate the identification of suitable solutions to address the management problem being investigated.

Different methodologies have been identified and used in causal mapping studies. The most dominant (Jenkins, 1994, p10) probably include the Self Q Technique developed by Bougon (1983), the Means-End Chain Method by Reynolds and Gutman (1984), COPE based Cause Map by Eden et al (1992) and Comparative Cause Mapping by Laukkanen (1992).

The causal mapping methodology applied in this research study does not directly emulate any one of the four methodologies mentioned above. Instead, it applies different aspects of the various approaches in an attempt to adapt a process that best suits the needs of this particular study, and to build upon the relative strengths of each methodology so as to maximise the study's validity and reliability.

The resultant approach most closely resembles those adopted by Eden et al (1992) and Laukkanen (1992). The process involved the application of highly unstructured interviews aimed at encouraging interviewees to explain the phenomenon in a manner, and using words, that makes sense to them. Interviewer intervention was limited to requesting further explanations of thoughts that were not clearly understood by the interviewer. Concepts were then coded in the original words used by the interviewees and graphically mapped on the basis of the causal links between them as established and described by the interviewees themselves. While secondary interviews were not organised, interviewees were provided with a copy of their map and invited to comment upon them if they considered any concepts or causal links to have been misrepresented by the interviewer. This contributed to high content and construct validity. The study's reliability was also established through the development and observation of an explicit operational protocol.

Comparison between maps was also made but not to the extent or purpose followed by Eden et al (1992) and Laukkanen (1992). While it is recognised that comparisons of individual cognitive maps can provide some indication of the movement of the members towards shared meaning or a common understanding (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1993, p1), the purpose of this research is neither to derive an aggregate map that establishes a single or common 'vision', nor is it intended to formulate a common organisational strategy or goal. Instead, the purpose is to explore the reasons why policy, at times, fails to be implemented as intended. In this respect, the focus of the study is not the derivation of one single aggregate map, but the development of as many contrasting maps as possible to explore in the deepest and broadest possible way, the various perceptions and concepts that can explain the phenomenon being studied. As such, comparisons between maps were intentionally limited to exploring whether similar constructs of concepts, rather than individual concept nodes, existed between the different maps. The richness of comparisons was also a function of the deliberate choice to include in the sample of interviewees, a cross-section of individuals holding different positions in the machinery of Government, and differing levels of managerial responsibility. This ensured a comparison of idiographic data so that full recognition is given to the idiosyncratic ways in which each of the research subjects views their world (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1993, p3).

In a similar fashion, the comparison of individual maps in terms of their meaning was not to establish and examine syntactical equivalence. The latter is an inadequately simplistic approach which misses the most important aspects of exploring cognition (Eden, Ackermann et al., 1993, p4). Of relevance to this study is a comparison of the emerging holistic properties of each map and how similar and different constructs are perceived to interact, similarly or differently, upon the phenomenon.

Research Synopsis to Guide Selection of Case Study

Synopsis of Research Issue

Issue	The inability to translate public policy into effective strategic action.
Research Question	What issues (or factors) curtail the effective implementation of public policy, and how can these issues be overcome?
Research Objectives	<p>The inability to translate policy into effective strategic action disrupts the public policy cycle, giving rise to a 'gap' between the policymaking and strategy implementation arms of Government. In this context, the research study aims to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ determine what issues, or factors, <i>inhibit</i> or <i>facilitate</i> the translation of public policy into effective strategic action; and ○ identify and examine past measures / responses that have tried to <u>address</u> / overcome the policy 'gap', or have otherwise <u>sustained</u> / enforced it.
Methodology	<p>A case study approach examining examples of policy implementation across Government.</p> <p>Two primary research methods will be used:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. documentary analysis (i.e., research based on secondary sources of data including case reports, minutes of meetings, newspaper articles, parliamentary debates and questions, etc.); and 2. in-depth interviews with key persons involved in determining and implementing the policy under review. <p>The selection of cases is to be established from personal interviews with three persons who in recent years have occupied senior roles in Government. Each of the three persons will be asked to recommend a number of cases of failed and/or successful policy implementation according to certain pre-determined criteria. The final selection of cases to form part of this study will be chosen by the researcher from the recommended 'pool'.</p>

This Interview

Objective	This interview is one of three aimed at identifying a number of past cases of failed and successful policy implementation.
Definition of Cases	<p>For the purpose of this research,</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. a case of successful policy implementation is defined as one wherein the strategic action adopted by the administrative arm of Government is considered to have delivered the intended policy and achieved the intended outcomes, <u>as perceived by the policy's stakeholders</u>, 2. a case of failed policy implementation is one wherein Government policy, <u>as perceived by the policy's stakeholders</u>, <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ was not implemented as intended; and/or ○ did not achieve the intended outcomes; or ○ was not implemented at all.
Case Selection Criteria	<p>The cited case(s) or example(s) of successful and / or failed policy implementation, should meet the following criteria;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ high political relevance or importance ○ high visibility within and/or external to the Public Service ○ focused in scope ○ a past event, but recent enough to be of relevance to the current operations of Government ○ extensively documented (example; reports, memoranda, file correspondence, minutes of meetings, media coverage, parliamentary debates etc.) which documents in the main would be available for this research study ○ involves stakeholders who would be willing to be interviewed for this research so as to provide more insight to the knowledge gained from documentary evidence

Outline of Database Modules and Standard Reports

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 Title
 Name
 Surname

Current Job Title
 Organisation / Department
 Comments

Career Progression

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Storyline Event Details

StorylinePIN Day Month Year Research Issue

Event Objective Outcome

Link to Key Actors Link to Key Documents

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
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Pre-Interview Synopsis Paper (Project 1)

Research Interest

To study and explore the issues influencing the implementation of public policy.

Confidentiality

Everything that will be said and discussed during this interview will be treated in confidence and will be used ONLY for the purpose of the research. The results of the research are only shared with the examining panel at Cranfield University - who are themselves bound by a confidentiality agreement. Even then, the names of the persons interviewed will not be disclosed to the examining panel. The source of all the information gathered is therefore protected.

Research Objective

To isolate those factors that curtail the effective implementation of public policy, identifying measures to overcome them.

To identify those factors that promote the effective implementation of public policy, identifying measures that could internalise them in the day-to-day management of the civil service.

Approach

The research is divided into three Phases (or projects).

Phase 1 (this phase) is concerned with examining the issues pertaining to an example of **failed** policy implementation. In the context of this research a case of failed policy implementation is one wherein Government policy,

- was not implemented as intended; and/or
- did not achieve the intended outcomes; or
- was not implemented at all.

Phase 2 will explore the issues pertaining to an example of **successful** policy implementation. In the context of this research, a case of successful policy implementation is defined as one wherein the strategic action adopted by the administrative arm of Government is considered to have delivered the intended policy and achieved the intended outcomes.

The 3rd and final phase of the research will focus on establishing a 'model', or framework, that attempts to propose solutions, or measures, that will build upon current best practice in the civil service while concurrently addressing its shortcomings.

Progress to Date

The case example for Phase 1 of the research is the Financial Management Reform Programme that was launched by the Government in the early '90s, following the recommendations emerging from the Operations Review and the PSRC reports in

1988 and 1989 respectively. The choice of this apparent failed policy implementation was determined by two interviewees who were closely involved in the implementation of this, and other, public reform policy decisions.

A number of documents that recount the objectives, structure, resourcing and outcomes of this policy decision have been reviewed.

Overview of Policy Decision

The origins of this policy decision can be traced to the recommendations emerging from the Operations Review and PSRC reports presented to Government in 1988 and 1989 respectively. In both cases, the analysis revealed a number of shortcomings in the financial management operations of the Government including, among others,

- a lack of policy planning and implementation capabilities,
- a lack of accountability and delegation,
- focus on pre-audit as opposed to post-audit of activities,
- inappropriate process of budget allocations and the prioritisation of capital etc.

Following these studies;

1. a Cabinet Committee was established in 1989 to provide direction to, and oversee, the implementation of Public Service Reform;
2. MSU was established - a Financial Management Group, led by Anthony Buttigieg and resourced by a number of expatriate experts in public finance, was created to specifically assist the Ministry of Finance in undertaking the necessary Financial Management Reforms;
3. a Steering Committee chaired by the Secretary Finance, and with membership extended to Economic Services, Social Policy and Works, was established to determine a prioritised programme of works for the reform initiatives, and to co-ordinate the work of the Financial Management Group;
4. over a period of approximately 5 years (1991-1995) the financial reform programme addressed the following priority initiatives:
 - Financial Policies, Procedures and Regulations
 - Financial Delegation and Accountability
 - Financial Planning and Budgeting
 - Department Accounting System (Chart of Accounts)
 - Audit Programme
 - Financial Management Training Programme

Purpose of this Interview

The purpose of this interview is to obtain first hand information on

1. your understanding of how the attempt to implement this particular policy developed over time;
2. your views on what went right and wrong, what could have been done better, and how; and
3. your general perceptions and feelings on the issues that curtail the effective implementation of public policy.

Interview Structure

Rather than following a traditional question-answer format, the interview will ideally take the form of a discussion that considers the issues pertaining to the implementation of this particular policy.

The following is an indication of the areas that I would like to explore.

1. Your **general impressions** of the objective, structure and approach adopted in implementing the Government's policy of financial management reform.
2. Your **perceptions** of the success and / or failure of the implementation of the financial reform policies.
3. Your understanding of the issues or **factors** that contributed to failure (as defined above), possibly highlighting **examples** of such factors.
4. Your interpretation of the **circumstances** that led to these factors; the difficulty encountered in overcoming such factors and / or why they were not tackled.
5. Possibly with the benefit of hindsight, how you would have **approached** the implementation of this policy decision **differently**.
6. Finally, and from a general perspective, your experience on the problems encountered by the Civil Service in implementing a Government's agenda – i.e., any other possible issues or factors that have the potential to curtail the effective implementation of public policy, but which were not manifest in the example under consideration.

Interview Transcript (Project 1)

Results of Individual Interviews (Project 1)

Legend to Notation used in Cognitive Maps

A	————→	B	'A' positively influences / leads to 'B'
A	———— ⁻ →	B	'A' negatively influences / acts against 'B'
A	----- ^e →	B	'A' is an example of 'B'
A	----- ^e ⁻ →	B	'A' is not an example of 'B'
A	———— ^m →	B	'A' somehow affects 'B'
A	————	B	'A' is somehow related to 'B'
A	———— ⁼ →	B	'A' is equivalent to 'B'
A	———— ⁼ ⁻ →	B	'A' is not equivalent to 'B'
A	———— ^{&} →	B	'A' and 'B' together influence 'C'
A	———— [?] →	B	'A' may be related to 'B', but this is not directly established by the interviewee
A	———— ⁰ →	B	'A' has no affect on 'B'

Interview Document 65

The cognitive map derived from Interview 65 (Chart A on facing page) is composed of one hundred and ten (110) concepts, of which ten (10) are heads (i.e., have no out-going links to other concepts) and thirty-six (36) are tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and thirty-four (134) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.22:1. These measures are indicative of a relatively tall hierarchical structure of argumentation that suggests depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under review, and a rather high degree of cognitive complexity Eden, Ackermann et al., 1992).

A computer-generated domain analysis intended to calculate the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity, returns a list of six (6) concepts with the highest density of links around them. Concept 5[65,7E] - 'there was [no] true ownership', and Concept 8[65,6D] - 'more likelihood of implementation...failure to implement' (which is also the 'goal' concept of the model Ackermann, Eden et al., 1990)) are the most densely populated nodes with ten (10) immediate links each. These are followed by Concept 35[65,11E] - '[good] political and administrative leadership' with eight (8) links; Concept 59[65,12A] - 'role delineation between the Minister and the Administrator' with six (6) links; and Concepts 1[65,6F] and 22[65,9A] - 'introduction of expatriates' and 'he doesn't know what he's talking about', respectively, with five (5) links each. A further nine (9) concepts are surrounded by four (4) links, thirteen (13) concepts by three (3) links, forty-five (45) concepts with two (2) links, and the remainder with one (1) link.

The relative importance of the six (6) key concepts returned by the domain analysis is further supported by their centrality scores, although Concepts 59[65,12A], 1[65,6F] and 22[65,9A] lose rank order position to other concepts that had scored lower in the domain analysis. As centrality scores are measures intended to calculate the dominance of concepts in the whole model, rather than just their immediate vicinity, the results obtained should indicate that, relative to the whole model, Concepts 59[65,12A], 1[65,6F] and 22[65,9A] are not as important as the other three (3) concepts that scored high in the domain analysis.

However, when the map is 'stripped' of the concepts that have no branched explanations or consequences (i.e., concepts that only serve to further elaborate the argumentation of the model), all six (6) key concepts once again emerge as the dominant nodes to / from which all other main concepts are related. Their centrality in the chain of argumentation leading to the 'goal' concept is therefore re-established.

This 'stripping' process enables the conceptual map to be collapsed to its barest elements, facilitating the analysis of the key chains of argumentation. Indeed, it is possible to identify at least three (3) natural clusters of concepts that, rather independently, lead to the 'goal' concept (Chart B on facing page). The three clusters are centred on Concepts 59[65,12A], 35[65,11E], and 5[65,7E]/1[65,6F]/22[65,9A] – the key concepts returned by the domain analysis mentioned above.

From this it may be deduced that:

4. the relationship between politician and public officer (Cluster A);
5. the qualities of the politician and administrator as leaders (Cluster B); and
6. the behaviour of local staff and expatriate consultants in driving policy implementation (Cluster C);

are seen by the interviewee as core elements leading to the achievement or non-achievement of the 'goal' concept. In fact, reference to the interview transcript reveals a number of statements made by the interviewee to qualify some concepts and which seem to support the above conclusions – for example:

- "role delineation between the Minister and the Administrator (Concept 12A) is of **paramount importance**"
- "the question of leadership (Concept 11E) I think is **critical**"
- "the introduction of expatriates (Concept 6F) was something that surely was **underlying everything**"
- "without ownership (Concept 7E) you **cannot move ahead**".

If the three clusters are divided and individually mapped into separate sets (after being 're-populated' with the constituent concepts that were previously stripped out), it is possible to move from a macro-level analysis of the entire conceptual map, to a

more micro-level analysis of each of the three clusters. This permits the analysis to isolate, and examine more closely, the inter-relationships of the individual concepts in their respective cluster. The process augments the above analysis, and provides far more enriching and insightful results.

In fact, ten (10) sub-sets or categories can be identified by ‘thematic content’ (see Table below and Chart C on facing page). These factor-categories shed more light, or meaning, to the interviewee’s ‘frame of mind’ and his perception of the factors leading to failed policy implementation.

	Cluster		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Context Accountability Power Cloning	Leadership Organisational Politics	Trust Participation Personal / Group Dynamics Customisation

Context

One of the key variables that the interviewee seems to be lending importance to is the context or environment within which policy is implemented – in particular, the ‘political’ climate.

To set the scene for his interpretation of the facts explaining the issue under review, the interviewee spent considerable time describing the historical events in the political development of the country over the past few decades. The intention was to illustrate an environment wherein the influence on the Public Service was such that it was rendered impotent in the execution of the administration of Government. Rather than being identified as a focused and synergistic body of elements interested in the effective formulation and implementation of socio-economic policy, the Public Service is identified as an intense but fragmented political battlefield with politicians wanting to assert themselves on how they should run the show (Concept 101[65,4C]) and civil servants “who succumbed to give in to the political masters” (Concept 104[65,4B]).

The relevance of all of this, as seems to be perceived by the interviewee, is the effect that such climate had in shaping and breeding long-lasting attitudes,

behaviours and relationships within the Civil Service – behaviours that are seen to have resulted in depleted levels of individual and collective care, motivation and commitment in the execution of policy.

In the interviewee's mind, the ramification of all this is two-fold. On the one hand, it inculcates a culture wherein the struggle for **power** seems to take precedence upon the management of policy. On the other hand, it promotes the eradication of clear lines of delineation among the key actors in the administration of Government and, consequently, a breakdown in **accountabilities**.

Power

The struggle for power is depicted as a factor alienating the attention of both politicians and administrators away from policy and into the domain of politics. This dynamic was seen to have reached a peak with the introduction of a legislative amendment to the Interpretation Act (which makes provision in respect of the construction and application of Maltese legislation), which was intended to withdraw and transfer all the responsibilities of the administrator into the hands of the politician. As a result, administrators had no clout to manage their operations, to an extent that the execution of policy had to follow, to the letter, the process and tempo dictated by the 'political master' (Concepts 65[65,19A] and 67[65,33A]). This consolidation of authority centralised control over resources and decisions, creating pressure (Concept 54[65,13D]) and conflict that either resulted in a brain drain of the best talent (Concept 56[65,13C]), or led to the adoption of a *laissez-faire* attitude (Concept 55[65,13A]). Either way, it is seen as having curtailed the effective implementation of policy.

The ability to separate powers and responsibilities between politicians and administrators is therefore a key factor determining the effectiveness of policy implementation (Concept 59[65,12A]). Although the separation of powers is not clearly defined, one is led to believe that control over resources and process are considered by the interviewee to be the prerogative of the administrator, with the domain of the politician being concerned with the development of an agenda of policy initiatives.

Accountability

Besides helping to focus efforts and attention, the separation of power is also deemed important by the interviewee to promote various degrees of autonomy and control over different aspects of the policy management process (Concept 64[65,32B]). Underlying this is the perceived need to institutionalise a clear delineation of roles between politicians and administrators (Concept 59[65,12A]) to ensure that everyone in the policy chain is made responsible for managing his/her individual contribution and furthermore is directly accountable for its success or failure (Concepts 61[65,17B] and 62[65,17C]).

The lack of accountability had been so entrenched in the system that a further legislative amendment was felt necessary to the Interpretation Act to reverse the impasse that had been created earlier. This was also accompanied by the drafting of position descriptions for Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries, Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Department, issued under a letter circular by the Prime Minister urging all concerned to accept and apply the said changes to the law, which would otherwise be rendered meaningless (Concept 71[65,32D]).

The introduction of strict lines of accountability is also perceived to be synonymous with the development of a system of checks and balances (Concept 63[65,32A]). Once again, this is seen to lead to a situation that promotes autonomy in operations so that efforts can be focused on the execution of policy, rather than the pursuit of political gains (Concept 73[65,33A]).

Cloning

Unfortunately, old habits are seen to die hard. Changes to legislation and written administrative instructions are, in themselves, only seen to be symbolic of what people would like to see happening, or what they would lead others to believe that they would like to have happen. Unless observed and acted upon, the required changes will never be realised.

In the interviewee's mind, what is perpetuating this situation is the appointment to headship positions of persons who have been in, and a part of, the system for a long time and who are therefore accustomed and acclimatised to the prevailing culture and frame of mind (Concept 78[65,36A]).

This is further strengthened by the custom of internal ministerial promotions (Concept 92[65,25D]) that preclude the possibility of external entrants stepping into headship positions with fresh ideas as to how policy can be executed differently than it has been in the past (Concept 94[65,25F]).

As such, past approaches to policy implementation are 'cloned' from one generation to the next, such that past failures are likely to be replicated in the future (Concept 95[65,25G]).

The appointment of young persons who are relatively new to the system is seen by the interviewee as a potential balancing force to this phenomenon (Concept 75[65,34D]), although counter-acting this is the limited administrative ability to move older people out of their headship positions in mainstream Civil Service jobs and into lateral Public Sector positions (Concept 79[65,35B]).

Therefore, the interviewee considers failure to introduce 'fresh blood' in the Civil Service (Concept 93[65,25E]) and failure to rotate civil servants in top positions across Departments and Ministries (Concept 92[65,25D]) as factors curtailing the effective implementation of public policy.

Leadership

Political and administrative leadership are perceived by the interviewee to be equally important factors that have the potential to influence the success or failure of policy implementation (Concept 35[65,11E]).

The perceived qualities of the 'good' leader that are likely to overcome failure in policy implementation can be divided into three broad categories. The first pertains to the personal abilities of the leader as manifested through attributes such as competence and the ability to establish a vision (Concepts 41[65,20B] and 42[65,20C]). The second is concerned with the person's aptitudes as manifested through his disposition to introduce change and challenge the status quo (Concept 43[65,20D]), to support areas of success (Concept 36[65,11C]), and to tenaciously persist when facing difficulties (Concept 34[65,10B]). The third quality concerns the character of the leader as it relates to his value system and the ability to drive and lead an initiative by *accepting* the need for particular policies (Concept 24[65,8B]), by assuming *ownership* of them and by seeing them through (Concepts 38[65,10C] and 5[65,7E]) – even if he may not particularly *believe* in the policy.

Despite this, however, exercising good leadership over a number of occasions is also perceived by the interviewee to potentially lead to failure in particular situations (Concept 39[65,20E]). The idea is that persons who relentlessly produce one success after another are unlikely to be sanctioned on those occasions when their actions, or inaction, lead to failure (Concept 45[65,21A]). Under normal circumstances this is understandable and accepted, as no one is perfect and everyone is bound to fail at times. However, this reasoning assumes that such instances of failure are inadvertent, unpredictable and / or involuntary. There is therefore cause for concern that leaders may use this successful record to their advantage, persisting to successfully implement those policies that they *believe* in and that suit them best, while rejecting or abandoning those other policies that they may have had to *accept*, but in which they do not *believe*. In the latter instances, it is likely that the leader will pay 'lip service' to what needs to be done (Concept 46[65,21C]), yet do nothing, or not enough, for it to be implemented successfully.

Organisational Politics

Closely linked to the latter argument (in the interviewee's mind), yet not necessarily to the 'Leadership' construct, is the issue of organisational politics.

The pace of change occurring in the world is not something that effects only competitive, profit-oriented, private-sector organisations. It equally affects the way Government goes about its business in formulating and implementing policies that are aimed at serving the socio-economic needs of society in the best possible way. It is therefore not surprising that individual policies, while being intrinsically important, may lose relative importance over time, with changes occurring in the needs, preferences, beliefs or opportunities of target audiences **and** policy makers alike (Concept 44 [21B]). As priorities change, so does the level of effort placed in a particular policy change, with the potential of the latter falling short of delivering what it was intended to achieve.

Similarly, while different people may agree on the need for a particular set of policies, they are likely to prioritise their importance in different ways to suit their own needs or preferences (Concept 96[65,26A]). As political leaders of the same Administration shift from one portfolio to another, it is possible that the live policies that were being championed by a predecessor will be perceived to be secondary to

the new visions of the in-coming 'champion' (Concept 82[65,25C]). Unless the policy is somehow being monitored or gauged by somebody at a higher level than a particular ministry portfolio – for example the Office of the Prime Minister (Concept 17[65,22D]) – it is likely that the predecessor's policy would be side-tracked and eventually forgotten, possibly resulting in a considerable and irrecoverable loss of investment.

A similar situation is even more likely to arise as the political leaders of a new Administration take Office (Concept 98[65,31A]). With a fresh mandate and eagerness to prove it can manage better than the out-going Government, the new Administration is likely to push its own agenda and policies in favour of previous or current initiatives. This situation is accentuated in a small country like Malta, where social life has traditionally been dominated by party politics and pique, and where political maturity leaves much to be desired (Concept 97[65,31B]).

This may therefore lead one to believe that the ability to centralise the co-ordination of policy, the ability to develop focused policies with as short a life span as possible, and expediency in policy management, will go a long way to overcome the negative impact that organisational politics currently has on the implementation of policy.

Trust

Possibly because of the role that politics plays in the daily lives of the Maltese, the formation of networks and conclaves around ideological positions is perceived as an almost natural occurrence (Concept 87[65,23D]).

Due to this, it is not hard to understand why it is difficult for people to have trust and confidence in fellow colleagues who happen to have different political ideologies and allegiances.

The fear of leaks, sabotage or outright actions aimed at damaging policy makers is perceived to force the latter to hesitate to share information and responsibility in the implementation of policy (Concept 86[65,23B]).

On the other hand, the interviewee also perceives civil servants as hesitant to trust politicians fearing that policy actions may be geared towards giving "awards to friends" (Concept 31[65,9F]).

As such, this may be seen by the interviewee to reinforce the struggle for power mentioned earlier. In this context, lack of trust may lead politicians to be reluctant to devolve powers and control to administrators (Concept 72[65,32C]) who, on the other hand, may be reluctant to assume responsibility and accountability for such control, fearing that this may somehow be used against them if things went wrong (Concept 60[65,34A]). Consequently, a stalemate situation is perceived to possibly arise (Concept 70[65,19D]).

Participation

Following from the above argument, the interviewee seems to imply that civil servants who are not trusted by politicians are omitted altogether from the policy cycle or involved only sparingly (Concepts 18[65,37B], 20[65,39A] and 6[65,6B]).

The interviewee clearly identified this lack of involvement and participation (especially at the formulation stage of policy), as a factor curtailing the effective implementation of policy. Lack of participation fails to induce a sense of ownership in that policy (Concept 7[65,6C]) thereby limiting the potential success of its implementation (Concept 8[65,6D]).

However, omitting participation in the policy cycle is not only a function of trust. It is also seen to arise when politicians deem their top civil servants to be unable or unsuitably qualified to formulate policies that are capable of translating their political visions into effective administrative action (Concept 90[65,24B]). Policy is therefore formulated by 'think tanks' outside of the civil service (Concept 19[65,37A]), which is simply expected to take such policies and implement them to the letter (Concept 20[65,39A]). As a result, there is no sense of ownership and the policy is not effectively implemented (Concept 7[65,6C]).

Personal / Group Dynamics

As employment with the Civil Service is perceived by the interviewee to be a life-long occupation with tenure (Concept 88[65,23E]), politicians have been limited in their ability to replace civil servants holding key positions and whom they do not trust or have confidence in.

In this situation, the appointment of persons outside of the Civil Service can only be arranged through direct recruitment in Private Secretariats (but this is limited) or through consultancy arrangements (Concept 1[65,6F]).

In the case under review, the introduction of primarily expatriate consultants was the chosen course of action, although in this case, they were appointed centrally and not at Ministerial level.

As perceived by the interviewee, this action led to a number of problems of an inter-personal and behavioural nature that once again failed to induce a sense of ownership of the policy that was being promoted, with the consequent effect that it failed to be implemented as intended.

The reasons for such failure can be examined from two positions – local mind-sets (Concept 22[65,9A]) and foreign arrogance (Concept 9[65,55A]). In the first instance, the insularity of an island-mentality (Concept 25[65,8E]) is perceived to have led the civil servants to believe that they know best (Concept 109[65,22B]) and outright object to even consider (Concept 110[65,22A]) the merits of the ideas proposed by these consultants from an “alien jurisdiction”. On the other hand, the expatriates were deemed to be “[in]sensitive to the local frame of mind” (Concept 21[65, 9C]) with a disposition to “lord it over as smart guys without wanting to dirty their hands”. This situation was intensified when the consultants were perceived to be ‘pushing’ the financial management policy initiative (Concept 16[65,7K]) and, in the process, taking over ownership for it and losing the support of the civil servants (Concept 13[65,8A]).

It is also possible that the attitude of the civil servants was influenced by the political controversy surrounding the introduction of expatriate consultants (Concept 11[65,7F]) although this was not directly established by the interviewee. If so, however, this could be a reflection of the party politics and pique prevailing in the country, as mentioned earlier.

Irrespective of the cause, these behaviours are seen to have created considerable tension and conflict such that any attempts to foster co-operation in the interest of implementing the Government’s policy were quickly stifled (Concept 4[65,7A]).

Customisation

Another factor deemed important by the interviewee in shaping the success or failure of policy implementation is the way in which practices with respect to the implementation of policy were introduced into the Civil Service (Concept 47[65,14B]).

The 'importation' of practices from other jurisdictions, lock, stock and barrel – possibly with the aim of gaining political mileage (Concept 51[65,15A]) – is perceived to be a recipe for disaster (Concept 50[65,14A]) unless due consideration is first given to the local evolution that would need to take place to support such practices (Concept 49[65,16A]).

Thus, the inability or unwillingness to customise policies, practices or ideas for their implementation, will not address structural, administrative and / or operational 'gaps', and are seen by the interviewee to almost inevitably contribute to failure.

Interview Document 66

The cognitive map derived from Interview 66 (Chart A) is composed of sixty-eight (68) concepts, with one (1) head (i.e., have no out-going links to other concepts) and twenty-three (23) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by seventy-six (76) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.12:1.

These results are indicative of a flat hierarchy of argumentation but one that is relatively intricate with all concepts leading towards one central node. In fact, the head concept in the map corresponds to the 'goal' concept of the model – Concept [66,5B] 'ensure that policy was implemented...failure in policy implementation'.

The observations on the composition of the map are further supported by a computer-generated domain analysis intended to calculate the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity. The goal concept is the only concept in the model that is densely populated with thirteen (13) links, followed only by six (6) concepts with four (4) links and eleven (11) concepts with three (3) links. The other remaining concepts are related by either two links or one. The relative indistinctiveness of a set of dominant concepts is also evident when a central analysis, intended to calculate the centrality of the top ten concepts in the whole model, returns a list of concepts that does not match those returned by the domain analysis.

However, when the map is stripped from those concepts that have no branched consequences or explanations, a number of key concepts that seem to dominate specific chains of arguments emerge. Indeed it is possible to group the remaining concepts in the map into three sets, or clusters, that seem to share some common theme with respect to how they influence the goal concept (Chart B).

The most evident is probably Cluster A which seems to be composed of concepts that either relate to the position and character of 'Head of the Civil Service' (Concept [66,14E]) or to the roles of other key players involved in the implementation of the financial management reform programme (Concept [66,15C]).

The second cluster (B) seems to be concerned with the issue of ownership of the policy implementation as expressed by the elements of belief (Concept [22,12D])

and involvement (Concept [66,10C). On the other hand, the concepts grouped in Cluster C are related to each other in that they reflect elements of group dynamic (Concept [66,6G]) and inter-personal relationships (Concept [66,2A]).

These interpretations are further supported if the stripping process is reversed to once again reveal the additional concepts complementing those remaining on Chart B. Closer analysis actually suggests that each of Cluster A and B can be broken-down into two further sub-elements (Chart C).

The concepts included in Cluster A seem to suggest that the interviewee's cognition of the issues surrounding the position of Head of the Civil Service and other key roles, is divided between perceptions of power relations on the one hand, and the fragmentation of roles on the other.

Similarly, the concepts grouped in Cluster B seem to suggest that the interviewee perceives the need for involvement in, and ownership of, the implementation of a policy from the perspective of administrative and political will.

Following this logic of argument, the interviewee's map can be broken down into three (3) clusters composed of five (5) factor-categories that are perceived to have influenced failure in policy implementation. These are summarised in the table below.

	Clusters		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Power Relations Role Fragmentation	Political Will Administrative Will	Interpersonal relationships

Power Relations

The position of Head of the Civil Service and the role that the incumbent had to play in the implementation of the example of failed policy implementation seemed to occupy a very important place in the interviewee's frame of mind.

Of particular relevance is the relationship that this position is seen to hold viz. a viz. the position of Finance Secretary. Rooting the relationship in a history of tradition and custom (Concept [66,6E]), the interviewee presents a situation wherein control over the resources of the civil service is perceived to be divided between the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Finance (PS, MOF) and the Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister (PS, OPM) (Concept [66,6D]). This argumentation suggests that while the PS, OPM may carry the title of 'Head of the Civil Service' (possibly in virtue of the fact that he represents the executive arm of the government's political leader), he is nonetheless not perceived as the *de facto primus interparis* by top management in the Civil Service (Concept [66,19A]). Consequently, his ability to sanction peers when government policy is not being followed and implemented is perceived to be somewhat limited. As such, control over the Finance Secretary (Concept [66,15C]) in relation to this example of failed policy implementation, but also to the bureaucracy at large (Concept [66,15H]) is virtually inexistent. The chain of command is broken, "accountability stops with the individual Permanent Secretaries but the peak is never reached" (Concept [66,20A]), and overall control to ensure that policy is effectively implemented (Concept [66,5B]) is jeopardised.

Unrelated to the policy under review, but closely related to this observation, was the interviewee's mention of a Public Service Act that is currently being drafted to regulate the organisation and operations of the civil service. As the draft currently stands, the Act also makes provision for the position of Chief Permanent Secretary, which establishes a *de jure* Head of the Civil Service to whom all other Permanent Secretaries would be unquestionably accountable. This should help to overcome the feeling of constraint by the Head of the Civil Service (Concept [66,16C]) and the need to escalate matters to the Prime Minister (Concept [66,18D]) to obtain "the strength of his word [and] direction" (transcript p.19).

Despite all of the above, the interviewee also seems to hint that it is possible that a Head of the Civil Service may use the current framework of things to disown responsibility (Concept 66,15A] for matters that fall outside the strict ambit of his portfolio as Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister. In other words, the interviewee may be suggesting that a person occupying both the role of leader of the civil service and leader of the highest portfolio of office, may conveniently 'switch hats' to suit different demands placed upon him in different situations.

Role Fragmentation

One solution that is perceived to potentially overcome this situation is separating the role of Head of the Civil Service from the position of Permanent Secretary in the Office of the Prime Minister.

The interviewee argues that the Office of the Prime Minister has traditionally included a large number of operational line departments that are not policy oriented. The demands of these departments are perceived to detract the attention of the Permanent Secretary responsible for this portfolio, from the development of administrative policies and strategies in support of the government's political agenda, to matters of day to day administration (Concept [66,23C]). Consequently, there has never been "an owner whose mission in life is change, vision, mission of the civil service" (Concept [66,23D]). As mentioned earlier, the interviewee sees the establishment of a Chief Permanent Secretary as a measure that would address this by focusing the latter's responsibility on the establishment and coordination of a vision of continuous change and development in support of the implementation of government policy.

However, the interviewee also sees role fragmentation as a potential factor curtailing the effective implementation of policy, and cites the traditional custom of fragmenting the roles of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Public Service (Concept [66,25A]) as a typical example. This division of roles into two distinct positions with separate incumbents is seen to lead to two outcomes. The first is a loss of coordination between policy as it emanates from Cabinet and the strategic response of the civil service to act upon it in a cohesive manner (Concept [66,22C]). The second is the loss of centralised control over decisions and the implementation of policy (Concept [66,15H]). These are seen to limit the ability for strategic action to flow seamlessly

from policy thereby curtailing the effective implementation of the government's agenda.

To offset this situation, the interviewee suggests that the person holding the role of Head of the Civil Service should also be appointed to the position of Cabinet Secretary so that he is both the executive arm to the Prime Minister and to Cabinet (Concept [66,24A]). Such consolidation is perceived to provide the Head of the Civil Service with greater status, and consequently power, to act as *primus interparis* (Concept [66,22A]). By exercising overall command and control on the central coordination of collective government policy (i.e., policies emanating from Cabinet rather than those of its leader (Prime Minister) as they relate to his immediate portfolio) the probability of successful policy implementation increases.

Political Will

However, in the absence of this power, the interviewee perceives political ownership as an important aspect for the accountability framework within the Public Service (Concept [66,18B]). Ownership is seen as an important element to drive politicians to coerce change (Concept [66,17C]) and bring about accountability (Concept [66,17B]) when cooperation is not freely forthcoming from the administrative arm of government.

However, the interviewee acknowledges that in practice coercion is only exercised when it is deemed beneficial to the person(s) administering such action. If a person does not believe in a planned course of action (Concept [66,12D]) or otherwise has different priorities (Concept [66,18A]) he is likely to forfeit the use of coercion and play politics (Concept [66,12A]) until the time and environment is right to fight those battles (Concept [66,12B]) that serve his agenda (Concept [66,12C]) and are therefore worth fighting. It should therefore be evident that if political will and ownership are perceived to have been lacking at a ministerial level in the Ministry of Finance, it is likely that goal alignment was missing between the policy reform programme presented to and endorsed by Cabinet, and the Minister's own agenda for reform. Viewed from this angle, the lack of political will in this case is possibly symptomatic of a larger problem that seems to be rooted in stakeholder interests. While political will is a determining factor influencing success or failure in policy

implementation, in this scenario it seems to take a position of secondary importance when compared to the need for good stakeholder management.

Administrative Will

Indeed the interviewee identifies the implementation of the Department Accounting System (DAS) as one of the initiatives under the financial management reform policy programme that was partially successful, because it “was a non-controversial issue” (Concept [66,10A]). One is therefore led to believe that when the interests of the people implementing the policy are either served by that policy or at least not threatened by it, active support and cooperation (Concept [66,10B]) that ensures the effective implementation of that policy will be forthcoming. Under such situations, issues of power relations or role fragmentation as discussed above do not influence the implementation of policy and its intended outcomes.

However, the interviewee seems to nonetheless imply that every initiative requires a champion to pick up the policy and make it his mission (Concept [66,10D]). In the absence of such leadership, a policy will “not keep up the steam and [will] die a natural death” (transcript p. 10). Once again, however, it is also possible to interpret this perception from the perspective of stakeholder management. An important element of the latter, that even possibly precedes goal alignment, is the need to identify someone who is interested in buying into a policy, if not drive to it, at least to support it. In the example cited by the interviewee, neither elements seemed to exist.

Inter-personal Relationships

To a large degree, a lot of what has been discussed above is a function of the relationships that various stakeholders to a policy develop among themselves. These are in turn shaped by the attitudes that people adopt in going about their business, and the values that underlie the conduct of such business.

One of the major reasons leading to failure in this example of policy implementation was the resistance offered by the policy implementers themselves. Once again, however, resistance is the symptom of the problem and not its cause. Underlying this resistance were the attitudes (Concept [66,5G]) and behaviour of the consultants that were brought to facilitate the policy implementation and the tactics they used to

achieve their aims (Concept [66,7B]). By adopting an air of supremacy based on the belief that “this is a brave new world, we know best, and we’re here to show you how to do it” (transcript p.7) the consultants (who were foreigners, not Maltese) quickly managed to alienate ministry staff whose natural defence system was to take a stand (Concept [66,5H]) and entrench their behaviour in their beliefs of what should or should not be implemented (Concept [66,8D]).

The interviewee argues that this stance was further accentuated when it was perceived that the consultants sent to aide the Ministry staff were actually working closer with the political arm of government than they were with them (Concept [66,4B]). Although this tactic may have been useful in an attempt to gain the confidence and support of the ministry’s political leader (Concept [66,4C]), it served to label the consultant as “the Minister’s man” (Concept [66,8A]) thereby coming across as an imposition (Concept [66,8B]). In a country that is so politically divided, and where the formation of cliques prevails, this response is almost inevitable. Yet, these values were not discerned and appreciated. Although not directly stated by the interviewee, it is possible that such behaviour was not voluntary or malicious, but rather a reflection of the consultants’ lack of sensitivity to the cultural and political context in which they were working.

On the other hand, divided loyalties (Concept [66,3B]) and working behind people’s backs (Concept [66,28A]) is intentional and malicious, and is reflective of unethical behaviour that runs counter to the value systems of honest and sincere people. The interviewee seems to argue that “small ‘p’ political games” (Concept [66,4D]) serve to fragment rather than unite an organisation (Concept [66,4E]) thereby displacing goal alignment and the concerted efforts to achieve a policy’s objective.

Interview Document 67

The cognitive map derived from Interview 67 (Chart A) is composed of ninety-seven (97) concepts, of which eight (8) are heads (i.e., have no out-going links to other concepts) and forty-five (45) are tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and twenty-six (126) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.3:1.

A computer-generated domain analysis intended to calculate the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity returns a list of eight (8) concepts with the highest density of links around them (see Table below).

Concept	No. of Links
Concept 2[67,1J] - 'failure [in policy implementation]...success' (goal)	14
Concept 33[67,6E] – 'resistance from top structures' Concept 69[67,20A] – 'ownership'	8
Concept 8[67,1G] – 'enforcement' Concept 1[67,1A] – 'good planning'	7
Concept 4[67,1C] – 'a human system' Concept 71[67,21A] – 'accountability' Concept 23[67,4A] – it [the financial management programme] was too demanding	5

The relative importance of these concepts, with the exception of Concept 23[67,4A]- '[the financial management programme] was too demanding', is further supported by their centrality scores, thereby also establishing their dominance in the entire map.

After the map is stripped of the concepts that have no branched explanations or consequences (i.e., concepts that only serve to elaborate the argumentation of the model), it is possible to identify at least six (6) clusters of concepts that contribute to the 'goal' concept, each of which seems to be centred on one of the key concepts jointly returned by the domain and centrality analyses. It is also possible to identify an 'orphan' concept (Concept 11[67,1K]), so labelled because it stands alone, linked only to the 'goal' concept.

Three (3) of the clusters (A, B, and C in Chart B) are centred on Concept 1[67,1A] – ‘good planning’, Concept 4[67,1C] – ‘a human system’, and Concept 8[67,1G] – ‘enforcement’, respectively. The formation of these clusters is hardly surprising, as right at the beginning of the interview, the three key concepts were explicitly identified by the interviewee as the core factors that, if managed incorrectly, would lead to failure in policy implementation – a position that was also constantly reiterated during the entire interview. However, a closer examination of Clusters B and C and further analysis of the examples brought by the interviewee in support of these views seems to indicate that each cluster is in fact composed of supporting sub-elements.

The interviewee’s impressions on ‘a human system’ (Cluster B) seem to be built upon two elements. The first is the ability of management to draw employees to participate in the planning and implementation of policy, while the second reflects the interviewee’s perceived need for management to involve itself in the activities performed by their subordinates in the implementation of policy.

In a similar vein, Cluster C can also be broken down into two sub-sets, reflecting two types of enforcement as perceived by the interviewee. At one end is a positive-type of enforcement that leads to successful policy implementation on the basis of cooperative behaviour between the key actors to the policy. At the other end is a more unilateral-type of enforcement measured in terms of management’s ability to control subordinates and line operations.

Also central to the cognitive map, although seemingly in a manner that was less obvious / explicit to the interviewee, are the three (3) clusters (D, E and F) centred upon Concept 71[67,21A] – ‘accountability’, Concept 33[67,6E] – ‘resistance from top structures’, and Concept 69[67,20A] – ‘ownership’, respectively. At first glance, these clusters may be thought to influence the goal concept in a manner that is rather independent of one another. However, closer consideration of the causal relationships between the clusters and their core concepts leads one to believe that, in fact, the three are dependent upon each other. ‘Ownership’ and ‘accountability’ seem to be perceived by the interviewee as the results achieved when appropriate measures are taken to overcome ‘resistance from top structures’. The link between the three, which becomes more apparent once the map is re-populated with all its

constituent concepts, is Concept 62[67,17B] – ‘enforcement comes after the final step’.

Following from this link, another observation can be drawn. In itself, Concept 62[67,17B] can be viewed synonymously with Concept 8[67,1G] – ‘enforcement’ (the core concept upon which Cluster C is built), and a direct relationship can therefore be established between the four clusters. Indeed, it is also possible to argue that, insofar as the interviewee perceives ‘enforcement’ (Concept 62[67,17B]) to follow from ‘resistance’ (Concept 33[67,6E]) and to lead to ‘ownership’ (Concept 69[67,20A]) and ‘accountability’ (Concept 71[67,21A]), then Clusters D (accountability), E (resistance) and F (ownership) can in fact be interpreted as further sub-sets of the interviewee’s understanding of the term ‘enforcement’ (Cluster C).

In the final analysis, therefore, the interviewee’s map can be broken-down into three main (3) clusters showing evidence of eight (8) categories of factors that can potentially contribute to failure or success in policy implementation, plus a further ‘orphan’ category. These are depicted in Chart C and listed in the Table below.

	Clusters			
	A	B	C	Other
Factor-Categories	Planning	Employee participation Management involvement	Control Cooperative enforcement Resistance Ownership Accountability	Comprehensiveness

Planning

In his opening statement, the interviewee immediately identified 'good planning' (Concept 1[67,1A]) as one of "the three legs of success". It was also stated that without planning, one should "not even attempt" to implement a policy, almost implying that this is a 'hygiene factor' or founding block for any management initiative relating to policy implementation.

The interviewee seems to assign three dimensions to 'good planning'. The first is realism. In this respect, a number of examples were used to illustrate how the policy under investigation, while objective in content and noble in vision, failed to be successfully implemented because it was unreachable (Concept 25[67,5A]). In this case, failure was perceived to have occurred because the demands placed upon the civil servants exceeded their competence (Concept 26[67,5B]), and because the policy proposals represented too radical a change from the then current way of doing things. Consequently, instead of infusing a challenge, they were a source of demotivation and people ended giving up hope (Concept 24[67,4B]).

Understanding limitations is therefore considered as the next dimension of 'good planning'. As perceived by the interviewee, organisational limitations can be caused by either one of two factors – employee capabilities (Concept 10[67,1I]), and the operational readiness of the organisation to implement a policy (Concept 28[67,5D]). In both cases, it is argued that the organisation must build and consolidate its internal capacity and potential before embarking on new ventures. Bringing people from outside of the organisation (Concept 7[67,1F]) to temporarily fill in gaps in the operational framework of the organisation is not seen as a solution. Indeed, it is seen as a measure that may compound the problem in at least one of two ways. First, the measures recommended for implementation may not 'fit' the environment and the organisation's operational framework (Concept 26[67,5D]). Second, the recommended measures may be so radical for the context in which they ought to be implemented, that people become sceptical of what is being proposed (Concept 50[67,11B]) and automatically resist it (Concept 33[67,6E]).

