Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa

Consensus: A Matter of the Continuation of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia

Cranfield University, Defence and Security

PhD

Academic Year: 2017 – 2025

Supervisor: Dr Anicée Van Engeland.

Cranfield University, Defence and Security

PhD

Academic Year: 2017 – 2025

Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa

Consensus: A Matter of the Continuation of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia

Supervisor: Dr Anicée Van Engeland.

© Cranfield University 2025. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the written permission of the copyright owner.

Academic integrity declaration

I declare that:

- The thesis I have submitted is entirely my work.
- The thesis has not been previously submitted to this or any other institution.
- All content, including primary and secondary data, is accurate to the best of my knowledge.
- All quotations and references have been appropriately acknowledged by academic research standards.

I understand that knowingly submitting work in violation of the above statement will be regarded as academic misconduct by the examiners.

Abstract

This research examines the introduction, implementation, and evolution of Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism from 1991 to 2019, focusing on political decentralization. The study seeks solutions to the ongoing lack of consensus on the governance system. Since its inception in 1991, the absence of consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism has hindered the applicability of its full potential as a governance system. This thesis employed a qualitative case study methodology to explore the importance of consensus building, relying on document-based data collection and analysis.

The findings indicated that the ruling party, characterized by a highly centralized structure, has dominated agendas at all levels since the system's introduction, stifling bargaining, and negotiation on the governance model. This centralization has obstructed the development of democratic practices, hindered the decentralization of power, and constrained the implementation of constitutional promises. Consequently, Multinational Federalism has failed to achieve the necessary consensus to form a democratic governance system capable of addressing Ethiopia's complex socio-economic and political challenges, leaving the country in a state of stalemate.

This study advocates for urgent national reconciliation, renegotiation, and engagement with various elites as a middle-ground approach. Additionally, it emphasizes the need to curb the ongoing segregation of ethnic identities, promote democratization based on the rule of law, and facilitate the formation of national political parties with regional branches to conduct free and fair elections. This thesis calls for national reconciliation, critical dialogue, and the amendment of certain constitutional provisions grounded in elite consensus and public endorsement through popular referendum.

This research makes an empirical contribution by interpreting the existing knowledge around federalism and democracy to enhance the understanding of policymakers, academics, and practitioners. It also contributes by establishing propositions that, if enacted, will contribute to building consensus in a multinational setting to promote inclusion and resolve impediments.

Key Words:

Ethiopian Student Movement, EPRDF, Constitution, Transitional Government of Ethiopia, House of Federation, Constitutional Assembly, Constitutional Commission.

Acknowledgments

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my PhD supervisors, Dr. Anicée Van Engeland and Dr. Gemma Collantes Celador, for their unwavering support and guidance throughout this project. Dr. Anicée, your exceptional mentorship as my primary supervisor has been invaluable. I am immensely grateful to both of you for helping me reach this stage.

I also extend my sincere thanks to Professor Ann Fitz-Gerald, my previous supervisor, whose influence has been pivotal in my academic journey. Her support during my decision to pursue a PhD was instrumental, and without it, I might not have followed this path.

I am profoundly grateful to my former boss, mentor, and comrade, the Former Prime Minister of Ethiopia, Hailemariam Desalegn, for arranging a significant portion of the financial support for this study. Additionally, I would like to thank my friend, Assefa Dukamo, for his financial contributions and enduring friendship over the years.

I am indebted to the leaders and staff of the House of Peoples' Representatives, House of Federation, National Election Board of Ethiopia, Ethiopian Statistics Service, and Policy Research Institute of Ethiopia for their assistance in obtaining primary and secondary data for this research.

A special thank you goes to my dear wife, Aynalem Assefa, for her love, encouragement, prayers, and unwavering support. Her understanding and care for me and our children have been the foundation of my PhD journey and my entire career.

I also extend my gratitude to our children, Mekdes, Amanuel, Mintesnot, Abel, Arfaso, and Salela, for their love, patience, and encouragement.

Finally, I would like to thank my friends, Dr. Hirpo Kumbi and Ambassador Dr. Markos Tekel, for their encouragement and support throughout this research.

Table of Contents

Academic integrity declaration ..... **i**

Abstract ..... **ii**

Key Words: ..... **iii**

Acknowledgments ..... **iv**

List of Figures ..... **ix**

List of Tables ..... **x**

List of Abbreviations ..... **xi**

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION **1**

1.1 Background of the Research **1**

1.2. Statement of the Problem *4*

1.3. Aim and Objectives of the Research *6*

1.4. Scope of the Research *7*

1.5. Significance of the Study *7*

1.6. Introduction to the Research Methodology *9*

1.7. Structure of the Research *9*

CHAPTER TWO: FEDERALISM, MULTINATIONAL FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND CONSENSUS **11**

2.1 Introduction *11*

2.2 The Overview of Federalism *13*

2.2.1 Ideological and Institutional Consideration of Federalism 18

2.2.2 The Historical Development of Federalism 20

2.2.3 Normative and Empirical Approaches of Federalism and Federation 24

2.2.4 Legal and Constitutional Approaches 25

2.2.5 Sociological approaches 27

2.3 Symmetry and Asymmetry 28

2.4 Multinational Federalism 31

2.4.1. Ethno-federalism as a last resort when unitarist fails. 34

2.5 Democracy 38

2.5.1 Direct Democracy 40

2.5.2 Representative Democracy 41

2.5.3 Federal Democracy 42

2.6. Consensus 45

2.7. Critical Review of Studies on Ethiopian Federalism 47

2.8. Summary 58

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 60

3.1. Introduction 60

3.2. Research Approach 61

3.3. Research Design 63

3.4. Method of Research 66

3.5. Sources of Data and Collection Procedures 68

3.6. Data Analysis 70

3.7. Ethical Considerations 71

3.8 Limitation of the study 73

3.9. Summary 73

CHAPTER FOUR: THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ETHIOPIAN STATE TO FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 75

4.1. Introduction 75

4.2. The Evolution of the State of Axumite and Its Decline 76

4.3. Ascendance of the Emperors and the Continuation of the Abyssinian State: The Unification and Centralization Attempts *81*
4.3.1. Emperor Tewodros 81
4.3.2 Emperor Yohannes 83
4.3.3. Emperor Menelik and The Establishment of The Current Ethiopia: Its Boarders and Capital 85
4.3.4 Ascendence of Emperor Haile Selassie to the Throne and His effort to Modernize the Centralized Unitary state. 88
4.4 The Uprisings and the Generation of the Ethiopian Revolution *93*
4.5 The Military Rule *99*
4.6 National Armed Struggle Groups *107*
4.6.1. The EPLF and ELF 108
4.6.2. The TPLF 111
4.6.3. The OLF 116
4.6.4. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) 118
4.6.5 Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) 120
4.7. Summary *121*

CHAPTER FIVE: THE ETHIOPIAN FEDERAL EXERCISE AND ITS CHALLENGES 123

5.1. Introduction *123*
5.2. The Creation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) *123*
5.3. The Creation of the Ethiopian Federal Constitution *137*
5.4. De jure federal structure *155*
5.4.1. The House of Federation: The Upper House 157
5.4.2. The Structure and Division of Powers 161
5.4.3. The Federal and Regional Elections: The End of Transitional Period 165
5.5. Implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism *171*
5.5.1. Implementation Aspects of the HOF 172

5.5.2. The Role of the EPRDF 183
5.5.3 The Issues of Minorities Outside their Mother Regions..... 191
5.6. The Crisis and the End of the EPRDF..... 193
5.6.1. Federal System Implementation and Democratic Unity Interpretations 194
5.7. Summary..... 200
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION..... 202
6.1. Introduction 202
6.2. Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia..... 202
6.2.1 Ideological Foundations of Ethiopian Federalism 209
6.2.2 Institutional Aspect of Ethiopian Federalism 214
6.2.3 Constitutionalism and the Making of the Ethiopian Constitution 216
6.2.4 Symmetry and Asymmetry in Ethiopian Federalism..... 218
6.2.5 Multinational Ethno-federalism Aspects of Ethiopian Federalism ... 220
6.3 Democratization in Ethiopia 222
6.4 Summary..... 230
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS 233
7.1 Objectives 1- 4 233
7.2. Propositions 235
7.3. Conclusions..... 243
7.4. Possible Future Work..... 244
BIBLIOGRAPHY..... 245
Appendix A Ethical approval letter 262

List of Figures

Figure 1: Saunders Onion Approach 61
Figure 2: The Previous and Current Ethiopian Map 76
Figure 3: ERRDF Regulation 188

List of Tables

Table 5. 1: List of Participants on the (PDC) 124
Table 5. 2: Political parties and groups represented in the COR. 130
Table 5. 3:NEBE Report, October 28/1994, ... 143
Table 5. 4:Administrative layers and their respective number of administration structures. 161
Table 5. 5: The 1st Elections Results 1995. 166
Table 5. 6: Decisions of the HOF 172
Table 5. 7: Regional government budget subsidy Criteria. 177
Table 5. 8: Regional government's budget subsidy criteria share. 177
Table 5. 9: Expenditure indicators decided by HOF. 178
Table 5. 10: Percentage of latest regional budget share. 179
Table 5. 11: Request and their decision status of identities. 180
Table 5. 12: Transfer of communities to adjacent regions. 182
Table 5. 13: 2005 Election results. 190
Table 5. 14: EPRDF executive committee Evaluation result. 195

List of Abbreviations

AAPO	All-Amhara Peoples' Organization
AESM	All Ethiopia Socialist Movement
AEUO	All Ethiopia Unity Organization
ALF	Afar Liberation Front
ANLF	Afar National Liberation Front
ANDM	Amhara National Democratic Movement
ANDP	Afar National Democratic Party
APDO	Afar People Democratic Organization
BGPDP	Benshangul Gumuz People's Democratic Party
BPLM	Benishangul Peoples Liberation Movement
CC	Constitutional Commission
CCI	Council of Constitutional Inquiry
CELU	Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Union
COEDF	Coalition of Ethiopia Democratic Forces
COR	Council of Representatives
CUD	Coalition for Unity and Democracy
DMF	Democratic Multinational Federalism
EDAG	Ethiopian Democratic Action Group
EDC	Ethiopian Democratic Coalition
EDU	Ethiopian Democratic Unity
EDORM	Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
ENDO	Ethiopian National Democratic Organization
ENDP	Ethiopia National Democratic Party
EPDA	Ethiopian People's Democratic Association
EPDM	Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Movement
EPDP	Ethiopian Peoples' Democratic Party
EPLO	Ethiopian Peoples' Liberation Organization
EPRA	EthiopianPpeoples' Revolutionary Army
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation Front
EPRDF	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front

EPRP	Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Party
ESS	Ethiopian Statistics Service
ESANA	Ethiopian Student Association North America
ESM	Ethiopian Student Movement
ESPDP	Ethiopian Somali People's Democratic Party
ESUE	Ethiopian Student Union in Europe
ESUNA	Ethiopian Student Union North America
EUS	Ethiopian University Student
FDRE	Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
GDU	Gammo Democratic Unity
GPDF	Gurage People Democratic Front
GPDM	Gambella People's Democratic Movement
GPDRP	Gambella Popole's Democratic Revolutionary Party
HNDO	Hadiya National Democratic Organization
HNL	Harari National League
HOF	House of Federation
HOPR	House of Peoples Representatives
IFLO	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia
ISEN	Institute for Study Ethiopian Nationalities
ISLM	Issa and Gurgura Liberation Movement
IT	Information Technology
KPC	Kaffa People's Congress
ML	Marxist-Leninist
NEBE	National Election Board of Ethiopia
NNP	Nations Nationalities and Peoples
NUEUS	National Union of Ethiopia University Students
OALF	Oromo Abbo Liberation Front
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
ONLF	Ogaden National Liberation Front
ONUF	Oromo National Unity Front
OPDF	Omotic People's Democratic Front
OPDO	Oromo People's Democratic Organisation

PDRE	Peoples' Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PMAC	Provisional Military Administration Council
PNDR	Programme of National Democratic Revolution
POMOA	Provisional Office of Mass Organizational Affairs
POW	Prisoners of War
SEPDM	Southern Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement
SEPDU	Southern Ethiopia Peoples' Democratic Union
SLM	Sidama Liberation Movement
SNNPRS	Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples Region State
SPDP	Silte People Democratic Party
TGE	Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
TNO	Tigray National Organization
TUSA	Tigray University Student Association
UOPLF	Union of Oromo People Liberation Front
USUAA	University Students Union of Addis Ababa
WPE	Workers Party of Ethiopia
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front
WPDF	Wolatyta People Democratic Front

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Research

Since its inception, Ethiopia has had a unitary system of government except for the ten years of a brief federal arrangement with Eritrea under the UN resolution, which was in place from 1952-1962 (Clapham, 2017). However, given the existing diversity and legacy of concentrated power, many argued that the best way to hold Ethiopia together was by adopting one of the variants of federalism (Assefa, 2009). It was no longer a matter of picking a choice from alternatives but something concerning the destiny of the nation/country: in other words, it was a matter of necessity, a long overdue project (Assefa, 2009).

