

Terrorism: The Never-changing Chameleon

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The presence of terrorism has remained constant over the years, but in the modern era its methods have shifted from promulgating ignored grievances onto the international arena to direct large-scale attacks on the national security of powerful states. Depending on access to resources, capability and quantity and quality of membership terrorism can oscillate between an exceptional irritant to a national and international trauma. Owing to the plethora of means and narratives, what in the past could have been minimised as an unlikely incredibility now it can demand to be taken seriously and demands to be prepared for it accordingly. Numerous challenges render the prediction of future terrorism difficult, including identifying and selecting real indicators of change amid the clamour of conflicting signals and indicators, deciding how to interpret public pronouncements, addressing the logic of the situation, and appreciating the choices to be made and accepting their consequences. This matters because states often become, especially at the beginning of terrorist campaigns, the helpless witnesses to the consequences of their own policies, and it is often late in the day when states see with any clarity the nature of their choices.

Concerning the fundamentals of terrorism, inequality, injustice, and interests fuel and will continue to nourish perceived and real grievances that terrorists may hijack to garner support to achieve their goals. Regarding the means of terrorism, depending on accessibility and reliability, terrorists and violent extremists will continue to use anything they can get their hands on. This may vary from something as basic as a knife to access to the latest technological advances, like biotechnology and augmented reality, which in turn provides them with new opportunities to continue their work. Additionally, the risk is not of defeating a major power

but the realisation of a new type of vulnerability. The 9/11 attacks for instance, created a reality of a future war that was different from anything that had happened before.

A plethora of competing realities precludes the adoption of a commonly agreed definition of terrorism, and as a generally accepted fact, it is not a preoccupation of this chapter. Schmid et al (2013) in the *Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research* provide an account on the definitional challenges of terrorism. This chapter explores the future of terrorism, and it does so by focusing on the paradoxical duality of the phenomenon of terrorism, which is its consistency and at the same time its chameleonic nature. The constant element refers to the causes and fundamentals of terrorism, and the changing character concentrates on the means and tactics of terrorism. The chapter then focuses on the consequences and implications of this duality on future terrorism and concludes with the provision of a model of future trends.

The Constancy of Terrorism: Causes and Fundamentals

Future terrorism has a revealing past but if everything flows and the world is but a series of constant transformations, making it impossible, as Heraclitus argued, to step into the same river twice, then looking at the past to predict the future can only give a partial picture that may lead to a false certainty when dealing with a complex phenomenon like terrorism. Arendt (1970, p. 6) posits that predictions are never anything but projections of present automatic processes and procedures, that is of occurrences that are likely to come to pass if people do not act and if nothing unexpected happens. Thus any action, purposeful or accidental, would disrupt these processes and procedures within whose frame the prediction moves and where it finds its evidence.

Terrorism as a phenomenon has been linked to vagueness, opacity, and discord, as it has been associated either with the ultimate sacrifice or with a heinous crime, all depending on the eyes of the beholder. Terrorism is motivated by causes that are considered as just by the perpetrators and it is expressed through violence and destructive means. Inasmuch as terrorists

consider their causes just then any means to achieve these are considered justifiable. The just cause gives them their constancy, while the means to achieve that just cause will be anything they can get their hands on, which gives them their adaptability and chameleonic nature. For terrorists one thing worse than taking their chance and failing is failing to take the chance. The above makes impossible an exhaustive list of causes of terrorism, which in turns makes it a Herculean task to accurately predict terrorism.

Previous models and types of future terrorism have been replaced by blurred concepts and a range of speculative possibilities. Demographic pressures, environmental degradation, resource accessibility, along with conflicting ideologies, ethnonational aspirations, and interpretations of religion are not new, but the scale and impact are idiosyncratic of current situations and future trends. The intensity and effects of these phenomena are going to be experienced unevenly across different regions and countries, further accelerating causes for conflict and straining counterterrorism efforts.