Binding the above two characteristics, and completing the interviewee's image of 'good planning', is the necessity to 'keep in mind who is going to make the policy work' (Concept 9[67,1H]). It is argued that the people 'within the system' are the

only ones who can thoroughly understand the organisation's strengths and weaknesses. They are instrumental in identifying operational limitations (Concept 87[67,25B]) and in realistically assessing what is achievable in the short, medium and long-term and cannot, therefore, be ignored.

Human System

Closely related to the third dimension of good planning is a second cluster of factors that is also seen to influence failure or success in policy implementation. The interviewee terms this 'a human system', and considers it the second "leg of success".

Two categories of factors seem to underpin this cluster in the interviewee's mind. These include the need for employee participation in planning and decision-making activities and management involvement in the implementation of policies entrusted to subordinates. At various points during the interview, examples were brought to illustrate both these dimensions of the 'human system', although participation seemed to be the most frequently cited, probably indicating what the interviewee considers to be the most important of the two.

The interviewee seems to approach the principle of employee participation from two different, and almost conflicting, angles. The first seems to emerge from the interviewee's perception of the need for fairness and the application of 'just' policies. In this sense, one is led to believe that the need for employees to participate in the planning of a policy and/or its roll-out is a reflection of their need for coaching, support, development and suitable working conditions (Concept 19[67,3A]). The second approach is more Machiavellian in nature, with the interviewee using participation simply as a means to an end. The participation of employees in the planning and implementation of policy is seen to lead to commitment to, and ownership of, that policy (Concept 86[67,25B]), and to identifying and overcoming potential stumbling blocks (Concept 87[67,26A]) thereby ensuring success.

Besides employee participation, the interviewee also lends importance to the need for management to get involved with their employees. At first this concept may seem identical to the concept of participation, but in effect the interviewee seems to be using the word 'involvement' to mean a different thing. While 'participation' was used to reflect the need for all employees to provide technical contribution to the

development and implementation of policy, 'involvement' seems to reflect the need for management to interact with subordinates. The tendency of the civil service to keep itself aloof (Concept 90[67,27B]), with officers not mixing outside their 'class', is somehow seen to potentially lead to false perceptions by senior management of the capabilities of their subordinates and the operational limitations of the organisations they manage (Concept 22[67,3D]).

Enforcement – Control

The lack of involvement at an operational level (Concept 17[67,2D]) is also seen to compromise management's ability to enforce its decisions thereby weakening its control over the implementation of policies.

In itself, lack of control is seen to produce at least two consequences. Firstly, by not visiting the 'engine room', management is seen to lack first hand experience of what subordinates are working at and how they are doing it. This prevents management from reacting to problems in time (or better still proactively preventing their emergence), such that 'the engine room will explode' (Concept 66[67,18D]) leading not only to failure in implementation but also to undesirable consequences at the personal / individual level (Concept 67[67,18E]). Secondly, by not gaining a thorough understanding of 'what the engine is capable of doing' (Concept 21[67,3C]), it is deemed likely that orders will be "barked" from above with no or little consideration to what is really implementable. Failure is again perceived to be inevitable.

Enforcement – Cooperation

In contrast to the previous type of enforcement, the interviewee cited an example of what is considered to be "good enforcement" (Concept 38[67,9A]).

Underpinning this example was agreement and cooperation by all parties involved in the policy decision and its implementation (Concept 42[67,9D]). In this respect, the essential ingredients are seen as political and administrative commitment (Concepts 39[67,9B] and 40[67,9C]) to ensure that the policy decision "moves forward"; a predisposition to learn by the junior staff that would be directly responsible for implementing the policy; and the timely and adequate provision of training (Concepts 36[67,8B] and 37[67,8C]). A possible fourth element in the composition of this 'co-

operative' behaviour is critical mass. In this respect, the interviewee found it important to emphasise (twice during the interview) that the predisposition to learn was shared by some 40% of the junior staff directly responsible for implementation.

Unfortunately, neither was this issue elaborated upon, nor were the conditions leading to commitment explicitly stated during the interview. It is possible that such cooperation was forthcoming from all camps because it provided all parties with better control on their respective contributions with regard to the financial administration of Government. It is therefore probably fair to deduce that the implementation of this particular policy was well supported because it was in the best interest of all parties involved.

Resistance

In contrast, the implementation of policy is likely to be 'torpedoed' (Concept 53[67,12C]) when personal interests are at stake.

The interviewee seems to ascribe two different attributes to these interests. The first relates to the demands that will be placed upon individuals, and the potential stress that this may lead. The second relates to the changes that a policy may bring about in terms of the power relationships in the organisation. In the first instance, people are seen likely to resist a policy if they perceive this to lead to additional work (Concept 52[67,12B]) especially if they are already under pressure to deliver on other fronts (Concept 34[67,6F]). In the second instance, they will offer resistance if their position in the organisation and subsequent control over resources is threatened because of a potential loss of power (Concept 31[67,6B]).

Another issue that is perceived to lead to resistance, and failure, is fear of failure itself. Besides fearing the consequences of not being able to successfully implement a given policy (Concept 55[67,13A]), the interviewee also seems to argue that resistance is likely to occur if the implementation of a particular policy may uncover other deficiencies in the managerial and/or operational effectiveness of the organisation (Concept 56[67,13B]). In this instance, the risk to management is even greater. Although not directly established by the interviewee, it is probably fair to deduce that in such cases, the degree of resistance will also be greater.

One perceived measure to overcome resistance is the ability to convince management of the merits of the policy (Concept 51[67,12A]), although in the

example cited by the interviewee (DAS) it is not exactly clear *how* management was convinced. With the interviewee's frame of mind, and the importance that was constantly attributed to 'a human system', one may be led to believe that reason and good communication, rather than coercion, may have been a determining factor to overcome resistance in the example used. However this is not clearly established. It is also possible to assume that the ability to convince management in this particular example, was a function of the fact that, as explained earlier, various parties were amenable to the policy itself. Once again, however, this cannot be accurately induced from the interview.

The interviewee clearly established resistance as a factor that leads to failure in implementation. It is also clearly stated that when such resistance comes from the 'top structures' of an organisation, then enforcement is the final step to overcome the potential of failure (Concept 62[67,17B]). It is interesting that the interviewee attributes responsibility for such action in one of two persons (Concept 61[67,17C]). The first is the Minister, establishing what in the interviewee's mind is the champion of policy (discussed later). The second is the Head of the Civil Service or "someone from there" (referring to the Office of the Prime Minister). This probably reflects the interviewee's belief that "what Castille⁷ says influences a lot" (Concept 44[67,10A]) and that "the Government is usually led by one person and his circle" (Concept 43[67,9E]), and reinforces the need for cooperative behaviour and support at a central level (discussed earlier) to ensure the right type of enforcement.

If this enforcement is forthcoming, the interviewee then perceives two outcomes. The first is the ability to attract commitment to the policy and, consequently, ownership of it (Concept 69[67,20A]). The second is the ability to directly charge someone with the responsibility for implementing a policy, hence introducing a measure of accountability (Concept 71[67,21A]).

Ownership

It is clear that the interviewee considers ownership to be indistinguishable from the concept of commitment and, in turn, the two are seen as a function of participation (Concept 85[67,25C]) and involvement (Concept 81[67,23C]).

⁷ The 'Auberge de Castille' houses the Office of the Prime Minister.

The interviewee also identifies the reason for lack of ownership as being people's natural aversion to take up enforcement (Concept 70[67,20B]), thereby possibly implying that it doesn't pay to enforce.

A possible reason for this is that the interviewee seems to consider accountability to follow from ownership, and identifies the latter as the encompassing factor that "goes all the way to the end". In this respect, the interviewee seems to be implying that people shy away from assuming ownership of a policy because they do not want to be answerable for its outcomes.

Accountability

Most of the discussion on accountability centred on the role of the Minister as perceived by the interviewee.

In this respect, it was very clearly established that the Minister's role is not to participate in implementation but to monitor it. Indeed, getting directly involved in implementation is seen as a recipe for disaster (Concept 58[67,14B]). Instead, the Minister is seen to be responsible for understanding what is happening (Concept 73[67,22A]), for questioning what is happening (Concept 74[67,22B]), and for pulling senior management along (Concept 79[67,22G]). However, the interviewee seems to imply that the effectiveness of such accountability is somehow limited, because of a number of factors influencing the decision-making process of the politician. These include the politician's perceived likelihood of losing political support from the people who he has to hold accountable (Concept 80[67,23A]); the control that the Minister can exercise on his civil servants, seen as a function of his relationship with them (Concept 77[67,22E]); and the political ideology of the civil servant (Concept 76[67,22D]) which, in itself, influences the perception of support or opposition at election time.

Related to the role of the Minister is the role of the Civil Servant. In contrast to the aforesaid, the interviewee perceives the civil servant's role to be exclusively focused on policy implementation (Concept 91[67,29A]). The link that this has with the issue of accountability is not directly stated but can nonetheless be implicitly induced. By placing considerable emphasis on the respective roles that the Minister and Civil Servant should assume, the interviewee seems to imply that a lack of role delineation would lead to role conflict and, possibly, the inability to introduce effective

checks and balances to ensure conformity to planned objectives and successful implementation.

Comprehensiveness

A final factor that is seen by the interviewee to influence success or failure in policy implementation is what was termed 'comprehensive system'.

In a way, this is not an independent factor, but rather seems to be used by the interviewee to embrace all the concepts mentioned throughout the interview. By defining the 'comprehensive system' as "all embodied, that covers everything" (Concept 11[67,1K]) one is led to believe that the interviewee is implying that all of the identified factors must be considered with equal importance to overcome failure in policy implementation.

Interview Document 68

The cognitive map derived from Interview 68 (Chart A) is composed of seventy-five (75) concepts, with one (1) head (i.e., have no out-going links to other concepts) and twenty-two (22) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by eighty-seven (87) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.16:1.

A computer-generated domain analysis intended to calculate the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity returns a list of ten (10) concepts with the highest density of links around them. Of these, only four (4) feature in the top ten most dominant concepts returned by a central analysis intended to measure the centrality of concepts relative to their position in the entire map.

To narrow the analysis, it is possible to 'strip' the map of all those concepts that have no branched explanations and consequences and that only serve to elaborate the chain of arguments presented by the interviewee. If a domain and central analysis are again performed under this situation, a match results in eight of the ten top concepts returned by each analysis. These results would suggest that the eight concepts (listed in the table below) are indeed the most central and dominant concepts explaining the key chain of arguments supporting the interviewee's perception of the issue under review.

Concept	No. of Links
Concept 1[68,1A] 'stormy and intermittent [implementation]...smooth implementation' (Goal concept)	12
Concept 2[68,1B] – 'friction caused by MSU top management' Concept 11[68,1K] – 'foster friendly co-operation between MSU and Finance' Concept 25[68,2A] – 'some experts engaged by MSU were not up to standard' Concept 43[68,4K] – '[consultants] adopt the attitude 'this is what I believe you need and this is what you get''	4
Concept 61[68,6C] – 'self-discipline	4
Concept 22[68,1V] – 'havoc to time schedules'	3

An analysis of the stripped map reveals a grouping of concepts sharing some similar theme around the key concepts returned by the domain and central analysis. Three main clusters emerge (Chart B), indicating that the interviewee's perceptions on what influences failure in policy implementation is driven by issues concerning:

1. the way in which inter-personal relationships develop between the people entrusted with implementing a policy (Cluster A);
2. the approach adopted when managing the implementation of policy (Cluster B); and
3. the personal abilities of the persons entrusted with implementation (Cluster C).

When the map is re-populated with the constituent concepts that were previously removed during the stripping process, it is possible to perform further detailed analysis on the Clusters and the conceptual ordering of their component concepts.

At this level of detail, it is possible to divide the concepts in Clusters A and B into further sub-groups or categories that, while still supportive of the overall theme of their respective clusters, distinguish themselves by the particular class of factors, or issues, that contribute towards specific strands, or chains, of argumentation.

In fact, it seems possible to examine the interviewee's perception of the influence of inter-personal relationships on policy implementation (Cluster A) from at least two angles. One relates to the role played by consultants who are hired to assist the civil service in implementing policy. The second pertains to the relationships and group dynamic that develops as a response to the attitudes and behaviours expressed by the individuals party to a policy implementation.

Similarly, the interviewee appears to discuss the approach taken when managing the implementation of policy (Cluster B) from two perspectives. The first seems to concern the application of rational methods of policy management and implementation achieved through the application of good planning and resource management strategies. The second perspective seems to address the interviewee's perception of how policy implementation is affected by irrational behaviour arising in response to the politicking that goes on in organisations.

In contrast, the concepts in Cluster C share a closer affinity to one another and the need for division into further categories is not apparent.

The table below summarizes the interpretation of the categories of factors that seem to dominate the interviewee's perception of what influences failure in policy implementation. These are also illustrated in Chart C.

	Cluster		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Group dynamics Role Execution	Planning Politics	Capabilities

Group Dynamics

“The success or failure of ventures can much depend on the personal chemistry of the parties involved (transcript p1)...the agency entrusted with the task must team up with the department involved in a particular project (transcript p,6)”.

The interviewee seemed to perceive friendship (Concept 11[68,1K]), collegiality and teamwork as the foundations for the development of good working relationships. The basis of such foundations and group dynamic seem to be the need for close personal interactions (Concept 13[68,1M]) and mutual trust between individuals.

The interviewee seems to suggest that close personal interactions are important for at least two reasons. At a practical level, they are important to ensure a true understanding of the problem at hand, of the resources available to solve that problem (Concepts 15[68,1O]) and, consequently, to ensure the development of a feasible solution. Furthermore, this interaction would help to foster an environment wherein policy initiatives are developed in an inclusive and participative manner, rather than unilaterally (Concept 16[68,1P]). As such, the initiatives are more likely to gain the acceptance and ownership of the people who ultimately need to shoulder responsibility for their implementation. At a more human and social level, the development of personal interactions is necessary for the establishment of an amicable relationship (Concept 11[68,1K]) and an *esprit de corps*, rather than a sense of loss or alienation (Concept 27[68,2C]).

However, the interviewee also seems to suggest that the ability to 'bond' is not only dependent upon the need for people to feel, and be felt, as part of a team. The 'personal chemistry' (Concept 12[68,1L]) is also a function of the ability to develop a relationship based on a sense of collegial confidence and trust. This cannot be achieved if accompanied by accusations of incompetence (Concept 8[68,1H]) and the undermining of authority (Concept 9[68,1I]), especially if done in a deceptive manner. These actions profoundly destabilise a relationship (Concept 2[68,1B]) such that, in all probability, the persons involved will never be able to reconcile their differences. As this occurs, different stakeholder interests are likely to emerge, alienating the alignment of goals and the successful achievement of a policy's objectives.

Role Execution

Friction (Concept 46[68,4N]) between two or more parties is also caused when one of the parties to the relationship assumes an authoritative position that extends beyond the remits of its role and mandate (Concept 44[68,4L]).

As evidenced through the examples mentioned by the interviewee, this was certainly a determining factor that is perceived to have impeded the successful implementation of the policy initiatives being examined. The interviewee describes a situation wherein the experts who were hired to assist civil servants in their tasks to implement policy, actually assumed ownership of such responsibility (Concept 44[68,4L]). The interviewee's choice of verbs and adjectives such as, 'overbearing attitudes' (Concept 74[68,7B]), 'crawling all over' (Concept 17[68,1Q]), and 'demanding progress' (Concept 18[68,1R]) are strongly indicative of a type of behaviour that would induce a feeling of 'arrogance', 'invasiveness' and 'imposition'. These attitudes and actions are likely to breed opposition and resistance from people of strong will and character, thereby leading to 'stormy and intermittent implementation' of policy (Concept 1[68,1A]).

In contrast, the interviewee suggests that had the consultants taken into consideration the experience and knowledge of the persons 'in the field' (Concept 73[68,7C]) and developed a sense of participation (Concept 50[68,5D]) rather than dictum (Concept 43[68,4K]) 'smooth implementation' would have followed.

The interviewee's perception of the division of roles and responsibilities between consultants and civil servants in the implementation of policy are clearly spelled out by reference to an example of successful implementation. This example also illustrates the interviewee's perception of the process that policy implementation should follow.

Planning

As a first step in this process, the interviewee suggests that a request for expert assistance should originate from the Ministry that is seeking to enlist help (Concept 69[68,6K]). The importance of this is not directly established by the interviewee, but seems to suggest that assistance would be better received if the need for it is internally established by the recipient organisation, rather than externally determined by someone else. Furthermore, assistance should come in the form of 'real' expertise. This points attention to the fact that the consultants enlisted by central government to assist the Ministry of Finance in undertaking its policy of reform, were not perceived to be experts (this is discussed later).

As a second step, the interviewee suggests that any recommendations made by experts should be suggested by them, and should be treated by the recipient Ministry, as proposals and not fiats for action (transcript p,6). The decision to accept, reject, adapt and / or implement recommendations is perceived to be the sole responsibility of the recipient Ministry (Concept 71[68,6M]), although even in this case, discussion with the line department concerned (Concept 70[68,6L]) is seen as a critical element of the process.

Much of what was discussed by the interviewee, with respect to the process that unfolded in the implementation of the policy initiatives of this case study, ran counter to this 'illustration'.

Besides the application of a suitable process to manage the implementation of policy, the latter is also perceived to be a function of good policy planning and resource management.

In the latter case, the ability to assign an adequate number of fixed resources to various policy initiatives (Concept 21[68,1U]) is seen as a critical measure to ensure that a policy proceeds as planned and fulfils all of its stated objectives within the timeframes established for its implementation. Changing the resources assigned to

manage and to implement the initiatives may potentially lead to a situation wherein the policy's objectives are changed (Concept 24[68,1X]) and / or are delayed (Concept 47[68,4O]) for implementation. Either way, a certain degree of failure would have been registered.

The smooth implementation of policy is also perceived to be dependent upon a clear vision and the establishment of detailed programmes and initiatives of what needs to be achieved, when and how (Concept 53[68,5G]). The interviewee places the onus for such responsibility on the Cabinet as "it is the Cabinet which leads the country and any attempt to blame the Civil Service and whatnot is like the proverbial incompetent workman blaming his tools (transcript p,5)". Indeed, the interviewee identifies the Cabinet as "the main culprit" for failure in the implementation of policy because of changing and conflicting agendas.

Politics

The interviewee suggests that the politicking that takes place at Ministerial level damages, or restrains, the ability of the civil service to successfully implement policy. It is argued that constant changes in direction (Concepts 57[68,5K] and 56[68,5J]) especially when taken unilaterally or done in a haphazard and unannounced manner, disrupt the policy management process thereby increasing the likelihood of failure.

Linked to this is the interviewee's perception on the need for increased accountability (Concepts 62[68,6D] and 61[68,6C]) "both by Cabinet collectively and by Ministers individually" (transcript p,6). The source of this accountability is seen to lie and be vested in the Prime Minister, as *primus interparis* and the country's leader.

The interviewee also explored the influence of politics on the implementation of policy using another example, albeit at a different organisational level. In this case, the interviewee suggests that policy may at times be inadequately implemented because of the need to protect stakeholder interests (Concepts 30[68,2F] and 32[68,2H]). This too draws some parallel to the need for better measures and structures of accountability, to avoid goal displacement, and to ensure the successful achievement of the intended policy objectives.

Capabilities

A final factor that was considered important by the interviewee was the need for assigning responsibility for policy implementation to people who are capable of delivering what is required (Concept 48[68,5A]).

The interviewee had a very poor opinion of the abilities of the consultants (Concept 25[68,2A]), which abilities were judged from two angles. The first was experiential. The interviewee suggests that the consultants assigned to work at the Ministry of Finance would have only been viewed as 'real experts' if their knowledge of public finance was directly drawn from established working experiences in other Ministries of Finance (Concept 75[68,7D]). Furthermore, such working experience could not have been limited to the individual's country of origin. The lack of further experience was seen to induce the consultant to recommend 'the only system' he knew. The second aspect upon which the consultants' expertise was judged was related to their understanding of the prevailing local conditions within which the policy initiatives had to be implemented (Concept 34[68,4B]). This bears some relation to the issue of experience in that the consultants were not perceived to be customising their proposed solutions to cater for the specific needs of the Ministry of Finance in Malta.

As a result of these perceptions, consultants were considered daring (Concept 35[68,4C]) and confidence in the advice they provided could not be established.

Interview Document 70

The cognitive map derived from Interview 70 (Chart A) is composed of ninety-six (96) concepts, of which forty-one (41) are tails (i.e., have no in-coming links from other concepts) and three (3) are heads (no out-going links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and seven (107) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.11:1.

A computer-generated domain analysis returns a list of six (6) concepts with the highest density of links around them. These are shown in the Table below.

Concept	No. of Links
Concept 1[70,1A] – ‘initiative went wrong...went right’ (GOAL concept)	19
Concept 4[70,1D] – ‘there was no assumption of ownership’ Concept 83[70,22D] – ‘the three [arms] of government didn’t interact with each other’	6
Concept 3[70,1C] – ‘the fundamental concepts were not taken on board’ Concept 60[70,16A] – ‘developed concept of a policy unit in the OPM with like models in each Ministry’ Concept 71[70,18F] – ‘concern about the optics, of being seen as building an empire’	5

A centrality analysis intended to calculate the dominance of concepts in the overall map, only returns Concepts 1[70,1A] and 4[70,1D] in the list of the top ten most central concepts. The dominance of the other four (4) concepts that were returned by the domain analysis is therefore not supported.

When the map is stripped of all concepts that have no branched explanations or consequences, and a domain analysis is again performed on the ‘reduced’ version of the interviewee’s map, Concepts 1[70,1A], 4[70,1D], 83[70,22D] and 3[70,1C] (the top four concepts that had previously featured in the domain analysis of the entire map) are again highlighted as the most dominant concepts in the map. Concept 49[70,14A] - ‘you have to break [the civil service]’ also emerges. The dominance of these concepts (with the exception of Concept 3[70,1C]) in relation to all other

concepts in the stripped map is also supported by a centrality analysis. Given that the stripping process of concepts is a technique intended to isolate all those concepts from the map that only serve to elaborate an interviewee's perception of things, the results of a domain and centrality analysis of the stripped version of the map are considered to be more indicative of the interviewee's key impressions than the results returned by a domain and centrality analysis of the entire map.

By examining the environs of these core concepts in the stripped map, it is possible to identify three (3) clusters of concepts that are centred upon, and / or closely related to, them by some common 'theme' (Chart B).

Cluster A, most of which centres upon Concept 49[70,14A], seems to relate to the interviewee's perception of the abilities of the civil service to effectively implement government policy.

Cluster B, which primarily focuses upon Concept 4[70,1D], seems to concern the interviewee's perception of ownership of, and commitment to, the policy initiative.

Cluster C is centred upon, and related to, Concept 83[70,22D], and is concerned with the interviewee's perception of the roles played by civil servants in the top management positions of government, in relation to their responsibility to ensure the effective implementation of policy.

A fourth isolated cluster of two concepts is also evident. The common theme in this Cluster (D) is the interviewee's perception of the issue of trust and its influence on the implementation of policy.

If the map is re-populated with all its component concepts, it is possible to move from a macro-level analysis of these four clusters to a more detailed analysis of the issues or factors underlying each one. The subject matter of the component concepts in Clusters B, C and D do not seem to be distinctive from the overall 'theme' of their respective group. However, closer examination of Cluster A would suggest that it is possible to further sub-divide this cluster into a number of sub-elements or factor-categories. While supportive of the overall theme of the cluster (ownership of, and commitment to, policy implementation) each factor-category is somewhat distinctive from the others, shedding different ideas or perspectives of what influences ownership of, and commitment to, policy implementation.

For analysis purposes, the interviewee's map of concepts can therefore be decomposed into four (4) clusters with six (6) categories of factors that are perceived by the interviewee to potentially contribute to failure (or success) in policy implementation. These are depicted in Chart C and summarised in the Table below.

	Clusters			
	A	B	C	D
Factor-Categories	Values/Customs Resistance Leadership	Capabilities	Role fragmentation	Trust

Values / Customs

The interviewee refers to the 'culture' prevailing of the Ministry of Finance (Concept 14[70,2D]) and the civil service at large (Concept 15[70,2E]) as one of the factors influencing the reluctance for the assumption of ownership (Concept 4[70,1D]) of the policy under review and, consequently, failure in its implementation (Concept 1[70,1A]).

The use of the word 'culture' seems to be used to imply two things. The first concerns the value system of the Ministry of Finance as it relates to the norms and traditions characterised by the historical emergence of the Maltese civil service from the Whitehall model of government. By stating that "the culture in the 1990s was certainly around Whitehall in the 1960s" (Concept 15[70,2E]), the interviewee seems to be implying that the norms imparted to the civil service during the country's era of colonial rule survived the end of colonial government in 1964 and remained unchanged thereafter. The reason for this is not explained. However, the interviewee seems to attribute the unwillingness of the civil service to keep abreast with changes in the administration of other governments in the rest of the world (Concepts 17[70,2G] and 18[70,2H]), as a factor that reduced its state of preparedness for the acceptance and implementation of new policies and practices.

Closely linked to values, is the issue or notion of customs. This is evident in two ways. The first is the interviewee's mention of a 'singular culture' (Concept 14[70,2D]) that distinguishes the 'way things were done' at the Ministry of Finance,

as different from the rest of the civil service. The second is the perception that having the last Permanent Secretary recently appointed from outside the Finance culture (Concept 41[70,8A]) creates some room for hope (Concept 42[70,8B]). This argument suggests that the 'reproduction' of leaders with shared and similar traditional values and customs during the course of this policy initiative is perceived by the interviewee as one of the factors that contributed to its failure.

Resistance

The inability, or unwillingness, to depart from set values and cultures is likely to create a mind-set that will tend to condition people to resist changes and do nothing (Concept 19[70,2I]).

Besides this, the interviewee also seems to be attributing people's resistance to assume ownership for the policy in question to two other issues. The first is a function of their ability to understand and appreciate the concepts or elements of a given policy (Concept 2[70,1B]). The interviewee is arguing that unless the people identified to implement a policy comprehend the logic and operation of that policy, they cannot value its utility and will instinctively resist it, albeit probably in a non-malicious or deceitful way. In a similar vein, if people understand the operations of a policy but these are not incorporated in an organisation's customs, procedures or practices, they will not be assimilated (Concept 38[70,7A]) in their day-to-day activities and will be left un-owned.

In contrast, resistance to implement policy can be direct and intentional. In the case under review, the interviewee's perception is that such type of resistance was the result of an unwillingness to accept the organisation and its people (Concept 22[70,2L]) that were brought to facilitate the necessary changes and assist in the implementation of the government's policy. The reasons offered for such resistance was the fact that the organisation was outside of the civil service (Concept 20[70,2J]) and was staffed by expatriate consultants (Concept 21[70,2K]). It is likely that nationality alone does not trigger such reactions, and the causes underlying this go far deeper than what was established during the interview. However, the details for such causes were not discussed, despite probes by the interviewer to this end. This notwithstanding, it is probably fair to conclude that observations on persons acting

openly hostile and insulting (Concept 47[70,9D]) are indicative of strained interpersonal relationships.

An interesting point is that nothing seemed to have been done to overturn such hostile resistance. In fact, the interviewee states that having the government sanctioning such initiative at the highest level possible (Concept 5[70,1E]) had no effect on whether or not the policy was taken on board. While not directly mentioned by the interviewee, this seems to indicate an inability to responsabilise people and hold them accountable for their actions.

The interviewee also suggests that involving in the process (Concept 25[70,3B]) the key people responsible for implementation had no effect on whether or not the policy was taken on board. However, two observations are necessary. The first is the interviewee's definition of what leads to involvement. Spending time with people to establish a good rapport (Concept 26[70,3C]) can improve commitment to an initiative but does not directly lead to it. The second observation is that by stating that 'Finance was very much involved in the process', the interviewee seems to be implying that control of this policy was outside of the Ministry of Finance and that the transfer of ownership was never contemplated. It is therefore possible that the ministry's lack of willingness to own the policy was a function of a perceived lack of their control over it.

Leadership

It is certainly evident from the interviewee's interpretation of events that no effort was made from the political side to either attract or retain control of the policy. In fact one of the issues influencing the failed outcome of this policy initiative is the perceived lack of political commitment by the Minister responsible for Finance at the time (Concept 33[70,6A]. Also closely related is the perception of a lack of commitment from the Cabinet Committee that was established to monitor and direct a series of reform initiatives of which, this was a critical element. With the Committee having directed its focus on others matters (Concept 40[70,7C]) the initiative is perceived to have lost the political direction that this body had been established to provide.

Moving beyond the political field, the interviewee identifies leadership in general as a central factor that influences failure or success in policy implementation. In fact, by drawing parallels between events occurring at the time when attempts were being

made to implement this policy, and similar attempts in more recent years, the interviewee suggests that a reason for failure is the lack of attention that was, and is, given to “leadership development” (transcript p,12). The inability to address this issue is perceived to have led to a “situation [that] is probably much worse [now] than before” (transcript p,12). To the interviewee, good leadership requires drive and commitment (Concept 63[70,12G]).

Role Fragmentation

Although not directly established by the interviewee, it is possible to draw parallels between the interviewee’s concept of leadership and that of role fragmentation, which is another factor that is perceived to have led to failure.

Two positions are presented. The first relates to the Head of the Civil Service and the leadership role that the incumbent is expected to exercise in order to control the various sub-institutions of the civil service. The second relates to the role of Cabinet Secretary in leading the development and analysis of policy for Cabinet, and in overseeing its implementation by the civil service.

The interviewee depicts a situation wherein the Head of the Civil Service is leader by title and not by deed. One of the issues that is perceived to have contributed to failure is the complete detachment of the Head of the Civil Service from the Ministry of Finance (Concept [70,5A]) due to the perception that this Ministry falls outside of his jurisdiction (Concept 30[70,5B]). Related to this is the perceived lack of interaction between the organisations that the interviewee considers as the core elements of government – the Ministry of Finance, Cabinet, and the administration of the civil service in relation to the policies emerging from Cabinet (Concept 83[70,22D]). By proposing a solution that would consolidate these functional roles and responsibilities under the control and leadership of the Head of the Civil Service (Concept 84[70,23A]), the interviewee perceives a situation that would reverse the negative effects influencing failure in implementation.

In a way that seems to support this drive to consolidate roles, the interviewee criticises a decision that had led to the division in roles and positions of the functions of Head of the Civil Service and Cabinet Secretary (Concept 74[70,20A]). This decision is perceived to have been originally taken in view of the lack of policy advice and analysis to the Prime Minister and to Cabinet (Concepts 77[70,20D] and

78[70,20E]) and the consequent lack of follow-up action to ensure that policies are effectively followed through (Concept 79[70,20F]). In effect, however, the separation of two roles did not help to focus attention on either aspect of policy analysis and development, or policy implementation (Concept 76[70,20C]). While recognising that the consolidation or separation of both roles has been equally successful in different countries adopting different models, the interviewee suggested that “probably given the experience here, having the two together makes sense” (transcript p,22).

The interviewee further argued that effective policy implementation requires, in the first instance, effective policy development, analysis and control. It is argued that this could have been achieved with the establishment of a central policy unit in the Office of the Prime Minister and satellite units in other Ministries (Concept 60[70,16A]). The central unit would be tasked with co-ordinating the development and analysis of policy initiatives for consideration by Cabinet, and for following-up their implementation by the civil service (Concepts 67[70,17D] and 65[70,17B]). However, in a way that contradicts the proposal made earlier, the interviewee suggested that such a unit could best maintain control on the development and implementation of policy if it is established outside the domain of the Head of the Civil Service (Concept 85[70,23B]). While seemingly suggesting this in recognition of a lack of capacity for policy development within the strict domain of the civil service (Concept 87[70,25A]), such a proposal runs counter to the logic of role consolidation and is suggestive of the same ailments identified by the interviewee as a result of fragmentation.

Capabilities

The interviewee’s perception of a lack of ‘capacity’ in the public service extended beyond the field of policy development.

In fact, a major element that is seen to have contributed to failure was an absence of capable civil servants that had the ability and know-how to drive the policy (Concepts 92[70,29A] and 9[70,1H]) despite the planning and detailed deconstruction of activities that had been performed to guide its implementation (Concepts 7[70,1G] and 8[70,2B]). Indeed, the interviewee seems to be arguing that if the persons leading the civil service at the time that this policy was being implemented continue to hold leadership positions, failure remains inevitable. The interviewee argues that

given the lack of resources with the requisite capacity (Concept 56[70,14C]) the civil service ought to have been broken up (Concept 49[70,14A]). Also supporting this latter view is the perceived unwieldiness of the civil service given its size and traditions (Concept 51[70,13B]). In this respect, the interviewee seems to suggest that one of the issues influencing implementation is the consolidation of responsibility in the civil service to act as both policy maker and operator. The interviewee argues that the civil service should divest itself of all matters pertaining to operational functions and should concentrate on the development and regulation of policy (Concept 54[70,13E]). By separating these two functions, the interviewee seems to suggest that the civil service can be reduced to a procurement function such that the implementation of policy is 'bought in' from external agencies. This would suggest that control over resources would diminish and the power to oppose implementation would decrease, or cease altogether. Furthermore, the likelihood of successful implementation is bound to increase, as failure would cause such agencies to lose their contracts.

Concurrently, however, the interviewee recognises that there is today some potential in younger civil servants who, with their knowledge and skills, both technical and practical, can overcome some of the elements that have traditionally led to failure.

Trust

A final factor that is perceived to have led to failure in implementation is the disloyalty of persons entrusted with delivering government's policy (Concept 34[70,6C]). While it is argued that it is laudable for a government to engender trust by showing confidence and belief in peoples' capabilities, irrespective of their political creed (Concepts 35[70,6D] and 36[70,6E]), the interviewee seems to suggest that following such a strategy will, at times, inevitably lead to failure. Once again, the interviewee reaffirms his position that if a government is going to be faced by people not sharing its vision, (Concept 50[70,14B]) then it is better off to break up the civil service, separating policy implementation from its development.

Interview Document 71

The cognitive map derived from Interview 71 (Chart A) is composed of sixty-nine (69) concepts, of which twenty-four (24) are tails (i.e., have no in-coming links from other concepts) and one (1) is a head (no out-going links). The latter concept is the 'goal' concept of the model. The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by seventy-six (76) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.1:1.

A computer-generated domain analysis, intended to calculate the intensity of relationships around individual concepts, returns a list of seven (7) concepts with the highest density of links around them. Of these, only six (6) concepts are again returned by a centrality analysis. Unlike the domain analysis, this analysis establishes the dominance of concepts as a function of their centrality in the entire map, rather than their immediate vicinity. In addition, the centrality analysis also identifies a further four (4) concepts that share a dominant position. The ten most dominant concepts are shown in the Table below.

Concept	No. of Links
Concept 1[71,1A] 'failure...success' (the GOAL concept)	8
Concept 11[7,5A] – 'inherited mentality'	5
Concept 8[71,4E] – '[accustomed] to passing the buck' Concept 35[71,11C] – 'civil servants on board' Concept 41[71,14A] – 'the human element is sine qua non' Concept 57[71,18C] – 'civil service rebels by offering resistance'	4
Concept 10[71,4G] – 'subsidiarity' Concept 44[71,5D] – 'establish a relationship' Concept 32[71,11A] – 'they are very difficult to accept change'	3
Concept 26[71,10B] – '[consultant's attitude creates feeling of] "these want to us now as well?" '	2

If the map is 'stripped' of the concepts that have no branched explanations or consequences (i.e., concepts that only serve to elaborate the argumentation of the

model), it is possible to identify at least three (3) clusters of concepts that, rather independently, contribute to the 'goal' concept.

Each of Cluster A, B and C (see Chart B) centres upon one or more of the ten (10) core concepts established by the domain and centrality analysis, as follows:

- Concept 11[7,5A] – 'inherited mentality', Concept 10[71,4G] – 'subsidiarity', and Concept 8[71,4E] – '[accustomed] to passing the buck', in **Cluster A**;
- Concept 57[71,18C] – 'civil service rebels by offering resistance and Concept 32[71,11A] – 'they are very difficult to accept change', in **Cluster B**; and
- Concept 35[71,11C] – 'civil servants on board', Concept 41[71,14A] – 'the human element is sine qua non', Concept 44[71,5D] – 'establish a relationship' and Concept 26[71,10B] – '[consultant's attitude creates feeling of] "these want to us now as well?"', in **Cluster C**.

The ordering of these 'natural' clusters seems to imply that the interviewee perceives:

7. the context or environment within which policy is to be implemented (Cluster A);
8. the behaviour, predisposition and attitudes of the individuals involved in policy implementation (Cluster B); and
9. the type of relationships established among the key players involved in policy implementation (Cluster C);

to be the most important group of elements influencing failure, or success, in policy implementation.

If the map is re-populated with all its component concepts, it is possible to move from a macro-level analysis of the three clusters to a more detailed analysis of the issues or factors underlying each cluster.

Cluster A may in fact be divided into two sub-sets or factor-categories. The first concerns the customs and habitual practices that people tend to acquire as they acclimatise to a particular environment. The second category is the conditioning of people's behaviours, which unlike the 'natural' establishment of customs, concerns the imposed conformity of behaviour through forced means. In either case, the

resultant effect is the shaping of people's aptitudes to managing policy and their willingness or abilities to assume responsibility for its implementation.

Cluster B, which concerns the behaviour and disposition of persons involved in policy implementation, can be divided into three sub-sets or factor-categories. The first relates to the political maturity and experience of Ministers in managing power and exercising authority. The second concerns the politics surrounding the selection, development and implementation of policy, while the third pertains to the cloning of management and the subsequent tendency for groupthink that is likely to arise in an organisation that is 'self-propagating'. While all three aspects are seen by the interviewee to lead to the rejection of policy and its implementation, a qualitative distinction seems to be made between the first two categories of factors and the third. In the latter case, rejection seems to be viewed as an *indiscriminate* act resulting from an inability to understand and accept the need for changes requiring a deviation in behaviours and norms. On the other hand, in the former two cases, rejection is a function of the *deliberate* resistance to implement policies either due to a perceived threat or to further some particular interest.

No contrasting factor categories can be noted in the composition of Cluster C. While two relationships are identified – that between civil servants and consultants, and between civil servants and Ministers – the interviewee seems to be viewing the importance for the establishment of close relationships from the single perspective of collegiality. This is seen as a key factor determining failure, or success, in policy implementation.

Further to the decomposition of the three Clusters, the re-populated map also re-establishes an 'orphan' category that was 'lost' during the 'stripping process'. This category pertains to the need for the customisation of policy and its implementation, to ensure that adopted strategies match *perceived* needs.

Following from the above, the interviewee's map can therefore be broken-down into three (3) clusters with six (6) categories of factors that can potentially contribute to failure or success in policy implementation, plus a further 'orphan' category. These are outlined in Chart C and listed in the Table below.

	Clusters			
	A	B	C	Other
Factor-Categories	Conditioning Customs	Cloning Political maturity Politics	Collegiality	Customisation

Conditioning

One factor that the interviewee perceives as an influence on failure in policy implementation is a 'culture' of "passing the buck" (Concept 8[71,4E]), where subordinates expect their superiors to shoulder responsibility for what needs to be done, when and how. As perceived by the interviewee, one reason for this is the conditioning of human behaviour that arises when persons are "cowed into submission" by those in power (Concept 20[71,9A] and Concept 17[71,8D]). The result is an imprint of what is expected from every person in the chain of command, such that anyone deviating from stipulated roles, even if in the form of eliciting ideas on how to differently approach a particular issue, would be "shot down and shut up" (Concept 19[71,8B]). In this instance, the civil servants' aversion for assuming responsibility for implementing policy (Concept 18[71,8C]) is seen as an almost natural occurrence of the context within which they operated. While the interviewee attributes this situation to a period of time prior to that underlying the case study under review, it is felt that the "era not conducive to provide ideas" (Concept 18[71,8C]) created lasting norms that hindered civil servants to change old habits and accept new responsibilities. As a result of this, the interviewee also views policy makers as having been limited in their ability to decentralise authority (Concept 10[71,4G]) with the consequent effect that policy at an operational level could not be properly managed to achieve the desired results, hence leading to failure in implementation.

Customs

The inability to entrench the principle of “subsidiarity” (Concept 10[71,4G]), which is seen as instrumental to facilitate the translation of policy into effective strategic action by the civil service, is also traced by the interviewee to “inherited mentalities” (Concept 11[71,5A]). While leading to the same consequences as the issue of ‘conditioning’ mentioned above, different factors are seen to influence this behaviour. In this case, the inability of the civil servants to assume responsibility for policy implementation is a function of them “not being accustomed to exercise power” (Concept 5[71,4C]) rather than an attempt to avoid it. In this case, the interviewee describes a scenario wherein behaviours and norms are established through the natural evolution of customs and habits that are in turn shaped by tradition and events. Of particular relevance to the interviewee was Malta’s long history of colonial servitude. This served to create an ‘us and them’ mentality in government such that mismanagement was somehow accepted by the civil service because it meant, “you’re stealing from the Queen, not the nation” (Concept 51[71,7G]). Because this “custom has been ingrained so much” (Concept 52[71,7H]), and to the extent that “civil servants are now⁸ taking from the nation” (Concept 69[71,7I]), powers could not be easily delegated (Concept 6[71,4B]). The interviewee seems to be implying that policy makers were averse to such delegation because they feared that it could create more problems than it would solve.

The aversion of civil servants to assume responsibility, and the reluctance of politicians to delegate it, possibly created a stalemate situation that hindered the effective implementation of policy.

Cloning

The concept of ‘inherited mentalities’ is also seen by the interviewee to influence management’s ability to accept changes (Concept 32[71,11A]) and drive the implementation of new policies. In this case, failure in policy implementation is a function of lack of organisational mobility (Concept 28[71,10C]) as evidenced through low levels of employee and management turnover (Concept 29[71,10D]).

⁸ Meaning even this day, ten (10) years after the launch of the FMRP, and thirty six (36) years after independence.

This hinders the infusion of new visions, new challenges and new approaches to policy management. As such, the tradition of internal promotions and 'self-propagation' in the Ministry of Finance is seen to lead management to become "ingrained in the job" (Concept 32[71,11A]) such that future action can only be perceived in terms of the strategies and tactics of the past. Resistance to change such behaviour is seen as inevitable, but seems to be perceived as an indiscriminate and unpremeditated act.

Politics

On the other hand, the interviewee also seems to acknowledge that resistance may be forthcoming in a more deliberate and premeditated fashion (Concept 57[71,18C]), if the interests of a group commanding some element of control on a particular situation are threatened or overlooked. The interviewee explained one such instance when the Ministry of Finance was "by-passed" (Concept 67[71,20A]) and a rather important decision that affected the operational ability of the Ministry was publicly announced without their knowing (Concept 62[71,19E]). The consequence of this was that 'conflict and tension germinated' (Concept 64[71,19G]) and Finance officials rebelled (Concept 65[71,20D]). Such behaviour is almost inevitable every time an individual or party is not involved in a decision that will affect it. However, in this case, the interviewee seems to imply that the underlying cause of such disruption went beyond the concept of democratic decision-making processes. In this case, the reaction seems to have been triggered because of a deeper feeling of helplessness (Concept 68[71,20C]) reflecting a perceived loss of power and control over resources and one's interests. The problem in this case was probably even more acute because both the Minister and the top officials at the Ministry of Finance were unaware of decisions taking place in the Office of the Prime Minister. The Ministry was therefore probably perceived to be 'under-siege' at both a political and administrative front.

A similar type of reaction is seen to arise when Ministers interfere with the administrative machinery of Government (Concept 23[71,9B]). The interviewee acknowledges that in those situations where civil servants feel threatened by the degree of Ministerial interference they are likely to find an excuse for citing their inability to implement a policy (Concept 24[71,9E]).

Political Maturity

Indeed the interviewee also attributes the deliberate resistance of civil servants to policy implementation as a function of the political maturity of the Ministers who lead them.

Ministerial interference is perceived as a potential contributor to resistance, and hence failure, to effectively implement policy, especially when the incumbent exercises the authority ascribed to him in virtue of this position, in a discriminate, powerful way. The interviewee cites age (Concept 53[71,16D]) and lack of experience (Concept 58[71,19A] and Concept 59[71,19C]) as the main causes of such behaviour.

Collegiality

In direct contrast to the aforesaid, the ability to establish a relationship (Concept 44[71,15D]) on amicable grounds is perceived to contribute to collaboration and the attainment of success in the implementation of policy (Concept 47[71,15G]). The development of this type of relationship is perceived to be dependent upon various factors, but in all cases it is seen to be the responsibility of the political leader to achieve this desired state.