The reality of adopting one of the variants of federalism became a necessity because of the earlier failed nation-building projects through assimilation and centralization attempts by military conquest from the Northern part of the country towards the Central, East, South, and West peripheral areas. The last advocate of a centralized unitary system was the Derg. This military regime ruled the country with an iron fist for 17 years, from 1974 until its collapse in May 1991, the time the Ethiopian Peoples' Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power (Bahru, 1991; Mulugeta, 2020). The fall of the Derg regime brought a complete overhaul of the unitary system and the establishment of the ancient Ethiopian empire (Assefa, 2009). Subsequently, the EPRDF government introduced at first *de facto* federalism and later *de jure* Democratic Multinational Federalism, which was a flagship project for the EPRDF government that intended to fulfill the desire for the self-administration of ethnic groups (identified in the 1994 Constitution as Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples) to accommodate the existing ethnic diversities and tear down century-long injustices (Tewfik, 2010).

The genesis of Democratic Multinational Federalism as a system of government in Ethiopia resulted from the Ethiopian University Student Movement (ESM) that carried the self-determination agenda. Some 50 years ago, Wallellegn Mekonnen, a third-year political science student at what was then the Haile Selassie I University

(now Addis Ababa University), published an article that, for the first time, openly raised the Question of Nationalities (Wallellegn, 1969 as cited in Yonatan & Karl, 2022).[1] Wallellegn dismissed the dominant idea of the time that Ethiopia was a nation-state and argued for the need to establish a genuine national state in which every nationality has an equal opportunity to preserve and develop its language, culture, and history (Wallellegn, 1969 in Yonatan & Kossler, 2022).

The 1960s student movement and subsequent Ethiopian revolutions were motivated by three fundamental quests, each impacting the birth of multinational federalism as a governance system. The first quest was to ensure land to the tiller, a subject the imperial regime's parliament debated on the tenancy regulation during ESM protest (Mulugeta, 2020; Bahru, 1991). The land to the tiller quest was later addressed by the military regime that proclaimed it to garner the support of the masses and reinforce its grip on power (Clapham, 2017; Negarit Gazeta 34th year 22, 11 March 1975). It was one of the most crucial land reform programs in Ethiopian history. It addressed the demands of most Ethiopian farmers, granting them access to land freed from living in servitude. The land reform program decisions reversed the imposition of Northern rulers over the land in the non-northern areas (Bahru, 1991). It, in turn, stripped the control of aristocracy or Northern rulers over the land, which they had exercised for a long time.

The second fundamental item on the students' agenda was self-determination and local autonomy for all ethnic groups (Bahru,1991). Although the military regime took significant steps by transferring possession of land to farmers, it did not recognize the other two pertinent questions: self-determination and democracy (Tewfik, 2010). The Ethiopian self-determination issue came to the fore on the eve of the 1974 popular uprising that deposed Haile Selassie I as emperor and enabled the military junta to come to power. However, the latter did not address the issue of self-determination; instead, it worsened the problems through persistent stubbornness,

[1] In the case of Ethiopian authors, names will be presented in references according to the conventions of the country, with the forename as opposed to surname/familial name used.

refusal to compromise, and its recourse to extreme violence to curb such demands (Tewfik, 2010).

This military junta's failure pushed the student movement leaders and members, various ethnic groups elites, and other Pan-Ethiopian opposition groups to armed struggles, which later evolved into liberation movements. These groups formed resistance or armed struggles in various parts of the country under the premise of self-determination and/or democracy, which resulted in the demise of the Derg in May 1991 after 17 years of protracted civil war. One of rebles was the TPLF, which organized the EPRDF from different ethnically based parties. The defeat of the military regime paved the way and created an opportunity for the EPRDF to undertake political and constitutional transformation. The EPRDF devolved state power along ethnolinguistic lines that enabled ethnic groups to administer themselves. The decision to embrace diversity resulted from the July 1991 Peace and Democracy Conference, which brought different stakeholders together (Tewfik, 2010).

The third fundamental aim of the then-student movement (ESM) was democracy and good governance. As a response to this desire, a new Constitution was enacted in 1994, applauded for its commitment to liberal democracy and respect for political freedoms and human rights (1994 Ethiopia's Constitution part one and part two) and launched Democratic Multinational Federalism to address the unanswered student question of self-administration and democracy by the military regime. The definition of *multinational democratic federalism is the equilibrium between political unity and cultural diversity that we today call multinational democratic federalism,* or *more simply called multinational federalism, in which democracy is the essential element* (Burgess & Gagnon, 2010**).** The Democratic Multinational Federalism, which was introduced in 1991 and has been implemented since then in Ethiopia, has produced mixed results in achievements and challenges.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

The movement of the then-northern core state created the modern Ethiopian state in the middle of the 19th century. It expanded to the Central, East, South, and West peripheral areas of current Ethiopia by engulfing various ethnic identities (NNPs) through conquest to create a centralized, unified country via assimilation. The modern Ethiopian state-building process took place for more than 150 years. However, the attempt had created resentment and disquiet in the newly incorporated areas of the traditional South. The imperial rulers of the time had tried to modernize the country and create a centralized, unified nation-state. The emperors' intent to build a nation-state was not achieved; instead, it created a centralized unitary state, which exacerbated the violation of rights (self-administration, economic and cultural) of the traditional South and the lack of democracy in the traditional North.

The subsequent military regime, the Derg, which followed the footprints of imperial regimes about assimilation and centralization, tried to do more to bring unification through its harsh policies of cultural change and a refusal to recognize and embrace the diversity of the country's ethnic groups, or at best by being very late to acknowledge them. Its denial to acknowledge the multiple diversities of the country's ethnic groups, and its push to bring unity in the form of socialist cultural change had not worked, and yet it was not successful. As a result, the military regime did not create a viable state through its assimilation attempts or cultural change. Following the overthrow and demise of the military regime in May 1991, the EPRDF government introduced and implemented constitutional Democratic Multinational Federalism to address the fundamental rights of self-rule and democratic freedom for ethnic groups and all Ethiopian citizens (Tewfik, 2010).

Although the EPRDF's government implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism has registered visible achievements in the areas of cultural plurality, establishments of the regional state along ethnic lines and self-administrations, language usage, and speedy socio-economic development, there have been many areas that lack consensus, including the absence of democratic practices. Hence,

the implementation of the DMF in Ethiopia during the last three decades has brought about disagreement, disputes, and controversies over the type of federal arrangement and the practices of its implementations that resulted in a lack of consensus on the benefits of the prevailing federal system. The disagreements and controversies have demanded national interventions to resolve the lingering resentments on major national issues.

However, the EPRDF did not adequately address these pertinent national issues: political empowerment and participation, democratization, dialogue, and negotiation on the federal system. The unavailability of these practices immersed the country in protracted ethnic conflicts and wars that have been leading the country to stalemates and the fear of disintegration. These problems manifested in the form of polarization of the political elites from different ethnic and political backgrounds. These manifestations have made the coexistence of the multiethnic country's citizens difficult. Failing to resolve these problems urgently may endanger a country of 120 million inhabitants and destabilize the Horn of Africa and the wider region.

Based on the above problems, and considering these challenges, this thesis thoroughly explores the processes of establishing and implementing the Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism (DMF). On top of this, the thesis strives to identify the factors impairing the evolution of DMF and suggests possible viable policy propositions for future solutions. Therefore, this thesis seeks to address the following primary and additional research questions:

How best to build consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia?

The following additional questions have developed:

1. How has the Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism framework supported and embraced the conceptual and theoretical backgrounds of federalism, federation, democracy, and federal democracy?
2. How much have the processes of introduction and implementation of the Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia been participatory,

negotiable, and inclusive in building a common ground between the elites of the country?

These sub-questions help to investigate document-based research and find a way forward to answer the main research question.

1.3. Aim and Objectives of the Research

This research sought optimum propositions to address the lack of consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism. It strives to identify the impairing factors that overwhelmed the system under investigation during its introduction and implementation.

The thesis has the following interrelated objectives:

First, to critically assess the alignment and uniqueness of Ethiopian Democratic Multinational federalism against the conceptual and theoretical formation of federalism in a multinational setting.

Second, to critically assess and evaluate the process of creating *de facto* multinational federalism during the TGE and the implementation of *de Jure* DMF after the ratification of the 1994 Ethiopian constitution to check the system's robustness.

Third, to identify and describe the challenges that obscured the viable implementation of DMF in Ethiopia and the missed opportunities in the processes.

Fourth, identify the mechanisms, tools, and instruments used in the implementation process and how they facilitated/obscured the implementation of DMF.

To address the thesis objectives, this researcher interrogated document-based data sources that comply with all the processes of introduction and implementation of Democratic multinational Federalism.

1.4. Scope of the Research

The Ethiopian multinational federal system of governance went through a sequence of transitional and implementation phases. Both the introduction and implementation phases did not bring the expected results due to the inappropriate practices that reduced constitutional promises. The failure to implement the constitutional promises generated a lack of consensus (Bahru, 2019; Assefa, 2023). Because of this, Ethiopia has experienced disagreement and protests that forced the EPRDF to change its leadership and, consequentially, dissolve itself. Nevertheless, the problem persists downward, and some urgent intervention is still imperative (Assefa, 2023).

Therefore, the scope of this research focuses on investigating the processes of the making and implementation of a multinational governance model at the federal level, looking into the Peace and Democracy Conference, the processes of drafting and ratifying the federal Constitution, and the implementation of the federal governance system based on the federal Constitution, the then ruling party practices focusing on its federal operation to analysis and interpret the impairing factors of the federal system to find possible proposition.

1.5. Significance of the Study

This research on Ethiopian federal governance can help advance the existing knowledge and interpretation of federalism and democracy. The study identifies the impairing factors and opportunities associated with democratic multinational federalism that imply how countries can build consensus and minimize disputes in a multinational setting. It contributes to enhancing the knowledge of policymakers, scholars, and practitioners to understand better the complexities of governing a diverse country like Ethiopia and identify strategies to improve federal governance systems elsewhere. Moreover, this study explores why federalism in Ethiopia, meant to promote inclusion and address issues related to diversity, faces challenges and has been criticized for stoking ethnic conflicts. Additionally, this study provides

insights into impediments to practicing constitutionalism and democratic multinational governance in Ethiopia. It pinpoints possible suggestions to help a country build a more effective and responsive federal governance system elsewhere.

Furthermore, this thesis contributes to the literature about the importance of building consensus on the model of the federal system that operates in a multinational setting like Ethiopia, which delegates the interpretation of the Constitution to elected representatives of HOF. In the case of Ethiopia, NNPs are the owners of the pact of the federal system (The preamble of the 1994 Constitution of Ethiopia).

On top of this, the researcher seeks to critique the putting together typology of federal formation outlined by Stepan (2005), one of the recognized typologies of federal formation. The critique arises from the assertion that Stepan's (2005) classification basis on assumptions rather than principles or values that truly reflect the core tenets of federalism. If a unitary government restructures without the participation of its key stakeholders, or if two distinct political entities merge without the consent of one of the other, then the outcome could either represent an authoritarian imposition of a one's decision on the other or the colonization of one state by another. Such processes do not align with federal principles and cannot legitimately result in the creation of a federal state. Therefore, categorizing putting together as a form of federal formation fails to meet the essential criteria for such a classification. This researcher challenges the inclusion of this topology in the categorization of federal formation, a critique that may help foster further academic debate. The implementation of DMF in Ethiopia is authoritarian, but it was erected correctly according to the values and principles of federal formation. Nevertheless, serious interventions are needed to improve and correct mistakes to gain national consensus, which can also be an area of academic debate as the researcher's contribution.