Unlike conventional armies and insurgents, terrorists do not need to hold territory. Their priority is to make others pay attention and to try and gain time and notional space, allowing them to secure support and means while their opponent is drained of patience and credibility. Paraphrasing Fanon (1961, ch.1) terrorism is not a rational confrontation of points of view, but the untidy affirmation of an original ideal propounded as an absolute. Another constancy is that the conflicting parties, obedient to the rules of Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity. The contradictions continue, as despite terrorism's destructive nature it is a source of solidarity and act of socialisation for the members of terrorist organisations. In their perception and thence reality it is their altruism and commitment to a cause that leads them down the pathway of radicalisation and engagement. These characteristics help make terrorism a lasting mode of asymmetric warfare. Thus, regarding the phenomenon of terrorism there is no transformational discontinuity, it is its *modus operandi* that changes.

The Chameleonic Nature of Terrorism: The Means and Tactics

Interlinked and interdependent reasons that are internal and external to terrorist groups constantly force organisations to adapt the way in which they operate. Internal motives include low retention of membership and loss of access to resources, while external reasons refer to the broader context within which a specific organisation is operating. Hezbollah's leaders for instance, described their movement as a cross between an army, a guerrilla, and a socio-political force, and believed they developed a new organisational model (Filippidou, 2020; Hoffman, 2009, p. 1). Ethnonationalist separatist terrorism for instance, had to adjust its modus operandi over the recent years. Different internal and external reasons explain this shift, including successful countermeasures, failure to achieve the endgame leading to loss of members and support, but also the decision of independentist organisations to distance themselves from existentialist terrorist groups that were on the rise since 9/11. The realisation of the support base of separatist organisations in the 21st century around the world is that these organisations cannot bomb their way to independence, and thus use of violence would backfire. Otherwise, any short-term benefits would be contradicted by a bitter legacy and popular desire for revenge, which in turn would make political gains non-viable (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 388). Hence, unsurprisingly in the wake of 9/11 separatist organisations, such as ETA (Basque country and Fatherland) in Spain and FLNC (National Liberation Front of Corsica) in France declared permanent ceasefires confirming their transition to peaceful politics. Although separatist violence is in decline, the presence and participation of nationalists and separatists in their regional parliaments are on the increase, which is the case for the Basque Parliament, and the Corsican and Northern Ireland Assemblies.

The intent, endgame, and access to resources often dictate the weapon of choice of terrorists, which in turn defines the type of the organisation. Weapons of mass destruction and

mass casualties have not yet been adopted as weapons of choice for most of the organisations. Jenkins' (1975) aphorism that terrorists want "a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead" holds true to this day in most cases of terrorism, apart from the existential ones. The choice of weapons will also depend on the threshold of tolerance of violence, the accessibility to necessary materials, and the organisation's know-how. If the chosen weapons and their effects exceed the organisation's and its supporters' threshold of tolerance then this will backfire. Moreover, the choice of weapon will attract commensurate countermeasures, which is however, something a terrorist organisation wants to avoid.

Practical constraints prohibit terrorists getting hold of certain weapons. In the early 1990s emphasis was laid on the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack. Even if sufficient fissionable material and knowledgeable engineers could be acquired, the risks for anyone trying to construct nuclear weapons would be very high. Terrorist organisations, apart from existential ones, will mainly try and operate in a grey zone, where the act is kept deliberately below the threshold of tolerance of violence that otherwise would cause the full wrath of a state, with all the possible security consequences.

Trends of Terrorism: The 5Ds of Future Terrorism

Trends in terrorism mirror the broader contemporary national and international threats and crises, which is reflected in the plethora of terrorist typologies. Hobbes' *bellum omnium contra omnes* appears more current than ever. From energy and resources to religious inspired terrorism, and everything in between, is considered a critical vulnerability and threat. The motivation and causes of terrorism are generated by any agenda and narrative that happens to be adopted by the first social agent to represent a viable need. Terrorism as a phenomenon resembles what Scroggins (2004, p. 427) characterises as "a violent ecosystem capable of generating endless new things to fight about without ever shedding any of the old ones". Thus,

Rapoport's framework of Waves of Global Terrorism (2022), with all its unavoidable challenges decades after its inception, remains valid.