The first factor is the need for the Minister to gain respect (Concept 37[71,12B]) by establishing himself as a person who is skilled in, and knowledgeable of, the political field he is leading (Concept 36[71,12C]). The second factor relates to the need for Ministers to acknowledge that attaining Office “doesn’t mean that the Holy Spirit has come down on us” (transcript pg.18). In this respect, the interviewee emphasised the need for Ministers to treat civil servants as their “friends”, establishing a horizontal rather than vertical line of communication (Concept 43[71,15C]). The inability to achieve such a relationship is likely to foster tension and conflict (Concept 39[71,13A]) such that civil servants do not accept ownership of those policy initiatives that the politicians would want to see implemented. The lack of ownership cripples the effectiveness of implementation at an operational level.

In a similar vein, the attitude adopted by consultants who are hired to assist the civil service in the implementation of policy, should be one of facilitation rather than imposition or indoctrination (Concept 26[71,10B]). The interviewee does not see this

as fostering good human relations that are perceived to be so fundamental in order to improve the probability of success in policy implementation.

Customisation

Another factor that the interviewee attributes to failure or success in policy implementation is the ability to understand the needs and demands of the people that one is trying to serve or work with, from their perspective. Failure is depicted as an inevitable outcome, if the strategies and tactics adopted to implement a policy are not construed in a manner that positively matches the desired fashion in which they are received (Concept 2[71,2B] and Concept 3[71,6A]).

Final Note - Priorities

While the above factor-categories are derived from an analysis of the interviewee's map of concepts, it is also possible to identify another important factor which seems to implicitly arise from the interview but which fails to be explicitly mentioned by the interviewee. This relates to the issue of stakeholder priorities and their subsequent influence on implementation.

It is interesting to note that for a substantial part of the interview, the discussion on what influences failure in policy implementation did not centre upon examples drawn from the programme of works that had been approved by Cabinet, in 1990, for the Financial Management Reform Programme. Instead, the interviewee chose to refer to other examples of policy initiatives (mainly of a fiscal nature) undertaken during the same period of time. It is therefore apparent that, at least as perceived by the interviewee, the Ministry of Finance was either working to a somewhat different agenda than that established by central Government or, more likely, to a similar agenda but one with a different priority ranking of initiatives. Although the reason for this is not immediately apparent from the interview and the resultant cognitive map⁹,

⁹ A possible reason is that in the early years of the Financial Management Reform Programme (FMRP), the Ministry of Finance was not officially represented in the Cabinet Committee on Reform that was established to monitor and direct a Government-wide change programme that included the FMRP (this was established from research into documentary evidence on this case study). Thus, it is likely that the Ministry of Finance was not directly involved in the establishment of priorities for this policy initiative. Furthermore, the reason for focusing on fiscal measures rather than change management policies may be attributed to the fact that the FMRP was launched only some 15 months prior to an election. The priorities of the political leadership at the Ministry of Finance may therefore have centred upon the fulfilment of fiscal electoral promises and/or the appeasement of taxpayers to re-attract support from the electorate.

one may establish at least two possible consequences of this situation. These include the conflict and tension between civil servants at the Ministry of Finance and consultants from the Management Systems Unit¹⁰ (Concept 42[17,14A]) and the resistance offered by civil servants to implement the said changes arising from the FMRP (Concept 57[71,18C]).

Despite numerous attempts to direct the interview on a discussion of the programme of works 'officially' included in the Financial Management Reform Programme, the interviewee seemed cautious to steer the discussion away from this, clearly indicating some uneasiness around the subject. Further probing to uncover more of the hidden factors surrounding this issue of priorities was therefore not pursued. Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that different stakeholders to this policy implementation initiative held different (possibly conflicting) interests and intents, and the inability to reconcile these differences and establish an agreed set of priorities was a determining factor that directly, or indirectly, influenced failure.

¹⁰ MSU was the Government's in-house management consultancy organisation, charged with facilitating a number of change programmes, key among which was the Financial Management Reform Programme in question.

Interview Document 72

The cognitive map derived from Interview 72 (Chart A) is composed of sixty-three (63) concepts, of which four (4) are heads (i.e., have no out-going links to other concepts) and twenty-eight (28) are tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by seventy-five (75) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.19:1.

A computer-generated domain analysis intended to calculate the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity returns a list of five (5) concepts with the highest density of links around them. These are listed in the Table below.

Concept	No. of Links
Concept 13[72,6C] - 'Heads of the Civil Service used to offer resistance to the people from MSU'	8
Concept 1[72,2A] – 'fiasco in implementation...success in implementation' (GOAL Concept) Concept 20[72,7H] – 'there wasn't a spirit of cooperation' Concept 21[72,6B] – 'there was no progress'	7
Concept 28[72,8B] – 'feeling of why should a foreigner come and interfere with how I should manage my own things'	5

With the exception of Concept 28[72,8B], the dominance of the above concepts in the map is also confirmed by a central analysis, which is intended to measure the dominance of concepts relative to the entire map.

If the map is stripped of all concepts that serve to elaborate the chains of argumentation and a domain and central analyses are again performed, the top four concepts highlighted in the table above once again re-emerge among the most dominant concepts of the map. A further concept that shares a pivotal role in the stripped map, as measured by the central analysis, is Concept 38[72,9J] – 'the priority [ranking] of the agenda was different'.

The stripping process facilitates the identification of three clusters of concepts that seem to contribute to the goal concept (Chart B). Each cluster is centred upon, and related to, one or more of the dominant concepts returned by the domain and central analyses. The clusters seem to indicate that, as perceived by the interviewee, the issues influencing failure in the implementation of policy are a function of:

1. the ability to institutionalise accountability (Cluster A);
2. stakeholder interests and their management in the execution of policy (Cluster B); and
3. the relationship between civil servants and consultants in the implementation of policy (Cluster C).

When the map is re-populated with the constituent concepts that were previously removed during the stripping process, a fourth cluster of inter-related concepts emerges. This cluster is composed of five concepts that are suggestive of the interviewee's perception of the influence that changes in top management have on the execution of policy.

Furthermore, by re-populating the stripped map, it is also possible to examine in further detail the conceptual ordering of the issues influencing each of the three clusters.

The concepts in Cluster A are all directly related to the chain of argumentation pertaining to the theme of accountability that distinguishes this cluster from the rest of the concepts in the map.

In a similar way, the concepts in Cluster C are also related to one another in an intricate chain of argumentation that reflects the influence of group dynamics on the implementation of policy.

On the other hand, the concepts in Cluster B can be categorised into two sub-groups that, while supportive of the overall theme of stakeholder interests and management, seem to influence failure, or success, in the execution of policy in a different way. The first category relates to the effect that the alignment of stakeholder goals, or rather its absence, has on policy management. The second category communicates the interviewee's perception of the influence that political intervention has on the implementation of policy.

The issues influencing failure in policy implementation can therefore be summarised into four (4) clusters and five (5) factor-categories as depicted in Chart C and listed in the table below.

	Clusters			
	A	B	C	D
Factor-Categories	Accountability	Goal alignment Political intervention	Group dynamics	Leadership

Accountability

The institutionalisation of structures of accountability (Concept 3[72,3B]) is perceived by the interviewee as one of the key factors determining the degree of failure (or success) in the execution of policy.

The interviewee approaches this issue from multiple directions. From one perspective, the general lack of accountability surrounding the implementation of policy in Malta is attributed to cultural or customary factors. The interviewee argues that the lack of accountability can be a reflection of a general lack of discipline (Concept 9[72,4B]). In itself, the latter is an expression of the unwillingness of people to disrupt collegial / social relationships (Concept 12[72,6A]), especially in view of the fact that, due to the country's small size, everyone knows each other (Concept 10[72,4C]). Also related to this is the view that, "unlike maybe other countries in the north" (transcript p,4), we are not, by nature, a law abiding people (Concept 11[72,4D]). The interviewee therefore seems to suggest that discipline and, consequently, accountability, can only surface if it is institutionalised in appropriate structures and if it is enforced.

A second perspective on accountability seems to be the perception that this factor is something relative and not absolute. Using Concepts 48[72,17D] and 50[72,18A] as examples, the interviewee seems to suggest that accountability cannot, or should not, be always exercised in the exact same manner. In this respect, the interviewee expresses the view that a person who has successfully implemented a number of policies cannot be reprimanded or disciplined because he failed to implement some

other policy. While this logic of argument is in a way rational, in that people are bound to fail in their actions at some time or other, it does somehow run counter to the interviewee's strong emphasis on the need to institutionalise accountability because of a lack of self-discipline. If the culture of shunning accountability is as real and profound as the interviewee would seem to suggest, then its application in a relative, rather than absolute manner, may lead to abuse.

A third perspective on accountability is its relationship with decentralisation (Concept 2[72,3A]). One of the major initiatives of the policy under review was the need to decentralise power from the central agencies of government to line departments. The fiasco in implementation (Concept 1[72,3A]) as measured by excesses in expenditure and a substantial deficit position (Concept 4[72,3C]) is attributed by the interviewee to the decision of devolving authority without concurrently delegating responsibility for it. The prevailing argument seems to be that if people are not held responsible and accountable for their authoritative action, they are likely not to experience a drive or interest in the outcomes of their actions and decisions.

Goal Alignment

During various parts of the interview, reference was made to the presence of a different agenda of priorities (Concept 38[72,9J]) guiding the implementation of the financial management reform policy.

Two stakeholder groups are identified – the Ministry of Finance, and the consultants hired by central government to facilitate the implementation of this reform initiative.

The lack of goal alignment seems to be attributed to the differences in opinion that lay between what officials at the Ministry were considering as the most urgent things requiring attention (Concept 36[72,9H]) and the policy agenda that was laid out by central government as supported by its consultants.

From this, at least two observations can be made. The first is that the process undertaken by central government in establishing the policy agenda and priorities for financial reform had either excluded the involvement of Ministry representatives (including the political dimension) or otherwise did not successfully broker their concerns in the equation. This is reflected in the interviewee's perception that, at least in certain aspects, the consultants hired by central government were initiating and driving policy initiatives (Concepts 25[72,7J]), rather than assisting in their

development and implementation. Furthermore, the interviewee attributes the differences in priorities to differences in the understanding of both parties on the resource potential of the Ministry of Finance to implement an agenda of reform (Concept 62[72,19C]).

The second observation is based on the interviewee's perception that achieving goal alignment is unlikely to happen when one stakeholder group is imposed upon another (Concept 33[72,9B]). In this case, the interviewee perceives a problem of ownership (Concept 34[72,9F]) that will deviate the attention of the recipient party away from the ultimate goal and outcomes of the 'suggested' policy initiatives.

In contrast, when goal alignment occurs (Concept 57[72,18H]) between all parties to a policy decision, the likelihood of successful implementation is almost guaranteed.

Political Intervention

Another important factor that is perceived to influence the failure, or success, of policy implementation is the role that politicians play in its execution.

The interviewee suggests that policy initiatives will almost inevitably always be successfully implemented if they are strongly supported by the responsible Minister (Concept 52[72,18C]). However, the converse does not automatically apply. In other words, neither can a lack of Ministerial intervention be considered to necessarily lead to failure in policy implementation, nor can a case of failed policy implementation be automatically attributed to a lack of Ministerial intervention.

The interviewee mentions two examples to illustrate this point. In the first example, the interviewee suggests that successful implementation of this particular policy initiative was directly attributed to the Minister's level of support and intervention in its execution. In itself, such support was perceived to be a function of the technical and professional competence of the particular Minister in question (Concept 53[72,18D]) and, hence, his ability to relate to and fully appreciate the need for such policy (Concept 55[72,18F]). In the second example, the interviewee cites a policy initiative that failed to be implemented (Concept 35[72,9G]) but specifically ruled out the lack of intervention by the Minister as the cause of such failure.

Group Dynamics

A key determining factor influencing failure in the policy under review was the relationship that developed between the civil servants at the Ministry of Finance, and the consultants perceived to be representing central government. The importance of this relationship is reflected in the interviewee's perception of the strong resistance offered by civil servants to partake in the implementation of the said policy (Concept 13[72,6C]) and the obliteration of an environment of co-operation (Concept 20[72,7H]).

The interviewee identifies a number of issues that may have potentially contributed to this particular group dynamic. The first relates to the ability to clearly communicate goals and intentions (Concept 15[72,7B]) so that a common understanding between parties is achieved. This is also possibly related to (although not directly established by the interviewee) the sense of fear of the unknown and the consequent threat to people's sense of confidence or security (Concept 18[72,7E]). Another issue contributing to the group dynamic relates to the attitudes and behaviours of the persons party to this relationship. Feelings of imposition (Concept 24[72,7K]) and excessive force (Concept 14[72,7A]) are seen to limit the establishment of a sense of teamwork and cooperation.

The perception of 'foreign' interference (Concept 28[72,8B]) is also a key consideration. The interviewee suggests that things would have developed differently had the consultants been of Maltese, rather than foreign, nationality (Concept 29[72,8C]). At first glance this may suggest considerable narrow-mindedness, but the real reason for such behaviour (which was only established after the interview was officially concluded) is different. The first is a function of envy, as the foreign consultants were offered conditions of employment that were significantly superior to those enjoyed by civil servants. The second was the perception that these consultants in fact did not possess any significant expertise. Had the selection process be handled by the Ministry of Finance, they would not have offered them an appointment. The real factor influencing failure, or success, is therefore the need for a perception of equity to prevail among all members to a group that is charged with implementing policy.

Leadership

Changes in management are also seen to potentially influence the manner in which policy is implemented.

The interviewee identifies frequent turnover in the leadership of the organisation (Concept 40[72,14B]) as a factor to be taken into consideration. This is seen to potentially impact the situation in one of two ways. The first is that changes in leadership may be followed by changes in the vision of what should, or should not, be undertaken, or by changes in the relative priority of initiatives (Concept 43[72,14F]). These have the potential of stalling or disrupting the rate of progress of current initiatives. The second is that the attention previously afforded to policy initiatives by the organisation's outgoing leader will diminish considerably until the incoming leader obtains a full understanding of the organisation's agenda and finds the time to dedicate his attention to ongoing initiatives (Concepts 41[72,14C] and 42[72,14D]). On the other hand, there may be times when new leadership helps to breathe new life into initiatives (Concept 44[72,15A]), although in itself this will not necessarily guarantee a successful outcome (Concept 21[72,6B]).

Interview Document 74

The cognitive map derived from Interview 74 (Chart A) is composed of seventy-two (72) concepts, of which three (3) are heads (i.e., have no out-going links to other concepts) and eighteen (18) are tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by eighty-five (85) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.18:1.

A computer-generated domain analysis intended to calculate the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity returns a list of four (4) concepts with the highest density of links around them (see Table below).

Concept	No. of Links
Concept 1[74,3D] - 'bad implementation...good implementation' (goal)	11
Concept 52[74,5G] – 'problem of quality'	8
Concept 34[74,2C] – 'issue of mentality'	6
Concept 57[74,6C] – 'we have a lopsided situation in the [leadership] of the country'	5

With the exception of Concept 57[74,6C], the dominance of the above concepts in the map is also confirmed by a central analysis, which is intended to measure the predominance of concepts relative to the entire map. However, if the map is stripped of all concepts that serve to elaborate the chains of argumentation, and a central analysis is again performed, all four concepts once again re-emerge, establishing their pivotal role in the map.

The stripping process facilitates the identification of three clusters of concepts that are centred upon, and related to, each of the dominant concepts in the above table (Chart B). These clusters seem to indicate that, as perceived by the interviewee, the issues influencing failure in the implementation of policy are a function of:

1. the customs and normative behaviours that frame particular mind-sets on how policy is to be approached and implemented (Cluster A);
2. the capabilities of civil servants in driving policy implementation (Cluster B); and

3. the role relationship between civil servants and politicians in leading the implementation of policy (Cluster C).

After the map is re-populated with the constituent concepts that were previously removed during the stripping process, it is possible to examine in further detail the conceptual ordering of the issues influencing each of the three clusters. The concepts in Clusters B and C are all supportive of the overall theme of the cluster in a very similar way. However, the concepts in Cluster A can be further sub-divided into two groups that, while also supportive of the overall theme, illustrate certain differences. The first category in this cluster seems to relate to the traditions and customs that influence the way in which people go about their jobs. The second category relates to the people's attitudes and behaviours in relation to values such as accountability and delegation.

The issues that are perceived to influence failure can therefore be summarised into three (3) clusters and four (4) factor-categories as depicted in Chart C and listed in the table below.

	Clusters		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Customs Accountability	Capabilities	Leadership

Customs

One of the core issues that is perceived by the interviewee to inhibit the successful implementation of policy is an 'issue of mentality' (Concept 34[74,2C]).

The interviewee described a situation wherein civil servants are averse to change (Concept 29[74,3I]) to an extent that initiatives that have the potential to influence the 'way of doing things' are either resisted (Concept 31[74,3K]), or otherwise adjusted until both process and outcome accommodates customary practices and behaviours (Concept 27[74,3G]). As a result, the intended objectives of such initiatives are lost and the policy is 'badly implemented'.

A critical element that is seen to contribute to resistance and change is the fear of making mistakes (Concept 33[74,3M]). While the interviewee does not directly

establish the reason for such fear, parallel argumentation leads one to believe that this is perceived to be the result of the inability of civil servants to venture into new practices that are distinct from those performed by their predecessors (Concept 39[74,4C]). As a result, proposed changes are not radical enough to meet the demands of new policy (Concept 44[74,4J]), potentially leading to tussles between civil servants and politicians and the eventual abandonment of the policy (Concept 42[74,4H]).

Of particular concern to the interviewee was the perception that the inability to venture into the unknown with a new policy is really a function of a lack of understanding and appreciation of the logic and rationale past practices, and their inapplicability to current demands (Concept 38[74,4G]).

Capabilities

Indeed, the interviewee calls in question the technical skills and practical capabilities of most civil servants (Concept [74,4B]), labelling the critical factor influencing failure in implementation as “a problem of quality” (Concept 52[74,5C]).

A key contributor to this problem in the past was the practice of appointment by seniority (Concept 71[74,8A]) that meant that people promoted to leadership positions might have not necessarily had the competence required to fulfil the obligations and responsibilities of their position (Concept 56[74,5F]). While an attempt was made to overcome this practice with the introduction of renewable definite contracts of appointment, the interviewee believes that this move was defeated by practices in the civil service that inhibit younger potential applicants from applying for such positions for fear of ‘offending’ colleagues (Concept 73[74,8C]). Indeed, this perception is not unique to the interviewee, and in a letter circular by the Head of the Civil Service dated May 2001, all civil servants in middle and senior management positions were urged not to be inhibited to apply for super-ordinate positions, as present incumbents had no guarantee of renewal. This would therefore lead one to believe that seniority still occupies a central role in shaping the management structure, and leadership competence, of the civil service, albeit in a more subtle and less explicit way.

The interviewee identifies two measures to overcome this problem of quality. One is the need for government to continue ‘pruning the civil service’ (Concept 82[74,8G]).

It is by removing more functions from within the ambit of the public sector (Concept 83[74,8H]) that the interviewee perceives the potential for 'breaking the system' and the 'type of mentality' that hinders good policy implementation. The other measure requires substantial investment in the training and education of all civil servants "both in the theory of what they're doing" (transcript p,5) and also in the sense of accountability and values (Concept 50[74,5H]).

Accountability

In fact, closely related to this 'problem of quality' was the perception that in many sectors civil servants are not prepared to take on responsibility (Concept 21[74,2H]). The interviewee cites attempts to responsibilise departments to assume a more direct role in policy implementation as a futile attempt unless the 'type of mentality' (Concept 81[74,6A]) changes, and the required structures are available to support delegation (Concept 24[74,3C]).

Making the civil service more accountable for its actions is considered as a measure that will introduce new values and behaviours that will alter current practices and behaviours, and the attitudes of civil servants when dealing with the implementation of policy. For the interviewee, this seems to be a basic pre-requisite for success as unless it is achieved the government "will never get there" (Concept 35[74,6B]).

However, while recognising the need for set-ups and procedures for monitoring, feedback and discipline when things do not proceed as planned (Concept 23[74,3B]), it is somewhat ironic that the interviewee does not consider civil servants to be accountable to their political masters for their actions (Concept 67[74,7D]). This perception seems to be driven by the belief that the appointment of civil servants to top management positions in the service is a function that the civil service itself should be performing (and hence regulating) in an autonomous manner (Concepts 69[74,7E] and 64[74,7A]). In itself, this is also based on the belief that ultimately civil servants share the same objectives of politicians (Concept 68[74,7F]) and an alignment of goals that will foster the successful implementation of policy is bound to result, with or without the intervention of politicians ensure that the best people who can implement their policies are indeed appointed to positions of leadership. Again somewhat ironically, the interviewee perceives the lack of goal

alignment to result not from the lack of accountability of civil servants to politicians, but rather from their lack of technical competence.

Leadership

Another critical consequence of 'the problem of quality' is the perceived lopsidedness in the leadership competence in government (Concept 57[74,6C]).

To the interviewee, the roles and responsibilities of politicians and civil servants are clear and distinct. While the latter are there to provide the technical know-how and expertise in managing the business of government (Concept 58[74,6D]), the role of the politician is to provide the vision of the government's social agenda (Concept 59[74,6E]) and to shoulder political responsibility for it (transcript p,6).

However, the civil servants' lack of technical skills and competence is perceived to lead to a situation wherein decisions are not taken (Concept 78[74,7J]) and politicians must mastermind both the formulation of policy and its implementation (Concept 63[74,6I]).

The interviewee seems to imply that when this occurs, it limits both what, and how much, can be done, such that things don't happen (Concept 62[74,6H]) consequently leading to failure.

Data Reduction of Results of Interviews (Project 1)

Appendix 10

Pre-Interview Synopsis Paper (Project 2)

Research Interest

To study and explore the issues influencing the implementation of public policy.

Confidentiality

Everything that will be said and discussed during this interview will be treated in confidence and will be used ONLY for the purpose of the research. The results of the research are only shared with the examining panel at Cranfield University - who are themselves bound by a confidentiality agreement. Even then, the names of the persons interviewed will not be disclosed to the examining panel. The source of all the information gathered is therefore protected.

Research Objective

- To isolate those factors that curtail the effective implementation of public policy, identifying measures to overcome them.
- To identify those factors that promote the effective implementation of public policy, identifying measures that could internalise them in the day-to-day management of the civil service.

Approach

The research is divided into three Phases (or projects).

Phase 1 (already undertaken) was concerned with examining the issues pertaining to an example of **failed** policy implementation.

Phase 2 (this Phase) is concerned with exploring the issues pertaining to an example of **successful** policy implementation. In the context of this research, a case of successful policy implementation is defined as one wherein ***the strategic action adopted by the administrative arm of Government is considered to have delivered the intended policy and achieved the intended outcomes.***

The 3rd and final phase of the research will focus on establishing a 'model', or framework, that attempts to propose solutions, or measures, that will build upon current best practice in the civil service while concurrently addressing its shortcomings.

Selection of Policy for Case Study

The case example for Phase 2 of the research is the Government's decision in 1992 to introduce a system of Local Government in Malta (White Paper, January 1992).

The choice of this apparent successful policy implementation was determined by two interviewees who were closely involved in the implementation of this, and other, public reform policy decisions.

A number of documents that recount the objectives, structure, resourcing and outcomes of this policy decision have been reviewed.

Overview of Policy Decision / Implementation

The origins of this policy decision can be traced back to the 1981 and 1987 electoral manifestos of the Nationalist Party that promised the introduction of a system of local government through the establishment of Local Councils.

In January 1992, the Nationalist Administration published a White Paper, which clearly articulated the rationale behind this initiative and the Government's objectives to use Local Councils as a vehicle for the decentralisation of power and the application of the principle of subsidiarity.

The development of this policy originated in the Office of the Prime Minister. Specific **political responsibility** for managing, monitoring and controlling its implementation was entrusted to the Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister.

Soon after the publication of the White Paper, the Management Systems Unit Limited was requested to appoint a Project Manager to develop and co-ordinate the **technical aspects** of this policy initiative and facilitate its implementation. MSU's involvement increased over time, to an extent that, by 1993, the Project Manager had some fifty (50) people¹ deployed on the project.

Responsibility for the initiative from a **Public Service viewpoint** was entrusted to the Director General in the Office of the Prime Minister and, later, to the Director, Local Councils Department.

The project was divided into a number of discrete but inter-related sub-projects to reflect the terms of reference with which the initiative was established. In essence, these activities included the following:

Activity	Objective / Undertaking
Locality Boundaries	<p>To determine the geographical boundaries between Local Councils.</p> <p>This required tracing the traditional borders of Malta's towns and villages, and culminated in the plotting and digitising of these boundaries on to existing high quality digital base maps.</p>
Functions	<p>To determine what role the local councils would fulfil and how they would do it.</p> <p>This required the identification of those activities which until then were performed by central government agencies but which would slowly be devolved to Local Councils.</p>

¹ Both MSU personnel and Civil Servants on secondment.

Migration Plan	<p>To determine a staged implementation for the transfer of responsibility from central government to Local Councils.</p> <p>This required the preparation of a phased implementation programme for the functions identified above, and that included the identification of organisational and resourcing requirements, the preparation of supporting administrative material (such as guidelines, procedures manuals etc.), training programmes, communication campaigns etc.</p>
Funding	<p>To determine an appropriate basis to guide the funding of Local Councils and ensure fairness and equity in the distribution of funds by central government.</p> <p>This required the development of a funding formula based on variables such as the locality's area and population, special needs etc. as well as extensive discussion/negotiation sessions to ensure perceived fairness and equity.</p>
Contract Preparation	<p>To prepare template contract agreements on the basis of which Local Councils would outsource the delivery of activities/functions.</p> <p>This required the collection of large amounts of demographic and physical information about each locality. As most of this information was not readily available at the time, it required the application of extensive work in the areas of work measurement, unit costs, work methods etc. and the development of geographical information systems.</p>
4. Regulations and Procedures	<p>To determine an appropriate regulatory and operational framework for Local Councils to ensure the effective execution of their functions.</p> <p>Besides the preparation of contracts (mentioned above) this required the preparation of a comprehensive package of regulations, procedures, guidelines and computerised templates, which documentation covered areas such as finance, audit, tendering, complaints handling, officer procedures etc.</p>

Another identified requisite for this initiative was the establishment of a Department of Local Councils to assist Local Councils in the initial phases of their introduction, to co-ordinate their activities and to supervise the development of the policy initiative. However, this task was not established as an objective of the project as outlined in the table above.

The project objectives/terms of reference as outlined above were delivered between 1992 and 1994. MSU's support to both the policy initiative and, eventually, to the Department of Local Councils continued well over that period, albeit at progressively reducing intensity. Today, the Management Efficiency Unit, MSU's successor, continues to provide ad hoc consultancy support to the Department of Local Councils.

Purpose of this Interview

The purpose of this interview is to obtain first hand information on:

1. your understanding of how the attempt to implement this particular policy developed over time;
2. your views on what factors (or measures) directly or indirectly influenced the successful implementation of this policy initiative, what could have been done better, and how; and
3. your general perceptions and feelings of the issues that curtail the effective implementation of public policy in Malta.

Interview Structure

Rather than following a traditional question-answer format, the interview will ideally take the form of a discussion that considers the issues pertaining to the implementation of this particular policy.

The following is an indication of the areas that I would like to explore.

1. Your **general impressions** of the objective, structure and approach adopted in implementing the Government's policy to introduce a system of Local Government.
2. Your **perceptions** of the success of the implementation of this policy initiative.
3. Your understanding of the issues or **factors** that contributed to success (as defined above), possibly highlighting **examples** of such factors.
4. Your interpretation of the **circumstances** that led to these factors and the **measures** that could be taken to ensure their presence in the implementation of future policy initiatives.
5. Possibly with the benefit of hindsight, how you would have **approached** the implementation of this policy decision **differently**, and why.
6. Finally, and from a general perspective, your experience on the problems encountered by the Civil Service in implementing a Government's agenda.

Original Proposed Project Terms of Reference (Project 2)

Original Proposed Terms of Reference¹¹

- to propose various options and possibilities for the role and functions of Local Government and its relationship with Central Government;
- to decide on the exact division of responsibilities between Central Government and Local Councils;
- to propose suitable possible administrative models for implementing Local Government;
- to determine, for each model, preliminary organisational structures, human resource requirements, operations arrangements, funding implications etc.;
- to determine, based on chosen model, the changes required in other agencies / departments / ministries before Local Government can become fully operational;
- to determine Local Government boundaries;
- to re-draft the proposed Bill taking all the above into account;
- to hold public hearings and re-draft as necessary; and
- to propose possible implementation plans.

¹¹ Source: Archives of the Management Systems Unit Limited.

Appendix 12

Results of Individual Interviews (Project 2)

Legend to Notation used in Cognitive Maps

A	————→	B	'A' positively influences / leads to 'B'
A	———— ⁻ →	B	'A' negatively influences / acts against 'B'
A	----- ^e →	B	'A' is an example of 'B'
A	----- ^e ⁻ →	B	'A' is not an example of 'B'
A	——— ^m →	B	'A' somehow affects 'B'
A	—————	B	'A' is somehow related to 'B'
A	——— ⁼ →	B	'A' is equivalent to 'B'
A	——— ⁼ ⁻ →	B	'A' is not equivalent to 'B'
A	——— ^{&} →	B	'A' and 'B' together influence 'C'
A	——— [?] →	B	'A' may be related to 'B', but this is not directly established by the interviewee

Interview Document 142

The cognitive map derived from Interview 142 (Chart A) is composed of sixty-two (62) concepts, with three (3) heads (i.e., have no out-going links to other concepts) and seventeen (17) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by seventy-eight (78) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.26:1. The presence of only one head concept is indicative of a hierarchical chain of argumentation, while the link to node ratio obtained suggests depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under examination.

One of the head concepts in the map (Concept – ‘successful policy implementation...failure in policy implementation’), is also the ‘goal’ concept of the model. Being surrounded by twelve (12) links to other concepts, it is the most dominant concept in the model. A computer-generated domain analysis that measures the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity identifies the second most dominant concept as being surrounded by only six (6) links. This is followed with three (3) concepts that are surrounded by five (5) links; four (4) concepts with four (4) links; and the remaining concepts with only three (3), two (2) links, or one (1) link.

Different results of ‘dominance’ are returned if a centrality score analysis is performed on the map. Unlike the domain analysis, centrality score is intended to calculate the dominance of concepts in the whole map, rather than their immediate vicinity. As such, it should provide a better indicator of what concepts occupy a central position in the interviewee’s holistic thinking about the policy initiative.

If the map is stripped of all concepts with no branched consequences or explanations, it is possible to reduce, or focus, the analysis on those concepts that occupy a critical position in the chain of argumentation. Commonalities arise between the results of a domain and centrality score analysis performed on the stripped version of the map. The top ten (10) concepts returned by the centrality score analysis also feature among the most dominant concepts calculated by the domain analysis. The strength of these concepts in both their immediate vicinity and the map as a whole is therefore established.

Using these results as the basis of the analysis, it is possible to divide the concepts into three distinct clusters (A, B and C in Chart B), each of which denotes a separate chain of argumentation.

The most evident chain of argumentation centres around four (4) concepts (listed below), which are also the four most dominant concepts (after the goal concept) returned by the domain analysis of the stripped map:

- Concept [142,2G] – ‘there was synergy between the Public Service, [MSU] and the PA to the PM’;
- Concept [142,2C] – ‘there was political support’;
- Concept [142,3D] – ‘OPM were owning the project big time’; and
- Concept [142,9C] – ‘there was participation, active participation, all the way’.

It is immediately apparent that the concepts in this cluster (A in Chart B), share a common theme based on the principles of effective group dynamics.

The second chain of argumentation (Cluster B in Chart B) is centred upon Concept [142,1H] – ‘it was a greenfield site’. Although not featuring among the most dominant concepts in the domain analysis, this concept is still returned among the top ten concepts in the centrality score analysis. The theme in this case is the effect of the environment or organisational context, on the implementation of policy.

In contrast, none of the concepts grouped in Cluster C occupies a dominant position as measured by either a domain or centrality score analysis of the stripped map. This may possibly mean that, relative to the dominant concepts in the other two clusters, these concepts are perceived by the interviewee to be less important. This notwithstanding, a shared theme does exist among the concepts in this group. This seems to reflect the perception that, at least in part, the policy was successfully implemented because the said implementation was properly planned and executed.

Further in-depth analysis of the three clusters is possible if the map is once again re-populated with all constituent concepts.

The idea of effective group dynamics emerging from Cluster A can be further subdivided into two elements, or categories, each of which represents a rather distinct class of factors that seems to be influencing the successful implementation of the policy under review. The first group, or factor-category, is based on the presence of

strong cooperation among the various elements of the team designated with the responsibility for this initiative. The second factor-category relates to the commitment from all quarters to support the implementation programme and ensure its success.

In contrast, all the concepts in Cluster B seem to fall within one broad category and cannot be divided into separate groups. The overarching theme remains the effect of the organisational context or environment within which policy is being implemented.

On the other hand, Cluster C can be divided into two factor-categories. In the first group of concepts, the interviewee attributes success to the ability to develop and execute a specific choice of strategy, while in the second group, success is linked to the effective resourcing of the project.

The factors influencing the successful implementation of this policy can therefore be grouped into five (5) main categories. These are illustrated in Chart C and summarised by cluster in the table below.

	Clusters		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Cooperation Commitment	Organisational Context	(Effective) Strategy (Effective) Resourcing

Cooperation

Some of the most dominant concepts in the interviewee's cognitive map related to the development of a strong group dynamic, in part, characterised by good cooperation. This is explored by the interviewee from two perspectives.

The first perspective seems to consider the personal relationships that developed among the members of the team that were selected to drive the policy implementation. By describing the relationship of the team as synergistic (Concept [142,2G]), the interviewee seems to indicate that the individual members complemented one another. This is not specifically explained, but statements such as 'he was a good man to work with' (Concept [142,4F]) and 'there weren't any internal fights' (Concept [142,2J]), would indicate that the cooperation was a function of the behavioural aspect of each individual's character. In lay terms, the interviewee seems to want to indicate that there was 'good chemistry' between the team members. Furthermore, the absence of any internal fights (Concept [142,2J]) and reference to the fact that there wasn't any time wasted (Concept [142,2K]), may also indicate that the members on the team shared common goals. In itself, this would have strengthened relationships further.

The interviewee also explores cooperation from a formal perspective. A lot of emphasis was placed on the perception that there was considerable political support for the initiative (Concept [142,2G]). The term political is approached from two directions. The first relates to the support emanating from the Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister, as the person to whom official 'P'olitical responsibility for the initiative was delegated by the Head of the Executive (Concept [142,2D]). The second is the support emanating from the Director General (Administration) to whom 'p'olitical responsibility for the initiative was delegated by the public service (Concept [142,2E]). The initiative therefore had two officially recognised sponsors, each of whom represented one of the two basic institutions of government – the political arm, and the administrative arm.

The above elements provided the right conditions for the initiative to develop without obstacles or opposition (Concept [142,2I]) and to pace itself rapidly (Concept [142,2L]).

Commitment

Closely linked to the idea of cooperation is the principle of commitment that also seemed to occupy an important role in the interviewee's mind. Like cooperation, commitment is also examined from two angles.

One perspective is the individual commitment of each member on the team, driven by aspects such as the personal qualities of the individuals themselves. These qualities include elements such as leadership (Concept [142,3B]), attention to detail (Concept [142,7A]), a practical, hands-on approach to project management (Concept [142,7B]) and a determination to make things work (Concept [142,9A]).

Another aspect driving such commitment could be the sense of belief that each member had in both the principles underlying the policy initiative (Concept [142,10C]) as well as its perceived outcomes (Concept [142,10D]). From one aspect, therefore, the belief was intrinsically driven by a match between the policy's objectives and the personal values of each individual. On the other hand, the belief was driven by an extrinsic interest to change the status quo.

Either way, this sense of belief is also perceived to have provided a source of motivation and a realisation that 'things could actually be done' (Concept [142,10E]). The motivation could also have been influenced by the fact that the policy was a new initiative (Concept [142,10B]) and one that had never been tried before. As such, it provided the members of the team with the opportunity to develop new skills (Concept [142,10I]) while possibly gaining some personal advantage.

The same elements of belief and motivation are also perceived to have influenced the collective commitment of the members as a 'team' (Concept [142,9B]).

The fact that the policy had no precedent meant that it was a learning experience for everyone involved (Concept [142,10I]). This possibly meant that everyone perceived all the players to be on a level playing field and no one felt threatened of making mistakes. Coupled with the fact that each person was individually determined to see this policy implemented (Concept [142,9A]), it is also likely to have influenced the level of participation in the team (Concept [142,9C]). However, this relationship was not directly established by the interviewee.

Collectively, as well as individually, the persons involved in this policy implementation carried responsibility for it (Concept [142,9B]), holding themselves and each other accountable for its success (Concept [142,10A]).

Organisational Context

The interviewee also identifies the presence of a 'greenfield site' (Concept [142,1H]) as another element influencing the successful implementation of the policy.

The interviewee uses this expression to explain the absence of an organisation or entity within the institution of government that had the power to oppose or stall the implementation programme. The reason for this was that the policy was a new concept (Concept [142,10B]) and one that was therefore not being served or administered by an existing department or ministry of government.

The implication of this context is three-fold. Not having to worry so much about the management of people or cultures with a vested interest in the status quo (Concepts [142,2A], [142,3F]), the implementing team could be more clinical in their approach (Concept [142,2B]); it could dictate the tempo at which the initiative progressed (Concept [142,8B]); and it could focus on getting things right, the first time round, rather than having to tinker with the system so as not to jolt the present system (Concept [142,5D]).

Drawing a parallel to current day realities, the interviewee perceives the creation of agencies external from the mainstream civil service as the only means of ensuring that policies can be effectively implemented in government (Concepts [142,8D] and [142,8E]). The need for such strategies is perceived to be necessary in order to alter the current state of inertness underscoring the environment (or context) within which government policy is formulated and executed.

(Effective) Strategies

The need for designing effective strategies was discussed by the interviewee as an issue in its own right.

The interviewee seems to want to indicate that success is also dependent upon the ability to implement policies following the development of specific strategies that are based upon a consideration of specific events occurring at a specific time, and upon

the state of preparedness of the environment to receive and adopt such policies (Concepts [142,4B], [142,4C] and [142,4D]).

Another dimension reflecting the choice of strategies that direct who, how and when policies are implemented is stakeholder interest. In this respect, the choice of not 'internalising' the implementation of this policy in the civil service was also described as a function of the desire of two primary actors to control ownership over it (Concepts [142,5F] and [142,3G]). The reason for this is not directly established by the interviewee but can be inferred through cross-references with other secondary documentation. In the former case, it is likely that the PA to the PM wanted ownership of the policy, because of a personal desire not to let his minister (the PM) down. In the latter case, it is likely that MSU wanted ownership of the initiative because it was one of the few areas where success was being registered and officially recognised.

Either way, it is evident that the interviewee was directing attention to the need to ensure that policy implementation is guided by tailor-made strategies that are designed to best suit the circumstances of the environment.

(Effective) Resourcing

In a similar way, the interviewee also links success to the ability to effectively plan and deploy the resources required to implement. This is examined from four perspectives.

The first considers the need to deploy a sufficient quantity of resources that enables the development of a critical mass (Concept [142,1D]). The importance of establishing this is it that generates a certain momentum that makes it difficult for things not to get implemented (Concept [142,1G]).

The second consideration relates to the need to focus resources on the policy that is being implemented. Besides underscoring the importance of deploying a large resource pool to a policy initiative, the interviewee also attributes success to the ability to assign the resource pool to a specific initiative only (Concept [142,1E]). Exclusively dedicating resources to a particular initiative (Concept [142,1F]) is seen to complement the strategy of developing a critical mass, thereby enhancing the probability of success.

A third consideration regarding resourcing strategies is whether resources should be external or internal to the recipient organisation. While it is recognised that too often this is dependent upon the outcome of power struggles between persons or entities who command effective control of the resources (Concept [142,1I]), the interviewee argues that sustainability of the policy initiative (Concept [142,1C]) can only be effectively achieved if resources are internalised. In this case, this meant the creation of a new department (Concept [142,1A]).

A fourth and final consideration is that quantity of resources alone is not sufficient to ensure success. A focused, internal, critical mass must also be adequately trained (Concept [142,3K]) and provided with sufficient doses of motivation (Concept [142,5E]). These are considered to be vital elements to ensure *long-term* sustainability (Concept [142,1C]).

It is interesting to note that, on more than one occasion, the interviewee deliberately chose to use the word 'rejects' to describe the resources that were trained and motivated to deliver this policy initiative. The significance to the interviewee was that training and motivation, if applied in the right manner and in sufficient quantity, can 'work miracles' with anyone.

Other secondary data may support this perception. Firstly, the 'rejects' were trained in new skills thereby providing them - possibly for the first time ever – with a competitive edge on other workers in the civil service. Secondly, they had a real opportunity to prove that they could perform to expectations and that therefore they were not 'rejects'. Thirdly, the implementation followed very tight deadlines meaning there were opportunities for over-time and hence extra remuneration.

Interview Document 143

The cognitive map derived from Interview 143 (Chart A) is composed of ninety-two (92) concepts, with four (4) heads (i.e., having no out-going links to other concepts) and twenty (20) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and thirty (130) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.41:1. These results are indicative of a rather complex and tall hierarchical chain of argumentation.

The goal concept in the model (Concept – ‘successful policy implementation...failure in policy implementation’) is the most densely populated concept, with thirteen (13) links to other concepts. As such, it is the most dominant concept in the map, as measured by a computer-generated domain analysis that calculates the intensity of relationships around concepts in their immediate vicinity. In terms of dominance, it is followed by six (6) other concepts that are surrounded by seven (7) links; one (1) concept surrounded with six (6) links; three (3) concepts with five (5) links; four (4) concepts with four (4) links; eighteen (18) concepts with three (3) links; and the remaining concepts with two (2) links or only one (1) link.

When considered in isolation, the results of the domain analysis do not facilitate the identification of specific chains of argumentation. Nor is this suitably established by running a centrality score analysis intended to calculate the dominance of concepts in the whole map, rather than their immediate vicinity. However, if the domain and centrality score analysis are again performed after the map is ‘stripped’ of those concepts that have no branched consequences or explanations, it is then possible to isolate at least two separate chains of argumentation.

The first chain of argumentation (Cluster A in Chart B) is centred upon Concept [143,3B] – ‘the government’s agenda was on a multi-faceted reform programme...one-dimensional’. Surrounded with eight (8) links, it is the most dominant concept (after the ‘goal’ concept) that is returned by the domain analysis. The common theme shared by the concepts in this cluster is not immediately obvious from an examination of the stripped version of the map. It becomes more apparent only after the map is re-populated with its constituent concepts.

Considered collectively, the concepts in this cluster indicate that the interviewee seems to judge the timing of events as a critical element contributing to the successful implementation of the policy under review. This is substantiated by Concept [143,1B], which is directly linked to the 'goal' concept and to which most of the chain of argumentation leads.

The second chain of argumentation (Cluster B in Chart B) is centred upon Concept [143,9C] – 'the identification of people that were capable of focusing, with competence on the subject'. Surrounded with seven (7) links, this concept is the third most dominant as established by the domain analysis of the stripped map. In this case, the theme shared by the concepts in this cluster is more readily apparent. The interviewee considers the capability and competence of the persons driving this policy initiative as another critical element for success.

A third group of related concepts (Cluster C in Chart B) is also evident. The common theme shared by the concepts in this cluster seems to relate to the approach taken in implementing the policy initiative (Concept [143,15C]). In this case, the cluster is not centred upon a dominant concept as calculated by the domain analysis of the map. This possibly suggests that, as perceived by the interviewee, the factors contributing to success in this cluster of concepts are less critical or important when compared to those in Clusters A and B. Nonetheless, the concepts must be considered with attention.

If the stripped map is re-populated with all component concepts, it is possible to move from a macro-level analysis of the theme behind each identified cluster, to a more detailed examination of the concepts driving that theme. In this way, the inter-relationships between individual concepts can be isolated and analysed so that different aspects (properties) of the same concepts can be determined.

Cluster A

The element of timing in Cluster A is explored by the interviewee from two main perspectives. The first is contextual and relates to a consideration of certain environmental / situational factors that shaped the development of the policy initiative and that influenced its successful adoption. The second perspective considers what the interviewee perceives to be the likelihood of a deliberate (planned) strategy adopted by the government to ensure a higher probability of success.