1.6. Introduction to the Research Methodology

This research methodology is based on single case study strategy research on Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia, focusing on political decentralization from 1991 to 2019 during the reign of the EPRDF. It is qualitative mono-methodological choice research. Choosing to use a mono method means that it makes use of one data type either qualitative or quantitative. The mono method comprises single data collection and analysis, which thus is either quantitative or qualitative (Saunders, 2007). Thus, the data sources used in this study were only a single data collection and analysis method, which used only qualitative data based on documents and reports for primary data sources and academic and political publications for secondary data sources. The background of the researcher who had participated in the system under investigation at the center of the implementation of DMF and who was well-informed about the strengths, weaknesses, and challenges of the system is presented in chapter three to illustrate how the researcher is cognizant of the risk of personal bias due to being the insider. Chapter three of this thesis details the research's validity and reliability, ethical considerations, and limitations.

1.7. Structure of the Research

This thesis is organized into seven chapters.

Chapter One: Introduction - introduces the subject of the research, the purpose, and the aim and objectives.

Chapter Two: Literature Review details the theoretical debate on federalism, multinational federalism, federal democracy, and consensus. It defines key concepts, such as ethno-federalism, federalization, the nature of federalism, and federal democratic principles, and reviews literature on Ethiopian multinational federalism.

Chapter Three: Methodology - focuses on the methodological consideration of the study. It describes the research approach, research design, data source documents

collection processes, and the researcher's translation of documents from the Amharic language to English. It aims to ensure the validity and reliability of the research through document analysis by investigating the multiple documents collected.

Chapter Four: Historical Evolution of the Ethiopian State Starting from the Northern core state to its evolution to the modern Ethiopia state up to the current federal system to understand how the indigenous state which was established in the Northern core state was expanded to create the current Ethiopia and necessitated the introduction of Democratic Multinational Federalism and to show how Ethiopia became the case study of this research.

Chapter Five: The Ethiopian Federal Exercise and Its Challenges- presents the primary and secondary data sources from documents and publication sources, and analysis data on Democratic Multinational Federalism. It elaborates on the start of the multinational federalism arrangement and its achievements, as well as the impairing factors that created the lack of consensus on the governance model.

Chapter Six: Discussion and Interpretation - presents the discussion and interpretation of the data findings from chapters four and five compared to a conceptual and theoretical background of federalism, democracy, multinationalism, and the literature review presented in chapter two.

Chapter seven: Conclusion - presents conclusions of the thesis and appeal for the maintenance of Democratic Multinational Federalism by building consensus on it and implied legal and policy implications, including suggestions on the amendments of some constitutional provisions accordingly.

CHAPTER TWO: FEDERALISM, MULTINATIONAL FEDERALISM, DEMOCRACY AND CONSENSUS

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the conceptual frameworks of federalism, federation, multinational federalism, democracy, federal democracy, and consensus to assess how the Ethiopian Democratic Multinational federalism introduction and its execution is embraced and supported by theoretical thoughts of federalism. This is to look for optimum propositions for building consensus on the system. The chapter also presents literature reviews of publications on the system under investigation.

The final decade of the twentieth century and the initial decade of the twenty-first century have seen a notable trend toward the adoption of federal constitutions by both established and newly formed states, reflecting a commitment to managing unity amidst diversity (Burgess, 2012). Countries such as Belgium (1993), the Russian Federation (1993), Ethiopia (1995), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), and Nigeria (1999) embraced federal systems. Meanwhile, states like South Africa (1996), Argentina (1994), and Spain (1978) enhanced their existing federal structures as part of broader processes of democratization and territorial decentralization (Burgess, 2012).

The early years of the new millennium continued this federal trend with Iraq adopting a federal constitution in 2005 and Nepal formally establishing a federal republic in 2007 (Burgess, 2012) This growing support for federal systems is based on the belief that such arrangements can foster unity by providing autonomy to subnational units. This support often draws from the experiences of successful democratic federations or the assumption that formal decentralization genuinely empowers constituent units (Dickovick, 2014, as cited in Bizuneh, 2021). The enthusiasm for federalism during this period was influenced by the post-Cold War global context, aiming to manage diverse populations and prevent disintegration based on the unique circumstances of each country.

However, the establishment of the federal system emanates from the unique nature of every country or community to create a new common state by bringing together independent and distinct states or to hold together the existing old state by devolution and decentralization to avoid the risk of disintegration. Thus, the unique nature of the ethnic identities and their number which are more than eighty ethnic groups with their languages, cultures, and religions (which includes indigenous traditional religions, Christianity, Islam, and Judaism) demanded some form of accommodation of diversity in Ethiopia to hold the country together. The purpose of federalism in Ethiopia was to avert the risk of disintegration of the country after the fall of the last agent of the unitary empire, the Derg.

The next section (2.2) of this chapter discusses an overview of federalism followed by the concept of federalism and federation that provides details on the areas of ideological institutional considerations of federalism, the historical development of federalism, and normative and empirical approaches to federalism. These concepts are helpful in the light of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia, which is the focus of this researcher's argument. The third section (2.3) of the chapter details symmetry and asymmetry in a federal setting, which will help the interpretation of data about Ethiopia, which has a symmetric model constitution and very asymmetric reality in the ground according to the theoretical framework. The fourth section (2.4) of the chapter discusses multinational federalism and deals with national and ethnonational federalism along with aspects of ethnonational federalism as a last resort for multinational settings. The conceptualization of these ideas strengthens the understanding of the study under consideration, the Multinational Federation of Ethiopia. The fifth section (2.5) of the chapter is about federal democracy and democracy related to federalism. This aims to link the conceptualization of federalism and democracy, which are expected for the success of Democratic Multinational Federalism. The sixth section (2.6) defines consensus and presents its theory. The seventh (2.7) section presents a critical review of the few scholars who

wrote about the Ethiopian federal system. The Summary (2.8) of the chapter presents the final section of chapter two.

2.2 The Overview of Federalism

The interest in introducing federalism as a resilient form of government in multinational countries is still growing (Burgess, 2012). This is because there is a hope that federalism can accommodate culturally and ethnically diverse communities in existing polities. This researcher believes so as well. Therefore, it is important to explore scholarly debates on the ideological dispensation of federalism and the institutional arrangement of federations to understand the theoretical and empirical analyses of federalism federation and democracy for the benefit of this thesis.

The term Federalism originates from the Latin word *Foedus*, which means league, covenant, or treaty. Although it is one of the most ancient concepts in political science, as a form of government, federalism represents a modern development (Kincaid, 2019). Essentially, federalism is a system of partnership established and governed by a covenant. This arrangement involves a distinctive form of collaboration where each partner's integrity is mutually recognized, aimed at fostering a specific form of unity among them (Elazar, 1987)

Federalism holds significance comparable to natural law in its role in defining justice and natural rights and outlining the origins and proper constitution of political society (Elazar, 1987). The concept of federalism and its application can be traced back to at least the sixteenth century, and possibly to ancient times (Elazar, 1987; Elazar & Kincaid, 2000; Dimitrios & Wayne, 2005; Thomas & Alan, 2015, as cited in Benz & Sonnicksen, 2021).

In both modern and postmodern eras, federalism has emerged as a crucial method for managing the desire to preserve or revive the benefits of smaller societies while addressing the need for larger communities to share resources or maintain cultural distinctiveness within broader societies. Thus, federal systems have been used both

to integrate new political entities while maintaining internal diversities and to link established states for economic benefits and enhanced security (Elazar, 1987). William defines federalism as: Federalism is a political organization in which the activities of government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each level of government has some areas where it makes final decisions (William, 1975).

Federalism became a significant tool for nation or state-building following the collapse of European colonial empires after World War II (Watts, 1994, as cited in Asnake, 2009). Many postcolonial, multi-ethnic countries in Asia and Africa adopted federal systems. Although some of these federations struggled in their early stages, the role of federalism in balancing competing demands for autonomy and unity in countries like India, Malaysia, and Nigeria remains evident (Rothchild, 1966, as cited in Asnake, 2009).

In recent years after the collapse of the Cold War, several African countries became either official self-proclaimed federal governments like Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Somalia or purposefully eschewed federal labels and created federal structural arrangements like South Africa, Sudan, Kenya, Democratic Republic of Congo, and South Sudan (Steytler & Kincaid, 2019). The efforts of the countries show that there is a hope of holding their countries together in a participatory way of accommodating all of their elites. Most federalism scholars advocate about the importance of both coming together and holding together federalism as an instrument of effective federal theory based on specific realities of a country, while William (1975) only focuses on coming together type of federalism which explains the creation of a new union by bringing two or more independent states voluntarily.

The ongoing debate over the definitions of federalism and federation has become a central topic in recent scholarly discussions, which are detailed below. While these terms are closely related, they carry different meanings and implications. Federalism refers to a governmental system in which power is distributed between a central authority and subnational units, such as states or provinces, allowing each to govern

within its sphere (Elazar, 1987; Watts, 1998). On the other hand, a federation is a specific type of political organization that combines strong constituent entities with a robust central government. In a federation, both levels of government possess powers granted to them by the people, enabling them to interact directly with citizens in the exercise of those powers (Elazar, 1987). In a genuinely democratic federation, there is a compound sovereign state where at least two governmental levels, the federal and the regional, enjoy constitutionally distinct authorities, although they may share some concurrent powers. Both the federal and regional governments can engage directly with citizens, and the citizens, in turn, directly elect representatives of these governments, ensuring democratic accountability at multiple levels (McGarry & O'Leary, 2005). Even though the word genuine is subjective, federations in older Western federations have a democratic system where the powers of the federal government and their federal units are respected by each level of government according to their constitutions and both enjoy their rights accordingly. In this type of federation, citizens enjoy the right to restrict the encroachment of government via a process of democratic elections that determine the fate of elected officials. This process helps to maintain political stability, and the newly evolving federations need to follow this system based on their pecular situation.

Federalism is a political organization that integrates separate polities into a unified system while allowing each to retain a certain level of autonomy. In contrast, a federation is a form of government where the national government shares sovereignty and power with constituent states or provinces. In such a system, the central government holds specific powers, while states or provinces maintain others (Simeon & Robinson, 1990). The distinction between federalism and federation is crucial, yet there has been some variation and ambiguity in how these terms are understood (Watts, 1998).

For some scholars, like Preston King (1982), federalism is a normative and philosophical concept that involves advocating for federal principles, whereas a federation is a descriptive term referring to a specific type of institutional relationship.

Conversely, others, such as Elazar (1987, 1993, 1994b) and Burgess & Gagnon (1993), view both federalism and federation as descriptive terms. In their perspective, federalism is the overarching category of political organization that includes various forms, such as federations, confederations, associated statehoods, unions, leagues, condominiums, constitutional regionalization, and constitutional home rule. Within this broad framework, federations represent just one species within the wider genus of federalism (Watts, 1998).

Federations are defined by three key characteristics. First, they have a geopolitical division, where the polity is divided into distinct states or provinces, each constitutionally recognized and protected from unilateral dissolution. Second, there is independence, meaning that both the states and the federal government operate autonomously, typically established through constitutional frameworks, with each level of government accountable to its constituents. This independence can exist in both democratic and non-democratic forms. Third, federations feature direct governance, where both state and national governments exercise direct authority over their citizens, each within specific policy areas. This division of authority is constitutionally defined, ensuring that both levels of government have established roles and responsibilities (Bednar, 2005).

According to Aalen (2002), a federation consists of territorially based regional units, such as states, provinces, regions, Länder, republics, or cantons, which are constitutionally guaranteed representation at the central level of government. Watts' definition of federalism aligns with the normative concept endorsed by King, which involves two main approaches. The first is a pragmatic balance between citizens' preferences for joint action in certain areas and self-government in others. This approach is rooted in *The Federalist Papers* by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay (1788) and has been influential in the advocacy of federalism in the English-speaking world (Wheare, 1963; Elazar, 1987, as cited in Watts, 1998). The second approach is more ideologically driven and is common among European advocates of federalism as discussed by King (1982) and Burgess & Gagnon (1993). This includes the idea of

federalism as a utopian system, exemplified by the philosophy of Marc (1987, as cited in Watts, 1998).