Global Terrorism Database (GTD 2022) shows a 1% decrease in the number of attacks and a 12% increase in terrorism deaths globally. The GTD, however, cannot provide a definitive answer to the question if terrorism has increased or decreased. Even if the number of deaths is decreasing the overall geographic footprint is increasing. Terrorism is concentrated in specific locations, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East, and Asia (GTD 2022). However, these locations are diverse, ambiguously defined and have contextual factors associated with them regarding terrorism. In Europe terrorism is characterised mostly by non-lethal attacks with the number of attacks exceeding the people killed. The Islamic State (IS) is in decline since 2019 after the fall of the so-called IS Caliphate territorial control and the deaths of its leaders al Baghdadi and al-Qurashi in 2019 and 2022 respectively. Al Qaeda (AQ) attacks are in the hundreds, but the organisation has been declining. AQ related groups are not insignificant, but they are concentrated in specific locations, like Somalia (GTD 2022). The global financial crisis and the refugee emergency has led, among others, to the increase of a fragmented Extreme Right-Wing Terrorism (ERWT), with a membership of technologically savvy young men, often in their teens, self-indoctrinated and self-initiated terrorists (Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament 2022, pp. 2-3).

Terrorist organisations aim to control natural resources in weak states to either influence politics or to enrich themselves or both. Based on current trends, conditions such as state fragility marred by chronic poverty, population bulge, lack of development, instability are more accurate predictors of countries at higher risk for terrorist campaigns than are religious or ideological indicators. A range of factors is behind current and future terrorism, which can be summarised into 5Ds, that is development, deprivation, decision-making, depletion, demographics. These 5Ds are not sufficient individually to trigger a terrorist campaign, as these

factors may overlap and coexist in different degrees. Moreover, these factors exist within the broader regional and international context.

Grievances, perceived or real, can develop as people find themselves with no access or control over natural resources. As Collier (2000) argues, opportunities for primary commodity predation cause conflict. The location of natural resources, such as oil fields is a key factor in setting priorities for territorial control. In his sombre but accurate article Kaplan (1994) argued that future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or caused by environmental scarcity and depletion. These conflicts would be subnational, making it hard for states and local governments to protect their own citizens. Terrorism in the West has declined by 68%, whilst Sub-Saharan Africa suffered 48% of global terrorist killings (GTI 2022). The Sahel for instance, is identified as a 'serious concern' (GTI 2022, p. 886) with deaths from terrorism in the region increasing by 1,000% since 2007. Simultaneously, the region is experiencing the high effects of climate change with scarce water and food insecurity, weak governance, and high population movement, thus attracting the attention of the IS.

Silke and Morrison (2022) advocate the clear impact of climate change on terrorism trends. Lake Chad for instance, has been reduced to a fraction of its original size since the 1960s. The decrease of the lake's size by 90% has led to the loss of local livelihood (UN 2018), which in turn led to a sharp increase in population movement to urban areas. Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, and Chad have been strongly affected by the shrinking of Lake Chad, with direct link to the emergence of the terrorist group Boko Haram (Silke & Morrison 2022, p. 884). The prognosis of this type of organisations is that they are likely to last because these are low intensity conflicts, and the organisations are impervious to a negotiated settlement, and they also carry the risk of contagion into neighbouring countries (Walter 2017). The longevity of these organisations is not owed to their successes but to the failures of the affected states and

the lack of interest and will of the international community to deal with these organisations effectively and efficiently.