The concepts that seem to give meaning to the contextual element of the initiative's timing can be further grouped into three sets, or factor-categories. In the first group, the interviewee talks about the development of a set of values and beliefs that were considered necessary to give meaning to the principles underlying the policy initiative (Concept [143,3C]). In the second group, the interviewee refers to the presence of enabling support policies to facilitate the delivery of the policy initiative in question (Concept [143,3B]). In the third group, consideration is given to the organisational context of the environment within which a policy decision is to be implemented (Concept [143,11C]), and its potential to oppose or facilitate implementation.

From a strategy perspective, the interviewee seems to attribute the successful implementation of the policy initiative to two things. The first relates to the ability to build and mobilise support for the policy initiative, by developing and managing an effective demand-side (or 'pull') strategy (Concept [143,6E]). The second relates to the ability of developing and managing an equally effective supply-side (or 'push') strategy by fostering commitment to the policy initiative (Concept [143,6D]).

Cluster B

In addition to the timing of the initiative, the interviewee also identifies the players involved in its implementation as a critical success factor.

This aspect is also explored by the interviewee from two broad perspectives. Firstly, the interviewee attributes success to the individual qualities of the key actors involved in the implementation of the examined policy (Concept [143,1A]). Secondly, success is attributed to the collective qualities of the key actors in their performance as a team (Concept [143,10B]).

Cluster C

A third and final consideration to success is the approach adopted in driving this policy initiative. In this case, importance is attributed to clear role delineation between the members of the implementing team (Concept [143,15B]), and to the deliberate choice of following a structured and planned methodology (Concept [143,16B]). Both issues are variants of approach and, as presented by the interviewee, seem to represent different properties (i.e., aspects) of it, rather than separate factors influencing success in a direct way.

In summary, the interviewee's map can be broken-down into three (3) clusters illustrating eight (8) factor-categories that are perceived to have influenced the successful implementation of this policy initiative. These are summarised in the Table below and illustrated in Chart C.

	Clusters		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Enabling Support Policies Context Values / Beliefs Demand Commitment	Individual Qualities Collective Qualities	Approach

Enabling Support Policies

In his analysis of the factors that contributed to the success of the Local Councils initiative, the interviewee ascribed a lot of importance to the environmental dimension within which this policy was being implemented (Concept [143,3A]).

The introduction of Local Councils was described as one dimension of a multi-faceted reform programme (Concept [143,3B]) intended to improve the administrative structures of government (Concept [143,4F]) and to create a culture of excellence in the country (Concept [143,4A]). In this context, the interviewee presents this initiative as one element in a chain of events that were intended to revolutionise the political (Concept [143,4D]), economic (Concept [143,3I]) and socio-cultural (Concepts [143,3K], [143,3H], and [143,3J]) standing of the country.

As such, this particular event could only be successfully implemented, if it were introduced at a particular point in time, following only the introduction of certain other events, and preceding others still.

Based on this consideration, at least three reflections are possible. The first concerns the need to consider a policy initiative in tandem with other current and planned initiatives – or, said differently, the need to consider the inter-operability of policy initiatives. The second consideration relates to the need to properly time the introduction of policy initiatives, while the third reflection concerns the need to understand and plan the sequence with which policy initiatives should be introduced. This explains the interviewee's perception "that it was as though someone had a master plan" (interview transcript, p.4).

Context

Related to the above is the organisational context within which a policy initiative must be implemented. Two scenarios are drawn. The first scenario relates to the experiences that are encountered when new policies are introduced in existing organisations (Concept [143,14B]). The second relates to the introduction of new policies that in themselves require the development of new organisational structures (Concept [143,11C]).

The latter case, which is also reflective of the scenario within which the Local Councils policy was introduced, is depicted as being advantageous to the policy implementer (Concept [143,12D]). The advantage is a function of the absence of existing structures (Concept [143,12B]), of motivations (Concept [143,12E]), or of personal interests (Concept [143,12A]). A fourth, and probably more important advantage, is the ability to start afresh, building new systems and operations without being hindered by the inertia of existing operations (Concept [143,12C]).

In contrast, implementing new policies or change in existing organisations (Concept [143,14B]) is considered to be more difficult to handle because of the issues mentioned above, requiring longer periods of time (Concept [143,12G]) and greater sensitivity for the needs of individuals engaged in the organisation (Concept [143,12H]).

In either case, however, the interviewee seems to attribute importance to the need for strong leadership (Concept [143,14A]). From one aspect, leadership is perceived

necessary to overcome and translate resistance into support, while on the other hand, leadership is deemed important to mobilise and motivate new resources into action.

As such, both approaches are intended to generate the same outcome; that is, the ability of drawing a following for the new policy or the change initiative. The establishment of a critical mass (Concept [143,13A]) is deemed to be an important success factor for the development of a sustainable momentum in favour of the policy initiative being implemented.

Values / Beliefs

Another critical success factor perceived by the interviewee is the need for a set of values or beliefs that are in tune with, and support, the principles of the policy being implemented.

Two of the key objectives behind the policy of Local Councils were the democratisation and depolarisation of government. The former objective would provide citizens with greater opportunities for direct involvement in governance (Concept [143,5C]), while the latter objective would broaden greater cooperation among people of different political ideologies.

In line with this philosophy, the policy initiative was implemented in a way that draws upon wide participation. The strategy that was followed contemplated the involvement of as many people as possible (Concept [143,3G]) and the involvement of individuals who were both pro and against the then current government (Concept [143,8B]).

The merit of this approach seems to lie in the idea that it may have created a sense of credibility in the policy that was being championed by the government (Concept [143,3F]) and, therefore, a sense of belongingness or ownership.

Demand

The principle of broad participation extended beyond the individuals that were directly involved or affected by the policy decision. In fact, an important consideration that is perceived to have facilitated the successful implementation of the policy initiative was the decision by government to explain its intents through the publication of a White Paper (Concept [143,6E]).

By inviting anyone to comment upon or criticise government's intended policy, the government was once again signalling its intent to practice the principles laid down in the White Paper itself. More importantly, however, by choosing to publish the White Paper on the eve of the general elections, the government was positioning itself in a way such that, if re-elected, it could strongly claim to have a fiat from the nation to implement the policy. As such, this strategy enabled the government to mobilise sufficient support (Concept [143,6C]) that would weaken or render futile, any resistance by individuals or entities who could oppose the policy.

Commitment

The strategy of creating a demand for the policy also had an impact on the supply side of things, by generating commitment within government quarters to ensure that it could deliver its promises (Concept [143,6B]).

Yet, even this 'supply-side strategy' did not happen naturally. In this case, the interviewee attributes success to two primary considerations. The first was the fact that the Prime Minister truly believed in the need for the policy initiative (Concept [143,6H]). Consequently, he was highly motivated and determined (Concept [143,6G]) to ensure that the government's resources would be mobilised to support its success. Secondly, the initiative resided within the Prime Minister's own ministerial portfolio (Concept [143,7D]). Once again, this decision was intentional. Besides symbolising the Prime Minister's resolve, it ensured an effective command and control that was essential to mobilise people into action (Concept [143,6F]).

Individual Qualities

Moving beyond a consideration of the contextual and strategic issues influencing success, the interviewee devoted considerable time to explain why the players involved in this policy initiative were also critical (Concept [143,1A]) for the outcome that was achieved.

In essence, there were four major players involved in implementing this policy – the personal assistant to the Prime Minister (Concept [143,8K]) representing the political arm of government; the Director General in the Office of the Prime Minister (Concept [143,7G]) and the Director of the Local Councils Department (Concept [143,8A]) representing the administrative arm of government; and the Consultant from the

Management Systems Unit Ltd. (Concept [143,9D]) representing the government's external consultancy support resource.

In each case, the importance of the players to the successful outcome of the policy initiative was described as a function of both their individual personal capabilities and their motivations. Each of these two qualities was in turn explored from different dimensions.

The personal capabilities of the key players were explained in terms of their competence (Concepts [143,9A], [143,8D], [143,10E]), their background and their resourcefulness (Concepts [143,9B], [143,8L], [143,8G], [143,11A], [143,16A]). The players' motivations are explained in terms of their personal interests as stakeholders to the policy itself (Concepts [143,8C], [143,8M], [143,7I]), and their own convictions and beliefs (Concepts [143,8H]).

All these qualities, or dimensions of commitment by each of the players, are seen to have generated enthusiasm (Concept [143,7H] that itself fired commitment with certain fervour, much like that of a missionary (Concept [143,8I]).

Collective Qualities

In addition to the attributes of each individual player, the interviewee also draws upon the importance of the collective qualities required by a team to successfully implement their mission.

These qualities are explored from two dimensions. The first is the need to develop a collective commitment, while the second relates to the need to develop synergistic cooperation.

The interviewee seems to be arguing that besides individual commitment, it is important that each player is also committed to something that has a collective, rather than personal, outcome. This is critical because it serves to enhance relationships and foster greater cooperation between the team. While every team member was individually responsible for some critical aspect of the policy – political (Concept [143,10F]), administrative (Concept [143,10D]), consultative/support (Concept [143,10E]) – it was their collective ability to merge the individual elements into one seamless whole (Concept [143,10B]) that greatly contributed to the initiative's success. The interviewee explained this metaphorically by drawing

parallels to the baking of a cake. Besides requiring all the necessary ingredients, for a cake to be properly baked, the ingredients must be added in sequence and mixed together in a certain way (Concept [143,10C]).

Approach

Related to the whole issue of team performance is a consideration of the roles that were assumed by each individual member (Concept [143,15A]).

It is evident from the aforementioned that each individual member of the team had a particular contribution to make. But besides this, the interviewee also thought it was important to mention that, in addition to his role, each individual also clearly understood the role played by each of the other members on the team (Concept [143,15B]). This was not elaborated upon in great depth, but is seen to have led to good co-ordination (Concept [143, 15C]) and, ultimately, to have contributed to making this initiative a success.

Tied to this is also the fact that the team met on a regular weekly basis throughout the implementation of the policy (Concept [143,15D]), despite the fact that this implementation was carried out over a number of years. Efforts were therefore sustained over the long-term. The interviewee perceives the institutionalisation of regular, sustained meetings as a factor that led to improved coordination but, possibly more important, to ensure that 'blockages were unblocked' (Concept [143,15E]).

From this it is probably fair to assume at least two things. First, that decisions were taken in a timely manner and that matters were resolved decisively as they arose. Secondly, that each team member must have been delegated specific responsibility for particular activities and empowered to execute them, reporting only to the team on progress achieved, or when requiring direction on issues that could not be solved without the consent or involvement of the other team members.

Following from the delineation of roles and the establishment of weekly meetings, is the approach adopted in implementing this policy in terms of its methodology.

Two observations are made. The first relates to the extensive research carried out by the team (Concept [143,9G]) prior to committing itself to a particular direction. By basing itself on the experience of other countries (Concept [143,10A]) that shared a similar political ideology and vision (Concepts [143,9E], [143,9F]), the team

shortened its learning curve, and avoided 're-inventing the wheel' or making the same mistakes experienced by other countries. The second observation made by the interviewee was that the team was very focused on what it was doing (Concept [143,16B]). While two members of the team had other responsibilities to fulfil, the other two, who were driving the initiative 'on the ground' were exclusively dedicated to the initiative and were therefore not distracted by other agendas (Concept [143,17A]). All their efforts could therefore be channelled to sustain the momentum required to drive the policy initiative to fruition.

Despite having isolated a number of factors that contributed to success, the interviewee acknowledges that, “you can come close to replicating (success) but perhaps not [in an] identical [way], because you will never find the ideal identical situation were you can replicate [things]” (interview transcript, p.10).

This is a very important consideration. It acknowledges that while individual factors may **influence** the success of a policy initiative, the latter is also dependent on the **availability and mix of a number of inter-related** factors, each one complementing the other. The **situational context** of the policy implementation as denoted by the factor-categories described above therefore remains critical.

Notwithstanding this, however, the interviewee also stated that it is possible to “find some common denominators [with other success stories]” (interview transcript, p.10), thereby also acknowledging that the same factors, applied differently in different circumstances, may also lead to success.

Interview Document 144

The cognitive map derived from Interview 144 (Chart A) is composed of seventy-five (75) concepts, with two (2) heads (i.e., having no out-going links to other concepts) and nineteen (19) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and four (104) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.39:1. The presence of only two head concepts is indicative of a hierarchical chain of argumentation, while the high link to node ratio obtained suggests depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under examination.

The 'goal' concept is surrounded by sixteen (16) links to other concepts, making it the most dominant concept in the model. In contrast, the next two most dominant concepts, as calculated by a domain analysis, are surrounded by only six (6) links. These are followed by another two (2) concepts that are surrounded by five (5) links; eight (8) concepts with four (4) links; and the remaining concepts with only three (3), two (2) links, or one (1) link.

Different results of 'dominance' are returned if a centrality score analysis is performed on the map. With the exception of the goal concept, the top concepts returned by the domain analysis do not feature among the top concepts returned by the centrality score analysis. The diverging results make it difficult to isolate sets of inter-related concepts that help to establish the interviewee's frame of mind.

On the other hand, converging results do arise when a domain and a centrality score analysis is performed on the map, after it is stripped of all concepts with no branched consequences or explanations. This operation facilitates the identification of concepts that occupy critical positions in the interviewee's chain of argumentation. Using these results as the basis of the analysis, it is possible to divide the concepts in the map into three distinct clusters (A, B and C in Chart B), each of which denotes a chain of argumentation sharing some common subject or theme.

Concept [144,6A] – '[these were] new concepts', seems to dominate the line of thinking in Cluster A. The interviewee seems to ascribe importance to the novelty of a policy, and the effect that this may have on the likelihood of success or failure in its implementation.

The interviewee also measures success as a function of the methodology followed in implementing a policy. This seems to be the general theme underscoring the grouping of concepts in Cluster B. The dominant concepts to which all other concepts are related are Concept [144,9E] – '[there] was good planning', Concept [144,3C] – 'the implementation was staggered', and Concept [144,5A] – 'there were various consultations'.

The chain of argumentation in Cluster C centres upon two dominant concepts: Concept [144,6G] – 'there was, obviously, the political commitment', and Concept [144,6H] – 'the political commitment [was] at the highest level'. Through the concepts in this cluster, the interviewee argues that a critical factor for the successful implementation of policy is the level of political support that it receives.

If the map is re-populated with all its constituent concepts, it is possible to move the analysis to a further level of detail.

For example, an examination of the re-populated concepts in Cluster A would indicate that the importance of the novelty of a policy, while still valid, is only one of a number of elements that contributed to success. Considering all the concepts in this cluster, it seems that it is the context within which all these elements came to play that had a beneficial or detrimental effect on the successful implementation of the policy in question.

Similarly, an examination of the concepts in Cluster C would indicate that formal political support is not the only thing that influences the successful implementation of a policy. Rather, success is seen as a function of the commitment of all persons or entities involved in implementing the policy, whether or not they represent the political element of government.

The issue of methodology arising from a consideration of the concepts in Cluster B can also be examined from multiple angles. In this case, however, it is possible to isolate specific (yet related) chains of argumentation, by dividing Cluster B into four smaller sub-sets, or groups of concepts. In the first group, the interviewee seems to discuss the methodology of implementation from the perspective of stakeholder involvement. A second perspective is the need for good planning, followed by the right choice of process and the selection/availability of capable resources.

The factors influencing the successful implementation of this policy can therefore be grouped into five (5) main categories. These are illustrated in Chart C and summarised by cluster in the Table below.

	Clusters		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Context	Stakeholder involvement Planning Process Resource capabilities	Commitment

Context

The context within which this policy was being implemented seems to be an important consideration to the interviewee. This is examined from two aspects.

The first is the novelty or innovativeness of the policy itself (Concept [144,6A]). This characteristic is perceived to stimulate change (Concept [144,6C]) and to generate awareness and interest (Concept [144,6B]) in what is being attempted, possibly leading to action that supports implementation (Concept [144,8E]). Although new ideas could possibly also generate opposition and resistance, this was not explored by the interviewee.

Secondly, the ability to stimulate positive action also seems to be explored in relation to a perceived state of readiness in the environment. The interviewee argues that there was a demand for the policy, both internal to government (Concept [144,1B]) as well as external to it (Concept [144,1A]). As such, the likelihood of success was greater as people were more amenable to change both their mentality and behaviour (Concept [144,6C]).

Stakeholder Involvement

Another important element that is perceived to have contributed to success was recognition of the need for expert assistance (Concept [144,8A]) and, consequently, the deliberate choice to engage in discussions and consultations (Concept [144,5A])

with a number of persons or organisations that had an interest in the policy and its outcomes.

Probably of some significance is the interviewee's reference to 'various' consultations, which were substantiated by a number of examples during the interview but which are not reflected in the map. The use of this term seems to imply that the interviewee considers a success factor to have been the breadth of discussions held, rather than just consultation in itself.

Another dimension that seems to be important to the interviewee is the continuity of consultation. In fact reference is made to the creation of an association of Local Councils (Concept [144,15D]) "again to have a forum of discussion" (transcript p.15). Although this was created after the policy was implemented, it featured as an important aspect of the implementation programme to secure long-term sustainability of the system.

The importance of stakeholder involvement is also explored from another two dimensions. The first relates to the interviewee's perception for the need to share policy and decision-making with as many people as possible (Concepts [144,5B] and [144,8G]). The second is more Machiavellian in nature, with the interviewee using consultation as a means to end – getting the best possible advice (Concept [144,8B]) and holding people accountable to it (Concept [144,8H]) to deliver what needs to be done (Concept [144,8F]).

Planning

Besides consultation, the interviewee also considers good planning as an important element for implementing a policy. This is explored from multiple perspectives.

The interviewee identifies clarity of vision and direction (Concept [144,9G]) as the first elements of good planning. These require a thorough understanding of the policy objectives and the desired outcomes (Concept [144,10B]) as well as an identification of the issues or constraints that may potentially hinder their achievement (Concept [144,9F]).

Related to the above is also the need to consider the detail of the policy (Concept [144,9H]). Every aspect of the policy must be considered (Concept [144,13E]) and objectives must be followed with specific activities that break the policy

implementation into manageable tasks (Concepts [144,10C], [144,12A] and [144,13C]).

Linked to this is the need for the application of control systems (Concept [144,13D]) and the continuous monitoring of activities and evaluation of results (Concept [144,17A]). As such, the interviewee seems to imply that planning is dynamic, rather than static, function. However, while the interviewee does refer to the need for on-going planning (Concept [143,13A]), this thought is not directly linked to those concerning monitoring and control.

Another interesting element referred to by the interviewee is the timeliness of the planning activity. The interviewee argues that despite efforts to plan ahead for events or problems, issues are always bound to arise. Success can nonetheless be achieved if these issues are treated proactively (Concept [144,17B]) and in a timely manner (Concept [144,17C]).

Process

Related to good planning is the process chosen to guide the implementation of a policy. While at first glance this may be indistinguishable from planning, the concepts related to 'planning' seem to refer to pre-implementation activities, while those related to 'process' apply to implementation and/or post-implementation tasks.

Once again, the interviewee first gives consideration to the context within which the policy was to be implemented (Concept [144,16A]). Importance is given to two aspects: the ability of the persons who would be responsible for administering the policy (Concept [144,3D]), and the suitability of the activities that would need to be performed in relation to the intended roles of the persons or entities who were to assume responsibility for them (Concept [144,3A]).

A second element was the incrementalist approach to implementation (Concept [144,3C]). This was a deliberate choice and was based upon a consideration of the context as well as an acknowledgement that persons must go through a learning process (Concept [144,4A]). The ability to stagger activities and handle implementation through a transition period (Concept [144,4B]) was deemed to have had a significant influence on the successful outcome of events.

Closely related to the issue of incrementalism was the detail of the approach adopted (Concept [144,6D]). This ensured that activities were undertaken with accuracy and precision (Concept [144,6F]), reducing the probability of mistakes and the risk of failure.

Resource Capabilities

Also related to the methodology of implementation was the emphasis on the need for the right resources (Concepts [144,14A] and [144,9C]). The interviewee seems to imply that the right techniques (mentioned above) must necessarily be accompanied with the right mix of skills, if efforts to implement policy are to be successful.

Resource capabilities are examined from two aspects. Firstly, the interviewee places equal importance on the need for ensuring that the 'right resources' are both on the driving end (the policy owners) (Concepts [144,14B], [144,15A], [144,15B] and [144,15C]) as well as the receiving end (the functional administrators) (Concepts [144,9A] and [144,9D]). This seems to be important to ensure effective hand-over and sustainability of the initiative over the long-term. Secondly the interviewee places importance on the need for a holistic resource capability. In fact, the availability of a political driver (Concept [144,14B]), of technical / expert support (Concept [144,15B]) and of administrative coordination (Concepts [144,15A] and [144,15C]) was identified as a critical element.

Mention was also made of the personal capabilities of the political driver. This was identified as a success factor but was neither elaborated upon, nor broadened to include the other persons directly involved on the implementation team.

Commitment

The importance of a holistic resource pool can also be seen from a commitment perspective. If success is partly based upon the availability and coordination of different skills, then it should follow that the individual commitment of the players providing those skills is equally important to ensure completeness of effort. This notwithstanding, the interviewee seems to consider political commitment as the most important element.

In this regard, the interviewee first distinguishes between philosophical and physical commitment (Concept [144,14F]). The philosophical commitment seems to refer to some intrinsic value or belief system; that is, the principles or objectives guiding the development of, and support to, the policy (Concept [144,10E]). On the other hand physical commitment is the visible element of commitment (Concepts [144,14E] and [144,6I]) that translates a belief into tangible action.

Another aspect of commitment seems to be its location. Reference to the fact that the political commitment was at the highest level (Concept [144,6H]) leads one to believe that the will behind success was greater than it would have been had the policy initiative been committed to, and driven by, someone at a lower echelon in the political hierarchy.

Also related to this is the perceived political risk associated with a lack of commitment and failure (Concept [144,10D]). The intensity of risk as measured by the degree of political repercussions arising from failure (Concepts [144,11B] and [144,11A]) was such that it demanded total political commitment from the highest level.

A final consideration of commitment relates to how it is approached. In the case under examination, the political commitment was results-driven. This is measured and explained as a function of flexibility (Concept [144,7D]) that requires sensitivity and adaptation to the context within which a policy is being implemented (Concepts [144,7E], [144,7F] and [144,7G]) as well as a function of decision-making. To the interviewee commitment is indistinguishable from the ability to be decisive in one's actions, and the willingness to do so with speed and agility. Success necessitates getting things done .

Interview Document 145

The cognitive map derived from Interview 145 (Chart A) is composed of one hundred and nineteen (119) concepts, with two (2) heads (i.e., having no out-going links to other concepts) and thirty-seven (37) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and forty nine (149) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.25:1. The presence of only two head concepts is indicative of a hierarchical chain of argumentation, while the high link to node ratio obtained suggests depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under examination.

One of the head concepts in the map is also the goal concept of the model. It is surrounded by twenty-one (21) links to other concepts, making it the most dominant concept in the map. In sharp contrast, the next most dominant concept is only surrounded by six (6) links. Four (4) other concepts are surrounded by five (5) links; thirteen (13) concepts by four (4) links; twenty-two (22) concepts by three (3) links; and the remaining concepts with only two (2) links, or one (1) link.

Only the first three of the dominant concepts identified above also feature among the top ten concepts returned by a centrality score analysis. This indicates that, relative to all the concepts in the map, these concepts are the only ones that occupy a dominant position both in their immediate vicinity and in the entire model. While these results provide an indication of the interviewee's frame of mind, more distinct chains of argumentation can be identified if the map is stripped of all concepts that have no branched consequences or explanations and that therefore only serve to elaborate the argumentation of the model.

Of the top ten (10) most dominant concepts returned by a domain analysis of the stripped map, seven (7) also feature among the top ten (10) most dominant concepts as measured by a centrality score analysis. These concepts can be considered to be the most pivotal to the model, thereby facilitating the identification of the most critical chains of argumentation.

Based on this logic, it is possible to group the concepts of the stripped map into three (3) clusters (Chart B). Each cluster centres upon one or more of the pivotal concepts and seems to influence success/failure in implementation in a relatively distinct way.

The pivotal or key concepts in Cluster A are Concept [145,2F] – ‘I had been [at MSB] for 17 years’, and Concept [145,2A] – ‘I had this background and experience’. All the other concepts in the cluster are somehow related to these, either through a physical link, or a common line of reasoning. In fact, the concepts in this cluster seem to share a similar subject, or theme, related to the personal context or background of the interviewee. This background is perceived by the interviewee to have had a significant influence on the successful outcome of the policy initiative.

The concepts in Cluster B also share a common theme among them. Once again, the subject is also related to the context within which the policy was being implemented, but in this case, it refers to the presence of a supportive external environment. The key concepts to which all others in the cluster relate are Concept [145,3G] – ‘the Prime Minister told me this is a big challenge, but you will have my full support’, and Concept [145,4I] – ‘[the Steering Committee] agreed with the plan’.

Linked to the themes in Clusters A and B, is the line of thinking behind the concepts in Cluster C. Through these concepts, the interviewee seems to be discussing the choice of approach, or method of implementation, as the policy under review was being executed. Three pivotal concepts seem to dominate the reasoning behind this cluster. These include Concept [145,7B] – ‘identify the shortest cut’; Concept [145,6D] – ‘the conventional approaches with government’; and Concept [145,8E] – ‘the mentality of the civil service’.

It is possible to analyse the three Clusters in further depth and detail, if the map is repopulated with all constituent concepts. In fact, each of the three Clusters can be broken down into further distinct groups of concepts. While still respecting the overall theme of the cluster from which they emerge, the concepts in each group share closer affinity to a more specific subject such that they present a distinct sub-category or class of factors influencing success or failure in policy implementation.

Cluster A can be divided into three factor-categories relating to the experience of the interviewee, his style of management, and his personal beliefs and values. Cluster B can be divided into two factor-categories; one relating to the formal support of the environment as manifested through political commitment, the other relating to less official support as emanating from informal networks. Cluster C is also divided into

two sub-groups, denoting the process element of the chosen method of implementation and the attitudes characterising such approach.

Each of these factor-categories influenced success in different ways and must be individually explored. They are illustrated in Chart C and listed, by cluster, in the Table below.

	Clusters		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Experience Management Style Values/Beliefs	Political Commitment Networks	Process Attitudes

Experience

The interviewee's experience is the first element of his personal background and capabilities that seems to bear relevance to the successful implementation of the local councils' policy.

There are various elements or properties that characterise this factor-category. The first is time related. The interviewee perceives his duration of employment at the Malta Shipbuilding Corporation (his former employer prior to this assignment) and, therefore length of experience, as a critical element of success (Concept [145,2F]). This is closely related to a second characteristic, which related to the type of experience gained through this employment. The interviewee's role in the organisation was project-management related (Concept [145,2H]) and largely involved the establishment of new administrative structures and operations 'from scratch' (Concept [145,3A]). Furthermore, the commercial element of the environment to which the interviewee had become accustomed to (Concepts [145,3B], [145,3E] and [145,3C]), also played an important role in shaping his mode of operation and outlook of management.

Collectively, the elements in the interviewee's past environment conditioned his style of management, which style matched the characteristics and requirements of the environment to which he was being exposed.

Management Style

Some of the concepts presented by the interviewee seem to point to five different characteristics of management style that are likely to have positively influenced the successful implementation of this policy.

One characteristic is a practical approach to management. The interviewee recognised that success could not be achieved by following the norm, and that specific measures were required to deal with a specific problem (Concepts [145,3J] and [145,3K]). Related to this is the ability to adapt to suit the contextual demands of the environment within which the policy was being implemented (Concept [145,4A]).

A third characteristic is the choice of following a structured and methodical management approach. The preparation of implementation programs (Concept [145,4C]) and strategic plans (Concept [145,4E]) are indicative of a preference of formal planning methodologies and proactive/rational decision-making behaviour. This notwithstanding, the interviewee also identifies flexibility (Concept [145,3I]) as an important element of success. When considered with a heightened level of self-motivation (Concept [145,3H]), this is indicative of a style of management that, while guided by process, is actually results-driven.

In this case, Government was able to task this type of individual because the policy and the programme was a new one. However, in other instances, a policy initiative may fall within the established programme precincts of a less motivated type of individual. If initiatives are dependent upon the right type of individual, and hiring new individuals for specific programmes is not possible, then Government should consider moving people around. Moving people around would also help avoid 'cloning' and the 'fossilisation' of ideas and customs as suggested by the results of Project 1).

A final but critical characteristic of style is the interviewee's personal disposition. His desire for challenges (Concepts [145,2I], [145,2E], and [145,2B]) and his sense of enthusiasm (Concepts [145,14A] and [145,14C]) seems to have generated an optimistic frame of mind that sparked further motivation and a determination to succeed.

Values and Beliefs

This disposition also seems to have been influenced by the interviewee's value system, which can be examined from two aspects.

The first aspect relates to the interviewee's intrinsic beliefs. The local councils' initiative was not just some other policy that government wanted to implement. It was a policy that was based upon a set of principles that the interviewee empathised with and considered instrumental for improving the quality of life (Concepts [145,1G], [145,1D]).

A second perspective is that the interviewee's beliefs were not only philosophical in nature but also applied in practice. Long before the development of this policy, the interviewee had already taken concrete measures to make a contribution to improve community life (Concepts [145,1E],[145,1F]). The policy therefore presented an opportunity to the interviewee to make a greater contribution that would have a long lasting effect. It therefore contributed to generating a personal interest in the successful outcome of the policy that may have again fuelled the interviewee's motivation and sense of determination.

It is also worth noting the interviewee's comment concerning his perceived ability to make a positive contribution (Concept [145,14D]). This reflects a different aspect of belief – a belief in oneself and in one's ability. This too is likely to have influenced his motivation and his determination to succeed.

Political Commitment

Another factor of success was the supportive environment within which the policy was being implemented.

Political commitment was perceived to be a particularly important element. Four properties of this type of commitment can be identified. The first concerns the location of the commitment. Commitment from the highest echelons of government (Concepts [145,3G], [144,2C], [145,8A]) is perceived to be more important than that arising from lower levels. This type of commitment is more likely to mobilise the support and cooperation required from stakeholders that could otherwise block or prolong its implementation (Concepts [145,5E], [145,5D]).

The commitment can also be described as being something physical. Reference to a Steering Committee (Concept [145,4I]) and the personal involvement of a political

figure (Concept [145,11B]) would suggest that the political commitment to this policy was visible, tangible and very much hands-on.

Related to this is also reference to the need for determination (Concept [145,3H]), recognition of a dynamic environment (Concept [145,12I]) and, consequently, flexibility (Concept [145,3K]). The interviewee therefore seems to suggest that the type of commitment is as important for success, as the level of commitment that is shown by politicians.

A fourth and similar consideration is the duration of the political commitment. The sustainability of success is attributed to the ability to uphold political commitment over the long-term (Concepts [145,12I] and [145,12H]).

Networks

Another form of support is that which originates from informal networks. This is seen to be at least as important as 'official' support as it enables the identification of short cuts and ensures that things get done.

The informal network seems to be based upon the development of personal relationships (Concept [145,4J]) and ones that can be influential in delivering the results required (Concept [145,7C]).

Process

The interviewee ascribed significant importance to the method adopted in implementing the policy initiative. One aspect was the process element of implementation. Once again, this seems to be explored from multiple perspectives.

One characteristic of process is the degree of bureaucracy of the system and the persons working within it. The interviewee ascribes success to the ability of the implementing team to be flexible and work around conventional systems to get things on time (Concepts [145,6F], [145,7B], [145,6C]).

In addition to flexibility, the interviewee also identifies practicality as another characteristic of success. This is described as the ability to use 'loopholes' to one's advantage (Concept [145,8L], [145,8B]) while working within the system.

On the other hand, practicality does not mean discarding detail. In fact, an important aspect of the process of implementation that was perceived to have positively influenced success was the accuracy employed in implementing the policy, combined with the application of rigorous standards and procedures (Concepts [145,9D], [145,9E], [145,13A]). Related to this was the availability of technical support that was significant both in terms of ability and amount (Concept [145,10B], [145,9C]), and trained human resources (Concepts [145,11C], [145,11D]).

A final consideration of process is that implementation was evidence, or experience-based. Thorough research of the success and failure of similar implementation programmes in other jurisdictions (Concepts [145,1A], [145,15B], [145,1C]) ensured that mistakes are avoided and lessons learnt by others are applied in a local context.

The interviewee also noted that starting from nothing was an advantage (Concepts [145,15C], [145,1B]) but failed to explore this issue further.

Attitudes

The interviewee also perceives attitude to be a determining factor influencing the method of implementation and, consequently, success or failure. The concepts discussed by the interviewee would suggest that this is explored from four angles.

Just as systems or processes can be bureaucratic, so too can people be inflexible in their approach and style. Following convention to the letter is not perceived to lead to success (Concepts [145,8K], [145,8F], [145,8D]) although it is likely to be convenient to many people (Concept [145,8G]). Arising from a consideration of this issue is people's disposition to risk. Indeed, success seems to be linked to the ability to depart from the norm and to assume responsibility for the outcomes of such risk (Concepts [145,8J], [145,8I], [145,8H]).

However, the interviewee also acknowledges that attitudes are shaped and moulded by the culture of the organisation or environment within which people operate (Concept [145,8E]). The interviewee describes the 'mentality' of the civil service as being stagnant (Concept [145,9B]), thereby suggesting the presence of some

organisational inertia that resists change and encourages a fatalistic attitude (Concept [145,15A]). The ability to draw people out of this environment and expose them to different experiences (Concept [145,9A]) is seen as a potential measure for changing attitudes and cultures.

On the other hand, the interviewee also believes that individual persons can also make a difference. This depends upon their personal attitudes and their ability to infuse a sense of optimism in the environment (Concept [145,14M]). In itself, this is perceived to be dependent upon personal belief in what one is trying to accomplish (Concepts [145,14F], [145,14G]) and the desire to assume responsibility for a challenge (Concept [145,14J]). The interviewee measures success in terms of these behavioural elements (Concepts [145,14K], [145,14I]) rather than technical knowledge or expertise (Concept [145,14L]).

Furthermore, the probability of success can be improved if the attitudes of the persons involved in implementation are properly aligned to ensure a collective effort. The interviewee believes that the development of sound group dynamics based on the principle of teamwork (Concept [145,12D]) is critical to ensure that everyone is pulling his own weight (Concepts [145,12C], [145,12F]) and that of the team (Concept [145,12E]).

Interview Document 146

The cognitive map derived from Interview 146 (Chart A) is composed of one hundred and ten (110) concepts, with one (1) head (i.e., having no out-going links to other concepts) and forty-one (41) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and thirty four (134) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.22:1. The presence of forty-one tails and only one head concept is indicative of a tall hierarchical chain of argumentation, while the link to node ratio obtained suggests depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under examination.

The head concept in the map, which is also the goal concept of the model, is surrounded by seventeen (17) links to other concepts, making it the most dominant concept in the map. In contrast, the next most dominant concept is only surrounded by eight (8) links. This is followed by two (2) other concepts, which are surrounded by six (6) links; five (5) concepts surrounded by five (5) links; eight (8) concepts by four (4) links; thirteen (13) concepts by three (3) links; and the remaining concepts with only two (2) links, or one (1) link.

When a centrality score analysis is performed on the map to measure the dominance of concepts in the entire model, rather than in their immediate vicinity, only four (4) of the top ten concepts identified above are also returned by this analysis. The ability to identify specific chains of argumentation that would explain the interviewee's cognition of the issue under review is possible, but limited. This is improved if the map is stripped of all concepts that have no branched consequences or explanations and that therefore only serve to elaborate the argumentation of the model.

Of the top ten (10) most dominant concepts returned by a domain analysis of the stripped map, seven (7) also feature among the top ten (10) most dominant concepts as measured by a centrality score analysis.

As the process of 'stripping' is intended to isolate the most critical concepts in a model, and given that the centrality score measures the dominance of a concept in the entire model, these concepts can be considered to be the most pivotal to the model, thereby facilitating the identification of the most critical chains of argumentation.

The concepts of the stripped map can in fact be notionally divided into four (4) clusters (Chart B), each of which centres around one or more of the pivotal concepts. The concepts in each cluster seem to share a common theme, and each cluster appears to influence success/failure in implementation in a relatively distinct way.

The central or most dominant concept in Cluster A, to which all other concepts are related, is Concept [146,3A] – ‘it just happened at the right time from all sides’. Through the use of these concepts, the interviewee identifies the presence of a number of contextual factors, which are deemed to have a determining affect on the successful outcome of this policy initiative.

In Cluster B, two concepts seem to occupy a dominant position; these are Concept [146,2H] – ‘Richard was the best placed’, and Concept [146,3B] – ‘if the PM had given this to another portfolio it wouldn’t have happened’. An examination of these concepts, and those linked to them, would suggest that the political dynamics defining this initiative is another important consideration determining the successful implementation of this policy initiative.

The dominant concepts in Cluster C, as measured by the centrality score analysis, are Concept [146,9A] – ‘we lack leadership’, Concept [146,10A] – ‘we have a weak civil service’, and Concept [146,13A] – ‘we have a very sick civil service and a very sick management class’. The subject binding together the concepts in this cluster relates to the capability of the civil service in implementing policy and driving new initiatives.

The fourth and last cluster of concepts pivots upon Concept [146,15G] – ‘you become enthusiastic’. The common theme in Cluster D is the motivation of the players driving a policy initiative.

If the map is again re-populated with the concepts that had been stripped out, it is possible to analyse the three clusters in further depth and detail. While the overall subject or theme of each cluster remains unchanged, the concepts in Clusters B and C can be divided into further sub-groups, each of which denotes a particular factor influencing the successful outcome of this policy initiative. The issue of political dynamics arising from Cluster B appears to be examined by the interviewee from the perspective of political will and the location of political responsibility. The capability

of the Civil Service in Cluster C is examined from the perspective of role delineation and the personal skills and capabilities of civil servants.

The Table below summarises the factors that are perceived by the interviewee to have influenced success. These are also illustrated in Chart C.

	Clusters			
	A	B	C	D
Factor-Categories	Context	Political Will Location (of political responsibility)	Role Delineation Skills and Capabilities	Motivation

Context

The interviewee ascribes considerable importance to the environment or context within which the policy initiative was being introduced and implemented. Underlying this line of thinking was the timing of the initiative (Concept [146,3A]), which is examined from three perspectives.

The first perspective is the perceived need for the policy both from a political (Concept [146,2A]) and an administrative (Concept [146,2B]) point of view. The interviewee does not directly explore the effect of this need. However, when related to other thoughts, the interviewee seems to be arguing that the policy was 'in demand', possibly encouraging policy makers to move ahead with this initiative.

Another element in the environment that may have encouraged the development and implementation of this policy was the availability of resources. The presence of trained personnel and expertise (Concepts [146,6H] and [146,6I]) and the availability of the requisite facilities and tools (Concept [146,6F] and [146,6G]) contributed to the appropriate timing of the policy and its implementation.

A third perspective relates to the presence of particular events that were generating and sustaining the momentum required to lead to the implementation of this policy. This momentum is explained from two angles, the first of which is political. The interviewee perceives the publication of a White Paper (Concept [146,2O]) and the choice of binding the policy as an electoral promise (Concept [146,2E]) as having

generated a political drive and commitment (Concept [146,2D]) that would provide the initiative with the impetus required for it to move forward. The second element of the momentum is technical. The interviewee argues that the results being obtained from a number of managerial and organisational reviews relating to the subject matter of the policy (Concepts [146,1B] and [146,4E]), provided the necessary elements to define an appropriate framework for the policy (Concept [146,4B]) and facilitated the process of its implementation (Concept [146,1F]).

Related to the above element is also the issue of priorities. The interviewee seems to argue that the political momentum, besides being dependent upon 'demand' and the 'availability of resources', is also dependent upon the political priorities of the government (Concept [146,4D]).

Finally, it is important to note that the interviewee seems to argue that all of the abovementioned elements must be simultaneously present to ensure the 'correct timing' for a policy initiative (Concept [146,3A]). For example, the 'need' for the policy without the 'availability of resources' and the presence of a particular 'momentum', may not have led to successful implementation. As such, it is the product of the elements, rather than their individual contribution, that seems to be a most critical factor influencing success or failure.

Political Will

The political momentum and the establishment of the policy as a priority initiative is also reflective of a situation wherein the government showed political will and determination in ensuring the successful adoption of this initiative.

This will is examined from two perspectives. The first is philosophical and relates to the government's belief in the need for the policy as manifested through the publication of a White Paper (Concept [146,2O]) and through the establishment of the policy as a key element of the electoral manifesto (Concept [146,2E]).

However, it is also physical, having been made manifest by the Prime Minister's personal involvement (Concept [146,2F]). To the interviewee this is one of the more relevant factors contributing to the successful outcome of the policy. The interviewee argues that, "in the Maltese context, the biggest political will is shown when the PM takes an initiative under his responsibility (transcript p.2)". This

strategy had a symbolic meaning and provided the policy initiative with the right visibility. Coupled with the Prime Minister's strong leadership position (Concept [146,9A]) it was an important ingredient to drive commitment from Government (Concept [146,4C]).

The ability to drive commitment is seen as an important element, even at the highest levels of government. The interviewee argues that the ability to 'play as a team' (Concept [146,9C]) is often lacking and, at times, people consciously do things that run counter to the overall goal or objective of that team (Concept [146,8I]). While commitment should be a natural consequence of the principle of collective responsibility (Concept [146,8G]), in practice it requires genuine will (Concepts [146,8D] and [146,8C]) and cooperation (Concept [146,8B]) if it is to work spontaneously. In the absence of these elements, it must be externally driven, often in a forceful manner (Concept [14,7G]), and by someone commanding power and authority (Concepts [146,9A] and [146,2M]).

Location of Political Responsibility

Indeed, a determining factor contributing to the success of this policy initiative was the deliberate choice of locating political responsibility for the initiative in the Office of the Prime Minister (the physical element) and in the hands of the Personal Assistant to the Prime Minister (the person element). Each one contributed to success in different, but complementary ways.

Choosing to locate the policy within the portfolio of the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) is a clear indication of the government's seriousness with respect to this policy. The reason for choosing to adopt such a strategy is at least twofold. Besides the issue of will and commitment, the interviewee argues that cooperation and coordination of activities between Ministries in Malta is very lacking (Concept [146,3D]). This is perceived to be a reflection of poor skills and capabilities (Concept [146,3E]) but also the result of piques between politicians (Concept [146,3F]). The interviewee seems to suggest that such piques are almost inevitable given the country's particular political context. However, the elements that might contribute to this situation (such as a small electorate), would not be explored by the interviewee. Cooperation is so lacking that had the initiative been entrusted to another portfolio 'it

would not have happened' (Concept [146,3B]). Indeed, "the problem with a lot of initiatives [is the lack of] proper genuine cooperation (transcript p.8)".

Another element resulting in such failure is the perceived inability of a Minister to mobilise action from another Minister (Concept [146,7F]), especially when the policy may threaten that Minister's power and, consequently, requires the use of coercive action (Concept [146,7G]). Again, this accentuates the lack of cooperation but also the problems relating to the absence of collective responsibility.

The Office of the Prime Minister is the only ministry that is perceived capable of doing things properly (Concept [146,3C]). This capability is not a reflection of the personal skills and expertise of the persons working there, but is rather a reflection of the command and control role that the ministry is perceived to occupy and its ability to 'open doors' (Concept [146,8A]).

Another element of importance is the fact that the policy was new and had no precedents or 'home'. This is perceived to have provided the implementing team with an element of flexibility (Concept [146,7D]) but also power because of no potential opposition (Concepts [146,7B] and [146,7E]). The "power was also reflected on [the team] because the government really assigned top people in government to do it (transcript p.8)".

Indeed, the physical location alone is not enough. The interviewee ascribed at least equal importance to the qualities of the person who was delegated with the responsibility for this initiative, and whom he symbolically termed 'the father of it all' (Concept [146,1A]). The pivotal role of this person is examined from two perspectives. The first relates to his resourcefulness, particularly in relation to his ability to secure the support and commitment of the MSU - government's management consultancy agency (Concept [146,2P]). The second concerns his individual, personal capabilities described in terms of clarity of vision (Concept [146,2I]), knowledge (Concept [146,2J]), creativity (Concept [146,2K]) and determination (Concept [146,2L]). The determination could also have been influenced by a sense of belief in the probability of success in the policy (Concept [146,2S]). The interviewee seems to suggest that the successful implementation of policy was not a frequent occurrence and, therefore, the prospect of one may have driven the implementing team harder to achieve the policy's intended outcomes.

Besides the personal capabilities and resourcefulness, the political leader also had the backing of the Prime Minister (Concept [146,2M]). The person was therefore 'best placed' (Concept [146,2H]) because "he had the political fiat and the tools (transcript p.2)".

Skills and Capabilities

Running counter to the personal capabilities of the political leader were the skills and capabilities in the civil service, which are described as 'weak', and seriously lacking good management (Concepts [146,10A] and [146,13A]).