Nation Nationalities and Peoples in Ethiopia embraced federalism to fulfill their desire to live in harmony together under a federal system by accommodating, diversity and leaving some authorities to the federal government. They are governing themselves individually in their localities according to the normative principles of federalism. The ideological aspect of federalism became a mantra in Ethiopia after Wallellegn Makonnen's article Nations Nationalities and Peoples, which had an ideological connection with the Stalinist thought that was published (Wallellegn, 1969). At the same time, a Federation is a compound polity combining constituent units and general government, each having powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution, each empowered to deal directly with the citizens in the exercise of a sizable part of its legislative, administrative, and taxing powers and, each directly elected by its citizens (Watts, 1998).

In a federation, the federal government usually cannot unilaterally alter the horizontal division of powers: constitutional change affecting competencies requires the consent of both levels of government. Therefore, federation automatically implies a codified and written constitution, and normally is accompanied at the federal level by a supreme court, charged with umpiring differences between the governmental tiers, and by a bicameral legislature in which the federal as opposed to the popular chamber may disproportionately represent the smallest regions (McGarry & O'Leary, 2005). In this regard, the Ethiopian Federal arrangement was formally created by the 1994 Ethiopian constitution which granted the right to establish self-governing regional states for all ethnic groups in the country at any time (Ethiopian 1994 constitution Article 46/2). This was a pragmatic action to hold the country together. Ideologically, the 1960s and 1970s Ethiopian student movement was the inspirational source of this federation, which had affiliation with Stalinist nations, nationalities, and people's slogans. This is useful for the interpretation of the data in chapter six.

2.2.1 Ideological and Institutional Consideration of Federalism

Most definitions of federalism focus on the nature of the system, specifically the division of power between the central or federal government and subnational or regional governments. However, they often fail to distinguish between the ideological aspects of federalism and its institutional structure (Asnake, 2009). King (1982), who highlighted this issue in federal studies, argued that the lack of differentiation between these two aspects contributes to the difficulty in conceptualizing federalism (king, 1982; as cited by Asnake, 2009).

In Ideological Factors in the Development of Federalism King (1982) provides a thorough analysis of the ideological foundations of federalism. He argues that federalism is not just a political system but also a political ideology rooted in core values such as the protection of individual liberty, the distribution of power between central and local authorities, and the promotion of democratic governance. King contends that federalism has been influenced by various ideological factors, including classical liberalism, republicanism, and populism. These ideologies have shaped federalism differently, with some emphasizing individual rights and others focusing on collective identity and community.

According to King (1982), ideological federalism encompasses at least three distinct mobilization orientations: centralist, decentralist, and balance (King, 1982, as cited in Asnake, 2009). First, centralist federalism has been promoted both nationally and internationally. On an international level, there is a long-standing belief that peace can be maintained by limiting the war-making powers of sovereign states through a supranational or federal structure (King, 1982; as cited in Asnake, 2009). This centralization has historically led to the formation of federations from previously independent states, such as the USA (King, 1982; as cited in Asnake, 2009).

Federalist decentralism, on the other hand, seeks to prevent the concentration and growth of power. This approach views decentralization as expressing particularity,

individualism, and democracy (King, 1982; as cited in Asnake, 2009). The third orientation, which King identifies as a doctrine of balance, is exemplified by Venn (1908), who describes the federal idea as striving to find equilibrium between centralization and decentralization. This orientation reflects the societal desire for union without complete unity. The federal idea is often seen as a compromise, symbolized by the balance between unity and diversity, autonomy and sovereignty, and national and regional interests (Smith, 1995).

In contrast, the federation is conceived as an institutional arrangement, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units in its decision procedure on some constitutionally entrenched basis (King, 1982; as cited in Smith, 1995). Thus, any existent form of federation can be consistent with at least one of the three types of federalism: centralization, decentralization, or balance (King, 1982). More specifically, although there may be federalism without federation, federalism can exist without a formal federation, as there are many examples of countries that have decentralized systems of government in which power is distributed between different levels of government. But there can be no federation without some matching variety of federalism. In these cases, federalism is still present because power is distributed between different levels of government, but the specific form of government may not meet the technical definition of a federation. Additionally, there are other types of decentralized systems of government, such as confederations, Federacy, and associated statehood, that are not considered federations but still embody the principles of federalism (Elazar, 1995).

In this regard, the Ethiopian federal arrangement corresponds to both ideological and institutional considerations of federalism. The introduction of the federal arrangement changed the century-long unjust relationship of Ethiopia's ethnic groups and created a framework for all ethnic communities to be recognized and acknowledged as equal citizens of the country. It is a decentralist form of King's federalism approach; its ideological inspiration was a result of the Ethiopian student

movement in the 1960s and 70s. The 1994 Ethiopian constitution established a federal and democratic structure (Article 1), and through this structure, the unitary government changed to a federal government with nine regional federal units at that time and became twelve federal units in Nov 2019 by disintegrating the previous SNNP regional State. The territorial jurisdiction of the federal Ethiopia comprises the territory of the members of the federation (Ethiopian 1994 Constitution Article 2).

2.2.2 The Historical Development of Federalism

Every federation emerges from unique historical and political circumstances, making it challenging to identify a universal set of factors explaining why countries adopt federal systems (Davis, 1978). However, examining factors from political, economic, and sociological perspectives can provide insights into the formation of federations (Asnake, 2009). When focusing on political factors, various interpretations arise among federalism experts. William, who explored theories on the origins of federations, proposed that the federal arrangement often results from negotiations between national leaders and officials of constituent governments. This federal bargain typically aims to aggregate territory to address external military or diplomatic threats or to prepare for potential aggression (William, 1964). However, a limitation of William's definition is its exclusive focus on the integration of independent units to form a federal government. It does not account for the decentralization of existing countries to maintain unity under pressure from centrifugal forces. Additionally, it fails to consider the creation of federal structures designed to accommodate the diversity of multinational and multicultural societies by granting autonomous regional governments, thereby preventing disintegration.

In contrast, some scholars like Elazar (1987) examine the political motivations behind federations from the perspectives of liberty, citizenship, and democracy. Federalism is considered a vital tool for protecting individual freedoms by restricting the power of the central government and fostering competition among different levels of government (Elazar, 1987). By distributing power between the central authority and the states, federalism prevents the excessive concentration of power and

potential abuse, ensuring that no single institution or individual can dominate the political system. This power-sharing arrangement helps safeguard individual liberties and prevents governmental encroachment on citizens' rights. Additionally, federalism supports democratic governance by promoting political competition and enhancing citizen participation. It allows for greater involvement in the political process, as citizens can engage in elections at both the national and local levels. This increased level of political engagement helps ensure that elected officials are more responsive to the needs and interests of their constituents (Elazar, 1979b; Stepan, 2001; Weinstock, 2001). However, the practical implementation of the aim of this thought seems very hypothetical in many federations due to the existence of encroachments by elected or non-elected authorities on the rights and liberties of citizens.

The process by which a federation is created is multifaceted and depends largely on the historical and political context of the entities involved. Generally, a country can become a federal state through two primary mechanisms: the unification of independent units or the decentralization of a previously centralized state. Each approach carries distinct implications for the balance of power between the federal government and its constituent regions. The first method, often referred to as federalization by aggregation, occurs when separate, independent entities choose to come together to form a unified federal state. In this scenario, the individual units voluntarily cede a portion of their sovereignty to the federal government in exchange for shared responsibilities in areas such as international relations, defense, security, and taxation (USA, Switzerland, and Australia). This process is typically driven by a desire for mutual benefits like collective security, economic cooperation, or greater international influence. However, even as these entities unite, they retain significant autonomy in policymaking over matters of local concern. This arrangement ensures that the regions maintain considerable control over their affairs, with the overarching federal government’s powers being deliberately limited and kept in check. The division of power in such federations is typically enshrined in a constitution, which

outlines the specific powers allocated to both the federal government and the constituent regions. Importantly, the Constitution often assigns residual powers—those not explicitly listed—to the federal government or the regions, further enhancing their autonomy and ensuring a favorable distribution of authority that aligns with the interests of the individual units (Watts, 1999; Baldi, 1999; Fabre, 2009).

The second method involves the decentralization of a previously centralized state, a process described by Elodie Fabre as federalism by decentralization. This approach typically occurs when a unitary state, often in response to pressures from regionalist movements or political parties, decides to devolve power to its constituent regions. Unlike federalization by aggregation, where regions retain significant power, the central government in a decentralized federation is more likely to preserve substantial authority. Consequently, the regions in such a system tend to have less autonomy compared to their counterparts in an aggregated federation. In these cases, the constitution generally assigns residual powers to the central government, limiting the scope of regional authority and ensuring that the central government retains ultimate control over key areas of governance (Watts, 1999; as cited in Fabre, 2009).

Rokkan and Derek (1982) offer a conceptual framework for understanding these processes, distinguishing between Mechanical federalism and Organic federalism. Mechanical federalism refers to a system that is imposed from above, characterized by territorial diversity but dominated by a central authority that holds significant political and institutional power. This type of federalism is often associated with centralized control, where the federal government exerts considerable influence over the constituent regions. On the other hand, organic federalism emerges from the voluntary association of various territories, where the central authority's power is limited, and the constituent units enjoy greater autonomy. This form of federalism is typically more balanced, with a distribution of power that favors regional independence and self-governance (Fabre, 2009).

Weinstock (1999) provides a similar perspective, labeling these processes as federal restructuring and federal integration. According to Daniel, a federal system can arise from either the federalization of a unitary state—where a centralized government devolves powers to regional units—or from an agreement among independent political entities to form a new federal structure. The former involves restructuring an existing state to accommodate regional demands for autonomy, while the latter involves the integration of previously independent states into a single federal entity.

Expanding on these concepts, Stepan (2005) categorizes federal formation into three distinct types, each reflecting different motivations and outcomes. The first type, coming together federalism, involves previously independent states voluntarily merging into a larger federal entity. This is done to pool resources, enhance collective security, and achieve common goals, such as economic development. Examples include the formation of the United States, Switzerland, and Australia. The second type, holding together federalism, is characterized by a centralized state that creates a federal system to maintain unity among its distinct regions or territories. This approach is often seen in countries like India, Spain, and Belgium, where the federal structure is used to manage regional diversity while preserving national unity. The third type, putting together federalism, involves a coercive effort by a non-democratic central power to assemble a multinational state, often incorporating previously independent states. This type of federalism has been observed in postcolonial Africa, where many such states were short-lived due to the lack of voluntary association and the heavy-handed nature of their formation. Stepan's notion of putting together federalism highlights the tension between democratic principles and coercive state-building, situating this type of federalism outside the normative framework of democratic governance. As a result, coming together federalism is often seen as the most democratic form while holding together federalism occupies a middle ground, and putting together federalism remains conceptually distant from the ideals of voluntary federal union (Burgess, 2012).

The two Stepan typologies are useful frameworks for analyzing and comparing different federal systems, and they highlight the diversity of federal arrangements that exist around the world. It also underscores the fact that federalism is not a one-size-fits-all solution but rather a flexible and adaptable set of practices and institutions that can be tailored to meet the needs and realities of different societies and their political contexts. From the researcher's view of this thesis, the third category of Stepan's federal formation approach, putting together, is against the very principle of creating sharedrules and self-rule. It can be categorized as simple as an autocratic failed attempt to federalize units, and it is difficult to categorize it as one of the approaches of federal formation because it lacks minimum values, principles, and processes of federal state creation.

The political reason for the creation of the Ethiopian Federation was from the viewpoint of liberty and democracy. There had been an assimilation attempt for more than a century to create a society of one language and one religion under one flag. Nevertheless, this effort was not successful, and it immersed the country in a protracted civil war for seventeen years (1974-1991). Therefore, the historical reason that brought multinational federalism to Ethiopia was the quest of the nations, nationalities, and peoples for self-administration under the framework of federal and democratic Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991).

2.2.3 Normative and Empirical Approaches of Federalism and Federation

The theoretical frameworks for understanding federalism can be broadly categorized into normative and empirical approaches. Normative approaches typically explore the presumed benefits and drawbacks of federalism, often highlighting its association with peace, security, citizenship, and democracy. Conversely, some critics argue that federalism can exacerbate regional inequalities and enable the oppression of local minorities by majorities (Shapiro, n.d., as cited in Burris, 2001). Empirical studies, on the other hand, examine the practical aspects of federal systems, such as the division of power between central and regional governments, the dynamics of intergovernmental relationships, variations among federal systems,

and the mechanisms of federal operation, including the causes and consequences of establishing or dissolving federal systems (Burris, 2001, as cited in Asnake, 2009).