Violence in countries experiencing severe inequalities, low if any, development, facing disputes over access and control of natural resources, with youth with no hope and with not much else to do, is not new. What is different is the direct correlation of the above conditions with the presence of terrorist organisations. According to the UN Panel of Experts' report (UN 2021, p. 22), al-Shabaab, formed in 2005 out of the old Union of Islamic Courts, and which has evolved in its operations and sourcing finances, is in a healthy financial position and remains entrepreneurial in nature benefiting from illegal taxation and other forms of extortion. The organisation has been damaging the environment through illegal charcoal exports, engages in illegal gold exports, as well as extorts Somalis for money. The vulnerability of Somalia to climate change is projected to increase, owing to its heavy dependency on its natural resources. This, along with the human-made depletion of natural resources linked to charcoal production, has increased its vulnerability to drought and desertification, leading to a big reduction in food security (UN 2021, p. 21). Emphasising complexity, according to the Panel's report al-Shabaab provides communities with protection from flooding, thus becoming a service provider to communities that otherwise receive little attention from the government.

ERWT environmentalism has surfaced as an "ideological agent for de-humanising those perceived to threaten racial purity" (Macklin 2022, p. 991). Even though these ideas are not new, the coincidence of crises such as energy, finance, refugee and migration, and urbanisation warns that ERWT will continue to rise at different degrees. This was evidenced in 2019 in the attacks on mosques in Christchurch in New Zealand with fifty-one dead, and in the El Paso attack with twenty-two people killed. The attacker at Christchurch called his attack an act of environmental defence against overpopulation (Tarrant 2019, p. 29), while the attacker at El Paso blamed the impact of overpopulation and overconsumption, resource

depletion and pollution for his acts (Crusius 2019, p. 3). Therefore, when a terrorist attack catches a state by surprise, this is not because these attacks are inconceivable, but rather because the relevant data of threat is not reaching the right ears, at the right time, in the right way.

Adding to the complexity of the phenomenon of terrorism is that it can be opportunistic and a response to a situation rather than a pre-organised and well-thought political endeavour. Where there is instability and conducive political and economic opportunities a terrorist group may form. Collier (2016) argues that greed and loot are more important than grievance and justice in explaining the incidence of violent conflicts. In turn this brings the control of and access to natural resources to the epicentre (Kalyvas 2008, p. 351). Although opportunities for gain and loot can facilitate recruitment, this does not translate into deep ideological commitment to the cause and loyalty to the organisation, evidenced in the existence of a plethora of organisations with limited impact.

The longer a terrorist organisation survives, the more difficult it becomes to separate its fight for ideology from its fight for profit. This became obvious with the now demobilised FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) who had long financed their struggle against the Colombian establishment through kidnapping, extortion, and participating in the drug trade (InSight Crime 2022). The FARC had to abandon kidnappings in 2012 as a precondition to inclusive negotiations with the Colombian government (Filippidou & O'Brien, 2020). Nevertheless, this loss of income was recovered by getting more involved in illegal gold mining. For 2015-2016, which is the last period the FARC were active, if all the criminal economies are added, the organisation is estimated to have earned \$580 million (InSight Crime 2022).

Nonetheless, there are strings attached even to loot. In poorer environments members of organisations must accept a lengthy struggle before they can expect any profit, and this only

after their turn comes (Weinstein 2005). Most of the FARC's profits were used to cover operating expenses, but a big portion of the profits was pocketed by FARC commanders (InSight Crime 2022). In the end, this profiteering within the organisation led to the formation of splinter groups and the decline of the organisation as such. However, in this case, adding to the complexity of counterterrorism, winning is neither the endgame nor is it desirable. The *raison d'être* of an organisation can be to just have the means to acquire legitimacy that it then can confer on actions, which otherwise would be punishable as mere crimes.