The interviewee identifies the civil service as "our biggest problem (transcript p.9)" and ascribes success in the policy's implementation to the ability of excluding the civil service from what was being done (Concept [146,10B]). By this, the interviewee meant that success was achieved because the implementation of the policy was not left in the hands of some Ministry or Department. Instead, political responsibility was retained at the highest level, and administrative responsibility was delegated to a selected number of civil servants who had the requisites necessary to drive it from that end. The choice of such persons depended upon their personal skills (Concept [146,10C]) their tact (Concepts [146,10G] and [146,10H]), their ability to sustain the initiative over the long-term (Concept [146,10F]), and, their attitude (Concept [146,10E]).

The interviewee acknowledges that individual persons may make a difference even without the requisite resources (Concept [146,12B]) provided that they have the right character and disposition to lead (Concept [146,12A]). However, long-term and repeated success can only be achieved if the civil service is composed of a number of such persons. The ability to develop a good civil service college (Concept [146,13D]) is perceived as the solution to this ailment (Concept [146,13H]).

Role Delineation

Besides the personal capabilities of the persons driving a policy, success is also perceived to be dependent upon clear role delineations.

The interviewee argues that due to the weakness of the civil service (Concept [146,10A]) and its poor management and leadership (Concepts [146,9J] and

[146,9B]), Ministers often feel compelled to intervene in the management and administration of government to ensure that policies are implemented (Concepts [146,9M] and [146,9N]). Such intervention is however interpreted by the civil service as interference, and the inability of the Minister to manage at arms length (Concept [146,9K]) generates resistance rather than cooperation (Concept [146,9L]). This is compounded when the degree of the politician's personal involvement is such that he/she becomes a stakeholder of the policy outcome (Concept [146,9I]) and therefore may lose objectivity as to what the policy intended to achieve.

The policy initiative under review is perceived to have been a success, specifically because of the absence of such a scenario. The interviewee describes a scenario characterised by a clear delineation between the political and technical roles driving this initiative. The role of the consultant and the civil servants selected to participate in this initiative was two-fold; to do the necessary analysis and administrative groundwork (Concept [146,14E]), and to propose technical solutions to the politician (Concepts [146,14F] and [146,14A]). The politician's role was to consider the proposals (Concept [146,14B]), to direct changes as deemed necessary in view of the political demands (Concept [146,15A]), and to make the necessary decisions (Concept [146,15B]). This delineation is perceived to have underscored the synergy between the elements of the team entrusted to implement the policy, ensuring its successful implementation.

Motivation

A final, but crucial, consideration determining the successful implementation of the policy was the level of enthusiasm that characterised the work of the team entrusted to deliver this initiative (Concept [146,15G]).

The persons' motivation is examined from two perspectives. The first relates to the development of a personal belief in the intrinsic values of the object of the policy. This belief, and the knowledge that such a policy would be of value to beneficiaries (Concept [146,15E]), seems to impart enjoyment and enthusiasm in one's work and, therefore, a determination to ensure it is successful.

On the other hand, the interviewee argues that motivation can also be externally driven. The source of motivation is seen to derive from the support shown to persons implementing a policy, through the deployment of resources (Concepts

[146,15D], [146,6C], and [146,6D]) and the manifestation of the policy owner's will and commitment to achieve what was targeted by the policy (Concept [146,6B]).

Interview Document 147

The cognitive map derived from Interview 147 (Chart A) is composed of one hundred and forty five (145) concepts, with three (3) heads (i.e., having no out-going links to other concepts) and forty-seven (47) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and seventy four (174) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.20:1. The results are indicative of a tall hierarchical chain of argumentation, while the high link to node ratio obtained suggests depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under examination.

One of the head concepts in the map, Concept [147,1A] – ‘things succeed...[things fail]’, is also the goal concept of the model and is surrounded by thirteen (13) links to other concepts. Concept [147,1D] – ‘determination’, is also surrounded by thirteen (13) links, making these two concepts the most dominant in the map as measured by a domain analysis. In contrast, the third most dominant concept is only surrounded by seven (7) links. This is followed by another two (2) concepts, which are surrounded by six (6) links; four (4) concepts surrounded by five (5) links; nine (9) concepts by four (4) links; and the remaining concepts with only three (3) links, two (2) links, or one (1) link.

Of the top ten (10) concepts returned by the domain analysis, six (6) also feature among the top ten (10) concepts resulting from a centrality score analysis. As this technique measures the dominance (‘centrality’) of concepts in the entire map, rather than their immediate vicinity, it may be concluded that these six (6) concepts are indicative of the main chains of argumentation in the interviewee’s cognitive model.

These chains of argumentation become more evident after the map is stripped of all concepts that have no branched explanations of consequences. The stripping process eliminates all concepts that only serve to elaborate the argumentation of the model. Eight (8) concepts appear to occupy a pivotal role in the stripped version of the model. Of the six (6) concepts returned by the domain and centrality score analysis of the entire map, four (4) feature among the eight (8) most dominant concepts in the stripped version of the map. The remaining two (2) concepts were replaced by others that are more representative of (or pivotal to) the chain of argumentation in which they feature.

After examining the concepts that are directly or indirectly linked to the pivotal concepts, it is possible to isolate at least four (4) chains (or 'clusters') of argumentation that, rather distinctly, lead to the goal concept of the model. The concepts in each cluster seem to share a common theme, appearing to influence success/failure in implementation in different ways.

The pivotal concepts in Cluster A are Concept [147,17A] – 'his personal character', and Concept [147,13C] – 'you had a good team'. The interviewee's emphasis in the cluster of concepts seems to relate to the capabilities of the individuals entrusted to lead the implementation programme of this policy initiative. Their individual and collective strengths are accredited as a major influence on the successful delivery of the policy initiative.

Cluster B is almost exclusively dependent upon Concept [147,1D] – 'determination', although both the domain and centrality score analysis of the stripped version of the map also identify Concept [147,1E] – 'do things in a half-hearted way' as an important and pivotal concept. The theme dominating the interviewee's line of reasoning in this cluster of concepts is very explicit. The interviewee identifies determination or will as a critical factor influencing the successful implementation of the policy.

The third chain of argumentation – Cluster C – pivots around Concept [147,1C] – 'common sense'. Through this chain of argumentation, the interviewee seems to be arguing that success is heavily dependent upon logical thinking and intervention in the conduct of business. 'Common sense' is therefore examined from the perspective of rationale processes and practice.

The fourth and last Cluster of concepts – Cluster D – shares a somewhat different theme from the former three. Pivoting around Concept [147,19A] – 'sometimes enthusiasm becomes contagious', the interviewee seems to be arguing that motivation, and the ability to motivate are essential elements contributing to success when implementing policy.

If the map is re-populated with all component concepts, it is possible to examine each chain of argumentation in further detail. Clusters A and B could also be notionally divided into further sub-clusters, each of which denotes a variant of the theme of the main cluster from which they arise.

Cluster A can be divided into two sub-groups, or factor-categories, representing the interviewee's thinking about the importance of the individual qualities of the persons driving an implementation programme, as well as their collective capabilities. Each of the two strands of thought brings different elements to bear on the successful implementation of policy.

Likewise, Cluster B can also be divided into two sub-groups. In this respect, determination seems to be examined as a function of attitude and the location of responsibility in driving implementation.

In summary, six (6) key factors are perceived by the interviewee to have influenced success. These are listed in the Table below and are also illustrated in Chart C.

	Clusters			
	A	B	C	D
Factor-Categories	Individual Qualities Collective Capabilities	Attitude Location of Responsibility	Process	Enthusiasm

Individual Qualities

The interviewee's perception of the importance of the qualities of the individual(s) driving an implementation programme seems to be a reflection of the approach adopted by the individual(s), rather than the skills that the individual(s) possess. While acknowledging the importance of academic qualifications, the interviewee identified the ability of "coming down to earth, or applying knowledge in a practical way (transcript p.24)" as the critical element influencing success.

The qualities of the individual are explored from multiple angles. The ability to assume a leadership position (Concept [147,19B]), to pay attention to detail (Concept [147,16E]) and to adopt a decisive work ethic (Concept [147,19E]) are described as crucial elements of the character required from individuals who are entrusted with the responsibility to drive implementation. Another important property of the individual qualities is his will and determination (Concepts [147,16G], [147,16F] and [147,16H]) to overcome any and all obstacles with which he may be faced, in order to deliver what is required. Possibly driving this, although not directly

established by the interviewee, is the individual's ability to take on responsibility for something in an enthusiastic manner (Concept [147,19D]). This is explained as another important property of an individual's character, but is also perceived as a factor that is likely to push the goals or objectives of an implementation programme to higher levels, in an attempt to achieve more of the same outcomes, or better results (Concept [147,19F]). In this respect, another important quality of the individual may be an ambitious character. A final consideration of the individual's qualities is the ability to relate knowledge to the environment or context within which a person is operating (Concept [147,21E], [147,21G] and [147,21F]). "A lot of knowledge about local government, but not applicable to the local scene (transcript p.21)" is perceived to be wasteful.

Collective Capabilities

In addition to the qualities of the individual, the interviewee also identifies the collective capabilities of the individuals who are party to an implementation programme as a critical success factor.

From this point of view, the interviewee seems to be arguing that success requires the synergistic integration of specific individual qualities into one collective whole. This is best exemplified when the interviewee mentions the existence of a Steering Committee that was driving the implementation programme, by reference to "It-tlieta fit-tlieta" (Concept [147,13A]). Although a literal translation simply means Tuesday's at 3 o'clock, therefore referring to the day and time when the Steering Committee used to meet, its use was symbolic and intended as the 'title' of the 'team'. This element of team spirit also arises when the interviewee metaphorically draws parallels between the Steering Committee and the Real Madrid football team playing at its best (Concept [147,17B]). The interviewee seems to suggest that the elements of a good team transcend the specific tangible knowledge or capabilities of individuals, focusing also on the intangibility of a team dynamic.

Ethical behaviour is also identified as a critical element of the team dimension. This is described in terms of consistency (Concept [147,25B]), which the interviewee uses to refer to the trustworthiness of the individuals in the team and their ability to remain truthful to their word (Concepts [147,25G] and [147,25E]). An interesting point in this regard is the ability to overcome bureaucratic behaviour (Concepts [147,25C] and

[147,25E]) that is critical when timeframes for implementation are short, as was the case in this example of policy implementation.

A final consideration of the collective capabilities also stems from an acknowledgement of the need to separate roles but at the same time bring different individuals with different backgrounds to work seamlessly together (Concepts [147,1I] and [147,1J]). This fusion of roles is perceived important to 'get the job done' (Concept [147,2A]). As presented, the interviewee would seem to suggest that implementation would have failed had one of the two roles been absent.

Attitude

An important aspect of determination that seems to be driving the interviewee's thoughts is the attitude that people adopt when charged with the responsibility to implement some policy. This seems to be examined from two perspectives.

The first perspective seems to relate to an individual's *forma mentis* – i.e., his frame of mind and feelings (Concept [147,1E]). The manner in which an individual goes about his/her task is perceived to have a determining effect on the outcome of such activity. This is almost explored from a psychological perspective and seems to be influenced by the personal interests of an individual on the outcome of the activity for which he/she is responsible. From one aspect, the personal interest is seen to arise from a person's intrinsic belief in the philosophy of the policy (Concepts [147,15A], [147,15B] and [147,15C]). On the other hand, the interest can be more personal in nature, and driven by a sense of pride and the need to 'rise to expectations' so as to fulfil the trust and confidence shown to the individual by others. In this respect, the interviewee recalled how the Prime Minister's gesture of calling for him and, in person, asking **him** to shoulder administrative responsibility for this initiative, gave the latter a sense of pride and determination not to let his Prime Minister down (Concept [147,1H]). This could be sensed in the interviewee's tone of voice as he re-lived the moment. Indeed he re-called his response as being "if you believe that I have the capability to take this on...[I will] (transcript p.1)".

Related to this latter point is the interviewee's perception on the need for impartiality when driving policy (Concept [147,10L]). This is possibly linked to the element of trust mentioned earlier and underscores the interviewee's perception of 'fair play'

and a determination to ensure that the collective goal takes precedence over individual interests. The interviewee describes a situation wherein the latter is threatened by a growing culture of politicisation in the civil service (Concepts [147,10M], [147,11A] and [147,11B]).

The second perspective of attitude is tenacity. The interviewee argues that determination cannot be short-lived, and that the right attitude is to be tenacious at what one does such that the results sought can be achieved and sustained in the long-term (Concepts [147,17E], [147,17D] and [147,17C]).

Location of Responsibility

Of course attitudes can be influenced by the choice of strategy adopted. A critical factor in this regard seems to have been the conscious decision regarding the location of responsibility for this policy initiative. Two properties seem to define this decision. The location of responsibility has a physical aspect and a personal element.

The physical aspect relates to the decision of locating the policy within the portfolio of the Office of the Prime Minister (Concept [147,7H]). This choice was driven by two considerations: the need to overcome resistance and reduce power (Concept [147,7J]), and the need to mould the policy in a way that it addresses the 'common good' rather than some personal gain (Concepts [147,11D] and [147,11C]). The effect of this choice was such that political commitment was mobilised and support/cooperation at both an administrative and political level was activated. It also provided a sort of 'incubation' period for the policy to develop and grow in a fertile and supportive environment.

The interviewee also argues that the choice of persons identified to lead the initiative from a political and administrative point of view was a determining factor. Politically, the policy was entrusted to the Prime Minister's Personal Assistant, thereby symbolising the Prime Minister's personal intervention and influence on this policy. This was important to engender cooperation (Concept [147,12A]) from all angles of government. A link to the issue of individual qualities can also be established. The issue of determination and the ability to overcome obstacles (Concept [147,16G]) seems to derive from the fact that the person in question was "seen as the Prime

Minister's mouthpiece (transcript p.20)". Having 'the ear of the Prime Minister' (Concept [147,10E]) he had the fiat to drive implementation, in a forceful manner if necessary. Furthermore, the interviewee also mentions the firm belief of the Secretary General of the party then in Office (Concept [147,8D]), hinting that at a political level, Ministers of Government were also probably under pressure to cooperate and conform to the party's agenda of implementing this particular policy initiative.

From an administrative perspective, the policy was also strategically positioned in the hands of an individual who, from a position of power and authority in the civil service, could be trusted upon and directed to implement the policy in a manner that met the government's intended outcomes. The fact that other influential people were consciously omitted from this policy initiative ensured that potential 'stumbling blocks' were eliminated outright, that time was not wasted on unnecessary 'political games' (Concept [147,10G]), and that the person leading the initiative had full control and authority over the policy (Concept [147,9A]). The ability to surround oneself with people who share in one's belief, and to emarginate those who either have no interest in what is being done, or do not support it or, worse still, have the potential to destroy it, is an important element for success. While this approach may have generated considerable pressure for the persons charged with this responsibility, it also challenged them and their capabilities (Concept [147,10F]) and injected a sense of enthusiasm and will to deliver successfully (Concept [147,9E]).

Taken collectively, these concepts would suggest that success was in part achieved because of the ability to strategically position and manoeuvre the ownership of, and commitment to, the policy initiative.

Process

The interviewee also ascribes a lot of importance to the issue of 'common sense' (Concept [147,1C]), which, to him, seems to be synonymous with the choice of approach or process adopted in implementing policy. This also seems to be examined from two perspectives.

The first perspective is the interviewee's perception of the need for a practical approach to implementing policy. From one aspect, this is seen as deriving from one's ability to choose to do the right thing – of being effective, but not necessarily

efficient. Thus, for example, although it was evident that the way this policy was to be implemented would have led to a greater financial burden (Concept [147,6D]), it was nonetheless considered to be the right decision in the circumstances (Concept [17,6B]) and one that would position the implementation programme in a way that ensures long-term success (Concept [147,6C]). However, an important consideration is the perceived role of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance (Concept [147,6G]). The interviewee suggests that overcoming this 'hurdle' almost automatically secures commitment by Government. This accentuates the role that location of responsibility has in the policy implementation framework.

On the other hand, being practical also means being flexible. The interviewee argues that regulations and practices should be used as guidelines rather than rules (Concept [147,15G]). Success requires adaptation to prevailing situations (Concepts [147,15H] and [147,16A]) and a private-sector mentality that is goal, rather than, process- oriented (Concept [147,15D]).

The interviewee also examines process from an experiential perspective. The interviewee seems to argue that success in implementation is based upon a willingness to learn from the experiences, mistakes and successes of others who have attempted similar policies in the past (Concepts [147,5I], [147,2D], and [147,4H]), as well as the ability to secure a clear vision and direction for the future (Concept [147,5A] and [147,5D]). This is not only important to reduce the learning curve and the time required to implement policy, but also to secure commitment to the policy and therefore cooperation during its implementation.

It seems important to note that the issues of determination, capability and common sense are seen to have universal application. The interviewee does not only apply them to the case of policy implementation under review but to "everything else in life (transcript p.1)".

Furthermore, the interviewee seems to argue that while each of the three elements has the capacity to individually influence success or failure, all three must be present to ensure success. The interviewee also seems to ascribe a sequence, starting with determination, then capability and then common sense – "a stupid person can have

all the determination in the world, but if he is not a capable person, he will not deliver. And also, at the end of the day a lot of it is common sense (transcript p.1)”.

Enthusiasm

A final determining factor that seems to have had a significant impact upon the successful implementation of the policy in question was the level of enthusiasm of the individuals driving the said implementation.

This enthusiasm can be said to portray a number of properties. The first element was the practical manner in which the policy was being implemented (Concept [147,21C]). The ability to face reality in the face and adopt a position that, given the then current constraints and limitations, would lead to a tangible output, albeit not necessarily the optimal one (Concept [147,21A]), was perceived by the interviewee as an important aspect and one that is believed to have acted as a motivating factor. Although not directly established by the interviewee, this motivation may have arisen because the interviewee and the team could clearly conceptualise what was required, how it was to be rolled out and when. They could see ‘the light at the end of the tunnel’.

The condition under which the policy was being implemented is another property of the enthusiasm experienced by the interviewee and the rest of the team. This is explored from two perspectives. The first is financial and relates to the ability of the lead organisation to provide the right monetary incentives to stimulate the relevant persons into action (Concept [147,21K]). The second is psychological, and relates to the ability of the lead organisation to motivate the people involved in the implementation through the application of sound management values such as respect (Concepts [147,22A] and [147,22B]).

Related to the above is also the provision of a supportive environment. Whether in the form of a skilled human resource base (Concept [147,18A]), or through visible leadership and commitment (Concepts [147,7G] and [147,17J]), the existence of a supportive environment is seen as a motivational influence on the attitude and performance of individuals.

Another aspect is the individuals’ personal belief in the objectives of the policy that is being implementing. The interviewee seems to argue that an individual is likely to be motivated to successfully implement a particular policy, when the he/she

understands the objectives of a policy, appreciates the beneficial effects that this will have in a social context and can visualise or, better still, experience such benefits first hand (Concepts [147,18E] and [147,18F]).

It is interesting to note that the interviewee chose to describe this experience as 'probably one of the best chapters in my life' (Concept [147,22D]), and as 'fun, enjoyable, really enjoyable' (Concept [147,18C]). This enthusiasm may have fuelled the three critical elements of determination, capability and common sense as described by the interviewee, but it may also have been the result of the application of the same three elements.

Interview Document 148

The cognitive map derived from Interview 148 (Chart A) is composed of sixty (60) concepts, with one (1) head (i.e., having no out-going links to other concepts) and twenty six (26) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by sixty-six (66) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.11:1. The results are indicative of a rather flat chain of argumentation.

The head concept in the map, Concept [148,1A] – ‘this programme was successfully implemented...[unsuccessfully implemented]’, is also the goal concept of the model. Being surrounded by eleven (11) links to other concepts, it is the most dominant concept in the map as measured by a domain analysis. In contrast, the next three most dominant concepts are only surrounded by five (5) links. Another three concepts are surrounded by four (4) links, followed by nine concepts with three (3) links, and the remaining concepts with only two (2) links, or one (1) link.

Only three (3) of the top ten (10) most dominant concepts returned by the domain analysis also feature among the top ten most dominant concepts returned by a centrality score analysis that is intended to measure the dominance of concepts in the entire model, rather than in their immediate vicinity. The identification of critical chains of argumentation to explain the interviewee’s frame of mind is therefore limited. These become somewhat more evident after the map is stripped of all concepts that have no branched explanations or consequences. The stripping process eliminates all those concepts that primarily serve to elaborate the model, thereby facilitating a more focused examination of the model.

A comparison of the results returned by both a domain and a centrality score analysis shows that seven (7) of the top ten (10) concepts returned by a domain analysis of the stripped version of the map also feature among the top ten (10) concepts returned by a centrality score analysis. It is therefore fair to conclude that these concepts occupy a pivotal role in the model and, hence, the interviewee’s thought processes.

An analysis of these dominant concepts, and those to which they are directly or indirectly linked, would suggest that the concepts can be grouped into three (3)

specific clusters, each of which portrays a different chain of argument and thought process (Chart B).

Cluster A seems to be centred upon Concept [148,1B] – ‘there was a fundamental political commitment’. The theme shared by the concepts in this cluster regards the issue of commitment and its relevance to the successful implementation of policy.

Concept [148,3G] – ‘developing the concept from really nothing was definitely an MSU project’, seems to dominate the line of reasoning in Cluster B. In this case, the interviewee’s thoughts seem to relate to the skills and capabilities underlying the policy definition and the implementation process followed.

On the other hand, the concepts grouped in Cluster C pivot around two key concepts: Concept [148,1F] – ‘conceptually [local government] was really very well understood by the politicians’; and Concept [148,3L] – ‘detail and structure prevailed’. As such, this group of concepts seems to be concerned about the approach adopted in implementing the said policy.

A final concept, Concept [148,10B] – ‘[we don’t identify the] key success factors at the outset’, possibly shares affinity with Cluster B in that it seems to relate to an aspect of approach. However, this cannot be directly determined from the stripped version of the map and, as such, the concept remains unlinked.

The themes driving the three clusters can be examined in further detail if the map is re-populated with all constituent concepts.

‘Commitment’ continues to dominate the line of reasoning behind the concepts in Cluster A, although further properties of this factor become more evident. This also applies to the ‘skills and capabilities’ element dominating the interviewee’s thoughts behind the concepts in Cluster B. On the other hand, the element of ‘approach’ in Cluster C can be examined from two more distinct angles, which, while still representative of it, seem to occupy in their own right a focal position in the interviewee’s perceptions of what influenced the successful implementation of the policy initiative. One of these two factors seems to concern the interviewee’s perception of the need for good planning when initiating a policy programme. Related to this is the strategy chosen to ensure that the policy was implemented in ways that would improve its probability of success. The orphan concept identified

above falls within this category of success factors, although it represents the antithesis of it.

In summary, therefore, four (4) key factors are perceived by the interviewee to have influenced success. These are listed in the Table below and are also illustrated in Chart C.

	Cluster		
	A	B	C
Factor-Categories	Commitment	Skills and Capabilities	Planning Strategy

Commitment

Comparing this policy initiative to the one of failure examined under Project 1, the interviewee identifies the presence of ‘a fundamental political commitment’ (Concept [148,1B]) as one of the “two things that really marked, in terms of the difference of how they were handled...the potential outcomes” (transcript p.1) of the two initiatives.

The critical role that this factor is perceived to have played is underscored by the fact that a discussion of it dominated most of the interview. Commitment is examined from a number of different perspectives.

A primary element is the distinction between political commitment and administrative commitment. The interviewee seems to argue that both were present (Concepts [148,1B] and [148,3H]) and both were driven by a sense of determination and resolve (Concepts [148,3H] and [148,4A]). However, the interviewee also examines the political commitment from a further two perspectives. At one level, the interviewee discusses political commitment as something pertaining to the executive arm of a government. At another level, the political commitment is examined from a party-political perspective (Concept [148,3B]). In this regard, the interviewee argues that a critical factor determining the success of this policy implementation programme was the fact that the political machinery of the Party in office was also directly involved in various elements of the policy’s formulation and its implementation (Concept [148,3A]). The reason for this is not examined in detail but

the interviewee seems to suggest that such involvement was necessary because of the perceived importance of the policy to the government (Concept [148,4G]). Cross-referencing this to other documentation would suggest that this is a correct interpretation, as the policy in question occupied a very important role in the Party's electoral manifesto. It would also explain the perceived importance of the 'high visibility' of the policy itself (Concept [148,5B]).

The high visibility and profile of the policy is also perceived to have contributed to generating a pressure for change (Concept [148,5D]). Other contextual elements that likewise contributed to this pressure included the fact that the policy influenced a wide audience (Concept [148,5C]), that other initiatives were underway that directly, or indirectly influenced the policy in question (Concept [148,5F]) and that as many interest parties as possible were involved in the process (Concept [148,5E]). The interviewee would seem to suggest that these elements generated a sense of compliance to the policy and mobilised commitment to it (Concept [148,5A]).

At a more individualistic level, the degree of political commitment is also explained by the fact that the policy was directly supported by the Prime Minister who personally believed in, and was committed to, the said policy (Concept [148,2D]). Furthermore, the commitment was tangible, in that the Prime Minister chose to delegate responsibility for it to a person who was widely recognised to be his mouthpiece and executive arm (Concept [148,4E]). The interviewee would suggest that this move was a clear signal of the government's true intent to successfully deliver the said policy (Concept [148,2F]). The reasoning behind this was not explored in detail but the interviewee identifies two important elements that contributed to it – the perception that the person driving this policy was a political leader and champion (Concepts [148,8B] and [148,2E]), and that he held the requisite competence to ensure its successful implementation (Concept [148,5G]).

Skills and Capabilities

The availability of the requisite skills and capabilities necessary to implement a particular policy is also seen as a critical success factor.

This is explored from at least two angles. In the first instance, and as mentioned above, the interviewee makes reference to the individual skills of the person(s) driving a policy initiative. More than qualifications, the interviewee seems to attribute

success to the *savoir faire* of the person(s) – his or her aptitude and innate ability to lead others (Concepts [148,9B] and [148,8B]). This is described as “very unusual [as] we don’t have a lot of competent people, we have really a dearth of leadership skills in this country (transcript p.5)”.

Furthermore, the availability of a sufficient *quantity* of appropriately competent resources is also deemed necessary (Concepts [148,6L] and [148,6M]). Linking this to commitment, the interviewee argues a firm resolve to deliver a policy must be backed by a willingness to support the programme with a sufficient level of investment in resources. A key determinant of the successful outcome of the policy under review was the availability of an organisation that had the skills and capabilities required in both qualitative and quantitative terms (Concept [148,3G]). In contrast, the interviewee explains the all too often failure in policy implementation as being, in part, a function of the inability or unwillingness to recognise the investment required by organisations in their resource capacities (Concept [148,7B]).

Planning

A third important factor influencing success is the perceived ability to understand the requirements of the policy and to plan ahead its implementation.

The ability to conceptualise and understand the detail and politics of a policy initiative (Concept [148,3N]) was identified by the interviewee as the second of “the two things that really marked the difference” (transcript p.1) between this example of successful implementation of policy, and the example of failure examined under Project 1.

Underlying this concept is the interviewee’s belief that unless the people responsible for a policy can come to grasp with, and comprehend, its principles and processes, they can never make it work. It is only by comprehensively understanding the dynamics of a policy that its viability can be determined (Concept [148,6I]).

The interviewee does not directly examine the exact influence that such understanding has. However, by emphasising the politicians’ role in this regard (Concept [148,1F]), the interviewee would seem to suggest that achieving the right element and influence of political support is what is primarily important.

Strategy

As a final consideration, the interviewee also highlights the importance of a well thought out execution.

From one perspective, 'detail and structure' (Concept [148,3L]) are perceived as critical elements to ensure success. In this way, the interviewee seems to argue that success is dependent upon a thorough implementation programme that accounts for all the elements or features that are necessary to ensure a smooth execution of the policy. Concurrently, the interviewee links this with the legislative norms and practices. The interviewee argues that in many instances policies fail to be properly implemented because the civil service is tied down with legislated processes that generate substantial bureaucracy and stifle flexibility (Concept [148,3I] and [148,3J]). However, such practices suited the policy in question given the particular prescriptive manner by which it was being implemented (Concept [148,3K]). The deliberate choice to legislate the detail of the policy proved to be a success factor, given the situational context within which the implementation programme had to be rolled out.

The application of legislation was even critical to overcoming resistance to change (Concepts [148,6E] and [148,46D]). By including elements of the policy implementation or, rather, its outcomes in legislation (for example, that the first election of Local Councils had to happen in November 1993) departments had to tow the line. Another critical move was the shifting of funds from one budgetary allocation to another (Concept [148,6F]).

However, the interviewee recognises that these successful interventions were facilitated by the fact that the policy implementation team was operating in a 'greenfield site' (Concept [148,6A]). As such, new activities were being created that did not impinge upon, or threaten, the existence of active operations or interest groups. In a similar vein, the interviewee failed to mention that the application of policy in legislation was in this case possible, and indeed necessary, because the subject matter dealt with the establishment of a basic political principle that required the force of law. Had the policy concerned dealt with an administrative matter, the application of legislation would not have made sense and would, in all probability, not have followed.

Irrespective of the specific process, or route chosen, the interviewee argues that extensive consultation (Concept [148,7A]) with all stakeholders through a comprehensive communications campaign (Concept [148,6N]) is essential to ensure success.

Finally, success is also seen to be dependent upon the holistic application of all the elements or factors that are perceived to play a vital role in the policy's implementation programme. Compromising upon one or more of these elements (Concept [148,10C]) would be "like baking a cake [without all the necessary] ingredients...between having something that is edible [or something that isn't] (transcript p.10)".

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that to the interviewee, "the critical success factors were really typically always the same ones (transcript p.6)". This would suggest that the successful outcome of this particular policy was not dependent upon some special circumstances – i.e., circumstances that had never been encountered before, or that could be replicated in the future.

Additionally, and in general terms, the interviewee also argues that implementation requires "a lot of hand-holding...and more resources [when] there isn't the commitment (transcript p.9)". It also requires "a sense of urgency [because] we live in an environment which is changing so rapidly (transcript p.10)".

Interview Document 149

The cognitive map derived from Interview 149 (Chart A) is composed of ninety-five (95) concepts, with four (4) heads (i.e., having no out-going links to other concepts) and thirty-two (32) tails (no in-coming links). The concepts (nodes) are interconnected by one hundred and fifteen (115) links, resulting in a link to node ratio of 1.21:1. The results are indicative of a tall hierarchical chain of argumentation and depth of thinking in consideration of the issue under examination.

One of the head concepts in the map, Concept – ‘successful policy implementation... failure in policy implementation’, is also the goal concept of the model. Surrounded by eighteen (18) links to other concepts, this is the most dominant concept in the map as measured by a domain analysis. In contrast, the next two most dominant concepts are only surrounded by six (6) links. Another concept is surrounded by five (5) links, followed by six concepts surrounded by four (4) links, and the remaining concepts with only three (3) links, two (2) links, or one (1) link.

Of the top ten (10) most dominant concepts returned by the domain analysis, only two (2) also feature among the top ten (10) most dominant concepts returned by a centrality score analysis that is intended to measure the dominance of concepts in the entire model, rather than in their immediate vicinity. As a result, it is difficult to objectively identify and isolate the critical chains of argumentation that would indicate the interviewee’s main perception and thoughts about the issue under review.

These become somewhat more evident after the map is stripped of all concepts that have no branched explanations or consequences. Of the top ten (10) concepts returned by a domain analysis of the stripped version of the map, seven (7) also feature among the top ten (10) concepts returned by a centrality score analysis, indicating their pivotal role in the interviewee’s thought processes. Although each one of these concepts influences success or failure in relatively distinct ways, they nonetheless seem to share some affinity to one another in terms of the ideas that are being conveyed. As such, these key concepts, and those to which they are linked, can be grouped into two broad clusters (Chart B).

Custer A is centred upon Concept [149,2K] – ‘the implementation was comprehensive’, Concept [149,5D] – ‘approved by Cabinet’, and Concept [149,12A]

– ‘it had to be bottom up...top down’. These three (3) concepts were identified among the top ten (10) most dominant concepts returned by both the domain and centrality score analysis of the stripped map. Through these concepts, one is led to believe that the interviewee considers the approach adopted in implementing the policy under review as an important element influencing success. Another concept that seems to follow this logic is Concept [149,2G] – ‘important that [the project] was at OPM’. Although statistically this concept was not identified as a dominant element of the stripped map, it nonetheless seems to occupy a central position for a number of other concepts that are directly or indirectly linked to it. Because of this, and the relation held with Concept [149,5D], it has been grouped with the other key concepts in Cluster A, as have all other concepts that are directly or indirectly related to it. Concept [149,6D] – ‘it’s always easier’, features among the top ten (10) concepts returned by the centrality score analysis, but is not among the top ten (10) concepts returned by the domain analysis. The concepts linked to this one also share affinity with the idea of approach and, as such, have been included as part of Cluster A.

Cluster B is centred upon the other four (4) key concepts returned by both the domain and centrality score analysis. These include Concept [149,1A] – ‘there was a big element of trust among the people working on this project, big trust’; Concept [149,20B] – ‘you had to tell them you have to do this’; Concept [149,2F] – ‘give clear direction’; and, Concept [149,15A] – ‘the team at OPM was basically functional’. A closer examination of these concepts and those to which they are linked would suggest that another important consideration influencing success or failure in the implementation of policy is the type of group dynamic that exists or develops between the persons entrusted to implement such policy.

Each of the two (2) clusters can be examined in further detail if the stripped map is repopulated with all its constituent concepts. This operation allows the identification and isolation of more specific chains of argumentation within each of the clusters.

The concepts in Cluster A can be divided into three (3) sub-groups. Each group represents a class of factors that, while still related to the overall theme of ‘approach’, influences success in a more specific way. The chain of argumentation in this first group seems to relate to the interviewee’s perception of the planning process undertaken in implementing the policy under review (Concept [149,2J]). In the second group, the chain of argumentation seems to be dominated by the

interviewee's perception of the importance of the location of responsibility for the said implementation (Concept [149,2G]). The third group centres upon the idea of the need for good coordination (Concept [149,2H]).

The concepts in Cluster B can also be divided into three sub-groups, each of which denotes a particular class of factors (or factor-categories) influencing success. The interviewee seems to suggest that success in policy implementation, as it relates to the issue of group dynamics, is dependent upon the development of a trustful relationship (Concept [149,1A]), the presence of strong leadership (Concept [149,2C]), and the availability of the requisite skills and capabilities (Concepts [149,15A], and [149,8F]).

In summary, six (6) key factors are perceived by the interviewee to have influenced success. These are listed in the Table below and are also illustrated in Chart C.

	Cluster	
	A	B
Factor-Categories	Planning Location of Responsibility Coordination	Trust Leadership Skills and Capabilities

Planning

One of the elements dominating the interviewee's perception of 'approach' with regards to the implementation of policy is the issue of planning. The interviewee explores this success factor from different angles.

Good planning is described as an evidence-based activity. The interviewee partly ascribes success to the ability of the implementing team to base itself and its activities on the knowledge derived from research undertaken in other jurisdictions (Concepts [149,5B] and [149,6F]). By emulating the successes achieved by others and by avoiding their failures, the team established itself and its implementation programme on solid foundations (Concepts [149,6F] and [149,5A]). Possibly, it also ensured faster implementation by avoiding having to 're-invent the wheel'.

Successful planning is also described to be a contextual activity. As such, success is seen to be dependent upon a 'customer-oriented' and a 'product/ability-oriented'

focus. In the former case, the interviewee ascribes success to the ability of the implementing team to match the deliverables of the implementation programme to the outcomes demanded by the recipients (Concepts [149,12A], [149,12B], [149,12C] and [149,12D]). This ensured that the interests of all stakeholders were considered and, if possible, acted upon. In the second case, success is also seen to be dependent upon the ability to develop an implementation programme that is based upon elements of the policy that are manageable and opportune given the circumstances within which they are being implemented (Concepts [149,12E] and [149,13A]). In both cases, success is underpinned by an ability to ensure that the conceptualised policy and vision is in tune with the situational context within which it is to be implemented. The decision to ditch a former White Paper and re-draft basic concepts in a new law underscores the importance that this factor was given by the implementing team (Concept [149,5A]).

A third and final element of planning that influences success, rather than failure, is the level of detail with which a policy implementation programme is approached. The interviewee talks about the importance of a 'comprehensive' approach (Concept [149,2K]), describing a planning process that starts before actual implementation (Concepts [149,3A], [149,2I], [149,3F] and [149,6G]) and that continues post-implementation (Concepts [149,3D], [149,3C], [149,3E] and [149,2J]), so as to ensure long-term sustainability. The establishment of regular meetings between the team members was identified as an important factor ensuring such comprehensiveness (Concept [149,2I]).

Location of Responsibility

Another important perspective of approach is the locus of responsibility of a policy implementation programme.

From an institutional perspective, the interviewee argues that implementation can only be successful if responsibility for it is resident in a location that can command total authority over the inputs, activities and outcomes that define such implementation. The policy under review was successfully implemented because it was managed by the only ministerial portfolio that could request, or coerce, conformity to decisions taken (Concept [149,14F]), given prevailing politics and circumstances (Concepts [149,14C], [149,14D], [149,14B] and [149,9H]).

Coordination

The interviewee also seems to argue that success is contingent upon the identification of a political and an administrative champion (Concepts [149,9C] and [149,9D]). More importantly, however, is the ability of these champions to cooperate (Concept [149,9E]) and their willingness to combine their strengths and influences (Concept [149,5E]) to ensure that implementation follows in the direction sought.

The element of coordination is also examined from a separate perspective. The interviewee seems to suggest that the ability to coordinate activities was also heavily influenced by the fact that the policy in question related to a “greenfield site” (transcript p.6).

As the policy in question was a new one and, as such, did not concern one particular Ministry or entity, it generated a situation that meant treading upon the interests of many persons (Concept [149,9F]). On the other hand, the interviewee also recognises that this situation meant that there weren't any heavily rooted interests that could have generated a substantial stumbling block or resistance to change (Concept [149,21C]). As such, the interviewee seems to argue that it is easier to mobilise cooperation (and overcome resistance) when vested interests are diffused rather than concentrated. Furthermore, cooperation can be organised better when a policy is supported at both a political and at an administrative level (Concept [149,5E]).

Cross referencing issues arising at the time of the policy implementation with present day realities, the interviewee identifies ‘structure’, ‘attitudes’ and ‘skills for coordination’ as basic necessities for ensuring coordination. The interviewee states that “structures have to be closer”, “the culture of cooperation has to change”, and “people have to meet to [facilitate] the sharing of information” (transcript p.27, p.28).

Trust

The interviewee also identifies the development of a trusting relationship among the persons implementing a policy as another critical factor for success.

The ability to develop trust seems to be based on two requisites - the presence of a respectful relationship (Concept [149,18A]) and a challenging situation (Concept [149,19C]). The interviewee did not elaborate upon these ideas in great detail.

However, the issue of respect seems to be based upon a perception that different people bring different skills and capabilities to bear upon a particular situation and that success is dependent upon the ability of each person to recognise his/her weakness and show confidence in the skills that other persons in the team employ to fill such void. On the other hand, by recognising that each person has some relative weakness, and by showing respect and confidence in the skills and capabilities of fellow workers, the team recognised that they needed each other in order to succeed. As such, they viewed their task as a challenge and chose to trust each other in order to implement the policy and achieve their common goal.

Trust also pushed the team to achieve higher levels of performance. The development of a trusting relationship is perceived to have enabled the team to assume more risk and, in so doing, to seek to achieve optimal, rather than convenient, results (Concept [149,19H]). As such, the interviewee seems to suggest that not only was the policy successfully implemented, but that the quality of the outcomes achieved was the highest possible.

Leadership

Success in implementation is also viewed in terms of the leadership qualities of the person who directed the policy programme.

The interviewee first describes leadership in terms of the clarity of vision (Concepts [149,2D] and [149,2F]) that is provided to the team driving the policy implementation. The interviewee argues that political leadership is often lacking (Concept [149,2E]) and, as such, policies often fail to be implemented successfully. In contrast, the presence of strong leadership on this programme enabled the establishment of clear roles and responsibilities (Concept [149,2A]) and the generation of the right level of commitment to the policy from all concerned (Concept [149,2B]).

To be effective, leadership must be mandated and must be manageable. In the former case, the interviewee seems to argue that leadership can only be properly exercised if it is based on authority (Concepts [149,19F] and [149,19G]). As such, if a person is delegated the responsibility to execute a policy, it should be possible and legitimate to direct people and resources to ensure the achievement of the policy's goals (Concepts [149,20A] and [149,20B]) irrespective of their position in the chain of command. However, the interviewee also seems to suggest that while leadership

should always be based on authority, it can only be effectively executed if the leader is supported by persons in the team who are subordinate to him not only in a team setting, but also in the normal chain of command (Concepts [149,6A] and [149,6B]).

Skills and Capabilities

A final consideration influencing the successful implementation of policy are the skills and capabilities that are brought to bear on the implementation programme. This is explored from two perspectives.

At one level, the interviewee suggests that successful implementation is dependent upon the ability to match the individual skills of a person to the requirements of a job (Concepts [149,17A], [149,17B] and [149,15E]). In the context of the policy under review, the team required “an individual whose mental framework was such that a decision is taken and he executes” (transcript p.16). Thus, successful implementation in itself is dependent upon the personal skills and capabilities of the individuals that drive it.


At a different level, success is also seen to be a function of the collective skills and capabilities of the persons entrusted with the implementation of a policy. As such, the interviewee talks about the functionality of the team (Concept [149,15A]). The interviewee argues that individual skills are important, but it is likewise important, if not more so, that the skills that each person brings to the team complements those of the other team members and fills in their void (Concept [149,15B]).

Of critical importance was also the availability of the requisite resources to the team (Concept [149,22A]). The interviewee states that, “most civil servants in Malta, or most Ministers, are expected to take [decisions] to propose things without resources” (transcript p.22). Taken together, the right skills and level of resources are perceived to ensure that ideas can be tested before being implemented, thereby avoiding potential failures (Concept [149,22A]).


The interviewee attributes failure in policy implementation to the general lack of personal skills and capabilities in the civil service (Concepts [149,8G], [149,8F] and [149,8E]), as well as the inability and/or unwillingness to bring these skills together to address common problems (Concepts [149,9K], [149,10B] and [149,10A]).