Regarding the normative approach, Ethiopian federalism brought the advantage of peace, security, and at least nominal democratic exercise during the EPRDF era and was able to end armed struggles that had been happening in different parts of the country before the introduction of the federal system. However, it created new minorities, and their disquiets due to ill negotiations and dialogue in the processes of federalization and implementation. At the empirical level, the traditional centralized unified Ethiopian state completely changed to two levels of government, federal and regional, along ethnic lines.

Consequently, several competing approaches to the study of federalism have emerged. Tarlton (1965) identified formal, legal, political, and sociological approaches. Similarly, Lori Torlakson (2003) proposed three competing approaches: sociological, constitutional, and governmental/political (Asnake, 2009). This thesis has focused on the legal and constitutional approaches which are relevant to understanding federal arrangements.

2.2.4 Legal and Constitutional Approaches

Federalism is commonly understood as a system of governance grounded in a constitution, where both citizens and regional entities are meaningfully represented at the central level. Scholars have emphasized that legal and constitutional approaches to federalism are crucial for understanding how constitutions create institutional frameworks that define the division of power between central and regional governments (Sawer, 1969; Wheare, 1963). The legal approach specifically highlights the importance of law and legal institutions in shaping the structure, processes, and dynamics of federal systems (Elazar, 1995). It focuses on the interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory laws, as well as the interactions between legal and political actors within these frameworks (Elazar, 1995). In the United States, the Supreme Court has played a pivotal role in shaping

the legal architecture of federalism by interpreting the U.S. Constitution and federal statutes. Through numerous landmark rulings, the Court has defined the scope of federal authority, clarified the relationship between the federal government and the states, and protected state sovereignty (Elazar, 1995).

This implies that the government must operate under the rule of law and adhere strictly to the principle of constitutionalism (Aalen, 2002). Such approaches emphasize that federations require written constitutions that prevent either level of government from making unilateral changes (Burgess, 2006). In a federal system, regional autonomy and representation are constitutionally protected, ensuring that the central government lacks the legal authority to abolish, amend, or redefine territorial units. Moreover, any changes to the constitution require an extraordinary majority from the constituent units to safeguard their interests (King, 1982; as cited in Aalen, 200). The principle of preventing the violation of rights by either level of government is crucial. However, conflicts may arise when federal or regional elites exceed their jurisdictions, potentially leading to disputes or even war. To prevent thistype of violetaion of jurisdictions, the federal constitution should include mechanisms, such as referendums initiated by the populace, to keep both levels of authority within their boundaries. Additionally, these approaches highlight the importance of an independent body, such as a Supreme or Constitutional Court, to adjudicate constitutional disputes (Burgess, 2012). Given the supremacy of the federal constitution over both levels of government, most federations entrust the task of constitutional interpretation to independent courts (Asnake, 2009).

Bicameralism is a crucial component of federal systems, serving distinct functions depending on the specific federal structure and constitutional framework in place. Typically, the first or lower house represents the interests of the federation's entire population and functions as a foundation for federal governance (Asnake, 2009; Aalen, 2002). This chamber is tasked with ensuring broad-based representation and supporting the federal government's authority. The role of the second chamber varies according to the federal tradition and the specific type of federalism practiced.

For example, in the United States, where federalism primarily aims to delineate and balance power, the Senate functions as a mechanism for states to counterbalance the authority of the national government (Aalen, 2002). However, the existing polarization of political parties might endanger this the very principle of balancing power between the federal government and regional states by gravitating to party support instead of the regional states when one party dominates the Senates.

In contrast, in federal systems with a parliamentary tradition or those focused on maintaining national unity, the second chamber is designed to ensure that national legislative actions are consulted with representatives from smaller regions as well as from larger ones. Consequently, the appointment methods for representatives in the second chamber vary significantly. They may be selected by state executives, as in Germany, elected by state legislatures, as in Switzerland, or directly by the electorate, as in the contemporary American federation (Aalen, 2002). This theoretical framework of bicameralism and its legal implications has been foundational for the analysis and discussion of Ethiopia's federal structure in Chapter Six.

2.2.5 Sociological approaches

The sociological focus of federalism examines how societal diversities interact with federal structures. William S. Livingston famously argued that the essence of federalism is not rooted in institutional or constitutional frameworks but in the societal context itself (William, 1952, cited in Burgess, 2006). According to Livingston, federalism is fundamentally a function of society rather than a product of constitutional design (Tarlton, 1965). He proposed that the sociological basis of federalism is deeply embedded in social cleavages, which may include sub-state nationalism, linguistic differences, indigenous groups, and communal traditions. Importantly, it is not merely the presence of these social cleavages that matters but their patterns of political significance and how they are territorially distributed throughout the federal state. The stability of the federal system's constitutional and political order relies on understanding these cleavage patterns and their changes

over time. Thus, the way social cleavages are distributed and evolve is crucial for maintaining the stability and functionality of the federal structure (Burgess, 2006).

This approach does not conflict with the constitutional or legal perspectives of federalism, which emphasize the need for a written constitution and functional institutions. Instead, it highlights the significance of reinforcing the connections between various societal cleavages to foster cooperation and mutual understanding, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the federal system for harmonious living. Embracing traditional values and respecting linguistic diversities at both subnational and national levels can contribute to promoting unity in diversity and ensuring the stability of the federal system, alongside establishing a constitution and institutions.

The insights from the sociological perspective on federalism are highly relevant to the Ethiopian federal arrangement. One of the research questions in this dissertation aims to explore sociological approaches in the context of Ethiopian federalism. Ethiopia, with its more than 80 linguistic groups, faces challenges related to sub-state nationalism, religious differences, and diverse indigenous and communal identities, each with its territorial claims. This complexity has been central to the development of Ethiopian federalism, which seeks to create a state structure that accommodates and addresses the country's vast diversity effectively.

2.3 Symmetry and Asymmetry

The study of federalism often centers on the degree to which relationships within federations are symmetrical or asymmetrical (Asnake, 2009). Tarlton defines symmetry in federalism as the extent to which component states share similar conditions and concerns within the federal system (Tarlton, 1965). Symmetry involves a uniform level of conformity and similarity among the political units about both the federal system and one another. In an ideal symmetrical federal system, the constituent units are identical in terms of territory, population, economic features, climate, cultural patterns, social groupings, and political institutions. These units

maintain the same relationship with the central authority, and each unit holds equivalent powers and responsibilities. The United States exemplifies a symmetrical federation, where each state has the same relationship with the federal government and similar authorities (Bednar, 2011). The Ethiopian Constitution of 1994 aimed to create a symmetrical federation by promoting rights such as self-determination, establishing a political community based on the rule of law, ensuring a democratic order, and advancing economic and social development across regional governments and ethnic groups (Preamble of the Ethiopian 1994 Constitution).

In contrast, asymmetry in federalism describes the extent to which component states differ from one another (Tarlton, 1965). An ideal asymmetrical federal system consists of political units that reflect the diverse interests, characteristics, and compositions within the broader society. Diversity is expressed through regional governments that possess varying degrees of autonomy and power. Each component unit has unique features that distinguish it from others, creating specific interests within the federation. Examples of asymmetric federalism include Belgium (Swenden, 2002), Canada (Watts, 1999b), Russia (Christina, 2011), and Spain (Agranoff, 1999). Asymmetrical federalism is often justified to recognize the distinct preferences of various subpopulations, such as ethnically identified groups, which negotiate (either formally or informally) for increased authority over areas significant to their identity, like education or language (Kymlicka, 1998, 2001). This approach addresses the practical realities of a country’s diversity and contributes to effective governance.

In Ethiopia, the 1994 Constitution provides special rights to the Oromia region, which has the largest ethnic population and surrounds Addis Ababa, the nation's capital. This arrangement allows Oromia to have special rights concerning various issues related to the capital city. Addis Ababa, as a self-governing city and the national capital, is accountable to the federal government (Ethiopian 1994 Constitution, Art. 49/5). This arrangement reflects the asymmetric nature of Ethiopian federalism, which has been explored in depth in the discussion chapter.

Burgess distinguishes between two types of asymmetries: *de facto* and *de jure* (Burgess, 2006). *De facto* asymmetry results from socio-economic and cultural conditions that create unequal relationships among federated units, while *de jure* asymmetry is established through constitutional and legal frameworks, leading to different treatments for constituent units under the law (Burgess, 2006). Kymlicka (1998) argues that asymmetrical federalism can be a valuable tool for managing diversity and addressing the needs of minority communities by granting different regions or groups varying levels of autonomy. This approach helps protect minority rights and ensures that the unique needs and interests of diverse communities are considered (Kymlicka, 1998).

Max Frenkel, in his Alphabet of Federalism, explains that asymmetry is a natural feature of federalism because it accommodates differences and diversity within a political system. Asymmetry can take many forms, including variations in size, population, culture, language, religion, and economic power among federal units. Frenkel argues that asymmetry should be viewed as a strength rather than a weakness in federal systems, as it allows for greater flexibility and responsiveness to local needs and preferences (Frenkel, 1986). Duchacek defines asymmetrical federalism as the absence of equal relationships among the constituent units of a federation in various respects. Asymmetry can manifest in different ways, such as disparities in population size, economic power, political influence, or cultural identity among federal units (Duchacek, 1970).

Duchacek argues that asymmetry is a fundamental aspect of federal systems, offering benefits in terms of flexibility and responsiveness to local needs and preferences. However, he also notes that asymmetry can lead to tensions and conflicts between federal units, particularly if some units perceive themselves as disadvantaged or discriminated against compared to others (Duchacek, 1970). Federations may be symmetrical in terms of constitutional and institutional arrangements, but the inherent principle of accommodating differences in self-rule and shared rule means that asymmetry often characterizes federal systems.

Understanding asymmetrical federalism is crucial for comprehending Ethiopia's federal structure and addressing the country's recurring challenges. This theoretical framework provides insights into how asymmetry functions within federal systems and helps in formulate strategies to manage and mitigate the tensions arising from such arrangements.

2.4 Multinational Federalism

Multinational federalism is a type of federalism in which the constituent states or regions of a country are recognized as distinct national groups with their own unique cultures, languages, and identities. This type of federalism is designed to accommodate the diversity of the different national groups within a country while still maintaining a unified political system (Burgess, 2012).

Multinational federalism emphasizes maintaining a sense of separateness within a state, rather than advocating for secession from it. This approach aims to protect, preserve, and promote distinct substate nations, allowing them to function as nations within a larger federal structure. Consequently, multinational federalism is inherently based on the idea of a dynamic and inclusive federal system, where its primary purpose is to accommodate and harmonize diverse groups within a unified state (Burgess, 2006, cited in Seymour, 2012). Kenneth examined the potential and constraints of federalism as a mechanism for uniting nations while preserving their unique identities. He suggested that federalism could enable the coexistence of distinct national identities and foster a broader sense of common nationality (Wheare, 1962). Similarly, Trudeau (1968), in his seminal essay The New Treason of the Intellectuals, argued that separating the concepts of state and nation could transform Canada into a genuinely pluralistic and polyethnic society. This separation would allow diverse identities to coexist within a unified state framework. Both Wheare (1962) and Trudeau (1968) envisioned federalism and nationalism as interrelated concepts that could be innovative and constructive in governance and politics. They recognized that achieving this vision would require exceptional political

acumen and leadership, coupled with an acceptance of the inherent instability that might accompany the initial stages of this process (Seymour, 2012).

Multinational federalists challenge the notion that every minority must inevitably seek its nation-state. Instead, they argue that even among those who do seek autonomy, they may choose to remain within their regional boundaries rather than pursue complete independence. According to this view, if provincial borders or federative components align with the boundaries of national, ethnic, religious, or linguistic communities—creating a federal society that matches the federating institutions—then a federation can effectively harmonize a diverse political society by creating more homogeneous sub-units. Multinational federalism thus explicitly rejects the unitarian and national federalist argument that self-rule for minorities necessarily conflicts with the territorial integrity of existing states (McGarry & O'Leary, 2005).