Even though there is a widespread assumption about global terrorism, geography still has a role to play. It is not always possible for technology to 'trump terrain' (Porter 2015). Along with human-made barriers such as economic development, there are still natural barriers like mountain ranges and oceans, that have an impact on accessibility and can limit or act as a shield of protection to terrorist organisations. Latin America is one of the most urbanised regions in the world with over 81% of its population living in cities (Statista 2022). Overall, urbanisation was considered a positive development, providing opportunities to people, bringing them out of poverty, and promoting economic growth. However, there have been places where the rapid urbanisation put the environment under duress and put the citizens in a state of permanent competition over scarce resources without effective governance and with inadequate policing. This also created a fertile ground for political violence and terrorism, as a city is target rich, impact high, but limits the options of states' responses. Networked cities where an attack can shut down transportation networks and city centres, give easy and quick access to media outlets, and provide opportunities for financial gains, will always attract terrorists.

Additionally, with population movement forced by war or dire economic conditions, the displaced people tend to gather into cities, augmenting tensions as witnessed in Lebanon which as of 2020 became home to 1.5 million Syrian refugees of a total population of 4.4

million. All this in a country that according to the World Bank (2021) is experiencing one of the most severe economic crises worldwide since the 19th century. With its history of prolonged civil war and numerous conflicts, Lebanon is named by the World Bank a fragility, conflict and violence state with a growing wariness of potential triggers to violent extremism and social unrest (World Bank 2021). According to a US Army study, megacities are “the epicentres of human activity on the planet and, as such, they will generate most of the friction which compels future military intervention” (Harris et al 2014). This and similar studies are nothing new, which raises the question why megacities are still ineffective when facing a terrorist attack. The immediate response to the Manchester Arena attack in 2017, for instance, is criticised as a catalogue of multi-level failings, including security and medical provision at the Arena and shortcomings in emergency services’ readiness and response (Manchester Arena Inquiry 2021, p. 15).

National and international responses to terrorism also dictate the shape of future terrorism. Successful counterterror measures and a transformation in security affairs may force terrorist groups to turn to more basic weapons and operations. Alternatively, inadequate counterterrorism can make terrorist organisations focus on high technology and cybersecurity, wherever possible. The attacks by lone actors and violent Islamist groups have been characterised by simplicity such as the use of knives and driving trucks into crowds. These basic weapons are difficult to detect, and without the need for a specialised know-how from the terrorists to make them work. Nonetheless, the above does not mean that terrorists’ endgame comes closer to materialisation. The digital age has proven to be a great facilitator for recruitment, fundraising, and planning attacks. Emerging technologies such as facial recognition, artificial intelligence, and social media, can make it harder for terrorist organisations to hide and sustain their campaigns. However, these technological advances also provide opportunities to terrorists, provided they can get hold of these (Parker & Sitter 2016).

Information warfare affects tangible and intangible aspects, as it is designed to disable systems dependent upon flows of information, and it also aims to influence ideas by interfering with the content of information. A strength of networks is that it creates strong social ties and facilitates the promotion of a shared story, a narrative about terrorists' purpose and modus operandi, merging identity and ideology. Following that, the narrative unifies and gives meaning to events and thus shapes responses (Lawrence 2017, p. 228). Thus, terrorists can cause as much damage and disruption with a laptop as they can with a physical attack. Digital technology is just a means, thus the point for them is to be able to link the damage caused to a political purpose and to persuade supporters and opponents. This is a challenge they are less successful with. However, throughout history terrorist organisations have tried to use the latest technology available at the time to achieve their goals. Thus, the use of the latest technology by terrorists is a constancy, but the mode of technology changes constantly.

Hobbes' dictum on 'the war of all against all' is reflected on both the ways and the character of terrorism, as there are numerous and varied terrorist organisations that claim to fight for the same cause. This in turn renders loyalty and commitment to an organisation nonbinding. Hence, states face a more fractious and impulsive type of terrorism making it more challenging to be constantly prepared for and to handle effectively. Freedman (2017, p. 196) argues, what led to increased Sunni support for the fight against AQ was not because of a shift in attitudes by the people, but a decision by some Sunni leaders to collaborate with the US military despite any distaste for the occupation.