Data Reduction of Results of Interviews (Project 2)


Interviewee #142




Interviewee #143




Interviewee #144




Interviewee #145




Interviewee #146




Interviewee #147



Interviewee #148



Interviewee #149



Consolidation of Factor-Categories from Individual, Reduced Map (Project 2)

Appendix 14 - Consolidation of Factor-Categories from Individual, Reduced Maps(Project 2)

Categories as they appear in Individual Maps	Categories after Consolidation		Notes:
	First Pass Grouping	Second Pass Grouping	
Approach [143]	Approach [143]	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	Includes Process
Attitude [145]			
Attitude [147]	Attitude [145,147]	Attitude [145,147]	
Collective Qualities [143]			
Collective Qualities [147]	Collective Qualities [143,147]		Treated as a 'sub-category' of Individual / Collective Attributes
Commitment [142]			
Commitment [143]			
Commitment [144]			
Commitment [148]	Commitment [142,143, 144,148]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	Includes Political Will and Political Commitment
Context [142]			
Context [143]			
Context [144]			
Context [146]	Context [142,143,144,146]	Context [142,143,144,146]	
Cooperation [142]	Cooperation [142]	Cooperation [142, 149]	Includes Coordination
Coordination [149]	Coordination [149]		Merged with Cooperation
Demand [143]	Demand [143]	Demand [143]	
Enabling Support Policies [143]	Enabling Support Policies [143]	Enabling Support Policies [143]	
Enthusiasm [147]	Enthusiasm [147]	Enthusiasm [146, 147]	Includes Motivation
Experience [145]	Experience [145]		Treated as a 'sub-category' of Individual / Collective Attributes
Individual Qualities [143]			
Individual Qualities [147]	Individual Qualities [143, 147]		Treated as a 'sub-category' of Individual / Collective Attributes
Leadership [149]	Leadership [149]	Leadership [149]	
Location of Political Responsibility [146]			
Location of Responsibility [147]			
Location of Responsibility [149]	Location of Responsibility [146, 147, 149]	Location of Responsibility [146, 147, 149]	
Management Style [145]	Management Style [145]	Management Style [145]	
Motivation [146]	Motivation [146]		Merged with Enthusiasm [147]
Networks [145]	Networks [145]	Networks [145]	
Planning [144]			
Planning [148]			
Planning [149]	Planning [144,148,149]	Planning [144,148,149]	
Political Commitment [145]	Political Commitment [145]		Treated as a 'sub-category' of Commitment
Political Will [146]	Political Will [146]		Treated as a 'sub-category' of Commitment
Process [144]			
Process [145]			
Process [147]	Process [144,145,147]		Merged with Approach
Resource Capabilities [144]	Resource Capabilities [144]		Merged with Individual / Collective Attributes
Resourcing [142]	Resourcing [142]	Resourcing [142]	
Role Delineation [146]	Role Delineation [146]	Role Delineation [146]	
Skills and Capabilities [146]			
Skills and Capabilities [148]			
Skills and Capabilities [149]	Skills and Capabilities [146,148,149]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	Includes Individual Qualities; Collective Qualities;Resource Capabilities; Experience
Stakeholder Involvement [144]	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	
Strategies [142]			
Strategy [148]	Strategy [142, 148]	Strategy [142, 148]	
Trust [149]	Trust [149]	Trust [149]	
Values / Beliefs [143]			
Values / Beliefs [145]	Values / Beliefs [143,145]	Values / Beliefs [143,145]	

'First Pass Grouping' of Properties and Dimensions (Project 2)

Data from Individual Maps				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories		
Index	Category [C]	Relationship(P/D to C)	Property and Dimensions [P/D]	First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Relationship(P/D to C)	Consolidated Category [C]
1	Commitment [143]	E	(located in) PM's ... Minister's portfolio of responsibility [143]			
2	Commitment [144]	E	(policy located in) PM's ... Minister's portfolio of responsibility [144]			
3	Political Commitment [145]	E	(policy located in) PM's ... Minister's portfolio of responsibility [145]	(policy located in) PM's ... Minister's portfolio of responsibility [143,144,145]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
4	Process [145]	E	(use of) knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable resources [145]	(use of) knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable resources [145]	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]
5	Context [143]	E	absence ... presence of existing cultures (mentalities) [143]			
6	Context [142]	E	absence ... presence of existing cultures [142]			
7	Strategy [148]	E	absence ... presence of existing organisational cultures [148]	absence ... presence of existing cultures (mentalities) [142,143,148]	E	Context [142,143,144,146
8	Context [142]	E	absence ... presence of existing organisation structures [142]		E	Strategy [142,148]
9	Context [143]	E	absence ... presence of existing organisation structures [143]	absence ... presence of existing organisation structures [142,143]	E	Context [142,143,144,146
10	Context [143]	E	absence ... presence of stakeholder interests [143]	absence ... presence of stakeholder interests [143]	E	Context [142,143,144,146
11	Planning [149]	E	accounted for ... overlooked stakeholder interests [149]	accounted for ... overlooked stakeholder interests [149]	E	Planning [144,148,149]
12	Commitment [142]	D	active ... passive participation [142]			
13	Context [143]	D	active ... passive participation [143]			
14	Commitment [143]	D	active ... passive participation [143]			
15	Context [144]	D	active ... passive participation [144]	active ... passive participation [142,143,144]	D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
16	Motivation [146]	E	adequate ... inadequate resources [146]	adequate ... inadequate resources [146]	D	Context [142,143,144,146]
17	Resourcing [142]	E	adequate ... inadequate training (of resources) [142]		E	Enthusiasm [146, 147]
18	Resource Capabilities [144]	E	adequate ... inadequate training [144]	adequate ... inadequate training (of resources) [142,144]	E	Resourcing [142]
19	Role Delineation [146]	I	all-encompassing ... focused involvement [146]	all-encompassing ... focused involvement [146]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
20	Individual Qualities [147]	E	ambitious ... unambitious character [147]	ambitious ... unambitious character [147]	I	Role Delineation [146]
21	Attitude [147]	E	apolitical ... politically-biased behaviour [147]	apolitical ... politically-biased behaviour [147]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
22	Commitment [148]	E	authoritative ... powerless individuals [148]	authoritative ... powerless individuals [148]	E	Attitude [145,147]
23	Values / Beliefs [143]	D	broad ... limited participation [143]		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
24	Demand [143]	E	broad ... limited participation [143]			
25	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E	broad ... limited participation [144]			
26	Commitment [148]	E	broad ... limited participation [148]	broad ... limited participation [143,144,148]	D	Values / Beliefs [143]
27	Process [145]	I	bureaucratic ... flexible system [145]	bureaucratic ... flexible system [145]	E	Demand [143]
28	Role Delineation [146]	E	clear ... unclear [146]	clear ... unclear [146]	E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]
29	Leadership [149]	E	clear ... unclear mandate [149]	clear ... unclear mandate [149]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
30	Enthusiasm [147]	E	clear ... unclear outcome [147]	clear ... unclear outcome [147]	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]
31	Approach [143]	E	clear ... unclear roles [143]			
32	Leadership [149]	E	clear ... unclear roles [149]			
33	Collective Qualities [147]	E	clear ... unclear separation of roles [147]	clear ... unclear roles [143,147,149]	E	Leadership [149]
34	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E	clear ... unclear vision (of leader) [146]			
35	Planning [144]	E	clear ... unclear vision [144]			
36	Process [147]	E	clear ... unclear vision [147]			
37	Leadership [149]	E	clear ... unclear vision [149]	clear ... unclear vision [144,146,147,149]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
38	Cooperation [142]	E	collaborative ... uncollaborative attitudes (behaviours) [142]	collaborative ... uncollaborative attitudes (behaviours) [142]	E	Planning [144,148,149]
39	Political Will [146]	E	collective ... individual responsibility [146]	collective ... individual responsibility [146]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]
40	Experience [145]	E	commercial ... public service-oriented [145]	commercial ... public service-oriented experience [145]	E	Leadership [149]
41	Commitment [148]	E	competent ... incompetent leadership [148]		E	Enthusiasm [146, 147]
42	Skills and Capabilities [148]	E	competent ... incompetent leadership [148]	competent ... incompetent leadership [148]		
43	Planning [144]	E	complete ... partial understanding of issues / objectives [144]	complete ... partial understanding of issues / objectives [144]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147
44	Enabling Support Policies [143]	E	complimentary ... conflicting (policy initiatives) [143]		E	Leadership [149]
45	Commitment [148]	E	complimentary ... conflicting initiatives [148]	complimentary ... conflicting initiatives [143,148]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
46	Planning [149]	E	comprehensive ... incomplete detail (of approach) [149]	comprehensive ... incomplete detail (of approach) [149]	E	Enabling Support Policies [143]
47	Coordination [149]	E	comprehensive ... limited scope of leadership (pol & admin) [149]	comprehensive ... limited scope of leadership (pol & admin) [149]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
48	Resource Capabilities [144]	E	comprehensive ... limited skills base [144]		E	Planning [144,148,149]
49	Cooperation [142]	E	comprehensive ... specific (type of) support [142]	comprehensive ... limited skills base [142,144]	E	Cooperation [142,149]
50	Values / Beliefs [145]	E	confidence ... doubt (in abilities) [145]	confidence ... doubt (in abilities) [145]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
51	Collective Qualities [147]	E	consistent ... inconsistent behaviour [147]	consistent ... inconsistent behaviour [147]	E	Values / Beliefs [143,145]
52	Role Delineation [146]	D	cooperation ... resistance [146]	cooperation ... resistance [146]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
53	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E	creative ... uncreative (leader) [146]	creative ... uncreative (leader) [146]	D	Role Delineation [146]
54	Strategy [148]	E	customised ... generic approach [148]		E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
54	Planning [149]	E	customised ... generic approach [149]			

Data from Individual Maps				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories		
Index	Category [C]	Relationship(P/D to C)	Property and Dimensions [P/D]	First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Relationship (P/D to C)	Consolidated Category [C]
55	Management Style [145]	E	customised ... normative response (to a problem) [145]	customised ... generic [145,148,149]	E	Strategy [142,148
56	Commitment [144]	E	decisive ... undecisive action [144]	decisive ... undecisive action [144]	E	Planning [144,148,149]
57	Individual Qualities [147]	E	decisive ... undecisive work ethic [147]	decisive ... undecisive work ethic [147]	E	Management Style [145]
58	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E	deliberate ... unintended consultation [144]	deliberate ... unintended consultation [144]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
59	Commitment [143]	E	Demand [143]	Demand [143]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
60	Coordination [149]	E	diffused ... concentrated stakeholder interests [149]	diffused ... concentrated stakeholder interests [149]	E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]
61	Process [147]	E	effective ... economical (in approach) [147]	effective ... economical [147]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
62	Management Style [145]	E	enthusiastic ... apathetic attitude [145]	enthusiastic ... apathetic attitude [145,146]	E	Cooperation [142,149]
63	Skills and Capabilities [146]	E	enthusiastic ... apathetic attitude [146]	enthusiastic ... apathetic attitude [145,146]	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]
64	Planning [149]	E	evidence-based (tested) ... un-tested approach [149]	experience-based (tested) ... un-tested [143,145,147,149]	E	Management Style [145
65	Process [147]	E	experience-based ... theoretical (un-tested) approach [147]	extensive ... limited experience [145]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
66	Approach [143]	E	experience-based ... theoretical [143]	extensive ... limited consultation [148]	E	
67	Process [145]	E	experience-based ... theoretical [145]	extensive ... limited research [143]	E	Planning [144,148,149]
68	Experience [145]	E	extensive ... limited [145]	external-imposed ... personal-innate [146]	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]
69	Strategy [148]	E	extensive ... limited consultation [148]	fast ... slow decision-making [144]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
70	Approach [143]	E	extensive ... limited research [143]	fear ... confidence (of making mistakes) [142]	E	Strategy [142,148]
71	Political Will [146]	E	external-imposed ... personal-innate [146]	flexible ... bureaucratic (in approach) [147]	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]
72	Commitment [144]	E	fast ... slow decision-making [144]	flexible ... bureaucratic behaviour [147]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
73	Commitment [142]	I	fear ... confidence (of making mistakes) [142]	flexible ... rigid approach [144]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
74	Process [147]	E	flexible ... bureaucratic (in approach) [147]	flexible ... rigid approach [145]	I	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
75	Collective Qualities [147]	E	flexible ... bureaucratic behaviour [147]			
76	Commitment [144]	E	flexible ... rigid approach [144]			
77	Management Style [145]	E	flexible ... rigid approach [145]			
78	Political Commitment [145]	E	flexible ... rigid approach [145]	flexible ... rigid [144,145,147]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147
79	Resourcing [142]	E	focused ... dispersed deployment (of resurces) [142]		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
80	Approach [143]	E	focused ... unfocused resources [143]		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
81	Motivation [146]	E	focused ... unfocused resources [146]	focused ... unfocused resources [142,143,146]	E	Management Style [145]
82	Cooperation [142]	E	formal ... informal political support [142]	formal ... informal political support [142]	E	
83	Location of Responsibility [147]	E	full ... partial control [147]	full ... partial control [147]	E	Resourcing [142]
84	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E	genuine ... deceitful cooperation [146]	genuine ... deceitful cooperation [146]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]
85	Attitude [145]	I	half-hearted ... spirited will [145]	half-hearted ... spirited will [145,147]	E	Enthusiasm [146,147]
86	Attitude [147]	I	half-hearted ... spirited will [147]	half-hearted ... spirited will [145,147]	E	Cooperation [142,149]
87	Strategy [148]	E	hand-holding ... unassisted approach to implementation [148]	hand-holding ... unassisted approach to implementation [148]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
88	Commitment [144]	E	high ... low (political) risk of failure [144]	high ... low (political) risk of failure [144]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
89	Commitment [142]	D	high ... low accountability [142]			
90	Commitment [143]	D	high ... low accountability [143]			
91	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	D	high ... low accountability [144]	high ... low accountability [142,143,144]	D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
92	Coordination [149]	I	high ... low aloofness (of Ministries) [149]	high ... low aloofness (of Ministries) [149]	D	Stakeholder Involvement [144]
93	Enthusiasm [147]	E	high ... low appreciation (of effort) [147]	high ... low appreciation (of effort) [147]	I	Cooperation [142,149]
94	Leadership [149]	D	high ... low commitment [149]	high ... low commitment [149]	E	Enthusiasm [146, 147]
95	Skills and Capabilities [149]	E	high ... low complementarity [149]	high ... low complementarity [149]	D	Leadership [149]
96	Trust [149]	E	high ... low confidence in colleagues' skills [149]	high ... low confidence in colleagues' skills [149]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
97	Process [144]	E	high ... low consideration of context [144]	high ... low consideration of context [144]	E	Trust [149]
98	Political Commitment [145]	D	high ... low cooperation (from stakeholders) [145]		E	Approach [143,144,145,147
99	Location of Responsibility [147]	D	high ... low cooperation [147]			
100	Commitment [148]	D	high ... low cooperation [148]			
101	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	D	high ... low coordination (between Ministries) [146]			
102	Approach [143]	D	high ... low coordination [143]	high ... low stakeholder cooperation [143,145,146,147,148]	D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
103	Planning [149]	E	high ... low customer orientation (of approach) [149]	high ... low customer orientation (of approach) [149]	D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
104	Strategies [142]	E	high ... low customisation (to environment) [142]	high ... low customisation (to environment) [142]	D	Approach [143,144,145,147]
105	Commitment [142]	E	high ... low determination (motivation) [142]		E	Planning [144,148,149]
106	Commitment [143]	E	high ... low determination (motivation) [143]		E	Strategy [142,148]
107	Individual Qualities [143]	D	high ... low determination (motivation) [143]			
108	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E	high ... low determination (of leader) [146]			
	Values / Beliefs [145]	D	high ... low determination (motivation) [145]			

Data from Individual Maps			Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories		
Index	Category [C]	Relationship(P/D to C) Property and Dimensions [P/D]	First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Relationship (P/D to C)	Consolidated Category [C]
109	Political Commitment [145]	E high ... low determination [145]	high ... low determination [142,143,145,146] <i>[n/a - the two have been merged]</i>	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
110	Motivation [146]	E high ... low enthusiasm [146]		E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
111	Individual Qualities [147]	E high ... low enthusiasm [147]		D	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
				D	Values / Beliefs [143,145]
112	Attitude [147]	E high ... low enthusiasm [147]	high ... low enthusiasm [146,147] high ... low expert support [145] high ... low flexibility [142] high ... low match with job requirements [149] <i>[n/a - the two have been merged]</i> high ... low momentum (for change) [142]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
113	Process [145]	E high ... low expert support [145]		E	Attitude [145,147]
114	Context [142]	D high ... low flexibility [142]		E	Approach [143,144,145,147
115	Skills and Capabilities [149]	E high ... low match with job requirements [149]		D	Context [142,143,144,146
116	Coordination [149]	E high ... low Ministerial cooperation [149]	high ... low momentum (for change) [142]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
117	Resourcing [142]	D high ... low momentum (for change) [142]			
118	Commitment [142]	D high ... low ownership [142]		D	Resourcing [142]
				D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
119	Values / Beliefs [143]	D high ... low ownership [143]	high ... low ownership [142,143]	D	Values / Beliefs [143]
120	Trust [149]	D high ... low performance [149]	high ... low performance [149]	D	Trust [149]
121	Attitude [147]	E high ... low personal interest [147]	high ... low personal interest [147]	E	Attitude [145,147]
122	Commitment [148]	E high ... low personal involvement (of PM) [148]	high ... low personal involvement [142,143,145,146,148] high ... low political commitment [147]		
123	Commitment [142]	E high ... low personal involvement [142]		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
124	Commitment [143]	E high ... low personal involvement [143]		D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
125	Political Commitment [145]	E high ... low personal involvement [145]		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
126	Political Will [146]	E high ... low personal involvement [146]	high ... low personal involvement [142,143,145,146,148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
127	Location of Responsibility [147]	D high ... low political commitment [147]	high ... low political commitment [147]	D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
128	Context [146]	E high ... low political priority (of initiative) [146]	high ... low political priority (of initiative) [146,148]		
129	Political Will [146]	E high ... low political priority (of initiative) [146]		E	Context [142,143,144,146
130	Commitment [148]	E high ... low priority to government [148]		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
131	Coordination [149]	E high ... low politico-administrative cooperation [149]			
132	Location of Responsibility [149]	D high ... low politico-administrative cooperation [149]	high ... low politico-administrative cooperation [149]	E	Cooperation [142,149
133	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	D high ... low power [146]	high ... low power [146]	D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
134	Commitment [148]	E high ... low pressure for change [148]	high ... low pressure for change [148]	D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
135	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E high ... low resourcefulness (of leader) [146]	high ... low resourcefulness (of leader) [146]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
136	Trust [149]	E high ... low respect [149]	high ... low respect [149]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
137	Attitude [147]	E high ... low sense of pride [147]	high ... low respect [149]	E	Trust [149]
138	Collective Qualities [147]	E high ... low sense of pride [147]	high ... low sense of pride [147]	E	Trust [149]
139	Skills and Capabilities [149]	E high ... low trust [147]	high ... low sense of pride [147]	E	Attitude [145,147]
			high ... low trust [147]	E	Attitude [145,147]
				E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
140	Planning [148]	E high ... low understanding of policy [148]	high ... low understanding of policy [148,149]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
141	Commitment [148]	E high ... low visibility of policy [148]	high ... low understanding of policy [148,149]	E	Planning [144,148,149]
142	Trust [149]	D high ... low willingness to risk [149]	high ... low visibility of policy [148]	E	Planning [144,148,149]
143	Coordination [149]	E high ... low willingness to share information [149]	high ... low willingness to risk [149]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
144	Strategy [148]	E holistic ... incomplete approach [148]	high ... low willingness to share information [149]	D	Trust [149]
145	Process [145]	E incentivised ... unincentivised resources [145]	holistic ... incomplete approach [148]	E	Cooperation [142,149]
146	Context [142]	E inert ... active organisational environment [142]	incentivised ... unincentivised resources [145]	E	Strategy [142,148]
147	Attitude [145]	I inflexible ... flexible style [145]	inert ... active organisational environment [142]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147
148	Networks [145]	E influential ... powerless [145]	inflexible ... flexible style [145]	E	Context [142,143,144,146
149	Context [144]	E innovative ... cliché policy [144]	influential ... powerless [145]	E	Context [142,143,144,146
150	Role Delineation [146]	I interference ... intervention [146]	innovative ... cliché policy [144]	E	Context [142,143,144,146
151	Resourcing [142]	E internal ... external use (of resources) [142]	interference ... intervention [146]	I	Role Delineation [146]
152	Commitment [144]	E intrinsic ... indifferent belief (in policy) [144]	internal ... external use (of resources) [142]	E	Role Delineation [146]
153	Commitment [143]	E intrinsic ... indifferent belief [143]			
154	Political Will [146]	E intrinsic ... indifferent belief [146]			
155	Motivation [146]	E intrinsic ... indifferent belief [146]			
	Values / Belief [145]	E intrinsic ... indifferent [145]			
156	Enthusiasm [147]	E intrinsic ... indifferent belief [147]	intrinsic ... indifferent belief (in policy) [143,144,146,147]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
157	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable (leader) [146]	intrinsic ... indifferent belief (in policy) [143,144,146,147]	E	Values / Beliefs [143,145]
158	Leadership [149]	E legitimate ... illegitimate mandate [149]	knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable (leader) [146]	E	Enthusiasm [146,147]
159	Political Commitment [145]	E long-term ... short-lived [145]	legitimate ... illegitimate mandate [149]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
160	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E long-term ... short-lived consultation [144]	long-term ... short-lived [145]	E	Leadership [149]
161	Attitude [147]	E long-term ... short-lived determination (tenacity) [147]	long-term ... short-lived consultation [144]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
162	Location of Responsibility [147]	D low ... high resistance [147]	long-term ... short-lived determination (tenacity) [147]	E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]
163	Values / Beliefs [143]	E matching ... contrasting personal values [143]	low ... high resistance [147]	E	Attitude [145,147]
164	Management Style [145]	E methodical ... unstructured approach [145]	matching ... contrasting personal values [143]	D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]
165	Role Delineation [146]	D objective ... subjective intervention [146]	methodical ... unstructured approach [145]	E	Values / Beliefs [143]
166	Planning [149]	E on-going ... short-lived [149]	objective ... subjective intervention [146]	E	Management Style [145]
				D	Role Delineation [146]

Data from Individual Maps				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories			
Index	Category [C]	Relationship(P/D to C)	Property and Dimensions [P/D]	First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Relationship (P/D to C)	Consolidated Category [C]	
167	Planning [144]	E	on-going ... static (in approach) [144]	on-going ... short-lived [144,149]	E	Planning [144,148,149]	
168	Context [144]	E	open-minded ... narrow-minded mentality [144]	open-minded ... narrow-minded mentality [144]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
169	Attitude [145]	E	optimistic ... fatalistic disposition [145]	optimistic ... fatalistic disposition [145]	E	Attitude [145,147]	
170	Attitude [147]	E	persistent ... wavering determination (tenacity) [147]	persistent ... wavering determination (tenacity) [147]	E	Attitude [145,147]	
171	Networks [145]	E	personal-informal ... official-formal [145]	personal-informal ... official-formal [145]	E	Networks [145]	
172	Commitment [144]	E	physical ... intangible [144]	physical ... intangible [144,145,148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
173	Political Commitment [145]	E	physical ... intangible [145]				
174	Commitment [148]	E	physical ... intangible [148]				
175	Enabling Support Policies [143]	E	planned ... unplanned sequential implementation (of policies) [143]	planned ... unplanned sequential implementation (of policies) [143]	E	Enabling Support Policies [143]	
176	Location of Responsibility [147]	E	PM ... Minister portfolio [147]	PM's ... Minister's portfolio [146,147]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,148]	
176	Motivation [146]	E	PM's ... Minister's portfolio [146]				
	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E	PM's ... Minister's portfolio [146]				
178	Management Style [145]	E	positive ... negative disposition [145]	positive ... negative disposition [145]	E	Management Style [145]	
179	Location of Responsibility [147]	E	powerful ... weak individuals [147]	powerful ... weak individuals [147]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,148]	
180	Process [145]	E	practical ... rigid (rule-based) approach [145]	practical ... rigid (rule-based) [145]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
181	Individual Qualities [147]	E	practical ... theoretical approach [147]	practical ... theoretical approach [147]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,148]	
182	Enthusiasm [147]	E	practical ... theoretical approach [147]				
183	Strategies [142]	E	pre-meditated ... emergent (in approach) [142]				
184	Context [144]	E	presence ... absence of demand [144]	presence ... absence of demand [144,146]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
185	Context [146]	E	presence ... absence of demand [146]				
186	Enthusiasm [147]	E	presence ... absence of incentives [147]				
187	Context [146]	E	presence ... absence of supporting events [146]	presence ... absence of supporting events [146]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
188	Planning [144]	E	proactive ... reactive (in approach) [144]	proactive ... reactive (in approach) [144]	E	Planning [144,148,149]	
189	Planning [149]	E	propitious ... inopportune timing (of activities) [149]	propitious ... inopportune timing (of activities) [143,149]	E	Planning [144,148,149]	
190	Enabling Support Policies [143]	E	propitious ... inopportune timing (of policy initiatives) [143]				
191	Approach [143]	E	regular ... infrequent meetings [143]				
192	Planning [149]	E	regular ... infrequent meetings [149]	regular ... infrequent meetings [143,149]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
193	Experience [145]	E	related ... unrelated [145]				
194	Individual Qualities [143]	E	related ... unrelated experience [143]				
195	Individual Qualities [143]	E	resourceful ... unresourceful [143]	resourceful ... unresourceful [143]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,148]	
196	Commitment [144]	E	results-oriented ... process driven approach [144]	results-oriented ... process driven [144,147]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
197	Process [147]	E	results-oriented ... process-driven mentality [147]				
198	Process [145]	E	rigorous ... negligent application of standards [145]				
199	Location of Political Responsibility [146]	E	senior (authoritative) ... junior individuals [146]	senior (authoritative) ... junior individuals [146]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,148]	
200	Collective Qualities [143]	E	similar ... dissimilar goals [143]	similar ... dissimilar interests (goals) [142,143]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,148]	
201	Cooperation [142]	E	similar ... dissimilar interests (goals) [142]				
202	Individual Qualities [143]	E	skilled ... inept [143]				
203	Individual Qualities [147]	E	specific ... generic knowledge of context [147]	specific ... generic knowledge of context [147]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,148]	
204	Process [144]	E	staggered ... sudden implementation (of activities) [144]	staggered ... sudden implementation (of activities) [144]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
205	Attitude [145]	I	stagnant ... progressive mentality [145]	stagnant ... progressive mentality [145]	I	Attitude [145,147]	
206	Commitment [148]	E	strong ... weak administrative determination [148]	strong ... weak administrative determination [148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
207	Commitment [142]	E	strong ... weak belief (in principles/outcomes) [142]	strong ... weak belief (in principles/outcomes) [142]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
208	Individual Qualities [147]	E	strong ... weak determination [147]	strong ... weak determination [147]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,148]	
209	Commitment [148]	E	strong ... weak involvement of political party [148]	strong ... weak involvement of political party [148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
210	Commitment [142]	E	strong ... weak leadership [142]	strong ... weak leadership [142,143,146,147,148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
211	Context [143]	E	strong ... weak leadership [143]				
212	Skills and Capabilities [146]	E	strong ... weak leadership [146]				
213	Individual Qualities [147]	E	strong ... weak leadership [147]				
214	Commitment [148]	E	strong ... weak leadership [148]				
215	Cooperation [142]	E	strong ... weak personal relationships [142]	strong ... weak personal relationships [142]	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
216	Resource Capabilities [144]	E	strong ... weak personal skills [144]	<i>[n/a - merged together]</i>			
217	Commitment [148]	E	strong ... weak political determination [148]	strong ... weak political determination [148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
218	Location of Responsibility [149]	E	strong ... weak power [149]	strong ... weak power [149]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,148]	
219	Commitment [144]	E	strong ... weak will (determination) [144]	strong ... weak will (determination) [144]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
220	Skills and Capabilities [149]	E	sufficient ... insufficient (in quantity) [149]	sufficient ... insufficient critical mass [142,143,146,148,149]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,148]	
221	Resourcing [142]	E	sufficient ... insufficient critical mass [142]				
222	Context [143]	D	sufficient ... insufficient critical mass [143]				
223	Skills and Capabilities [148]	E	sufficient ... insufficient quantity of resources [148]				
224	Context [146]	E	sufficient ... insufficient resources [146]	sufficient ... insufficient critical mass [142,143,146,148,149]	D/E	Context [142,143,144,146]	

Data from Individual Maps				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories		
Index	Category [C]	Relationship(		First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Relationship	
		P/D to C)	Property and Dimensions [P/D]		(P/D to C)	Consolidated Category [C]
225	Resourcing [142]	E	sufficient ... insufficient motivation (incentives) [142]	sufficient ... insufficient motivation (incentives) [142]	E	Resourcing [142]
226	Location of Responsibility [147]	E	supportive ... unsupportive environment [147]	supportive ... unsupportive environment [147]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,148]
227	Cooperation [142]	D	synergistic ... individualistic group dynamic [142]		D	Cooperation [142,149]
228	Collective Qualities [143]	E	synergistic ... individualistic group dynamic [143]	synergistic ... individualistic group dynamic [142,143]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
229	Skills and Capabilities [146]	E	tactful ... tactless [146]	tactful ... tactless [146]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
230	Attitude [145]	E	team-oriented ... individualistic [145]		E	Attitude [145,147]
231	Collective Qualities [147]	E	team-oriented ... individually oriented behaviour [147]	team-oriented ... individualistic [145,147]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
232	Planning [144]	E	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [144]			
233	Process [144]	E	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [144]			
234	Process [145]	E	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [145]			
235	Planning [148]	E	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [148]			
236	Strategy [148]	E	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [148]		E	Planning [144,148,149]
					E	Approach [143,144,145,147]
					E	Strategy [142,148]
237	Individual Qualities [147]	E	thorough ... superficial grasp of detail [147]	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [144,145,147,148]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
238	Approach [143]	E	timely ... tardy decisions [143]	timely ... tardy decisions [143]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]
239	Location of Responsibility [149]	E	total ... partial control [149]	total ... partial control [149]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,148]
240	Context [146]	E	trained ... untrained resources [146]	trained ... untrained resources [146]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]
241	Context [142]	E	unthreatened ... threatened stakeholder interests [142]		E	Context [142,143,144,146]
242	Strategy [148]	E	unthreatened ... threatened stakeholder interests [148]	unthreatened ... threatened stakeholder interests [142,148]	E	Strategy [142,148]
243	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E	various ... limited consultations [144]	various ... limited consultations [144]	E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]
244	Motivation [146]	E	visible ... intangible commitment [146]			
245	Enthusiasm [147]	E	visible ... unseen (political) commitment [147]	visible ... unseen commitment [147]	E	Enthusiasm [146,147]
246	Commitment [144]	E	visible ... unseen [144]			
247	Political Commitment [145]	E	visible ... unseen [145]			
248	Political Will [146]	E	visible ... unseen intervention [146]	visible ... unseen [144,145,146]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
249	Skills and Capabilities [146]	E	weak ... strong management skills [146]	weak ... strong management [146]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]
250	Commitment [148]	E	wide ... narrow reach (of policy) [148]	wide ... narrow reach (of policy) [148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
251	Attitude [145]	E	willing ... unwilling to assume responsibility [145]	willing ... unwilling to assume responsibility [145]	E	Attitude [145,147]
252	Attitude [145]	E	willingness ... unwillingness to risk [145]	willingness ... unwillingness to risk [145]	E	Attitude [145,147]

‘Second Pass Grouping’ of Properties and Dimensions (Project 2)

Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories			
Index	First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Consolidated Category [C]	Relationship [P/D to C]	Second Pass Grouping [P/D or Category]	Relationship [P/D to C] [C to C]	Consolidated Category [C]	
3	(policy located in) PM's ... Minister's portfolio of responsibility [143,144,145]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,147,148]	
		Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	E		E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	
177	PM's ... Minister's portfolio [146,147]	Enthusiasm [146,147]	E	(policy in) PM's ... Minister's portfolio [143,144,145,146,147]	E	Enthusiasm [146,147]	
127	high ... low political commitment [147]	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
4	(use of) knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable resources [145]	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	E	(use of) knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable resources [145]	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	
	absence ... presence of existing cultures (mentalities [142,143,148]	Context [142,143,144,146]	E	absence ... presence of existing cultures (mentalities [142,143,148]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
7		Strategy [142,148]	E		E	Strategy [142,148]	
	absence ... presence of existing organisation structure: [142,143]	Context [142,143,144,146]	E	absence ... presence of existing organisation structure: [142,143]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
10	absence ... presence of stakeholder interests [143]	Context [142,143,144,146]	E	absence ... presence of stakeholder interests [143]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
11	accounted for ... overlooked stakeholder interests [143]	Planning [144,148,149]	E				
103	high ... low customer orientation (of approach) [143]	Planning [144,148,149]	E	accounted for ... overlooked stakeholder interests [143]	E	Planning [144,148,149]	
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	D				
15	active ... passive participation [142,143,144]	Context [142,143,144,146]	D				
16	adequate ... inadequate resources [143]	Enthusiasm [146, 147]	E				
		Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E		E	Enthusiasm [146,147]	
		Resourcing [142]	E		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
224	sufficient ... insufficient critical mass [142,143,146,148,149]	Context [142,143,144,146]	D/E	sufficient ... insufficient critical mass [142,143,146,148,149]	D/E	Resourcing [142]	
					E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
240	trained ... untrained resources [146]	Context [142,143,144,146]	E	trained ... untrained resources [146]	E	Enthusiasm [146,147]	
		Resourcing [142]	E		E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
18	adequate ... inadequate training (of resources) [142,144]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	adequate ... inadequate training (of resources) [142,144]	E	Resourcing [142]	
19	all-encompassing ... focused involvement [143]	Role Delineation [146]	I	all-encompassing ... focused involvement [143]	I	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
20	ambitious ... unambitious character [147]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	ambitious ... unambitious character [147]	E	Role Delineation [146]	
21	apolitical ... politically-biased behaviour [143]	Attitude [145,147]	E	apolitical ... politically-biased behaviour [143]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
22	authoritative ... powerless individuals [143]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E			Attitude [145,147]	
179	powerful ... weak individuals [147]	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	E				
					E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
199	senior (authoritative) ... junior individuals [146]	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	E	authoritative ... powerless individuals [146,147,148]	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	
		Values / Beliefs [143]	D		D	Values / Beliefs [143]	
		Demand [143]	E		E	Demand [143]	
		Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E		E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	
26	broad ... limited participation [143,144,148]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	broad ... limited participation [143,144,148]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
27	bureaucratic ... flexible system [145]	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	I				
180	practical ... rigid (rule-based) [145]	Approach [143,144,145,147]	E				
114	high ... low flexibility [142]	Context [142,143,144,146]	D				
		Approach [143,144,145,147]	E		E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
		Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
78	flexible ... rigid [144,145,147]	Management Style [145]	E	flexible ... rigid [142,144,145,147]	E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
28	clear ... unclear [146]	Role Delineation [146]	E		E	Management Style [145]	
29	clear ... unclear mandate [149]	Leadership [149]	E	clear ... unclear [146]	E	Role Delineation [146]	
30	clear ... unclear outcome [147]	Enthusiasm [146, 147]	E	clear ... unclear mandate [149]	E	Leadership [149]	
		Approach [143,144,145,147]	E	clear ... unclear outcome [147]	E	Enthusiasm [146, 147]	
		Leadership [149]	E		E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
33	clear ... unclear roles [143,147,149]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	clear ... unclear roles [143,147,149]	E	Leadership [149]	
		Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	E		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
		Planning [144,148,149]	E		E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	
		Approach [143,144,145,147]	E		E	Planning [144,148,149]	
37	clear ... unclear vision [144,146,147,149]	Leadership [149]	E	clear ... unclear vision [144,146,147,149]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
38	collaborative ... uncollaborative attitudes (behaviours) [143]	Cooperation [142,149]	E		E	Leadership [149]	
39	collective ... individual responsibility [143]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	collaborative ... uncollaborative attitudes (behaviours) [143]	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
40	commercial ... public service-oriented experience [143]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	collective ... individual responsibility [143]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	commercial ... public service-oriented experience [143]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
42	competent ... incompetent leadership [148]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E				
					D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148,149]	
94	high ... low commitment [149]	Leadership [149]	D	Leadership [148,149]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
43	complete ... partial understanding of issues / objectives [144]	Planning [144,148,149]	E				
		Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
140	high ... low understanding of policy [148,149]	Planning [144,148,149]	E	high ... low understanding of policy [144,148,149]	E	Planning [144,148,149]	
		Enabling Support Policies [143]	E				
45	complimentary ... conflicting initiatives [143,148]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E				

Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories			
Index	First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Consolidated Category [C]	Relationship [P/D to C]	Second Pass Grouping [P/D or Category]	Relationship [P/D to C] [C to C]	Consolidated Category [C]	
					E	Enabling Support Policies [143	
					E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
					E	Context [142,143,144,148]	
187	presence ... absence of supporting events [146]	Context [142,143,144,146]	E	presence ... absence of supporting events [143,146,148]			
	comprehensive ... limited scope of leadership (pol & admin			comprehensive ... limited scope of leadership (pol & admin			
47	[149]	Cooperation [142,149]	E	[149]	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
		Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	E		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	
49	comprehensive ... limited skills base [142,144]	Cooperation [142,149]	E	comprehensive ... limited skills base [142,144]	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
	confidence ... doubt (in abilities	Values / Beliefs [143,145	E	confidence ... doubt (in abilities	E	Values / Beliefs [143,145	
50	consistent ... inconsistent behaviour [147	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	E	consistent ... inconsistent behaviour [147	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	
51	cooperation ... resistance [146	Role Delineation [146]	D	Cooperation [142,149	D	Role Delineation [146]	
52	creative ... uncreative (leader) [14	Location of Responsibility [146,147,14	E	creative ... uncreative (leader) [14	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,14	
104	high ... low customisation (to environment) [14	Strategy [142,148	E				
97	high ... low consideration of context [14	Approach [143,144,145,147	E				
					E	Strategy [142,148	
		Planning [144,148,149]	E		E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
55	customised ... generic approach [145,148,149]	Management Style [145]	E	customised ... generic [142,144,145,148,149]	E	Management Style [145]	
56	decisive ... undecisive action [144	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	decisive ... undecisive action [144	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
57	decisive ... undecisive work ethic [147	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	E	decisive ... undecisive work ethic [147	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	
58	deliberate ... unintended consultation [14	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E	deliberate ... unintended consultation [14	E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	
59	Demand [143]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	Demand [143]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
60	diffused ... concentrated stakeholder interests [14	Cooperation [142,149]	E	diffused ... concentrated stakeholder interests [14	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
61	effective ... economical [147	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	E	effective ... economical [147	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	
		Management Style [145	E		E	Management Style [145	
63	enthusiastic ... apathetic attitude [145,146]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	enthusiastic ... apathetic attitude [145,146]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
		Planning [144,148,149	E		E	Planning [144,148,149	
67	experience-based (tested) ... un-tested [143,145,147,149]	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	E	experience-based (tested) ... un-tested [143,145,147,149]	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	
68	extensive ... limited experience [14	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	E	extensive ... limited experience [14	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	
69	extensive ... limited consultation [14	Strategy [142,148	E				
					E	Strategy [142,148	
243	various ... limited consultations [144]	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E	extensive ... limited consultations [144,148]	E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	
70	extensive ... limited research [14	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	E	extensive ... limited research [14	E	Approach [143,144,145, 147]	
71	external-imposed ... personal-innate [14	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	external-imposed ... personal-innate [14	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
72	fast ... slow decision-making [144	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E				
					E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	
238	timely ... tardy decisions [143]	Approach [143,144,145,147]	E	fast ... slow decision-making [143,144]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
73	fear ... confidence (of making mistakes) [142	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	I	fear ... confidence (of making mistakes) [142	I	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
		Resourcing [142]	E		E	Resourcing [142]	
		Approach [143,144,145,147]	E		E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
81	focused ... unfocused resources [142,143,146]	Enthusiasm [146,147]	E	focused ... unfocused resources [142,143,146]	E	Enthusiasm [146,147]	
82	formal ... informal political support [142	Cooperation [142,149]	E	formal ... informal political support [142	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
83	full ... partial control [147	Location of Responsibility [146,147,14	E				
239	total ... partial control [149	Location of Responsibility [146,147,14	E	total ... partial control [147,149	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,14	
84	genuine ... deceitful cooperation [14	Location of Responsibility [146,147,14	E	genuine ... deceitful cooperation [14	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,14	
86	half-hearted ... spirited will [145,147	Attitude [145,147]	I	half-hearted ... spirited will [145,147	I	Attitude [145,147]	
87	hand-holding ... unassisted approach to implementation [148]	Strategy [142,148]	E	hand-holding ... unassisted approach to implementation [148]	E	Strategy [142,148]	
88	high ... low (political) risk of failure [144	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	high ... low (political) risk of failure [144	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	D		D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	
91	high ... low accountability [142,143,144]	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	D	high ... low accountability [142,143,144]	D	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	
92	high ... low aloofness (of Ministries) [149	Cooperation [142,149]	I	high ... low aloofness (of Ministries) [149	I	Cooperation [142,149]	
93	high ... low appreciation (of effort) [147	Enthusiasm [146, 147]	E				
					E	Enthusiasm [146, 147]	
136	high ... low respect [149]	Trust [149]	E	high ... low respect [147,149]	E	Trust [149]	
95	high ... low complementarity [149	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	E	high ... low complementarity [149	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	
96	high ... low confidence in colleagues' skills [14	Trust [149]	E	high ... low confidence in colleagues' skills [14	E	Trust [149]	
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	D		D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	
		Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	D		D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	
102	high ... low stakeholder cooperation [143,145,146,147,148]	Approach [143,144,145,147]	D	Cooperation [142,149]	D	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
219	strong ... weak will (determination) [14	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E				
206	strong ... weak administrative determination [14	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E				
217	strong ... weak political determination [14	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E				
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E				
		Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	E		E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149]	
		Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	D		D	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
109	high ... low determination [142,143,145,146]	Values / Beliefs [143,145]	D	high ... low determination [142,143,144,145,146,148]	D	Values / Beliefs [143,145]	
		Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	E		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,14	
112	high ... low enthusiasm [146,147]	Attitude [145,147]	E	high ... low enthusiasm [146,147]	E	Attitude [145,147]	

Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories			
Index First Pass Grouping [P/D]		Consolidated Category [C]	Relationship [P/D to C]	Second Pass Grouping [P/D or Category]		Relationship [P/D to C] [C to C]	Consolidated Category [C]
113	high ... low expert support [145	Approach [143,144,145,147	E	high ... low expert support [145		E	Approach [143,144,145,147
115	high ... low match with job requirements [145	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145	E	high ... low match with job requirements [145		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145
117	high ... low momentum (for change) [142	Resourcing [142]	D	high ... low momentum (for change) [142		D	Resourcing [142]
119	high ... low ownership [142,143]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	D	high ... low ownership [142,143]		D	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
		Values / Beliefs [143]	D			D	Values / Beliefs [143]
		Trust [149]	D			D	Trust [149]
120	high ... low performance [149	Attitude [145,147]	E	high ... low performance [149		E	Attitude [145,147]
121	high ... low personal interest [147	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E	high ... low personal interest [147		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
126	high ... low personal involvement [142,143,145,146,14	Context [142,143,144,146	E	high ... low personal involvement [142,143,145,146,14		E	Context [142,143,144,146
130	high ... low political priority (of initiative) [146,148]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	high ... low political priority (of initiative) [146,148]		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]
		Location of Responsibility [146,147,145	E			E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145
		Cooperation [142,149]	D			D	Cooperation [142,149]
132	high ... low politico-administrative cooperation [149]	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145	D	high ... low politico-administrative cooperation [149]		D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145
133	high ... low power [146	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145	E	high ... low power [146,149		D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145
218	strong ... weak power [149	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E	high ... low pressure for change [148		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
134	high ... low pressure for change [148	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145	E	high ... low resourcefulness (of leader) [145		E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145
135	high ... low resourcefulness (of leader) [145	Attitude [145,147]	E	high ... low sense of pride [147		E	Attitude [145,147]
137	high ... low sense of pride [147	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145	E	Trust [147,149]		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145
138	high ... low trust [147	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E	high ... low visibility of policy [148		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
141	high ... low visibility of policy [148	Trust [149]	D			D	Trust [149]
142	high ... low willingness to risk [149	Attitude [145,147]	E			E	Attitude [145,147]
252	willingness ... unwillingness to risk [145]	Cooperation [142,149]	E			E	Cooperation [142,149]
143	high ... low willingness to share information [145	Strategy [142,148]	E	holistic ... incomplete approach [148		E	Strategy [142,148]
144	holistic ... incomplete approach [148	Approach [143,144,145,147	E	incentivised ... unincentivised resources [145		E	Approach [143,144,145,147
145	incentivised ... unincentivised resources [145	Context [142,143,144,146	E	inert ... active organisational environment [14		E	Context [142,143,144,146
146	inert ... active organisational environment [14	Attitude [145,147]	I	inflexible ... flexible style [145		I	Attitude [145,147]
147	inflexible ... flexible style [145	Networks [145]	E	influential ... powerless [145		E	Networks [145]
148	influential ... powerless [145	Context [142,143,144,146	E	innovative ... cliché policy [144		E	Context [142,143,144,146
149	innovative ... cliché policy [144	Role Delineation [146]	I	interference ... intervention [145		I	Role Delineation [146]
150	interference ... intervention [146]	Resourcing [142]	E	internal ... external use (of resources) [142		E	Resourcing [142]
151	internal ... external use (of resources) [142	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E			E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
207	strong ... weak belief (in principles/outcomes) [142	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E			E	Values / Beliefs [143,145]
156	intrinsic ... indifferent belief (in policy) [143,144,146,147]	Values / Beliefs [143,145]	E			E	Values / Beliefs [143,145]
		Enthusiasm [146,147]	E	intrinsic ... indifferent belief (in policy) [142,143,144,146,147]		E	Enthusiasm [146,147]
		Location of Responsibility [146,147,145	E	knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable (leader) [14		E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145
157	knowledgeable ... unknowledgeable (leader) [14	Leadership [149]	E	legitimate ... illegitimate mandate [145		E	Leadership [149]
158	legitimate ... illegitimate mandate [145	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E	long-term ... short-lived [145		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
159	long-term ... short-lived [145	Stakeholder Involvement [144]	E	long-term ... short-lived consultation [144		E	Stakeholder Involvement [144]
160	long-term ... short-lived consultation [144	Attitude [145,147]	E	long-term ... short-lived determination (tenacity) [14		E	Attitude [145,147]
161	long-term ... short-lived determination (tenacity) [14	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145	D	low ... high resistance [147		D	Location of Responsibility [146,147,145
162	low ... high resistance [147	Values / Beliefs [143]	E	matching ... contrasting personal values [143		E	Values / Beliefs [143]
163	matching ... contrasting personal values [143	Management Style [145]	E	methodical ... unstructured approach [145		E	Management Style [145]
164	methodical ... unstructured approach [145	Role Delineation [146]	D	objective ... subjective intervention [145		D	Role Delineation [146]
165	objective ... subjective intervention [145	Planning [144,148,149]	E	on-going ... short-lived [144,149		E	Planning [144,148,149]
167	on-going ... short-lived [144,149	Context [142,143,144,146	E			E	Context [142,143,144,146
168	open-minded ... narrow-minded mentality [14	Attitude [145,147]	I			E	Attitude [145,147]
205	stagnant ... progressive mentality [145]	Attitude [145,147]	E			E	Attitude [145,147]
169	optimistic ... fatalistic disposition [145	Management Style [145]	E	optimistic ... fatalistic disposition [145]		E	Management Style [145]
178	positive ... negative disposition [145]	Attitude [145,147]	E	persistent ... wavering determination (tenacity) [14		E	Attitude [145,147]
170	persistent ... wavering determination (tenacity) [14	Networks [145]	E	personal-informal ... official-formal [145		E	Networks [145]
171	personal-informal ... official-formal [145	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E	physical ... intangible [144,145,148		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148
174	physical ... intangible [144,145,148	Enabling Support Policies [143]	E	planned ... unplanned sequential implementation (of policies		E	Enabling Support Policies [143]
175	planned ... unplanned sequential implementation (of policies	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145	E	[143]		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145
182	practical ... theoretical approach [147]	Enthusiasm [146,147]	E	practical ... theoretical approach [147]		E	Enthusiasm [146,147]
		Strategies [142]	E			E	Strategies [142]
		Context [142,143,144,146	E			E	Context [142,143,144,146
185	presence ... absence of demand [144,145	Enthusiasm [146,147]	E	presence ... absence of incentives [147		E	Enthusiasm [146,147]
186	presence ... absence of incentives [147	Planning [144,148,149]	E	proactive ... reactive (in approach) [14		E	Planning [144,148,149]
188	proactive ... reactive (in approach) [14	Planning [144,148,149	E	propitious ... inopportune timing (of activities) [143,149]		E	Planning [144,148,149
190	propitious ... inopportune timing (of activities) [143,149]	Enabling Support Policies [143]	E	propitious ... inopportune timing (of activities) [143,149]		E	Enabling Support Policies [143]
		Approach [143,144,145,147	E			E	Approach [143,144,145,147
		Planning [144,148,149]	E			E	Planning [144,148,149]
192	regular ... infrequent meetings [143,149]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145	E	related ... unrelated experience [143,14		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145
194	related ... unrelated experience [143,14	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145	E	resourceful ... unresourceful [143		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,145
195	resourceful ... unresourceful [143						

Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories				Consolidation of Properties / Dimensions and relationship to Consolidated Categories			
Index	First Pass Grouping [P/D]	Consolidated Category [C]	Relationship [P/D to C]	Relationship [P/D to C]			
				Second Pass Grouping [P/D or Category]	[C to C]	Consolidated Category [C]	
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	
197	results-oriented ... process-driven [144,147]	Approach [143,144,145,147]	E	results-oriented ... process-driven [144,147]	E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
198	rigorous ... negligent application of standards [147	Approach [143,144,145,147	E	rigorous ... negligent application of standards [147	E	Approach [143,144,145,147	
		Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	E		E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	
201	similar ... dissimilar interests (goals) [142,143]	Cooperation [142,149]	E	similar ... dissimilar interests (goals) [142,143]	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
202	skilled ... inept [143]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	E	skilled ... inept [143]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	
203	specific ... generic knowledge of context [147	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	E	specific ... generic knowledge of context [147	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	
204	staggered ... sudden implementation (of activities) [147	Approach [143,144,145,147	E	staggered ... sudden implementation (of activities) [147	E	Approach [143,144,145,147	
		Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E		E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	
		Context [142,143,144,146]	E		E	Context [142,143,144,146]	
214	strong ... weak leadership [142,143,146,147,148]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	Leadership [149]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
215	strong ... weak personal relationships [142	Cooperation [142,149]	E	strong ... weak personal relationships [142	E	Cooperation [142,149]	
225	sufficient ... insufficient motivation (incentives) [142	Resourcing [142]	E	sufficient ... insufficient motivation (incentives) [142	E	Resourcing [142]	
226	supportive ... unsupportive environment [147	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149	E	supportive ... unsupportive environment [147	E	Location of Responsibility [146,147,149	
		Cooperation [142,149	D				
228	synergistic ... individualistic group dynamic [142,143]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E		D	Cooperation [142,149	
		Attitude [145,147]	E		E	Attitude [145,147]	
231	team-oriented ... individualistic [145,147]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	team-oriented ... individualistic [142,143,145,147]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
229	tactful ... tactless [146]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	E	tactful ... tactless [146]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	
46	comprehensive ... incomplete detail (of approach) [147	Planning [144,148,149]	E				
		Planning [144,148,149]	E		E	Planning [144,148,149]	
		Approach [143,144,145,147]	E		E	Approach [143,144,145,147]	
		Strategy [142,148]	E		E	Strategy [142,148]	
237	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [144,145,147,148]	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	E	thorough ... superficial attention to detail [144,145,147,148,149]	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149]	
		Context [142,143,144,146	E		E	Context [142,143,144,146	
242	unthreatened ... threatened stakeholder interests [142,148]	Strategy [142,148]	E	unthreatened ... threatened stakeholder interests [142,148]	E	Strategy [142,148]	
245	visible ... unseen commitment [147	Enthusiasm [146,147]	E				
					E	Enthusiasm [146,147]	
248	visible ... unseen [144,145,146]	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	E	visible ... unseen [144,145,146,147]	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148]	
249	weak ... strong management skills [146	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	E	weak ... strong management skills [146	E	Personal / Team Attributes [143,144,145,146,147,148,149	
250	wide ... narrow reach (of policy) [148	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	E	wide ... narrow reach (of policy) [148	E	Commitment [142,143,144,145,146,148	
251	willing ... unwilling to assume responsibility [147	Attitude [145,147]	E	willing ... unwilling to assume responsibility [147	E	Attitude [145,147]	

Appendix 17

Selection of Research Method for Steps 1 and 2 (Project 3)

Step 1

The application of conjoint analysis was originally identified as the preferred method for short-listing the factors influencing failure and success as elicited from Projects 1 and 2 respectively. This technique involves the measurement of psychological judgments of perceived similarities or differences and choice alternatives¹². In fact, the term conjoint is a contraction of **consider jointly**¹³. The technique is primarily applied in marketing research, particularly product development/consumer behaviour studies, where interviewees are asked to consider paired attributes of a product(s) and trade off one attribute in favour of another, until a list of preferences, based on value judgements, can be derived. Applied to this research, conjoint analysis involves the elicitation of respondents' judgements of choice between paired factors of failure and success, so that a rank order of perceived importance / priority can be established between these factors.