The practical implementation of multinational federalism involves managing a political system that operates within multicultural and multinational contexts. Effective application requires careful interaction among elites to balance diversity and protect minority rights while mitigating inefficiencies that could undermine national unity in a country with multiple ethnic or linguistic groups. The success of such a system depends on several factors, including its context and the mechanisms put in place to ensure transparency and participation. The historical creation of a unitary state in Ethiopia achieved through conquest and forced assimilation, led to resentment and turmoil over the centuries. The introduction of Democratic Multinational Federalism (DMF) was intended as a remedy for the longstanding conflicts related to Ethiopian identities. However, the implementation of DMF has to be tailored to Ethiopia's unique context, reflecting the dynamic nature of its state structure.

The success of any federal system hinges on achieving a balance between centripetal and centrifugal forces within the state (Burgess, 2006). Scholars categorize federations based on their roles in addressing ethnic issues (Burgess,

2006; Jo'zsef, 2005). Federations are generally classified into two main categories: mono-national federations and ethno-federations. Mono-national federations, while not necessarily ethnically homogeneous, are organized to support a single national identity. These federations may involve states where national and ethnic minorities are also minorities in each constituent unit. The goal of national federalism is often nation-building and the reduction of internal national or ethnic differences. Older Western federations such as the USA, Austria, Germany, Australia, and Latin American countries typically fall into this category. These federations emerged from the union of previously independent units, with the primary objective of uniting people who shared a common language and culture (O'Leary, 2001).

The second category encompasses federations that are nationally and ethnically heterogeneous, operating in a federal structure that reflects this diversity. These are known as ethno-federations. In an ethno-federation, internal boundaries are often drawn to ensure that some units are controlled by national or ethnic minorities. Additionally, multiple nationalities may be explicitly recognized as co-founders and co-owners of the federation. Notable examples include Switzerland, established in its current form in 1848, and Canada, established in 1867. Following decolonization, the Indian subcontinent was divided into India and Pakistan, both multi-ethnic federations. In Africa, Nigeria and Ethiopia are federations, while South Africa operates with a federal structure in practice (McGarry & O'Leary, 2005).

These federations are also termed multiethnic or multinational federations. Multiethnic federations are characterized by a predominant majority nation that unifies the population through state patriotism and a shared identity. On the other hand, multinational federations feature distinct ethnic groups with separate national identities, where each group's loyalty primarily lies with its national member state, while loyalty to the federation is secondary. The success of such federations relies on whether the individual nations are bound together by a common, enduring political interest (Jozsef, 2005).

In this regard, Ethiopian federalism is often categorized as a multinational federation. In Ethiopia, no single ethnic group dominates, with the largest ethnic group comprising around 40% of the population. Additionally, individual ethnic groups in Ethiopia maintain distinct national identities, with loyalty primarily directed towards their ethnic region. This aligns with Jo'zsef's categorization of multinational federations, emphasizing that success depends on shared political interests (Jo'zsef, 2005). Conversely, other scholars view Ethiopian federalism as multiethnic, focusing on its regionalization and the formation process, which they argue lacked genuine negotiation among political forces (Aalen, 2002; Tesfaye, 2010; Gedamu, 2019; Atnafu, 2017; Mahmood, 2019; Jon, 2012; Asnake, 2009). Aalen contends that Ethiopian federalism, though meeting minimal definitions of federation lost legitimacy due to its undemocratic introduction and insufficient bargaining (Aalen, 2002). The debate over ethno-national federations is complex, with the effectiveness of such systems dependent on various factors, including implementation context, design specifics, and the attitudes of the elites involved.

2.4.1. Ethno-federalism as a last resort when unitarist fails.

Ethno-federalism is defined as at least some, if not all, the constituent units of the federations are homelands controlled by the respective ethnic groups (Roeder, 2009). For Hale (2001, 2005), a federal political system is one in which territorial governance units are explicitly designated as ethnic homelands, and elsewhere as a federal political system in which component regions are intentionally associated with specific ethnic categories.

According to Anderson (2014), whether it is termed ethnic, ethno-national, plurinational, or multinational federalism, the design of federal subunit boundaries to conform to the territorial distribution of ethnic groups continues to generate controversy among scholars of institutional design. For some it is an effective means of alleviating deep ethnic divisions that can help to hold together the common state; for others, it is an insidious institutional recipe for the inevitable disintegration of the

common state. So, ethno-federalism is not implemented as a panacea, or because it is the choice of first resort. It is implemented only after an alternative institutional form, usually, Unitarianism, has failed; it is implemented precisely because the alternative failed. Therefore, ethno-federalism is invariably the choice of last resort because it is the only choice available in the absence of feasible alternatives. It is important to review a few pieces of literature written on the areas of ethno-federalism due to the focus of this research is on the fully ethno-federalism state of Ethiopia. The two articles reviewed here are Roeder (2009) and Anderson (2014).

Roeder's (2009) article Ethno-federalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalism presents a critical analysis of the concept of ethno-federalism, which involves the creation of federal structures that are based on ethnic or linguistic criteria. Roeder (2009) argues that while ethno-federalism is often proposed as a solution to ethnic conflict and nationalism, it can exacerbate these issues by creating new divisions and inequalities within a country. Roeder notes that ethno-federalism assumes people's political identities are based primarily on their ethnicity or language, rather than on other factors such as class, religion, or ideology. However, he argues that this assumption is often flawed and that political identities are complex and multifaceted. By focusing exclusively on ethnic or linguistic criteria, ethno-federalism can reinforce divisions between different groups and neglect other important factors that shape political identity.

Furthermore, Roeder argues that ethno-federalism can create new inequalities and grievances within a country. By granting special privileges or autonomy to certain ethnic or linguistic groups, the federal government can create resentment among other groups that feel left out or marginalized. In addition, Roeder notes that the creation of new administrative structures and boundaries can be expensive and inefficient, leading to further grievances and conflict.

Roeder (2009) also points out that ethno-federalism can lead to a situation where minority groups have too much power and influence within the federal system. This

can create a sense of insecurity and resentment among the majority group, leading to yet further conflict and tension. However, his arguments have their limitations. One of the limitations of Roeder's (2014) critique of ethno-federalism is that it assumes all ethnic or linguistic groups are equal in terms of their power and influence within a country. Some groups may be historically disadvantaged or marginalized and may require special measures to ensure that they are not left behind in the federal system. While Roeder (2009) acknowledges the potential for inequalities to arise within an ethno-federal system, his analysis does not fully address the complex and often asymmetrical power dynamics that can exist between different groups.

Another limitation of Roeder's (2009) critique is that it does not fully engage with the practical challenges of managing ethnic conflict and nationalism within a country. While he suggests that a more flexible and inclusive federal system may be more effective, he does not provide concrete details on how this could be achieved in practice. In addition, his analysis does not fully address the potential trade-offs and compromises that may be necessary to achieve political stability and national unity.

Finally, it is worth noting that Roeder's (2009) critique of ethno-federalism is based primarily on empirical evidence from a limited set of case studies. While these cases provide valuable insights into the potential drawbacks of ethno-federalism, they may not be representative of all contexts and may not fully capture the nuances of political identity and conflict in different countries. Overall, while Roeder's critique of ethno-federalism raises important questions and challenges some of the assumptions underlying this approach, it is important to recognize the limitations of his view and the need for further research and debate around the most effective strategies for managing diversity and conflict within a country.

In his 2014 article Ethno-federalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement...? Except for All the Others, Anderson argues that while ethno-federalism has its flaws, it is the best option for countries with deeply divided societies. Ethno-federalism is a form of federalism in which power is distributed along ethnic lines, with different regions or groups given significant autonomy to govern themselves. Anderson

acknowledges that ethno-federalism can lead to problems such as ethnic tensions, corruption, and even secessionist movements. However, he argues that it is still preferable to other forms of government in deeply divided societies, such as centralized states or confederations. Anderson (2014) cites examples of successful ethno-federalism in countries such as Switzerland, Canada, and Belgium, where it has helped to maintain peace and stability. He also argues that ethno-federalism can provide a sense of belonging and representation for minority groups that may feel marginalized in a centralized state.

Anderson (2014) explores the implementation and effectiveness of ethno-federalism in Ethiopia and South Africa. Anderson (2014) argues that ethno-federalism can be an effective way to promote self-determination and autonomy for different ethnic groups, but it also poses significant challenges. Anderson begins by defining ethno-federalism and distinguishing it from other forms of federalism. He then examines the cases of Ethiopia and South Africa, two countries that have adopted ethno-federalism in different ways. In Ethiopia, the government has created nine ethnic-based regional states, each with significant autonomy and the ability to develop and implement policies that reflect local needs and priorities. In South Africa, the government has established nine provinces that are not organized along ethnic lines, but that still have a significant degree of autonomy.

Anderson (2014) argues that ethno-federalism has been successful in Ethiopia in promoting greater ethnic representation and self-determination, but it has also led to some challenges, including tensions between different ethnic groups and the risk of secession. In South Africa, ethno-federalism has been less successful, as provincial governments have struggled to balance their autonomy with the need to coordinate policies with the national government. Overall, Anderson (2014) suggests that ethno-federalism can be an effective way to promote self-determination and autonomy for different ethnic groups, but it requires careful implementation and ongoing attention to the challenges it poses.

The vitality of the debate between advocates and critics of this form of federal arrangement obscures the fact that hostility toward ethnic federalism is generally more widespread than sympathy for it. However, the question if not ethno-federalism, then what? Cannot be avoided. When the unitary state fails, the direct result is unlikely to be the session of ethnic units because a last-resort alternative exists ethno-federalism. Hence, failed unitary systems avoid the consequences of their failure by becoming ethno-federal. When ethno-federalism fails, however, there are no institutional alternatives left to try; all options for preserving the common state have been exhausted and the session of an ethnic unit is the unsurprising consequence. So, in the absence of an ethno-federal solution, the status quo prevails, and the world must deal with the negative consequences of unrecognized states in the system (Anderson, 2014). Anderson adequately explained the importance of ethno-federalism and the precautions needed to be taken during the implementation of the governance model.

2.5 Democracy

Since the end of the Cold War, democracy has attained an almost sacred status in both political and academic discourse, often seen as a hallmark of legitimacy. Despite its central importance, the concept of democracy has become somewhat diluted, with various political figures and scholars co-opting it for their purposes. Politicians across the ideological spectrum invoke the term to endorse their actions and policies, seeking to legitimize their agendas by aligning with democratic ideals. At the same time, scholars frequently append qualifiers to the term, acknowledging its broad and sometimes ambiguous application. This widespread use has led to a situation where the term ‘democracy’ can mean different things to different people, depending on the context and the intentions of those using it (Coppedge, M et al., 2011).

Traditionally, democracy has been defined in its simplest form as ‘rule by the people.’ However, many contemporary scholars argue that democracy is more accurately understood as a unique framework for organizing the relationship between rulers

and the ruled. In modern political democracies, governance involves a system in which citizens hold their leaders accountable, primarily through indirect means such as electing representatives who make decisions on their behalf (Schmitter & Karl, 1991). This indirect participation is seen as a cornerstone of democratic governance, ensuring that those in power remain answerable to the people. Dahl (1998,) offers a more detailed conceptualization of democracy, describing it as a system designed to enforce a set of rules and principles through a constitution. This framework ensures that all members of society are treated as equally capable of participating in decision-making processes regarding public policies. According to Dahl, democracy plays a critical role in preventing autocratic rule, safeguarding fundamental rights, ensuring a broad range of personal freedoms, and enabling individuals to protect their interests. It supports self-determination, moral responsibility, human development, and political equality, while also fostering peace and prosperity. This is particularly evident in the observation that democracies tend to avoid conflicts with one another, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the democratic peace theory (Doyle, 2004).

Dahl further elaborates on the concept by identifying a set of procedural minimal conditions necessary for what he terms polyarchy or modern political democracy. These conditions include constitutionally vesting decision-making power in elected officials, ensuring that elections are frequent, fair, and free from significant coercion, and guaranteeing that nearly all adults have the right to vote and run for office. Additionally, citizens must be able to express themselves freely without fear of severe punishment, and political issues should be broadly defined, with access to a variety of information sources protected by law. Moreover, citizens should have the right to form independent associations, including political parties and interest groups, to ensure a vibrant and pluralistic political landscape (Schmitter & Karl, 1991).