Complexity and Terrorism: Taking Advantage of the Limits of Complex Systems

Future terrorism is difficult to predict as it depends on choices that have not been made yet and in uncertain circumstances and within a complex internal and external environment. Terrorists are becoming more skilful and flexible operationally looking even more at softer civilian targets with less protection, such as Boko Haram and the Chibok schoolgirls kidnapping in

Nigeria. This is especially the case as harder targets like politicians and security services become better protected. Still, a terrorist organisation even if it dedicates great and systematic effort to control physically and psychologically the narrative, the situation, and its members, it cannot maintain this control over all these different elements indefinitely and survive long term. Adding to the complexity, is that terrorism in addition to the plethora of existent causes it may just occur because of aggressive and opportunistic actors. Thus, a terrorist attack may be a surprise because of a deceptive military operation, but also owing to a lack of a triggering crisis.

Even for terrorists, organisational performance relies on their ability to manage complex networks of interdependencies that are constantly evolving over time. These complex challenges refer to tangibles, for instance access to materiel, and intangibles, including members' commitment and loyalty. Managing this complex network determines the capacity of the organisation to sustain large-scale, systemic failures like the arrest of its leadership and the general decline of the organisation. Depending on the context, if a single tangible or intangible element, internal or external to the organisation, fails, it may cause a ripple effect and it may affect subsequent elements and therefore lead to a systemic failure. If for instance, a cell of a terrorist organisation is compromised, this may lead to the decline or even collapse of the entire organisation. Additionally, if a specific element of an organisation is constantly targeted and is removed, everything attached to this element will also be affected and be removed, creating in this way a structural gap. Repeating this process in a strategic manner may lead to further disconnect, ultimately bringing the organisation to its knees. In the case for instance where the communications of a terrorist organisation are targeted, this will also affect among others its recruitment ability. In this regard, the effort could be to identify the specific affected element to avoid future repetition of the same pattern.

However, the said pattern is one out of many provided within a complex network, in which case, the broader organisation is not affected but only the risk of experiencing the same

pattern is. Furthermore, systemic failures in terrorist organisations are often due to mundane reasons and minor disturbances. The reason for instance for a terrorist organisation's low membership retention may just be generational. It is different to enter an organisation young and carefree and different for somebody with family obligations to remain in an organisation. Thus, when deciding on counterterrorism measures it is necessary to identify and take into consideration network effects by controlling the way in which the different components and elements of a terrorist organisation interact.

On an individual level, a useful factor that can help identify future terrorism trends is the internal locus of control (Rotter 1954), which affects risk-taking behaviour. It is a personality attribute reflecting the degree to which terrorists perceive events to be under their control. This is in opposition to the external locus of control where people believe events to be under powerful others or under outside forces (Rotter, 1954). Internal locus of control is a useful example of a generalized expectancy which applies to a wide variety of situations. Those with a high internal locus of control believe they have a significant personal control over their behaviour and are therefore more likely to assume responsibility for their decisions and their actions, and they tend to be less conforming and less obedient and more independent. Lopez-Garrido (2020) argues that people with an internal locus of control are better at resisting social pressure to conform or obey, because they take responsibility for their actions. This is reflected in terrorists' behaviour irrespective of organisational typology and when it is combined with a belief in a perceived or real just cause, it is easy to understand why terrorism will remain an attractive approach for a percentage of the population.


Future Trends: 5Ds as a predictive model

Following from the above analysis the chapter proposes a predictive model of future terrorism. The suggestion is that the combination of data on the 5Ds of development, deprivation, decision-making, depletion, demographics along with the proposed model below could help

identify future terrorism trends. The model aims to identify countries and areas at a higher terrorism risk, depending on the degree and the extent of the existence of the 5Ds. It establishes how different components interact and can lead to terrorism. As mentioned earlier, these 5Ds are not sufficient by themselves to lead to terrorism, as these factors may overlap and coexist in different degrees and ways. Within this context the 5Ds become a threat multiplier enabling and facilitating terrorism.