While this technique would have brought a considerable element of rigour to Step 1 of the research process, it was not applied in practice for a number of reasons:

1. it was very difficult to describe or define the attributes of the factors (i.e., their properties and dimensions), such that these could be presented in a manner that would allow interviewees to consider them in sufficient detail to really appreciate the difference between the factors;
2. in some instances, it would be difficult to trade off factors influencing failure or success in the same manner that product attributes are traded off, because people are likely to refuse to sub-optimize on such things;
3. a large number of factors had been derived from the research of Projects 1 and 2 (26 and 21 factors respectively). Pairing these factors together would have produced 325 and 210 combinations respectively. Assuming respondents could make sensible judgements of choice at a rate of say 30 seconds per combination, each interview related to the factors of failure would take 150 minutes to conduct, while those on success would require 105 minutes each. This meant that either (i) a lot of time would have to be set aside for

¹² Source: <http://marketing.byu.edu/htmlpages/tutorials/conjoint.htm>

¹³ Source: <http://www.marketstrategies.com/itmethod/conjoinh.htm>

interviewing or research assistants would be required so that interviews could be conducted in parallel, or (ii) a limited number of interviews would have to have been conducted. The project could not secure research assistance and a small sample size was not sought given the desire to maximise the generalisability of results. Furthermore, the long duration of each interview would have likely led to interviewee fatigue and the large number of factor combinations would have accentuated the repetitive and tedious nature of this technique, thereby generating criticism and objections from interviewees.

A different technique was therefore required that would produce equally reliable results, but that would be easy to use and faster to apply, and that could involve a larger and more adequate sample of interviewees.

The chosen alternative was a survey based on the application of a questionnaire that would require respondents to critically consider the factors elicited from the previous studies and to prioritise these factors in order of perceived importance.

Step 2

Following a similar logic to that described above, the original intention of adopting the repertory grid technique (see Fransella and Bannister, 1977, Stewart and Stewart, 1981, Goffin, 1994, Goffin, 2001) for Step 2 of Project 3 had to be abandoned. Like the application of conjoint analysis, this technique would have involved the application of long interviews that were likely to lead to interviewee fatigue. It would also have required the employment of research assistance, which was neither available nor afforded. Furthermore, given the number of factors involved, it would have required a level of complexity that would have left interviewees disengaged.

Appendix 18

Sample Covering Letters and Questionnaires

Stephen Giacchino

Address: Il-Bejta
St. Nicholas Street
Marsascala, ZBR09

Tel: 21 633879
E-mail: stephen.giacchino@magnet.mt

15th April 2002

The Hon Lawrence Gonzi
Minister for Social Policy
Palazzo Ferreria
Republic Street
Valletta CMR 02

Dear Minister,

I am researching the issues influencing success and failure in the implementation of public policy in Malta. This research forms part of my studies for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration at Cranfield University in the UK. My studies are being sponsored by the Government of Malta through the Office of the Prime Minister.

As a Minister involved with implementing a wide range of policies I am confident that you will have very clear ideas as to the weight and influence of specific factors that bring about success or failure, and I would therefore like to invite you to contribute to my research.

I am administering questionnaires on success and failure, but enclose with this letter **one** 3-page questionnaire that should only take **a few MINUTES** of your time to complete. I would like to ask you to review the pre-defined list of 26 factors and, based on your experience in public administration, consider the likelihood of each factor to contribute to *failure* in the implementation of public policy. Each factor should be rated as either 'LIKELY to contribute to failure', 'MOST LIKELY to contribute to failure', or 'WILL CERTAINLY contribute to failure'.

In the context of this research, a case of failed policy implementation is one wherein Government policy is either not implemented as intended, and/or does not achieve the intended outcomes, or is not implemented at all.

In completing the questionnaire you should note that there are no right or wrong answers. The objective of the study is to elicit your perception of the degree to which the listed factors are likely to contribute to failure. **Your answers will be treated in confidence and will be used ONLY for the purpose of the research.**

The completed questionnaire can be returned to the undersigned using the self-addressed envelope enclosed with this letter. If you require any clarifications, please call me on 22982406 or 9945 1285. A response by the 22nd April 2002 would be greatly appreciated.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your assistance.

Stephen Giacchino

Stephen Giacchino

Address: Il-Bejta
St. Nicholas Street
Marsascala, ZBR09

Tel: 21 633879
E-mail: stephen.giacchino@magnet.mt

15th April 2002

Dr Godwin Grima
Permanent Secretary
Ministry for Home Affairs and the Environment
'Casa Leoni'
476, St Joseph High Road
Santa Venera HMR 18

Dear Dr Grima

I am researching the issues influencing success and failure in the implementation of public policy in Malta as part of my studies for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration at Cranfield University in the UK.

As you are one of the senior decision-makers in Government, I am confident that you will have very clear ideas as to the weight and influence of specific factors that contribute to success or failure in policy implementation. I would therefore like to invite you to contribute to my research.

I am administering questionnaires on success and failure, but enclose with this letter **one** 3-page questionnaire that should only take **a few MINUTES** of your time to complete. I would like to ask you to review the pre-defined list of 26 factors and, based on your experience in public administration, consider the likelihood of each factor to contribute to *failure* in the implementation of public policy. Each factor should be rated as either 'LIKELY to contribute to failure', 'MOST LIKELY to contribute to failure', or 'WILL CERTAINLY contribute to failure'.

In the context of this research, a case of failed policy implementation is one wherein Government policy is either not implemented as intended, and/or does not achieve the intended outcomes, or is not implemented at all.

In completing the questionnaire you should note that there are no right or wrong answers. The objective of the study is to elicit your perception of the degree to which the listed factors are likely to contribute to failure. **Your answers will be treated in confidence and will be used ONLY for the purpose of the research.**

The completed questionnaire can be returned to the undersigned using the self-addressed envelope enclosed with this letter. If you require any clarifications, please call me on 22982406 or 9945 1285. A response by the 22nd April 2002 will be greatly appreciated.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your assistance.

Stephen Giacchino

Below is a list of twenty-six (26) factors that have been suggested to influence failure in the implementation of public policy. Each factor has been defined (and where necessary qualified) to explain its underlying meaning. Your interpretation of each factor should be based on this definition.

You are kindly asked to first read through the list of factors to gain familiarity with the terms and definitions being used. Then, based on your experience in public administration, please consider the likelihood of each factor to lead to *failure* in implementation, rating each factor as either 'LIKELY to contribute to failure', 'MOST LIKELY to contribute to failure', or 'WILL CERTAINLY contribute to failure'. Please place a '✓' in the box corresponding to your chosen answer. Your responses will be held in **strict confidence** and used only for the purpose of this study.

Factor Influencing FAILURE			to contribute to Failure	MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure	WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure
(Absence of) Accountability	Defined as...	the absence of a suitable framework that holds people responsible for the tasks and duties assigned to them, and the outcomes of their performance.			
(Absence of) Administrative Will	Defined as...	a lack of visible commitment to a policy by the administrative arm of Government <i>[because of]</i> feelings of imposition, or a disbelief in the merits of the policy itself.			
(Inadequate) Capabilities	Defined as...	the lack of resourcefulness of the individuals involved in implementation, <i>[characterised by]</i> their limited experience and inadequate skills / qualifications.			
Cloning (of management practices)	Defined as...	the practice of 'replicating' traditional approaches to management, <i>[characterised by]</i> an adherence to conventional rules, norms and traditional behaviour.			
(Lack of) Collegiality	Defined as...	the absence of a friendly relationship between individuals party to an implementation programme <i>[driven by]</i> their inability or unwillingness to operate as a team.			
Conditioning	Defined as...	actions taken by senior decision makers to influence the behaviour of persons <i>[with the objective of]</i> inducing them to oppose or resist the implementation of a policy programme			
Context	Defined as...	an unproductive environment <i>[characterised by]</i> conflicting interests among politicians.			
(Lack of) Cooperation	Defined as...	the reluctance of individuals to collaborate with one another to achieve some common goal.			
(Entrenched) Customs	Defined as...	the perpetuation of established organisational systems and cultures that stifle change and innovation.			
(Lack of) Customisation	Defined as...	a standardised, rather than bespoke, approach to the implementation of policy.			

Factor Influencing FAILURE			to contribute to Failure	MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure	WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure
Divergent Goals	Defined as...	the inability to agree on a common set of goals, <i>[because of]</i> different stakeholder priorities and uncooperative behaviours.			
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	Defined as...	a group of persons working individually rather than as part of a team, <i>[because of]</i> different interests, and feelings of inequity, and imposition.			
(Lack of) Leadership	Defined as...	the inability to develop and command a following for a particular policy, <i>[because of]</i> one's ineptness, an unclear or changing vision, and/or wavering commitment.			
Management Aloofness	Defined as...	the inability or unwillingness of management to interact with subordinates and get directly involved in the implementation of a policy initiative.			
Mistrust	Defined as...	the lack of confidence in persons involved in implementation, <i>[because of]</i> different political ideologies, feelings of disloyalty and the fear of sabotage.			
Organisational Politics	Defined as...	the competitive struggle for power, <i>[driven by]</i> dissimilar stakeholder goals, feelings of threatened interests and the fear of losing control over resources.			
(Lack of policy) Ownership	Defined as...	individuals' unwillingness to assume responsibility for the policy and its implementation			
(Lack of) Participation	Defined as...	the inability or reluctance to actively engage the involvement of various stakeholders in the implementation of a policy initiative.			
(Ineffective) Planning	Defined as...	an uncoordinated and fragmented approach to implementation, that is reactive to emerging issues and imposed top-down, rather than proactive in style and developed bottom-up.			
(Absence of) Political Will	Defined as...	a lack of visible commitment to a policy by the political arm of Government			
Political Immaturity	Defined as...	the imposing attitudes and behaviour of politicians, particularly young or new Ministers / Parliamentary Secretaries, who lack experience and political savvy.			
(Low) Political Intervention	Defined as...	the absence of Ministerial involvement in the implementation and administration of policy <i>[characterised by]</i> low support and low visible participation.			
Power (Struggles)	Defined as...	the quest for authority and control over resources that alienates attention away from the management of policy and into the domain of (small 'p') politics.			

Factor Influencing FAILURE			to contribute to Failure	MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure	WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure
Resistance	Defined as...	the opposition confronting a policy initiative, <i>[because of]</i> external imposition, inadequate understanding of the policy objectives, and the fear of losing power.			
(Lack of apparent) Results	Defined as...	the tardiness and low visibility of outcomes from a policy implementation initiative.			
Role Fragmentation	Defined as...	the division of responsibility for a policy initiative among many individuals, such that there is no clarity of focus and ambiguous ownership.			

Finally, please list the factors that you have rated as 'WILL CERTAINLY contribute to failure' in order of priority, starting with that factor which you think is **the most damaging to a policy implementation initiative**. If you identified more than five (5) factors in the category 'WILL CERTAINLY contribute to failure', limit yourself to the five (5) that you consider as the most damaging to implementation.

1.	The most damaging factor to implementation is...	
2.	The second most damaging factor to implementation is...	
3.	The third most damaging factor to implementation is...	
4.	The fourth most damaging factor to implementation is...	
5.	The fifth most damaging factor to implementation is...	

THANK YOU for your Cooperation

To thank participants for their contribution, responses will be entered in a draw for a **Weekend Break** at the **Cornucopia Hotel, GOZO**. If you wish to participate, please enter your details in the table below:

Name and Surname	
Your Position in Government:	
Your e-mail address:	
Your office address:	
Your telephone and fax numbers:	

Below is a list of twenty-one (21) factors that have been suggested to influence the successful implementation of public policy. Each factor has been defined [and where necessary qualified] to explain its underlying meaning. Your interpretation of each factor should be based on this definition.

You are kindly asked to first read through the list of success factors to gain familiarity with the terms and definitions being used. Based on your experience in public administration, then rate each factor as either 'IMPORTANT', 'VERY IMPORTANT', or 'CRITICAL' for the *successful* implementation of public policy. Please place a '✓' in the box corresponding to your chosen answer. Your response will be held in **strict confidence** and used only for the purpose of this study.

SUCCESS Factor			for success	Very Important for success	Critical for success
(Effective) Approach	Defined as...	a well-researched and structured process to implementation, <i>[characterised by]</i> clarity of vision, thorough attention to detail and fast decision-making.			
(Positive) Attitude	Defined as...	an optimistic, team-oriented disposition and a persistent determination to succeed.			
Commitment	Defined as...	a tangible and visible political and administrative will to deliver policy.			
(Institutional) Context	Defined as...	the absence of existing organisational structures and cultures, and unthreatened stakeholder interests.			
Cooperation	Defined as...	collaborative behaviour between stakeholders to a policy, <i>[characterised by]</i> goal alignment, the development of strong personal relationships, and a high willingness to share skills and information.			
Demand	Defined as...	people's perceived need and desire for a new policy initiative.			
(Effective) Planning	Defined as...	the detailed organisation of activities.			
(Effective) Resourcing	Defined as...	the focused deployment of skilled and motivated resources in quantities sufficient to provide a critical mass.			
Enthusiasm	Defined as...	a heightened level of personal / team motivation, <i>[characterised by]</i> an intrinsic belief in the policy, the presence of incentives and visible political support.			
Leadership	Defined as...	the ability to develop and command a following, <i>[characterised by]</i> clarity of vision and a legitimate mandate.			
Location of Political Responsibility	Defined as...	the power emanating from the place or position that holds political ownership for the policy, and its ability to command authority over the deployment of resources.			

SUCCESS Factor			for success	Very Important for success	Critical for success
Management Style	Defined as...	the enthusiastic and optimistic behaviour of management, and their ability to adapt to prevailing circumstances.			
Ownership	Defined as...	a perceived state of belongingness to, and responsibility for, a policy implementation programme.			
Project Team Dynamic	Defined as...	the presence of a group of individuals with different but complimentary skills and expertise, working collaboratively towards a common goal.			
(Timeliness of) Results	Defined as...	outcomes that are consistent with a policy initiative, <i>[characterised by]</i> delivery in stages and as early as possible.			
Role Delineation	Defined as...	the clear demarcation of responsibility between individuals, particularly between politicians and civil servants.			
Skills and Abilities	Defined as...	the capability and resourcefulness of individuals involved in implementation, <i>[characterised by]</i> qualities such as extensive experience, adequate training and qualifications, and a practical approach to policy management.			
Stakeholder Involvement	Defined as...	broad and active consultations with persons or entities likely to affect, or be affected by, the policy.			
Trust	Defined as...	a high degree of confidence in persons involved in the implementation initiative, <i>[characterised by]</i> the belief that individuals will not sabotage the initiative, or cause deliberate harm.			
(Use of) Networks	Defined as...	utilising one's personal-informal relationship with others to gain access to, or control over, resources.			
Values / Beliefs	Defined as...	people's conviction of the 'rightness' or 'goodness' of a policy initiative, because it is consistent with their personal values.			

continued...

Finally, please list the factors that you have rated as 'CRITICAL' in order of priority, starting with that factor which you think is **the most difficult to manage or obtain**. If you identified more than five (5) factors as 'CRITICAL', limit yourself to the five (5) that are the most difficult to manage or obtain.

1.	The most difficult success factor to manage or obtain is...	
2.	The second most difficult success factor to manage of obtain is...	
3.	The third most difficult success factor to manage of obtain is...	
4.	The fourth most difficult success factor to manage of obtain is...	
5.	The fifth most difficult success factor to manage of obtain is...	

THANK YOU for your Cooperation

To thank participants for their contribution, responses will be entered in a draw for a **Weekend Break** at the **Cornucopia Hotel, GOZO**. If you wish to participate, please enter your details in the table below:

Name and Surname	
Your Position in Government:	
Your e-mail address:	
Your office address:	
Your telephone and fax numbers:	

Frequency Counts and Priority Ranking by Factor Category & Actor Group

Failure - All Respondents
No of Replies

74

Factor Influencing FAILURE		LIKELY to contribute to Failure		MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure		WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure		LEFT Out
(Absence of) Accountability	Defined as...	16	22%	23	31%	34	46%	1
(Absence of) Administrative Will	Defined as...	14	19%	24	32%	36	49%	0
(Inadequate) Capabilities	Defined as...	21	28%	34	46%	18	24%	1
Cloning (of management practices)	Defined as...	49	66%	17	23%	7	9%	1
(Lack of) Collegiality	Defined as...	25	34%	33	45%	16	22%	0
Conditioning	Defined as...	15	20%	38	51%	21	28%	0
Context	Defined as...	25	34%	28	38%	20	27%	1
(Lack of) Cooperation	Defined as...	18	24%	30	41%	26	35%	0
(Entrenched) Customs	Defined as...	24	32%	35	47%	14	19%	1
(Lack of) Customisation	Defined as...	46	62%	21	28%	6	8%	1
Divergent Goals	Defined as...	9	12%	35	47%	30	41%	0
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	Defined as...	15	20%	42	57%	17	23%	0
(Lack of) Leadership	Defined as...	4	5%	28	38%	42	57%	0
Management Aloofness	Defined as...	25	34%	32	43%	11	15%	0
Mistrust	Defined as...	35	47%	24	32%	15	20%	0
Organisational Politics	Defined as...	19	26%	37	50%	18	24%	0
(Lack of policy) Ownership	Defined as...	12	16%	26	35%	36	49%	0
(Lack of) Participation	Defined as...	30	41%	32	43%	11	15%	1
(Ineffective) Planning	Defined as...	19	26%	37	50%	18	24%	0
(Absence of) Political Will	Defined as...	16	22%	19	26%	39	53%	0
Political Immaturity	Defined as...	30	41%	31	42%	13	18%	0
(Low) Political Intervention	Defined as...	29	39%	36	49%	8	11%	1
Power (Struggles)	Defined as...	23	31%	37	50%	14	19%	0
Resistance	Defined as...	18	24%	34	46%	21	28%	1
(Lack of apparent) Results	Defined as...	38	51%	29	39%	7	9%	0
Role Fragmentation	Defined as...	18	24%	37	50%	18	24%	1

Most Damaging	2nd Most Damaging	3rd Most Damaging	4th Most Damaging	5th Most Damaging
9	12	3	4	3
7	2	8	9	4
3	3	1	2	1
1	1	1	0	0
1	3	0	0	2
2	3	2	3	1
0	3	1	3	4
2	2	3	1	3
0	2	1	2	3
0	0	0	1	1
2	0	7	7	4
0	2	2	2	1
16	5	7	3	5
0	1	0	2	2
0	3	3	2	0
1	3	2	1	2
1	8	8	6	4
0	1	1	2	1
2	5	4	5	3
21	2	6	1	2
0	1	1	0	4
1	3	0	1	1
2	2	4	1	4
0	5	4	4	1
1	0	2	1	0
2	2	1	5	3

Failure - Politicians

No of Replies

5

Factor Influencing FAILURE		LIKELY to contribute to Failure		MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure		WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure		LEFT Out	Most Damaging	2nd Most Damaging	3rd Most Damaging	4th Most Damaging	5th Most Damaging
(Absence of) Accountability	Defined as...	1	20%	2	40%	1	20%	1	1	0	0	0	0
(Absence of) Administrative Will	Defined as...	2	40%	1	20%	2	40%	0	1	0	0	0	0
(Inadequate) Capabilities	Defined as...	3	60%	2	40%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cloning (of management practices)	Defined as...	4	80%	1	20%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Lack of) Collegiality	Defined as...	2	40%	3	60%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Conditioning	Defined as...	2	40%	3	60%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Context	Defined as...	4	80%	1	20%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Lack of) Cooperation	Defined as...	1	20%	3	60%	1	20%	0	0	1	0	0	0
(Entrenched) Customs	Defined as...	1	20%	3	60%	1	20%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Lack of) Customisation	Defined as...	3	60%	2	40%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	1
Divergent Goals	Defined as...	2	40%	3	60%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	Defined as...	2	40%	2	40%	1	20%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Lack of) Leadership	Defined as...	0	0%	2	40%	3	60%	0	2	0	1	0	0
Management Aloofness	Defined as...	2	40%	2	40%	1	20%	0	0	0	0	0	1
Mistrust	Defined as...	3	60%	2	40%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Organisational Politics	Defined as...	2	40%	1	20%	2	40%	0	0	0	0	1	0
(Lack of policy) Ownership	Defined as...	0	0%	3	60%	2	40%	0	0	1	1	0	0
(Lack of) Participation	Defined as...	2	40%	2	40%	1	20%	0	0	1	0	0	0
(Ineffective) Planning	Defined as...	2	40%	3	60%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Absence of) Political Will	Defined as...	1	20%	0	0%	4	80%	0	1	1	2	0	0
Political Immaturity	Defined as...	3	60%	2	40%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Low) Political Intervention	Defined as...	1	20%	3	60%	1	20%	0	0	1	0	0	0
Power (Struggles)	Defined as...	1	20%	3	60%	1	20%	0	0	0	1	0	0
Resistance	Defined as...	3	60%	2	40%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Lack of apparent) Results	Defined as...	3	60%	2	40%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Role Fragmentation	Defined as...	1	20%	2	40%	2	40%	0	0	0	0	2	0

Failure - Civil Servants
No of Replies

45

Factor Influencing FAILURE		LIKELY to contribute to Failure		MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure		WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure		LEFT Out
(Absence of) Accountability	Defined as...	9	20%	15	33%	21	47%	0
(Absence of) Administrative Will	Defined as...	8	18%	16	36%	21	47%	0
(Inadequate) Capabilities	Defined as...	11	24%	23	51%	10	22%	1
Cloning (of management practices)	Defined as...	30	67%	10	22%	4	9%	1
(Lack of) Collegiality	Defined as...	13	29%	22	49%	10	22%	0
Conditioning	Defined as...	7	16%	22	49%	16	36%	0
Context	Defined as...	14	31%	18	40%	12	27%	1
(Lack of) Cooperation	Defined as...	12	27%	20	44%	13	29%	0
(Entrenched) Customs	Defined as...	19	42%	19	42%	7	16%	0
(Lack of) Customisation	Defined as...	29	64%	14	31%	2	4%	0
Divergent Goals	Defined as...	4	9%	21	47%	20	44%	0
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	Defined as...	9	20%	26	58%	10	22%	0
(Lack of) Leadership	Defined as...	3	7%	22	49%	20	44%	0
Management Aloofness	Defined as...	15	33%	21	47%	3	7%	0
Mistrust	Defined as...	22	49%	12	27%	11	24%	0
Organisational Politics	Defined as...	9	20%	26	58%	10	22%	0
(Lack of policy) Ownership	Defined as...	9	20%	18	40%	18	40%	0
(Lack of) Participation	Defined as...	21	47%	14	31%	9	20%	1
(Ineffective) Planning	Defined as...	10	22%	26	58%	9	20%	0
(Absence of) Political Will	Defined as...	12	27%	11	24%	22	49%	0
Political Immaturity	Defined as...	16	36%	21	47%	8	18%	0
(Low) Political Intervention	Defined as...	20	44%	23	51%	2	4%	0
Power (Struggles)	Defined as...	14	31%	20	44%	11	24%	0
Resistance	Defined as...	9	20%	22	49%	14	31%	0
(Lack of apparent) Results	Defined as...	25	56%	14	31%	6	13%	0
Role Fragmentation	Defined as...	12	27%	24	53%	8	18%	1

Most Damaging	2nd Most Damaging	3rd Most Damaging	4th Most Damaging	5th Most Damaging
7	7	2	2	2
4	2	4	5	2
2	2	1	1	1
1	0	1	0	0
0	3	0	0	2
2	2	2	3	1
0	2	0	3	1
2	0	2	0	2
0	1	0	1	2
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	7	6	3
0	1	2	2	0
8	1	4	2	2
0	0	0	0	1
0	3	3	1	0
1	3	1	0	2
0	5	1	3	4
0	0	1	2	0
0	3	1	4	2
14	1	3	1	1
0	1	0	0	3
1	1	0	0	0
1	2	3	1	3
0	4	4	3	1
0	0	2	1	0
1	1	0	2	2

Failure - Consultants
No of Replies

10

Factor Influencing FAILURE		LIKELY to contribute to Failure		MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure		WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure		LEFT Out
(Absence of) Accountability	Defined as...	1	10%	3	30%	6	60%	0
(Absence of) Administrative Will	Defined as...	0	0%	2	20%	8	80%	0
(Inadequate) Capabilities	Defined as...	4	40%	3	30%	3	30%	0
Cloning (of management practices)	Defined as...	6	60%	3	30%	1	10%	0
(Lack of) Collegiality	Defined as...	5	50%	1	10%	4	40%	0
Conditioning	Defined as...	2	20%	5	50%	3	30%	0
Context	Defined as...	2	20%	2	20%	6	60%	0
(Lack of) Cooperation	Defined as...	3	30%	4	40%	3	30%	0
(Entrenched) Customs	Defined as...	3	30%	5	50%	1	10%	1
(Lack of) Customisation	Defined as...	7	70%	2	20%	1	10%	0
Divergent Goals	Defined as...	1	10%	4	40%	5	50%	0
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	Defined as...	3	30%	5	50%	2	20%	0
(Lack of) Leadership	Defined as...	0	0%	2	20%	8	80%	0
Management Aloofness	Defined as...	4	40%	4	40%	2	20%	0
Mistrust	Defined as...	4	40%	4	40%	2	20%	0
Organisational Politics	Defined as...	4	40%	2	20%	4	40%	0
(Lack of policy) Ownership	Defined as...	2	20%	1	10%	7	70%	0
(Lack of) Participation	Defined as...	2	20%	8	80%	0	0%	0
(Ineffective) Planning	Defined as...	4	40%	3	30%	3	30%	0
(Absence of) Political Will	Defined as...	0	0%	2	20%	8	80%	0
Political Immaturity	Defined as...	6	60%	3	30%	1	10%	0
(Low) Political Intervention	Defined as...	1	10%	5	50%	4	40%	0
Power (Struggles)	Defined as...	3	30%	5	50%	2	20%	0
Resistance	Defined as...	2	20%	4	40%	4	40%	0
(Lack of apparent) Results	Defined as...	5	50%	5	50%	0	0%	0
Role Fragmentation	Defined as...	4	40%	3	30%	3	30%	0

Most Damaging	2nd Most Damaging	3rd Most Damaging	4th Most Damaging	5th Most Damaging
0	3	0	2	0
1	0	1	4	1
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	1	1	0	2
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0
1	1	1	1	2
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0
0	0	1	0	0
0	1	2	2	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	2	2	0	0
6	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	1
0	1	0	0	1
1	0	0	0	1
0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	0

Failure - Anonymous Respondents
No of Replies **14**

Factor Influencing FAILURE		LIKELY to contribute to Failure		MOST LIKELY to contribute to Failure		WILL CERTAINLY contribute to Failure		LEFT Out	Most Damaging	2nd Most Damaging	3rd Most Damaging	4th Most Damaging	5th Most Damaging
(Absence of) Accountability	Defined as...	5	36%	3	21%	6	43%	0	1	2	1	0	1
(Absence of) Administrative Will	Defined as...	4	29%	5	36%	5	36%	0	1	0	3	0	1
(Inadequate) Capabilities	Defined as...	3	21%	6	43%	5	36%	0	1	1	0	1	0
Cloning (of management practices)	Defined as...	9	64%	3	21%	2	14%	0	0	1	0	0	0
(Lack of) Collegiality	Defined as...	5	36%	7	50%	2	14%	0	1	0	0	0	
Conditioning	Defined as...	4	29%	8	57%	2	14%	0	0	1	0	0	0
Context	Defined as...	5	36%	7	50%	2	14%	0	0	0	0	0	1
(Lack of) Cooperation	Defined as...	2	14%	3	21%	9	64%	0	0	1	1	1	1
(Entrenched) Customs	Defined as...	1	7%	8	57%	5	36%	0	0	1	1	1	1
(Lack of) Customisation	Defined as...	7	50%	3	21%	3	21%	1	0	0	0	1	0
Divergent Goals	Defined as...	2	14%	7	50%	5	36%	0	1	0	0	1	0
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	Defined as...	1	7%	9	64%	4	29%	0	0	1	0	0	1
(Lack of) Leadership	Defined as...	1	7%	2	14%	11	79%	0	5	3	1	0	1
Management Aloofness	Defined as...	4	29%	5	36%	5	36%	0	0	1	0	2	0
Mistrust	Defined as...	6	43%	6	43%	2	14%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Organisational Politics	Defined as...	4	29%	8	57%	2	14%	0	0	0	0	0	0
(Lack of policy) Ownership	Defined as...	1	7%	4	29%	9	64%	0	1	1	4	1	0
(Lack of) Participation	Defined as...	5	36%	8	57%	1	7%	0	0	0	0	0	1
(Ineffective) Planning	Defined as...	3	21%	5	36%	6	43%	0	2	0	1	1	1
(Absence of) Political Will	Defined as...	3	21%	6	43%	5	36%	0	0	0	0	0	1
Political Immaturity	Defined as...	5	36%	5	36%	4	29%	0	0	0	1	0	0
(Low) Political Intervention	Defined as...	7	50%	5	36%	1	7%	1	0	0	0	1	0
Power (Struggles)	Defined as...	5	36%	9	64%	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0
Resistance	Defined as...	4	29%	6	43%	3	21%	1	0	0	0	1	0
(Lack of apparent) Results	Defined as...	5	36%	8	57%	1	7%	0	1	0	0	0	0
Role Fragmentation	Defined as...	1	7%	8	57%	5	36%	0	0	1	0	1	1

Success - All Respondents

No of Replies

62

SUCCESS Factor		Important for success		Very Important for success		Critical for success		Left Out
(Effective) Approach	Defined as...	11	18%	25	40%	26	42%	0
(Positive) Attitude	Defined as...	11	18%	36	58%	14	23%	1
Commitment	Defined as...	9	15%	17	27%	36	58%	0
(Institutional) Context	Defined as...	45	73%	11	18%	4	6%	2
Cooperation	Defined as...	18	29%	28	45%	16	26%	0
Demand	Defined as...	46	74%	9	15%	6	10%	1
(Effective) Planning	Defined as...	14	23%	30	48%	18	29%	0
(Effective) Resourcing	Defined as...	14	23%	31	50%	17	27%	0
Enthusiasm	Defined as...	12	19%	33	53%	17	27%	0
Leadership	Defined as...	6	10%	19	31%	37	60%	0
Location of Political Responsibility	Defined as...	15	24%	24	39%	22	35%	1
Management Style	Defined as...	14	23%	36	58%	12	19%	0
Ownership	Defined as...	11	18%	30	48%	21	34%	0
Project Team Dynamic	Defined as...	19	31%	31	50%	12	19%	0
(Timeliness of) Results	Defined as...	18	29%	36	58%	7	11%	1
Role Delineation	Defined as...	17	27%	24	39%	20	32%	1
Skills and Abilities	Defined as...	13	21%	31	50%	18	29%	0
Stakeholder Involvement	Defined as...	16	26%	25	40%	21	34%	0
Trust	Defined as...	22	35%	25	40%	15	24%	0
(Use of) Networks	Defined as...	37	60%	21	34%	4	6%	0
Values / Beliefs	Defined as...	41	66%	15	24%	5	8%	1

Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	2nd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	3rd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	4th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	5th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain
6	6	3	1	4
4	4	1	2	1
7	9	4	7	6
0	0	1	1	0
1	2	3	3	3
2	0	0	0	0
2	2	4	4	1
5	1	3	2	4
1	1	2	3	5
8	7	10	2	1
6	3	5	0	3
0	0	6	3	0
3	2	6	6	2
2	2	2	4	1
1	0	1	1	2
7	6	1	1	1
2	5	2	3	2
2	9	0	5	3
2	3	4	3	2
0	0	0	0	1
1	0	1	0	3

Success - Politicians

No of Replies

4

SUCCESS Factor		Important for success		Very Important for success		Critical for success		Left Out
(Effective) Approach	Defined as...	0	0%	1	25%	3	75%	0
(Positive) Attitude	Defined as...	0	0%	3	75%	1	25%	0
Commitment	Defined as...	0	0%	1	25%	3	75%	0
(Institutional) Context	Defined as...	2	50%	2	50%	0	0%	0
Cooperation	Defined as...	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0
Demand	Defined as...	4	100%	0	0%	0	0%	0
(Effective) Planning	Defined as...	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0
(Effective) Resourcing	Defined as...	2	50%	2	50%	0	0%	0
Enthusiasm	Defined as...	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0
Leadership	Defined as...	0	0%	3	75%	1	25%	0
Location of Political Responsibility	Defined as...	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0
Management Style	Defined as...	0	0%	3	75%	1	25%	0
Ownership	Defined as...	0	0%	3	75%	1	25%	0
Project Team Dynamic	Defined as...	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0
(Timeliness of) Results	Defined as...	1	25%	3	75%	0	0%	0
Role Delineation	Defined as...	1	25%	1	25%	1	25%	1
Skills and Abilities	Defined as...	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0
Stakeholder Involvement	Defined as...	0	0%	4	100%	0	0%	0
Trust	Defined as...	1	25%	2	50%	1	25%	0
(Use of) Networks	Defined as...	2	50%	1	25%	1	25%	0
Values / Beliefs	Defined as...	2	50%	2	50%	0	0%	0

Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	2nd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	3rd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	4th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	5th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain
2	1	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0
0	2	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	1
1	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0
0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0

Success - Civil Servants

No of Replies

39

SUCCESS Factor		Important for success		Very Important for success		Critical for success		Left Out
(Effective) Approach	Defined as...	9	23%	17	44%	13	33%	0
(Positive) Attitude	Defined as...	8	21%	20	51%	10	26%	1
Commitment	Defined as...	7	18%	12	31%	20	51%	0
(Institutional) Context	Defined as...	31	79%	5	13%	2	5%	1
Cooperation	Defined as...	13	33%	17	44%	9	23%	0
Demand	Defined as...	29	74%	6	15%	3	8%	1
(Effective) Planning	Defined as...	9	23%	20	51%	10	26%	0
(Effective) Resourcing	Defined as...	8	21%	19	49%	12	31%	0
Enthusiasm	Defined as...	7	18%	21	54%	11	28%	0
Leadership	Defined as...	5	13%	11	28%	23	59%	0
Location of Political Responsibility	Defined as...	10	26%	16	41%	12	31%	1
Management Style	Defined as...	8	21%	21	54%	10	26%	0
Ownership	Defined as...	7	18%	17	44%	15	38%	0
Project Team Dynamic	Defined as...	14	36%	18	46%	7	18%	0
(Timeliness of) Results	Defined as...	13	33%	20	51%	5	13%	1
Role Delineation	Defined as...	9	23%	14	36%	16	41%	0
Skills and Abilities	Defined as...	9	23%	21	54%	9	23%	0
Stakeholder Involvement	Defined as...	12	31%	12	31%	15	38%	0
Trust	Defined as...	13	33%	18	46%	8	21%	0
(Use of) Networks	Defined as...	26	67%	12	31%	1	3%	0
Values / Beliefs	Defined as...	26	67%	10	26%	3	8%	0

Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	2nd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	3rd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	4th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	5th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain
3	3	1	1	2
3	4	0	1	0
3	5	3	4	3
0	0	1	1	0
1	1	1	2	1
1	0	0	0	0
1	1	3	1	1
5	1	2	1	2
1	0	1	2	3
2	4	8	2	1
3	2	2	0	2
0	0	5	2	0
2	1	4	5	2
2	2	0	1	0
1	0	1	1	2
6	5	1	1	0
1	3	2	1	0
1	5	0	4	3
2	2	1	1	1
0	0	0	0	1
1	0	0	0	3

Success - Consultants
No of Replies
11

SUCCESS Factor		Important for success		Very Important for success		Critical for success		Left Out
(Effective) Approach	Defined as...	1	9%	5	45%	5	45%	0
(Positive) Attitude	Defined as...	2	18%	8	73%	1	9%	0
Commitment	Defined as...	0	0%	2	18%	9	82%	0
(Institutional) Context	Defined as...	7	64%	2	18%	2	18%	0
Cooperation	Defined as...	3	27%	5	45%	3	27%	0
Demand	Defined as...	8	73%	1	9%	2	18%	0
(Effective) Planning	Defined as...	3	27%	5	45%	3	27%	0
(Effective) Resourcing	Defined as...	3	27%	6	55%	2	18%	0
Enthusiasm	Defined as...	1	9%	7	64%	3	27%	0
Leadership	Defined as...	0	0%	2	18%	9	82%	0
Location of Political Responsibility	Defined as...	1	9%	3	27%	7	64%	0
Management Style	Defined as...	4	36%	6	55%	1	9%	0
Ownership	Defined as...	2	18%	6	55%	3	27%	0
Project Team Dynamic	Defined as...	2	18%	7	64%	2	18%	0
(Timeliness of) Results	Defined as...	2	18%	7	64%	2	18%	0
Role Delineation	Defined as...	4	36%	5	45%	2	18%	0
Skills and Abilities	Defined as...	2	18%	4	36%	5	45%	0
Stakeholder Involvement	Defined as...	3	27%	5	45%	3	27%	0
Trust	Defined as...	4	36%	2	18%	5	45%	0
(Use of) Networks	Defined as...	5	45%	4	36%	2	18%	0
Values / Beliefs	Defined as...	9	82%	1	9%	1	9%	0

Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	2nd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	3rd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	4th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	5th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain
0	2	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	1
3	2	1	1	2
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	1	0
0	0	0	1	1
0	0	1	0	1
4	1	2	0	0
3	1	2	0	0
0	0	0	1	0
0	1	1	1	0
0	0	1	2	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	1	0	0	1
0	0	0	2	1
0	3	0	0	0
0	0	3	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0

Success - Anonymous Respondents

No of Replies

8

SUCCESS Factor		Important for success		Very Important for success		Critical for success		Left Out
(Effective) Approach	Defined as...	1	13%	2	25%	5	63%	0
(Positive) Attitude	Defined as...	1	13%	5	63%	2	25%	0
Commitment	Defined as...	2	25%	2	25%	4	50%	0
(Institutional) Context	Defined as...	5	63%	2	25%	0	0%	1
Cooperation	Defined as...	1	13%	4	50%	3	38%	0
Demand	Defined as...	5	63%	2	25%	1	13%	0
(Effective) Planning	Defined as...	1	13%	3	38%	4	50%	0
(Effective) Resourcing	Defined as...	1	13%	4	50%	3	38%	0
Enthusiasm	Defined as...	3	38%	3	38%	2	25%	0
Leadership	Defined as...	1	13%	3	38%	4	50%	0
Location of Political Responsibility	Defined as...	3	38%	3	38%	2	25%	0
Management Style	Defined as...	2	25%	6	75%	0	0%	0
Ownership	Defined as...	2	25%	4	50%	2	25%	0
Project Team Dynamic	Defined as...	2	25%	4	50%	2	25%	0
(Timeliness of) Results	Defined as...	2	25%	6	75%	0	0%	0
Role Delineation	Defined as...	3	38%	4	50%	1	13%	0
Skills and Abilities	Defined as...	1	13%	4	50%	3	38%	0
Stakeholder Involvement	Defined as...	1	13%	4	50%	3	38%	0
Trust	Defined as...	4	50%	3	38%	1	13%	0
(Use of) Networks	Defined as...	4	50%	4	50%	0	0%	0
Values / Beliefs	Defined as...	4	50%	2	25%	1	13%	1

Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	2nd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	3rd Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	4th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain	5th Most Difficult to Manage / Obtain
1	0	2	0	1
1	0	0	1	0
1	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	2	0	1
1	0	0	0	0
0	1	1	2	0
0	0	1	0	1
0	1	0	1	0
1	2	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	1
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	1	0	0
0	0	0	1	1
0	0	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	0
0	2	0	0	1
1	1	0	1	0
0	1	0	0	0
0	0	0	0	0
0	0	1	0	0

Appendix 20

Data Sorting

All Actor Groups

Factor Influencing FAILURE	C D E			W/C as a % of all respondents
	LIKELY ... to contribute to Failure	MOST LIKELY ...	WILL CERTAINLY ..	
(Lack of) Leadership	4	28	42	57%
(Absence of) Political Will	16	19	39	53%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	12	26	36	49%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	14	24	36	49%
(Absence of) Accountability	16	23	34	46%
Divergent Goals	9	35	30	41%
(Lack of) Cooperation	18	30	26	35%
Conditioning	15	38	21	28%
Resistance	18	34	21	28%
Context	25	28	20	27%
Organisational Politics	19	37	18	24%
(Ineffective) Planning	19	37	18	24%
Role Fragmentation	18	37	18	24%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	21	34	18	24%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	15	42	17	23%
(Lack of) Collegiality	25	33	16	22%
Mistrust	35	24	15	20%
Power (Struggles)	23	37	14	19%
(Entrenched) Customs	24	35	14	19%
Political Immaturity	30	31	13	18%
Management Aloofness	25	32	11	15%
(Lack of) Participation	30	32	11	15%
(Low) Political Intervention	29	36	8	11%
(Lack of apparent) Results	38	29	7	9%
Cloning (of management practices)	49	17	7	9%
(Lack of) Customisation	46	21	6	8%

Total Number of Replies

Factor Influencing FAILURE	74 H I					M	
	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
(Lack of) Leadership	16	5	7	3	5	36	49%
(Absence of) Political Will	21	2	6	1	2	32	43%
(Absence of) Accountability	9	12	3	4	3	31	42%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	7	2	8	9	4	30	41%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	1	8	8	6	4	27	36%
Divergent Goals	2	0	7	7	4	20	27%
(Ineffective) Planning	2	5	4	5	3	19	26%
Resistance	0	5	4	4	1	14	19%
Power (Struggles)	2	2	4	1	4	13	18%
Role Fragmentation	2	2	1	5	3	13	18%
Conditioning	2	3	2	3	1	11	15%
(Lack of) Cooperation	2	2	3	1	3	11	15%
Context	0	3	1	3	4	11	15%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	3	3	1	2	1	10	14%
Organisational Politics	1	3	2	1	2	9	12%
Mistrust	0	3	3	2	0	8	11%
(Entrenched) Customs	0	2	1	2	3	8	11%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	2	2	2	1	7	9%
(Lack of) Collegiality	1	3	0	0	2	6	8%
(Low) Political Intervention	1	3	0	1	1	6	8%
Political Immaturity	0	1	1	0	4	6	8%
(Lack of) Participation	0	1	1	2	1	5	7%
Management Aloofness	0	1	0	2	2	5	7%
(Lack of apparent) Results	1	0	2	1	0	4	5%
Cloning (of management practices)	1	1	1	0	0	3	4%
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	1	1	2	3%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)

Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Politicians

Factor Influencing FAILURE	C D E			WC as a % of all respondents
	LIKELY ... to contribute to Failure	MOST LIKELY ...	WILL CERTAINLY..	
(Absence of) Political Will	1	0	4	80%
(Lack of) Leadership	0	2	3	60%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	0	3	2	40%
Role Fragmentation	1	2	2	40%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	2	1	2	40%
Organisational Politics	2	1	2	40%
(Lack of) Cooperation	1	3	1	20%
(Entrenched) Customs	1	3	1	20%
(Low) Political Intervention	1	3	1	20%
Power (Struggles)	1	3	1	20%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	2	2	1	20%
Management Aloofness	2	2	1	20%
(Lack of) Participation	2	2	1	20%
(Absence of) Accountability	1	2	1	20%
(Lack of) Collegiality	2	3	0	0%
Conditioning	2	3	0	0%
Divergent Goals	2	3	0	0%
(Ineffective) Planning	2	3	0	0%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	3	2	0	0%
(Lack of) Customisation	3	2	0	0%
Mistrust	3	2	0	0%
Political Immaturity	3	2	0	0%
Resistance	3	2	0	0%
(Lack of apparent) Results	3	2	0	0%
Cloning (of management practices)	4	1	0	0%
Context	4	1	0	0%

Total Number of Replies

Factor Influencing FAILURE	5 H I					M	
	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
(Absence of) Political Will	1	1	2	0	0	4	80%
(Lack of) Leadership	2	0	1	0	0	3	60%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	0	1	1	0	0	2	40%
Role Fragmentation	0	0	0	2	0	2	40%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	1	0	0	0	0	1	20%
(Absence of) Accountability	1	0	0	0	0	1	20%
(Lack of) Cooperation	0	1	0	0	0	1	20%
(Lack of) Participation	0	1	0	0	0	1	20%
(Low) Political Intervention	0	1	0	0	0	1	20%
Power (Struggles)	0	0	1	0	0	1	20%
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	0	1	1	20%
Management Aloofness	0	0	0	0	1	1	20%
Organisational Politics	0	0	0	1	0	1	20%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Cloning (of management practices)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Lack of) Collegiality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Conditioning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Context	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Entrenched) Customs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Divergent Goals	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Mistrust	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Ineffective) Planning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Political Immaturity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Resistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Lack of apparent) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)

Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Civil Servants

Factor Influencing FAILURE	C D E		
	LIKELY ...	MOST LIKELY ...	WILL CERTAINLY..
	to contribute to Failure		
			WC as a % of all respondents
(Absence of) Political Will	12	11	22
(Absence of) Administrative Will	8	16	21
(Absence of) Accountability	9	15	21
(Lack of) Leadership	3	22	20
Divergent Goals	4	21	20
(Lack of policy) Ownership	9	18	18
Conditioning	7	22	16
Resistance	9	22	14
(Lack of) Cooperation	12	20	13
Context	14	18	12
Power (Struggles)	14	20	11
Mistrust	22	12	11
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	9	26	10
Organisational Politics	9	26	10
(Inadequate) Capabilities	11	23	10
(Lack of) Collegiality	13	22	10
(Ineffective) Planning	10	26	9
(Lack of) Participation	21	14	9
Role Fragmentation	12	24	8
Political Immaturity	16	21	8
(Entrenched) Customs	19	19	7
(Lack of apparent) Results	25	14	6
Cloning (of management practices)	30	10	4
Management Aloofness	15	21	3
(Low) Political Intervention	20	23	2
(Lack of) Customisation	29	14	2

Total Number of Replies

Factor Influencing FAILURE	45					M	
	H	I					
	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	...most damaging						
(Absence of) Political Will	14	1	3	1	1	20	44%
(Absence of) Accountability	7	7	2	2	2	20	44%
(Lack of) Leadership	8	1	4	2	2	17	38%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	4	2	4	5	2	17	38%
Divergent Goals	1	0	7	6	3	17	38%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	0	5	1	3	4	13	29%
Resistance	0	4	4	3	1	12	27%
Conditioning	2	2	2	3	1	10	22%
Power (Struggles)	1	2	3	1	3	10	22%
(Ineffective) Planning	0	3	1	4	2	10	22%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	2	2	1	1	1	7	16%
Organisational Politics	1	3	1	0	2	7	16%
Mistrust	0	3	3	1	0	7	16%
(Lack of) Cooperation	2	0	2	0	2	6	13%
Role Fragmentation	1	1	0	2	2	6	13%
Context	0	2	0	3	1	6	13%
(Lack of) Collegiality	0	3	0	0	2	5	11%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	1	2	2	0	5	11%
(Entrenched) Customs	0	1	0	1	2	4	9%
Political Immaturity	0	1	0	0	3	4	9%
(Lack of apparent) Results	0	0	2	1	0	3	7%
(Lack of) Participation	0	0	1	2	0	3	7%
(Low) Political Intervention	1	1	0	0	0	2	4%
Cloning (of management practices)	1	0	1	0	0	2	4%
Management Aloofness	0	0	0	0	1	1	2%
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)
Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Consultants

Factor Influencing FAILURE	C D E			WC as a % of all respondents
	LIKELY ...	MOST LIKELY ...	WILL CERTAINLY..	
	to contribute to Failure			
(Absence of) Administrative Will	0	2	8	80%
(Lack of) Leadership	0	2	8	80%
(Absence of) Political Will	0	2	8	80%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	2	1	7	70%
(Absence of) Accountability	1	3	6	60%
Context	2	2	6	60%
Divergent Goals	1	4	5	50%
(Low) Political Intervention	1	5	4	40%
Resistance	2	4	4	40%
Organisational Politics	4	2	4	40%
(Lack of) Collegiality	5	1	4	40%
Conditioning	2	5	3	30%
(Lack of) Cooperation	3	4	3	30%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	4	3	3	30%
(Ineffective) Planning	4	3	3	30%
Role Fragmentation	4	3	3	30%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	3	5	2	20%
Power (Struggles)	3	5	2	20%
Management Aloofness	4	4	2	20%
Mistrust	4	4	2	20%
(Entrenched) Customs	3	5	1	10%
Cloning (of management practices)	6	3	1	10%
Political Immaturity	6	3	1	10%
(Lack of) Customisation	7	2	1	10%
(Lack of) Participation	2	8	0	0%
(Lack of apparent) Results	5	5	0	0%

Total Number of Replies

Factor Influencing FAILURE	10 H I					M	
	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	...most damaging						
(Absence of) Political Will	6	0	1	0	0	7	70%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	1	0	1	4	1	7	70%
(Lack of) Leadership	1	1	1	1	2	6	60%
(Absence of) Accountability	0	3	0	2	0	5	50%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	0	1	2	2	0	5	50%
(Ineffective) Planning	0	2	2	0	0	4	40%
Context	0	1	1	0	2	4	40%
Role Fragmentation	1	0	1	0	0	2	20%
Power (Struggles)	1	0	0	0	1	2	20%
(Low) Political Intervention	0	1	0	0	1	2	20%
Resistance	0	1	0	0	0	1	10%
Organisational Politics	0	0	1	0	0	1	10%
Divergent Goals	0	0	0	0	1	1	10%
Mistrust	0	0	0	1	0	1	10%
Political Immaturity	0	0	0	0	1	1	10%
(Lack of) Collegiality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Conditioning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Lack of) Cooperation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Management Aloofness	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Cloning (of management practices)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Entrenched) Customs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Lack of) Participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Lack of apparent) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)

Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Unknown Actor Group

Factor Influencing FAILURE	C D E			WC as a % of all respondents
	LIKELY ...	MOST LIKELY ...	WILL CERTAINLY..	
	to contribute to Failure			
(Lack of) Leadership	1	2	11	79%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	1	4	9	64%
(Lack of) Cooperation	2	3	9	64%
(Ineffective) Planning	3	5	6	43%
(Absence of) Accountability	5	3	6	43%
(Entrenched) Customs	1	8	5	36%
Role Fragmentation	1	8	5	36%
Divergent Goals	2	7	5	36%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	3	6	5	36%
(Absence of) Political Will	3	6	5	36%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	4	5	5	36%
Management Aloofness	4	5	5	36%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	1	9	4	29%
Political Immaturity	5	5	4	29%
Resistance	4	6	3	21%
(Lack of) Customisation	7	3	3	21%
Conditioning	4	8	2	14%
Organisational Politics	4	8	2	14%
(Lack of) Collegiality	5	7	2	14%
Context	5	7	2	14%
Mistrust	6	6	2	14%
Cloning (of management practices)	9	3	2	14%
(Lack of) Participation	5	8	1	7%
(Lack of apparent) Results	5	8	1	7%
(Low) Political Intervention	7	5	1	7%
Power (Struggles)	5	9	0	0%

Total Number of Replies

Factor Influencing FAILURE	14 H I					M	
	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	...most damaging						
(Lack of) Leadership	5	3	1	0	1	10	71%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	1	1	4	1	0	7	50%
(Ineffective) Planning	2	0	1	1	1	5	36%
(Absence of) Accountability	1	2	1	0	1	5	36%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	1	0	3	0	1	5	36%
(Lack of) Cooperation	0	1	1	1	1	4	29%
(Entrenched) Customs	0	1	1	1	1	4	29%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	1	1	0	1	0	3	21%
Role Fragmentation	0	1	0	1	1	3	21%
Management Aloofness	0	1	0	2	0	3	21%
Divergent Goals	1	0	0	1	0	2	14%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	1	0	0	1	2	14%
(Lack of) Collegiality	1	0	0	0		1	7%
(Lack of apparent) Results	1	0	0	0	0	1	7%
Conditioning	0	1	0	0	0	1	7%
Cloning (of management practices)	0	1	0	0	0	1	7%
Political Immaturity	0	0	1	0	0	1	7%
(Absence of) Political Will	0	0	0	0	1	1	7%
Resistance	0	0	0	1	0	1	7%
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	1	0	1	7%
Context	0	0	0	0	1	1	7%
(Lack of) Participation	0	0	0	0	1	1	7%
(Low) Political Intervention	0	0	0	1	0	1	7%
Organisational Politics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Mistrust	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Power (Struggles)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)

Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

All Actor Groups

SUCCESS Factor	Important...	C	D	E
		VERY Important...	CRITICAL...	Critical as a % of all respondents
Leadership	6	19	37	60%
Commitment	9	17	36	58%
(Effective) Approach	11	25	26	42%
Location of Political Responsibility	15	24	22	35%
Ownership	11	30	21	34%
Stakeholder Involvement	16	25	21	34%
Role Delineation	17	24	20	32%
Skills and Abilities	13	31	18	29%
(Effective) Planning	14	30	18	29%
Enthusiasm	12	33	17	27%
(Effective) Resourcing	14	31	17	27%
Cooperation	18	28	16	26%
Trust	22	25	15	24%
(Positive) Attitude	11	36	14	23%
Management Style	14	36	12	19%
Project Team Dynamic	19	31	12	19%
(Timeliness of) Results	18	36	7	11%
Demand	46	9	6	10%
Values / Beliefs	41	15	5	8%
(Use of) Networks	37	21	4	6%
(Institutional) Context	45	11	4	6%

Total Number of Replies

SUCCESS Factor	62					M	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	H	I					
	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	
	...most difficult to manage or obtain						
Commitment	7	9	4	7	6	33	53%
Leadership	8	7	10	2	1	28	45%
(Effective) Approach	6	6	3	1	4	20	32%
Ownership	3	2	6	6	2	19	31%
Stakeholder Involvement	2	9	0	5	3	19	31%
Location of Political Responsibility	6	3	5	0	3	17	27%
Role Delineation	7	6	1	1	1	16	26%
(Effective) Resourcing	5	1	3	2	4	15	24%
Skills and Abilities	2	5	2	3	2	14	23%
Trust	2	3	4	3	2	14	23%
(Effective) Planning	2	2	4	4	1	13	21%
(Positive) Attitude	4	4	1	2	1	12	19%
Cooperation	1	2	3	3	3	12	19%
Enthusiasm	1	1	2	3	5	12	19%
Project Team Dynamic	2	2	2	4	1	11	18%
Management Style	0	0	6	3	0	9	15%
(Timeliness of) Results	1	0	1	1	2	5	8%
Values / Beliefs	1	0	1	0	3	5	8%
Demand	2	0	0	0	0	2	3%
(Institutional) Context	0	0	1	1	0	2	3%
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	1	1	2%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)
Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Politicians

	C	D	E
SUCCESS Factor	Important...	VERY Important...	CRITICAL... Critical as a % of all respondents
(Effective) Approach	0	1	3
Commitment	0	1	3
(Positive) Attitude	0	3	1
Leadership	0	3	1
Management Style	0	3	1
Ownership	0	3	1
Cooperation	1	2	1
(Effective) Planning	1	2	1
Enthusiasm	1	2	1
Location of Political Responsibility	1	2	1
Project Team Dynamic	1	2	1
Skills and Abilities	1	2	1
Trust	1	2	1
Role Delineation	1	1	1
(Use of) Networks	2	1	1
Stakeholder Involvement	0	4	0
(Timeliness of) Results	1	3	0
(Institutional) Context	2	2	0
(Effective) Resourcing	2	2	0
Values / Beliefs	2	2	0
Demand	4	0	0

Total Number of Replies

	4	I				M	
SUCCESS Factor	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	...most difficult to manage or obtain						
(Effective) Approach	2	1	0	0	0	3	75%
Commitment	0	2	0	1	0	3	75%
Leadership	1	0	0	0	0	1	25%
Skills and Abilities	1	0	0	0	0	1	25%
Cooperation	0	1	0	0	0	1	25%
(Positive) Attitude	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%
Location of Political Responsibility	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%
Management Style	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%
Project Team Dynamic	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0	1	1	25%
Trust	0	0	0	1	0	1	25%
(Institutional) Context	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Demand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Effective) Planning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Effective) Resourcing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Ownership	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Timeliness of) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Role Delineation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Stakeholder Involvement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Values / Beliefs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)
Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Civil Servants

SUCCESS Factor	Important...	C VERY Important...	D CRITICAL...	E Critical as a % of all respondents
Leadership	5	11	23	59%
Commitment	7	12	20	51%
Role Delineation	9	14	16	41%
Ownership	7	17	15	38%
Stakeholder Involvement	12	12	15	38%
(Effective) Approach	9	17	13	33%
(Effective) Resourcing	8	19	12	31%
Location of Political Responsibility	10	16	12	31%
Enthusiasm	7	21	11	28%
Management Style	8	21	10	26%
(Effective) Planning	9	20	10	26%
(Positive) Attitude	8	20	10	26%
Skills and Abilities	9	21	9	23%
Cooperation	13	17	9	23%
Trust	13	18	8	21%
Project Team Dynamic	14	18	7	18%
(Timeliness of) Results	13	20	5	13%
Values / Beliefs	26	10	3	8%
Demand	29	6	3	8%
(Institutional) Context	31	5	2	5%
(Use of) Networks	26	12	1	3%

Total Number of Replies

SUCCESS Factor	H Most Difficult	I 2nd	3rd	4th	5th	M No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	...most difficult to manage or obtain						
Commitment	3	5	3	4	3	18	46%
Leadership	2	4	8	2	1	17	44%
Ownership	2	1	4	5	2	14	36%
Role Delineation	6	5	1	1	0	13	33%
Stakeholder Involvement	1	5	0	4	3	13	33%
(Effective) Resourcing	5	1	2	1	2	11	28%
(Effective) Approach	3	3	1	1	2	10	26%
Location of Political Responsibility	3	2	2	0	2	9	23%
(Positive) Attitude	3	4	0	1	0	8	21%
Trust	2	2	1	1	1	7	18%
Skills and Abilities	1	3	2	1	0	7	18%
(Effective) Planning	1	1	3	1	1	7	18%
Enthusiasm	1	0	1	2	3	7	18%
Management Style	0	0	5	2	0	7	18%
Cooperation	1	1	1	2	1	6	15%
Project Team Dynamic	2	2	0	1	0	5	13%
(Timeliness of) Results	1	0	1	1	2	5	13%
Values / Beliefs	1	0	0	0	3	4	10%
(Institutional) Context	0	0	1	1	0	2	5%
Demand	1	0	0	0	0	1	3%
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	1	1	3%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)
Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Consultants

SUCCESS Factor	Important...	C VERY Important...	D CRITICAL...	E Critical as a % of all respondents
Commitment	0	2	9	82%
Leadership	0	2	9	82%
Location of Political Responsibility	1	3	7	64%
(Effective) Approach	1	5	5	45%
Skills and Abilities	2	4	5	45%
Trust	4	2	5	45%
Enthusiasm	1	7	3	27%
Ownership	2	6	3	27%
Cooperation	3	5	3	27%
(Effective) Planning	3	5	3	27%
Stakeholder Involvement	3	5	3	27%
Project Team Dynamic	2	7	2	18%
(Timeliness of) Results	2	7	2	18%
(Effective) Resourcing	3	6	2	18%
Role Delineation	4	5	2	18%
(Use of) Networks	5	4	2	18%
(Institutional) Context	7	2	2	18%
Demand	8	1	2	18%
(Positive) Attitude	2	8	1	9%
Management Style	4	6	1	9%
Values / Beliefs	9	1	1	9%

Total Number of Replies

SUCCESS Factor	H Most Difficult	I 2nd	3rd	4th	5th	M No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	...most difficult to manage or obtain						
Commitment	3	2	1	1	2	9	82%
Leadership	4	1	2	0	0	7	64%
Location of Political Responsibility	3	1	2	0	0	6	55%
Trust	0	0	3	1	1	5	45%
Stakeholder Involvement	0	3	0	0	0	3	27%
(Effective) Approach	0	2	0	0	1	3	27%
Ownership	0	1	1	1	0	3	27%
Project Team Dynamic	0	0	1	2	0	3	27%
Skills and Abilities	0	0	0	2	1	3	27%
(Effective) Planning	1	0	0	1	0	2	18%
Role Delineation	0	1	0	0	1	2	18%
Enthusiasm	0	0	1	0	1	2	18%
Cooperation	0	0	0	1	1	2	18%
(Effective) Resourcing	0	0	0	1	1	2	18%
(Positive) Attitude	0	0	0	0	1	1	9%
Management Style	0	0	0	1	0	1	9%
(Institutional) Context	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Demand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Timeliness of) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Values / Beliefs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)
Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Unknown Actor Group

		C	D	E
SUCCESS Factor	Important...	VERY Important...	CRITICAL...	Critical as a % of all respondents
(Effective) Approach	1	2	5	63%
(Effective) Planning	1	3	4	50%
Leadership	1	3	4	50%
Commitment	2	2	4	50%
Cooperation	1	4	3	38%
(Effective) Resourcing	1	4	3	38%
Skills and Abilities	1	4	3	38%
Stakeholder Involvement	1	4	3	38%
(Positive) Attitude	1	5	2	25%
Ownership	2	4	2	25%
Project Team Dynamic	2	4	2	25%
Enthusiasm	3	3	2	25%
Location of Political Responsibility	3	3	2	25%
Role Delineation	3	4	1	13%
Trust	4	3	1	13%
Demand	5	2	1	13%
Values / Beliefs	4	2	1	13%
Management Style	2	6	0	0%
(Timeliness of) Results	2	6	0	0%
(Use of) Networks	4	4	0	0%
(Institutional) Context	5	2	0	0%

Total Number of Replies

	8					M	
SUCCESS Factor	H	I				No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th		
	...most difficult to manage or obtain						
(Effective) Approach	1	0	2	0	1	4	50%
(Effective) Planning	0	1	1	2	0	4	50%
Leadership	1	2	0	0	0	3	38%
Stakeholder Involvement	1	1	0	1	0	3	38%
Commitment	1	0	0	1	1	3	38%
Skills and Abilities	0	2	0	0	1	3	38%
Cooperation	0	0	2	0	1	3	38%
Ownership	1	0	1	0	0	2	25%
(Positive) Attitude	1	0	0	1	0	2	25%
Enthusiasm	0	1	0	1	0	2	25%
(Effective) Resourcing	0	0	1	0	1	2	25%
Project Team Dynamic	0	0	0	1	1	2	25%
Demand	1	0	0	0	0	1	13%
Role Delineation	1	0	0	0	0	1	13%
Trust	0	1	0	0	0	1	13%
Values / Beliefs	0	0	1	0	0	1	13%
Location of Political Responsibility	0	0	0	0	1	1	13%
(Institutional) Context	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Management Style	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Timeliness of) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

First sorted by Columns E,D,C (top five shaded)
Then sorted by Columns M,H,I

Appendix 21

Goodness-of-Fit Test Results

All Actor Groups

Total Number of Replies

74

Factor Influencing FAILURE	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor listing factor in top 5	% respondents	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most damaging										
(Lack of) Leadership	16	5	7	3	5	36	49%	36	14	22	473.90	33.30
(Absence of) Political Will	21	2	6	1	2	32	43%	32	14	18	315.75	22.19
(Absence of) Accountability	9	12	3	4	3	31	42%	31	14	17	281.21	19.76
(Absence of) Administrative Will	7	2	8	9	4	30	41%	30	14	16	248.67	17.47
(Lack of policy) Ownership	1	8	8	6	4	27	36%	27	14	13	163.05	11.46
Divergent Goals	2	0	7	7	4	20	27%	20	14	6	33.28	2.34
(Ineffective) Planning	2	5	4	5	3	19	26%	19	14	5	22.75	1.60
Resistance	0	5	4	4	1	14	19%	14	14	0	0.05	0.00
Power (Struggles)	2	2	4	1	4	13	18%	13	14	-1	1.51	0.11
Role Fragmentation	2	2	1	5	3	13	18%	13	14	-1	1.51	0.11
Conditioning	2	3	2	3	1	11	15%	11	14	-3	10.44	0.73
(Lack of) Cooperation	2	2	3	1	3	11	15%	11	14	-3	10.44	0.73
Context	0	3	1	3	4	11	15%	11	14	-3	10.44	0.73
(Inadequate) Capabilities	3	3	1	2	1	10	14%	10	14	-4	17.90	1.26
Organisational Politics	1	3	2	1	2	9	12%	9	14	-5	27.36	1.92
Mistrust	0	3	3	2	0	8	11%	8	14	-6	38.82	2.73
(Entrenched) Customs	0	2	1	2	3	8	11%	8	14	-6	38.82	2.73
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	2	2	2	1	7	9%	7	14	-7	52.28	3.67
(Lack of) Collegiality	1	3	0	0	2	6	8%	6	14	-8	67.75	4.76
(Low) Political Intervention	1	3	0	1	1	6	8%	6	14	-8	67.75	4.76
Political Immaturity	0	1	1	0	4	6	8%	6	14	-8	67.75	4.76
(Lack of) Participation	0	1	1	2	1	5	7%	5	14	-9	85.21	5.99
Management Aloofness	0	1	0	2	2	5	7%	5	14	-9	85.21	5.99
(Lack of apparent) Results	1	0	2	1	0	4	5%	4	14	-10	104.67	7.36
Cloning (of management practices)	1	1	1	0	0	3	4%	3	14	-11	126.13	8.86
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	1	1	2	3%	2	14	-12	149.59	10.51

175.83

Politicians

Total Number of Replies

5

Factor Influencing FAILURE	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most damaging										
(Absence of) Political Will	1	1	2	0	0	4	80%	4	1	3	9.23	9.60
(Lack of) Leadership	2	0	1	0	0	3	60%	3	1	2	4.16	4.32
(Lack of policy) Ownership	0	1	1	0	0	2	40%	2	1	1	1.08	1.12
Role Fragmentation	0	0	0	2	0	2	40%	2	1	1	1.08	1.12
(Absence of) Administrative Will	1	0	0	0	0	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
(Absence of) Accountability	1	0	0	0	0	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
(Lack of) Cooperation	0	1	0	0	0	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
(Lack of) Participation	0	1	0	0	0	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
(Low) Political Intervention	0	1	0	0	0	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
Power (Struggles)	0	0	1	0	0	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	0	1	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
Management Aloofness	0	0	0	0	1	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
Organisational Politics	0	0	0	1	0	1	20%	1	1	0	0.00	0.00
(Inadequate) Capabilities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
Cloning (of management practices)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
(Lack of) Collegiality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
Conditioning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
(Entrenched) Customs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
Divergent Goals	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
Mistrust	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
(Ineffective) Planning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
Political Immaturity	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
Resistance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96
(Lack of apparent) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	0.92	0.96

28.68

Civil Servants

Total Number of Replies

45

Factor Influencing FAILURE	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor listing factor in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most damaging										
(Absence of) Political Will	14	1	3	1	1	20	44%	20	9	11	128.74	14.88
(Absence of) Accountability	7	7	2	2	2	20	44%	20	9	11	128.74	14.88
(Lack of) Leadership	8	1	4	2	2	17	38%	17	9	8	69.66	8.05
(Absence of) Administrative Will	4	2	4	5	2	17	38%	17	9	8	69.66	8.05
Divergent Goals	1	0	7	6	3	17	38%	17	9	8	69.66	8.05
(Lack of policy) Ownership	0	5	1	3	4	13	29%	13	9	4	18.89	2.18
Resistance	0	4	4	3	1	12	27%	12	9	3	11.20	1.29
Conditioning	2	2	2	3	1	10	22%	10	9	1	1.81	0.21
Power (Struggles)	1	2	3	1	3	10	22%	10	9	1	1.81	0.21
(Ineffective) Planning	0	3	1	4	2	10	22%	10	9	1	1.81	0.21
(Inadequate) Capabilities	2	2	1	1	1	7	16%	7	9	-2	2.74	0.32
Organisational Politics	1	3	1	0	2	7	16%	7	9	-2	2.74	0.32
Mistrust	0	3	3	1	0	7	16%	7	9	-2	2.74	0.32
(Lack of) Cooperation	2	0	2	0	2	6	13%	6	9	-3	7.04	0.81
Role Fragmentation	1	1	0	2	2	6	13%	6	9	-3	7.04	0.81
Context	0	2	0	3	1	6	13%	6	9	-3	7.04	0.81
(Lack of) Collegiality	0	3	0	0	2	5	11%	5	9	-4	13.35	1.54
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	1	2	2	0	5	11%	5	9	-4	13.35	1.54
(Entrenched) Customs	0	1	0	1	2	4	9%	4	9	-5	21.66	2.50
Political Immaturity	0	1	0	0	3	4	9%	4	9	-5	21.66	2.50
(Lack of apparent) Results	0	0	2	1	0	3	7%	3	9	-6	31.97	3.69
(Lack of) Participation	0	0	1	2	0	3	7%	3	9	-6	31.97	3.69
(Low) Political Intervention	1	1	0	0	0	2	4%	2	9	-7	44.27	5.12
Cloning (of management practices)	1	0	1	0	0	2	4%	2	9	-7	44.27	5.12
Management Aloofness	0	0	0	0	1	1	2%	1	9	-8	58.58	6.77
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	9	-9	74.89	8.65

102.53

Consultants

Total Number of Replies

10

Factor Influencing FAILURE	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor listing factor in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most damaging										
(Absence of) Political Will	6	0	1	0	0	7	70%	7	2	5	25.78	13.40
(Absence of) Administrative Will	1	0	1	4	1	7	70%	7	2	5	25.78	13.40
(Lack of) Leadership	1	1	1	1	2	6	60%	6	2	4	16.62	8.64
(Absence of) Accountability	0	3	0	2	0	5	50%	5	2	3	9.47	4.92
(Lack of policy) Ownership	0	1	2	2	0	5	50%	5	2	3	9.47	4.92
(Ineffective) Planning	0	2	2	0	0	4	40%	4	2	2	4.31	2.24
Context	0	1	1	0	2	4	40%	4	2	2	4.31	2.24
Role Fragmentation	1	0	1	0	0	2	20%	2	2	0	0.01	0.00
Power (Struggles)	1	0	0	0	1	2	20%	2	2	0	0.01	0.00
(Low) Political Intervention	0	1	0	0	1	2	20%	2	2	0	0.01	0.00
Resistance	0	1	0	0	0	1	10%	1	2	-1	0.85	0.44
Organisational Politics	0	0	1	0	0	1	10%	1	2	-1	0.85	0.44
Divergent Goals	0	0	0	0	1	1	10%	1	2	-1	0.85	0.44
Mistrust	0	0	0	1	0	1	10%	1	2	-1	0.85	0.44
Political Immaturity	0	0	0	0	1	1	10%	1	2	-1	0.85	0.44
(Lack of) Collegiality	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
(Inadequate) Capabilities	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
Conditioning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
(Lack of) Cooperation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
Management Aloofness	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
Cloning (of management practices)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
(Entrenched) Customs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
(Lack of) Participation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92
(Lack of apparent) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	3.70	1.92

73.16

Unknown Actor Group
Total Number of Replies

14

Factor Influencing FAILURE	Most Damaging	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5
		...most damaging					
(Lack of) Leadership	5	3	1	0	1	10	71%
(Lack of policy) Ownership	1	1	4	1	0	7	50%
(Ineffective) Planning	2	0	1	1	1	5	36%
(Absence of) Accountability	1	2	1	0	1	5	36%
(Absence of) Administrative Will	1	0	3	0	1	5	36%
(Lack of) Cooperation	0	1	1	1	1	4	29%
(Entrenched) Customs	0	1	1	1	1	4	29%
(Inadequate) Capabilities	1	1	0	1	0	3	21%
Role Fragmentation	0	1	0	1	1	3	21%
Management Aloofness	0	1	0	2	0	3	21%
Divergent Goals	1	0	0	1	0	2	14%
(Dysfunctional) Group Dynamic	0	1	0	0	1	2	14%
(Lack of) Collegiality	1	0	0	0		1	7%
(Lack of apparent) Results	1	0	0	0	0	1	7%
Conditioning	0	1	0	0	0	1	7%
Cloning (of management practices)	0	1	0	0	0	1	7%
Political Immaturity	0	0	1	0	0	1	7%
(Absence of) Political Will	0	0	0	0	1	1	7%
Resistance	0	0	0	1	0	1	7%
(Lack of) Customisation	0	0	0	1	0	1	7%
Context	0	0	0	0	1	1	7%
(Lack of) Participation	0	0	0	0	1	1	7%
(Low) Political Intervention	0	0	0	1	0	1	7%
Organisational Politics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Mistrust	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%
Power (Struggles)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%

Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
10	3	7	53.40	19.84
7	3	4	18.56	6.89
5	3	2	5.33	1.98
5	3	2	5.33	1.98
5	3	2	5.33	1.98
4	3	1	1.71	0.64
4	3	1	1.71	0.64
3	3	0	0.09	0.04
3	3	0	0.09	0.04
3	3	0	0.09	0.04
2	3	-1	0.48	0.18
2	3	-1	0.48	0.18
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
1	3	-2	2.86	1.06
0	3	-3	7.25	2.69
0	3	-3	7.25	2.69
0	3	-3	7.25	2.69

54.17

All Actor Groups

Total Number of Replies

62

SUCCESS Factor	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most difficult to manage or obtain										
Commitment	7	9	4	7	6	33	53%	33	15	18	333	23
Leadership	8	7	10	2	1	28	45%	28	15	13	175	12
(Effective) Approach	6	6	3	1	4	20	32%	20	15	5	27	2
Ownership	3	2	6	6	2	19	31%	19	15	4	18	1
Stakeholder Involvement	2	9	0	5	3	19	31%	19	15	4	18	1
Location of Political Responsibility	6	3	5	0	3	17	27%	17	15	2	5	0
Role Delineation	7	6	1	1	1	16	26%	16	15	1	2	0
(Effective) Resourcing	5	1	3	2	4	15	24%	15	15	0	0	0
Skills and Abilities	2	5	2	3	2	14	23%	14	15	-1	1	0
Trust	2	3	4	3	2	14	23%	14	15	-1	1	0
(Effective) Planning	2	2	4	4	1	13	21%	13	15	-2	3	0
(Positive) Attitude	4	4	1	2	1	12	19%	12	15	-3	8	1
Cooperation	1	2	3	3	3	12	19%	12	15	-3	8	1
Enthusiasm	1	1	2	3	5	12	19%	12	15	-3	8	1
Project Team Dynamic	2	2	2	4	1	11	18%	11	15	-4	14	1
Management Style	0	0	6	3	0	9	15%	9	15	-6	33	2
(Timeliness of) Results	1	0	1	1	2	5	8%	5	15	-10	95	6
Values / Beliefs	1	0	1	0	3	5	8%	5	15	-10	95	6
Demand	2	0	0	0	0	2	3%	2	15	-13	163	11
(Institutional) Context	0	0	1	1	0	2	3%	2	15	-13	163	11
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	1	1	2%	1	15	-14	189	13
												92

Politicians

Total Number of Replies

4

SUCCESS Factor	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most difficult to manage or obtain										
(Effective) Approach	2	1	0	0	0	3	75%	3	1	2	4	4
Commitment	0	2	0	1	0	3	75%	3	1	2	4	4
Leadership	1	0	0	0	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
Skills and Abilities	1	0	0	0	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
Cooperation	0	1	0	0	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
(Positive) Attitude	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
Location of Political Responsibility	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
Management Style	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
Project Team Dynamic	0	0	1	0	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	0	0	1	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
Trust	0	0	0	1	0	1	25%	1	1	0	0	0
(Institutional) Context	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
Demand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
(Effective) Planning	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
(Effective) Resourcing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
Ownership	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
(Timeliness of) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
Role Delineation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
Stakeholder Involvement	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
Values / Beliefs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	1	-1	1	1
												18

Civil Servants

Total Number of Replies

39

SUCCESS Factor	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most difficult to manage or obtain										
Commitment	3	5	3	4	3	18	46%	18	9	9	76	8
Leadership	2	4	8	2	1	17	44%	17	9	8	60	6
Ownership	2	1	4	5	2	14	36%	14	9	5	22	2
Role Delineation	6	5	1	1	0	13	33%	13	9	4	14	1
Stakeholder Involvement	1	5	0	4	3	13	33%	13	9	4	14	1
(Effective) Resourcing	5	1	2	1	2	11	28%	11	9	2	3	0
(Effective) Approach	3	3	1	1	2	10	26%	10	9	1	1	0
Location of Political Responsibility	3	2	2	0	2	9	23%	9	9	0	0	0
(Positive) Attitude	3	4	0	1	0	8	21%	8	9	-1	2	0
Trust	2	2	1	1	1	7	18%	7	9	-2	5	1
Skills and Abilities	1	3	2	1	0	7	18%	7	9	-2	5	1
(Effective) Planning	1	1	3	1	1	7	18%	7	9	-2	5	1
Enthusiasm	1	0	1	2	3	7	18%	7	9	-2	5	1
Management Style	0	0	5	2	0	7	18%	7	9	-2	5	1
Cooperation	1	1	1	2	1	6	15%	6	9	-3	11	1
Project Team Dynamic	2	2	0	1	0	5	13%	5	9	-4	18	2
(Timeliness of) Results	1	0	1	1	2	5	13%	5	9	-4	18	2
Values / Beliefs	1	0	0	0	3	4	10%	4	9	-5	28	3
(Institutional) Context	0	0	1	1	0	2	5%	2	9	-7	53	6
Demand	1	0	0	0	0	1	3%	1	9	-8	69	7
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	1	1	3%	1	9	-8	69	7
												52

Consultants

Total Number of Replies

11

SUCCESS Factor	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most difficult to manage or obtain										
Commitment	3	2	1	1	2	9	82%	9	3	6	41	16
Leadership	4	1	2	0	0	7	64%	7	3	4	19	7
Location of Political Responsibility	3	1	2	0	0	6	55%	6	3	3	11	4
Trust	0	0	3	1	1	5	45%	5	3	2	6	2
Stakeholder Involvement	0	3	0	0	0	3	27%	3	3	0	0	0
(Effective) Approach	0	2	0	0	1	3	27%	3	3	0	0	0
Ownership	0	1	1	1	0	3	27%	3	3	0	0	0
Project Team Dynamic	0	0	1	2	0	3	27%	3	3	0	0	0
Skills and Abilities	0	0	0	2	1	3	27%	3	3	0	0	0
(Effective) Planning	1	0	0	1	0	2	18%	2	3	-1	0	0
Role Delineation	0	1	0	0	1	2	18%	2	3	-1	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	0	1	0	1	2	18%	2	3	-1	0	0
Cooperation	0	0	0	1	1	2	18%	2	3	-1	0	0
(Effective) Resourcing	0	0	0	1	1	2	18%	2	3	-1	0	0
(Positive) Attitude	0	0	0	0	1	1	9%	1	3	-2	3	1
Management Style	0	0	0	1	0	1	9%	1	3	-2	3	1
(Institutional) Context	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	3	-3	7	3
Demand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	3	-3	7	3
(Timeliness of) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	3	-3	7	3
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	3	-3	7	3
Values / Beliefs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	3	-3	7	3
												46

Unknown Actor Group
Total Number of Replies

8

SUCCESS Factor	Most Difficult	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	No of times factor features in top 5	% respondents listing factor in top 5	Observed Scores (O)	Expected Scores (E)	O - E	(O - E) ²	$\frac{(O - E)^2}{E}$
		...most difficult to manage or obtain										
(Effective) Approach	1	0	2	0	1	4	50%	4	2	2	4	2
(Effective) Planning	0	1	1	2	0	4	50%	4	2	2	4	2
Leadership	1	2	0	0	0	3	38%	3	2	1	1	1
Stakeholder Involvement	1	1	0	1	0	3	38%	3	2	1	1	1
Commitment	1	0	0	1	1	3	38%	3	2	1	1	1
Skills and Abilities	0	2	0	0	1	3	38%	3	2	1	1	1
Cooperation	0	0	2	0	1	3	38%	3	2	1	1	1
Ownership	1	0	1	0	0	2	25%	2	2	0	0	0
(Positive) Attitude	1	0	0	1	0	2	25%	2	2	0	0	0
Enthusiasm	0	1	0	1	0	2	25%	2	2	0	0	0
(Effective) Resourcing	0	0	1	0	1	2	25%	2	2	0	0	0
Project Team Dynamic	0	0	0	1	1	2	25%	2	2	0	0	0
Demand	1	0	0	0	0	1	13%	1	2	-1	1	0
Role Delineation	1	0	0	0	0	1	13%	1	2	-1	1	0
Trust	0	1	0	0	0	1	13%	1	2	-1	1	0
Values / Beliefs	0	0	1	0	0	1	13%	1	2	-1	1	0
Location of Political Responsibility	0	0	0	0	1	1	13%	1	2	-1	1	0
(Institutional) Context	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	4	2
Management Style	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	4	2
(Timeliness of) Results	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	4	2
(Use of) Networks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0%	0	2	-2	4	2
												18

Appendix 22

Defining a Policy Context – An Example

Policy Initiative – A New Framework for the Management of Heritage

A Public Service Department responsible for the national patrimony (the Museums Department) is to be disbanded. In its place will be created two new entities: one to be focused on service delivery (the operation of museums and heritage sites); the other, to be focused on regulating heritage operators.

So far as is possible and required, the budget of the current department as well as the current complement of employees are to be shared between and deployed to the new entities. Some of the employees may also need to be re-deployed to other Ministries. The labour force culture is such that a transfer can often be viewed negatively. It is anticipated that both of the new entities will want to revise the terms and conditions of work so as to stimulate higher productivity, improve operational effectiveness, and lengthen the hours that heritage sites are open to the public. The labour force is heavily unionised and has a collective agreement.

Financial budgets for recurrent and capital expenditure purposes must be developed and proposed for the favourable consideration of the Minister of Finance. Government funding is tight, owing to the need to reduce deficits. Many heritage sites are in derelict condition and security at the sites is very lax. There have been many acts of vandalism and each one provokes an outburst of public criticism of the museums administration and the political administration.

The Minister responsible for heritage matters has appointed a Chairman for the service delivery entity. The Chairman has never worked within the Public Service. His character tends towards being emotional and to become pre-occupied with non-strategic considerations. The Minister has also appointed the Regulator. The Regulator is a career Public Officer but has never worked in a regulatory environment. His character tends towards being academic and laid-back. Neither the Chairman nor the Regulator regards the other favourably.

This new policy was initially conceived 7 years ago and the introduction of the proposed framework has gone through multiple fits and starts. This has left employees disillusioned of the political commitment to the initiative, has created a

sense of suspicion of the real motives behind this change and has raised their doubts and fear on what's in store for them in the future.

An election is approaching and the Minister wants to be seen as being pro-active and, obviously, wants this transition (the policy project) to take place smoothly over the next three months. Because of the nature of Opposition politics, a success in this initiative may invoke the displeasure of the Party in Opposition.

In effect, the person who will lead this transition project will function as the interim Chief Operating Officer. The attributes sought in this project leader are those that would typify any senior operational manager and those attributes should be exercised in conjunction with a knowledge of, or a sensitivity towards, Public Service financial and administrative regulations and policy. Because of the dynamics of the environment within which the COO will operate, the ability to handle conflict and operate tactfully are critical qualities.