Scholarly definitions of democracy often concentrate on the institutions and processes that underpin democratic governance. For instance, Dahl’s influential works closely associate democracy with the mechanisms of representative

government. According to this view, democracy is achieved if citizens can participate equally in free and fair elections, and if these elections have a direct impact on government actions and policies. This institutional perspective is crucial for understanding how democratic governance functions in practice (Dalton. Et al., 2007). However, the public perception of democracy encompasses more than just these institutional mechanisms; it also includes a significant social dimension. Surveys conducted by Dalton et al. (2007) reveal that democracy is commonly associated with a broad range of values, including freedoms, civil liberties, and citizens' rights. Furthermore, democracy is expected to involve the creation of institutions and democratic processes that embody the principle of rule by the people, including the holding of elections, majority rule, open and accountable governance, and the provision of social benefits such as equality, justice, peace, and stability.

In summary, while democracy remains central to modern political discourse, it is a complex and multifaceted concept that incorporates both procedural and social dimensions. Its effective implementation requires a delicate balance between institutional mechanisms and the broader social context, ensuring that democratic ideals are both practiced and perceived in a way that aligns with the fundamental values of freedom, equality, and justice.

2.5.1 Direct Democracy

Direct democracy is an umbrella term encompassing various political processes where citizens vote directly on laws rather than selecting representatives. The earliest example of this form of democracy can be traced back to ancient Athens, where town meetings allowed citizens to gather in a specific place to make public decisions collectively. This town meeting model represents one of the oldest forms of direct democracy. Today, the most prominent manifestation of direct democracy is through ballot measures or propositions, where voters directly decide on specific laws by voting Yes or No on these proposals (Matsusaka, 2005).

Direct democracy includes several processes such as town meetings, recall elections, initiatives, and various forms of referendums. A common feature of these processes is the direct participation of voters in decision-making. However, scholars have increasingly focused on the procedural aspects of direct democracy, identifying critical stages like qualification, campaigning, and implementation. Qualification requires that a policy proposal demonstrates a minimum level of public interest to be placed on the ballot. Campaigning involves the effort needed to build support for the proposal, which often requires more resources than the initial qualification. Implementation determines the real-world impact of a successful initiative or referendum, as its effects on policy depend on how it is enacted after the election (Lupia & Matsusaka, 2004).

2.5.2 Representative Democracy

The development of representative democracy is often hailed as one of the significant accomplishments of modern politics, though it was far from an easy achievement. In Europe, it took over seven centuries, along with numerous rebellions and revolutions, to fully establish. The model of representative democracy familiar in countries like Europe, the United States, Chile, Japan, and India consists of a collection of territorially based governing institutions, including written constitutions, independent judiciaries, and laws. These institutions uphold procedures such as the periodic election of legislative candidates, limited terms for political offices, secret ballot voting, competitive political parties, the right to public assembly, and freedom of the press (Alonso et al., 2011).

According to Urbunatti (2010), the concept of representation originates from the Latin language, lacking a Greek equivalent, and involves acting on behalf of someone else. The term representative democracy captures the complexity, richness, and uniqueness of modern political systems, which represent an original synthesis of two distinct and, in some ways, opposing political traditions. In its standard definition, representative democracy has four key features: the sovereignty of the people as expressed through the electoral selection of representatives;

representation as a free mandate relationship; electoral mechanisms that ensure representatives remain responsive to the people they represent; and universal suffrage, which underpins political equality by giving all citizens the right to vote (Urbinatti, 2010). A central aspect of this definition is that constituencies are defined by territory rather than by economic, corporate, or cultural interests—a principle dating back to Cleisthenes' reforms in ancient Athens during the sixth century BCE. As noted by (Rehfeld, 2005; as cited in Urbinatti, 2010), in almost every democracy in the world, citizens are represented based on where they live.

2.5.3 Federal Democracy

Federalism and democracy are central concepts in political science, shaping the institutional design and political practices in numerous countries worldwide (Dardanelle, 2010). Federal democracy is essentially a form of liberal democracy, grounded in Western constitutionalism and the procedural norms of liberal democratic governance (Burgess, 2012). Historically, the connection between democracy and federalism was not a central issue in constitutional debates until the late nineteenth century. Thus, from a historical perspective, there is no inherent link between federalism and democracy (Benz & Sonnicksen 2021).

These concepts evolved as separate historical phenomena, with roots dating back to the Greeks and Romans. They gradually intertwined due to shifts in power relations among empires, dynasties, alliances, and princely states. The rise of the modern state in Europe during the sixteenth century, combined with religious conflicts stemming from the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, laid the groundwork in the seventeenth century for a radical rethinking of political authority, obligation, and legitimacy (Burgess & Gagnon, 2010). Over time, federalism and democracy have come to be viewed as closely connected concepts, particularly in how they both limit power and enable participation in governance (Burgess & Gagnon, 2010).

A widely accepted view is that federalism and democracy complement each other within a political system (Lijphart, 1999). Federalism is seen as promoting democracy, while democracy is often considered a prerequisite for effective federalism. Watts elaborates on this by stating that:

> Liberal-democratic values are essential for a functioning federal system, as they ensure respect for constitutional norms, the rule of law, and the rights of regional minorities, fostering a spirit of tolerance and compromise. Federalism, in turn, enhances these democratic values by ensuring the legitimacy of both federal and regional governments, each of which is directly elected and accountable to its electorate. Furthermore, federalism disperses power among multiple decision-making centers, which helps prevent autocratic rule (Watts, 2008, p. 192, as cited in Benz & Sonnicksen, 2015, p. 1).

Since the fall of Portugal's dictatorship in 1974, and particularly after the Berlin Wall's fall in 1989, many reformers have rhetorically linked democracy to decentralization and federalism (Kincaid, 1995; Diamond, 1999). These connections were often drawn in response to the suppression of democracy and freedom by centralized, authoritarian regimes during the twentieth century. Reformers frequently positioned democracy against authoritarianism and federalism or decentralization against centralization (Kincaid, 2010, as cited in Burgess & Gagnon, 2010). However, the relationship between federalism and democracy has been evident throughout the three waves of democratization that began in the nineteenth century (Huntington, 1991).

The first wave of democratization (1828-1926), which led to the establishment of democracy in around 30 countries, produced four of the world’s five major and enduring federal democracies: the United States, democratized in 1828 according to Samuel P. Huntington, Switzerland in 1848, Canada in 1867, and Australia in 1901. This wave also saw the creation of federal systems in Mexico (1824),

Venezuela (1830), Argentina (1853), Germany (1871), Brazil (1889), and Austria (1920). However, many of these federal systems were not democratic initially, and most experienced periods of undemocratic rule following the breakdown of federal democracy. Nonetheless, ten of today's 24 federal countries established federalism during this first wave, with four maintaining uninterrupted federal-democratic systems (Huntington, 1997).

The second wave of democratization (1943-1962) restored the number of democracies to over 30, including the creation of the world's fifth major federal democracy, Germany, in 1949, as well as federal systems in India (1950), Austria (1955), Nigeria (1960), and Malaysia (1963). However, not all of these federations have remained consistently democratic. The third wave of democratization (1974-present) further increased the number of electoral democracies and federal polities, both democratic and non-democratic. During this period, 11 of the 24 current federal countries were established, though some, such as Ethiopia, Pakistan, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates, are either undemocratic or questionably democratic (Kincaid, 2010; as cited in Burgess & Gagnon, 2010).

In contemporary discourse, many assume that a federal system cannot function effectively without democracy and that federalism enhances the quality of democracy (Burgess, 2012 Watts, 2008). Indeed, modern federalism and liberal democracy evolved together, both aiming to limit government power and include checks and balances to prevent its concentration (Benz & Sonnicksen, 2021). The idea that federalism and democracy are mutually reinforcing is strongly influenced by normative political theories (Dahl, 1983; Follesdal 2018; Hueglin, 2013a; Levy, 2007; Scott, 2011; Whitaker, 1992).

Federalism is generally seen as a constitutional principle that supports individual liberty and equality, allowing citizens to participate in the political system without discrimination. It is often advocated as a means to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority (Tocqueville [1835–40] 2010), to mobilize citizens for political

participation (Scott, 2011; Weinstock, 2001), and to manage conflicts between groups peacefully and equitably (De Schmitter, 2011; Levy, 2007). However, the relationship between federalism and democracy is complex and not without challenges. Federalism has value for democracy, especially considering the increasing plurality of post-industrial societies (Benz & Sonnicksen, 2021).

Democracy, particularly in the form of majority rule, faces limitations, especially when considering the economic, social, and cultural disparities among different regions and populations. These disparities can lead to a gap between formal equality, as enshrined in laws, and substantive equality, as experienced by citizens. Federalism serves as a crucial counterbalance to policies based on the unrealistic ideal of a homogeneous demo (Breton, 1998). To protect diversity from the homogenizing effects of majority rule, federalism mandates that fundamental decisions should be acceptable to, or approved by, all regions or groups within the state (Benz & Sonnicksen, 2021).

2.6. Consensus

The term consensus stands out as one of the most ambiguous concepts in a field of politics characterized by its inherent complexities. Its definition can vary widely, encompassing ideas such as harmony, cooperation, or sympathy within different parts of a system or organism. More specifically, consensus is often understood as unanimity or general agreement in matters of opinion, evidence, and testimony. In contemporary usage, it can also denote a unified or convergent trend of opinion. Consensus is not merely a necessary component but an inevitable aspect of American politics (Payne, 1965).

Horace (1930) offers a distinct perspective, defining consensus as an agreement resulting from social change. He describes it as a plateau in the skewed curve of social change, illustrating how it represents a temporary state of stability amidst ongoing societal shifts. Additionally, Horace views consensus as the pattern of

cohesion within folkways and mores. This cohesion reflects the homogeneities of thought and behavior established by the merging of diverse group conduct systems. For Horace, consensus is essentially the product of adjustments among conflicting values within a society, forming a crucial aspect of social organization.

Payne (1965) identifies three primary interpretations of consensus found in the literature. The first is a political method characterized by compromise and the pursuit of accommodation among divergent, often conflicting interests. This method involves finding common ground to reconcile differences and achieve cooperative outcomes. The second interpretation applies to the existing harmony within a political system. Here, consensus refers either to general agreement on fundamental principles or beliefs widely accepted in a society or to agreement on specific public policy issues. The third interpretation describes the equilibrium that results from the process of bargaining among competing interests. This equilibrium represents a state of balance achieved through negotiation and compromise.

A comprehensive theory of consensus politics should encompass concepts of stability, continuity, and, importantly, change. Such a theory can provide valuable insights into governance practices across election cycles and the transition of political party control. It sheds light on how policy development is influenced by agreement on procedures and broad policy goals, even when there are disagreements about methods. Furthermore, it helps in understanding how shifts in political opinion occur over time and how policy and political change reflect alterations in political agendas shaped by prevailing political ideas (Heffernan, 2001).

According to Payne (1965), the search for consensus is integral to understanding the character of a political system, as seen in public opinion, political parties, and interest groups. Achieving consensus involves addressing the challenge of how it is to be attained. The process typically relies on the mediating role of politicians or political brokers who employ the art of compromise to navigate and reconcile

conflicting interests. Truman (1955) underscores the importance of consensus in the patterns of interaction among interest groups. Group theorists argue that public policy emerges from the interplay of diverse political interest groups, both organized and potential, which arise in specialized societies (Truman, 195; as cited in Payne, 1965). Therefore, those Political leaders and organizations that have recognized the role of consensus have flourished, while those that have ignored it have done so at their peril (Payne, 1965).

In the context of Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism, understanding consensus—especially in terms of stability and continuity—is crucial. The federal system of Ethiopia depends heavily on achieving equilibrium among various stakeholders to promote peace and stability within the country. This requires a nuanced understanding of how consensus can be fostered amidst diverse and often conflicting interests. The insights gained from analyzing consensus can help to address the challenges faced by this federal system and contribute to more effective governance and policymaking.

2.7. Critical Review of Studies on Ethiopian Federalism

Various research and literature have been published on federalism in general as governance and political science research. In the previous sections, issues related to theoretical and conceptual frameworks were discussed in detail along some cases and experiences of federal system governance. This body of research, which has been ongoing since the 1990s, is of significant importance as it sheds light on the evolution of federalism in Ethiopia and its implications. Federalism became the center of Ethiopian political debate after the establishment of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia in 1991 and the scholarly discussions that followed have greatly enriched our understanding of this complex system.