[Figure X.1 about here]

Figure X.1: Predictive Model of Future Terrorism



Source: Author's own elaboration

As highlighted by the GTD (2022), the different locations facing terrorism have contextual factors associated and these occur over time. Owing to the complexity of current threats and of terrorism the relationship between the different factors is dynamic, and the relationship between each component is particular to each situation. At times, the 5Ds may form a causal relationship, while in others they act as a trigger. The complex interaction between terrorism and the 5Ds creates a vicious circle, as demonstrated in the model above. The presence of 5Ds will increase insecurity in the affected area, which in turn can aggravate natural disasters, creating a fertile ground for terrorist organisations. These can be dealt with through strategic and tactical measures at different levels and at different entry points, depicted in the model. Simultaneously, the different factors and relationships between all three levels of macro, meso, and micro are all relevant when assessing terrorist threat. The causes, triggers, effects of the 5Ds, and insecurity act as predisposition factors for terrorism. For this predisposition to lead to terrorism an individual must be motivated for the cause to the point of joining an organisation. This in turn can lead to vulnerability. However, as Brown (2015) argues, vulnerability and insecurity are on the opposite ends, as insecurity is a debilitating awareness of one's limitations, while vulnerability is the ability to see one's potential for growth. Vulnerability happens when a person *outgrows* insecurity. This type of vulnerability can lead an individual to join a terrorist organisation. Additionally, the model provides entry opportunities, and the strategic and tactical counterterrorism entry points will vary depending on the specific situation and conditions.

Conclusion: Terrorism's Conditional Future

The influences and factors examined in this chapter intersect in a complex manner making difficult solid and detailed predictions on the specifics of future terrorism. Predicting future terrorism may run the risk of giving voice to alarmism, in turn leading to unnecessary expenditure and ineffective countermeasures. The reality is that decision makers are defined

and limited by their experiences and often miss what becomes obvious in hindsight. Then again, the types of future terrorism may also be dictated by the demands for political survival of governments. A terrorist organisation for instance operating in a distant region of a country might be ignored or get less attention, compared to a campaign in the country's major cities. Examining future trends of terrorism, can validate Thucydides' (1980) idea that decision makers seem to be quite unique in the ability to consider the future as something more certain than what is before their eyes, and to see uncertainties as realities, simply because they would like them to be so.

It is unrealistic to expect an exhaustive list of causes in a complex phenomenon like terrorism. Thus, the 5Ds identified and discussed above, should really be 5Ds plus one. The latter is necessary to accommodate Taleb's (2007) 'black swan' of an unexpected event of magnitude and consequence with its dominant role in history. The chapter highlights that even though terrorist tactics constantly change, as a phenomenon it remains constant. Terrorism, be it religiously inspired or extreme right wing, is a globally networked, merciless, and willing threat, and as a multi-strand and multi-faceted phenomenon, there is a need for a fusion of means and measures to deal with it effectively.

Assuming there is opportunity and will, as discussed under the 5Ds, terrorism will remain a weapon of choice. If there is a perceived or real just cause, which gives terrorism constancy, and available forms of violence, which provide the chameleonic nature of terrorism, then there will always be place at different degrees for terrorist organisations. The exact mode of future terrorism would be speculative, but the hope is that still, it will be sufficiently familiar to be manageable with the adoption of appropriate measures. Within this context even though terrorism has ancient roots, it remains an emergent problem with complex systems and patterns arising out of a multiplicity of interactions. Future terrorist trends and means will include

creative repetition, while states will need to avoid responses of non-creative repetition but focus on intentional adaptation, which is at the heart of emergent strategy and approaches.

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