Federalism in the format of structural governance is a relatively new phenomenon in Ethiopia. Historically, Ethiopian political culture and political psychology were founded on the combination of a strong polity and a unified and centralized authority.

Unity and centralization are sought as the best and most successful forms of governance (Tekletsadik,1958; Bahiru,1991). Ethiopia experienced decentralized governance practices during the era of princes (zemene mesafint) between 1769 and 1855 when powerful warlords governed their respective territories without central command. Those periods are considered the dark period or the period of failure of Ethiopian statehood. Specifically, the lack of central government and the accompanying chaos led to the total rejection of any idea of decentralization among the hitherto political elites of Ethiopia. Emperor Tewodros II, the emperor who had ended the era of princes and started unified and modern Ethiopia in 1855, is hailed among Ethiopian historiographers and some political elites as the hero of the nation specifically for his attempt to centralize the power and create a single command.

Emperor Yohannes IV of Ethiopia, who reigned in Ethiopia between 1872 and 1889, allowed regional leaders to have certain autonomy and the title “Nigus”- (means King) while retaining the title King of Kings for himself. This era is considered the beginning of *de facto* federal practices in Ethiopian political history. However, many Ethiopian political historians criticize him and the era by claiming that he allowed regional autonomy to weaken the central government, blaming this system for the deafest of Ethiopia by the Mahadist movements of the Sudan, where the emperor himself lost his life. Thereafter, the 1952 UN-brokered Ethio-Eritrean federation did not last more than a decade. The abolishment of the Ethio-Eritrean federation itself linked with, among other things, the then elites’ political culture, which associated decentralization of power as a weakness and a threat to the strong central power and authority of the emperor (Bahru, 1991).

One of the underlying causes of the Ethiopian Revolution was the national question of the Ethiopian nations and nationalities for political equality and economic justice. It partly answered the economic question by nationalizing the land and redistributing it to the original owners, the farmers. However, the military regime, which was dominated by the educated elites of the imperial regime, refused to recognize the Ethiopian nation and nationalities’ quest for recognition and regional self-

administration, continuing the centralized administration and monoculture by idolizing the emperor Tewodros as the hero and successful leader of the country. However, after mounting pressure from armed opposition groups and the public for regional autonomy and rights to self-governance, the military regime tried to address some concerns of regional self-administration issues by allocating nominal powers to some territories with the name of self-governing territories after promulgating the 1987 Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) constitution. But it was too little too late. It could not stop dozens of armed opposition groups who were fighting the regime for regional and national self-determination with a clear recognition of ethnic identity, who later toppled the regime and came up with a different political experiment for Ethiopian statehood (Bahru, 1991).

When the transitional government of Ethiopia was established in 1991, recognizing Ethiopian diversity and establishing the federal system of governance became the top agenda in political dialogue. During this time, the incumbent political group and ethnic-based oppositions staunchly advocated for such a system, while the Pan-Ethiopian political groups developed criticisms against the decentralized political dispensation. These critics claimed the justification that decentralized governance is the weakest form of governance and accused the incumbent political group of divide-and-rule tactics to stay in power (Yohannis, 2021; Bekalu, 2017). Since then, the issue of federalism has taken a central stage in the Ethiopian political landscape and in that of academia. Different scholars' research is available on the topic in question. Most of the available literature can be categorized as in favor of multinational federalism, against it, and/or accepting multinational federalism but demanding significant improvement in the future.

The scholars in favor of the federal arrangement in Ethiopia are further split into two categories, each with its unique perspective. The first category of scholars is those who fully endorse the established federal governance of Ethiopia. Some of these scholars were advisory members of the constitutional drafting team. They used their scholarly platform to justify the Ethiopian federal system and defended it (Andreas,

2003; Fasil, 1997). These scholars advocate for multinational federalism with a clear recognition of the ethnic, linguistic, and cultural identities of Ethiopian communities. The other category of scholars who have studied Ethiopian federalism categorizes the Ethiopian federation as multiethnic federalism (Aalen, 2002; Yonatan, 2010; Yohannes, 2019; Bekalu, 2017; Mahmood Mamdain, 2019; Jon, 2012; Asnake, 2009). These scholars view the Ethiopian Federation from an ideologically rigorous perspective of regionalization, emphasizing a lack of sufficient bargaining during its formation procedures. Aalen suggested the Ethiopian Federation as it fulfills the minimalist definition of federation-like institutional guarantees and describes it as losing legitimacy before it was implemented. According to Aalen, it was introduced in an undemocratic manner which lacked a genuine bargaining procedure between different political forces (Aalen, 2002).

Others have categorized and defined the governance structure as ethnic federalism and do not want to recognize the multinational character of the governance system (Bekalu, 2017; Siraw, 2016). Some of these scholars give the governance system the epithet of systemic illness and suggest that the government urgently needs to reconsider an ethnic federal arrangement (Bekalu, 2017). However, others, including the late Professor Burgess (2012), recognize the Ethiopian Federation as fulfilling the criteria of multinational federalism. In addition to Burgess, others like Addis Alem (2014), Nigussie (2016), and Thomas Temesgen (2016) describe Ethiopian federalism as multinational federalism. Burgess (2012) endorsed Ethiopian 1994 federal constitution article 39 and its sub-articles as:

> These ten sections of Article 39 contain the conceptual and organizational principles of the multinational federation. Taken at face value, they suggest that culture, customs, language, identity, psychology or mindset, and territoriality are the key concepts that comprise what we call multinational federalism in the multinational federation (Burgess, 2012, p. 29).

Therefore, those scholars who classify Ethiopian federalism as ethnic federalism and refuse to admit its multinational behavior, did not seem to do a detailed investigation

of the two types of ethno-federation, multiethnic and multinational federation (Siraw,2016; Bekalu, 2017).

Another category of scholars analyzed Ethiopian federalism concerning in relation to democratization. There have been several criticisms about the democratic promise and practice of the EPRDF government. The scholars in this group assert that the promised multiparty system has not been realized that elections were by and large ceremonial rather than legitimate, and that the country could not develop a suitable political structure that could accommodate its diverse nature (Merera, 2011, cited in Bizuneh 2021; Tasew, 2016).

The other group asserts that a lack of political plurality and other factors have contributed to hindering the federal arrangement from attaining its stated goals (Mengisteab, 2007; Yohannis, 2022; Thomas Temesgen, 2016; Clapham, 2009). This group stressed the lack of inclusiveness in the process of its formation and the resultant absence of consensus as a failure to implement the political system properly by dispersing power, citing the centralizing nature of the dominant party. These studies are very relevant to the benefit of this thesis, as its focus is political decentralization.

(Clapham, 2009; as cited in Yohannis, 2022) captured the following in his review of the importance of pluralism in Ethiopian multinational federalism:

> The deeper problem facing Ethiopia is that it is now too complex and diverse a society to be managed without the extremely adept deployment of political skills discussions, bargaining, compromise, and simultaneous recognition of alternative sources of authority that are needed to create some kind of workable synthesis of the different elements of which it is composed (Clapham, 2009, p. 191).

Yohannis (2022) and Temesgen (2016) push this thought by stressing the need for political dialogue between the ruling elite from the past and present to discuss and agree, at least on a minimum list, on what the national agenda must be. These

scholars narrate the practical problems of the current federal system of Ethiopia. They have also identified the merits and demerits of the Ethiopian Federal system. However, their research lacks a clear and comprehensive perspective of how both the question of identity and democratization must be addressed. They focus either on principles of federalization or democratization independently, while the problem has to be approached and addressed concurrently from both corners of federalization and democratization.

Scholars like Mahmood Mamdani (2019) describe the Ethiopia federation as comparable to the former Soviet solution of the national question. He argued that it was a move that also had similarities with the British approach to its former African colonies, which turned ethnic groups into units of local administrations, termed indirect rule. He asserts that the late EPRDF leader Meles Zenawi was most likely influenced by Soviet ethno-territorial federalism, which has a direct resemblance to the classically Stalinist definition of nation, nationality, and people. This scholar's information seems very far from the historical evolution of the Ethiopian state and lacks a basic perspective about Ethiopia to explain the contemporary Ethiopian reality. Although there have been inefficiencies in the formation and implementation of Ethiopian federalism, the current governance model is the result of failed assimilation efforts (Asnake, 2009). Likewise, Jon explains that ethnicity has become the basis of politics, where ethnic and cultural rights are given, but political liberties, respect for human rights, and economic equality are neglected, and ethnic divisions are increasing (Jon, 2012). However, the 1994 Ethiopian constitution clearly and loudly declares political liberty, respect for human rights, and economic equality of Nations Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia and all citizens individually (Ethiopian 1994 Constitution Article, 14, 31 and 41). The above criticism, although it had tried to address the problem of actualization of the promise of federalization, lacks enough investigation of the situation to make a differentiation between constitutional commitments and their implementations.

The academic discourse and debate between those groups of scholars have continued for the last three decades. However, no definitive and agreed conclusion has been reached yet. Currently, it seems that most scholars have recognized the importance of federal and decentralized forms of governance for Ethiopia, but they fail to agree on whether such decentralization should consider ethnic, socio-cultural, and linguistic diversity in Ethiopian society. In line with these discussions, some selected literatures on the topic of the subject matter were briefly reviewed below:

Yohannes Gedamu (2022). *The Politics of Contemporary Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Authoritarian Survival*

One of the recent publications on the Ethiopian Federal governance system was published as part of the African Governance series published in 2022 by Routledge. The title categorically labels Ethiopian Federalism as Ethnic Federalism and asserts that Ethiopian ethnic federalism is an enabling instrument for the survival of an authoritarian regime in Ethiopia. The book deals with various issues about contemporary Ethiopian politics from historical perspectives to the current crisis. Its focus is the post-1991 Ethiopian political dispensation. It attempts to capture the overall governance issues in the last three decades. It also tries to justify/prove a hypothesis that ethnic federalism helped the authoritarian regime to survive and that such a system stokes ethnic-based violence in the country. The writer also argues that ethnic federalism has disintegrated Ethiopian society into ethnic entities to benefit other groups and to punish the hitherto dominant group, the Amhara. The book concludes that there are winners and losers in the Ethiopian Ethnic Federal system. The book also asserts that the Ethiopian Federal system is not decentralized; regional governments have no power, and the country is highly controlled from the center. However, such an assertion is self-contradictory on the one hand and lacks a proper diagnosis of the real problem on the other.

Gedamu's research fails to objectively diagnose the overall implementation problem of Ethiopian federalism and fails to offer meaningful policy implication propositions. The scholar argues that all conflicts that happened in post-1991 Ethiopia were

caused by the federal system, but he did not try to prove this assertion with adequate empirical data. Gedamu, at the same time, concludes that the ongoing ethnic federal system has contributed to the stability of the country, which again contradicts the same research's conclusion. The question here is how a federal system that accommodates the ethnic, socio-cultural, and linguistic diversity of Ethiopian society and opts to find the remedy for the previous injustices and national oppressions that happened over century contributed to conflicts and targeted the hitherto dominant ethnic group. Therefore, this research did not demonstrate the gaps in proper diagnosis of the problem of the Ethiopian federal system and the unsubstantiated conclusions reached.

Bekalu Atnafu Taye (2017). Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia:

This research examines the prevalence of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia and attempts to link the causes of such conflicts with the ethnic federalism that the country adopted in 1991. From the outset, the researcher labels ethnic federalism as the main cause of the prevalent ethnic conflicts in the years between 1991 and 2016 and tries to prove such an assertion. The objective of the research itself is to show the level of ethnic conflict caused by the politicization of tribal identity in Ethiopia (Bekalu, 2017). The scholar generalizes his opinion by calling Ethiopian federalism a conflict-promoting application of federalism. He then made slight adjustments in his criticism of federalism by using the technical problems of federalism to blame as the causes of ethnic conflict in Ethiopia.

Bekalu is highly dependent on a few pieces of literature to drive toward their hastily generalized conclusion. It mainly deals with authoritarian and undemocratic governments to conclude whether the current federal arrangement is appropriate or not. The research rather dealt with how authoritarian and undemocratic as well as centralized governance systems became the sources of conflict, including that of ethnic-based violence in Ethiopia. The scholar has proposed an unrelated policy implication, which is about rescinding the recognition of ethnic and socio-linguistic diversity in the Ethiopian political landscape.

Asnake (2013). *Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Ethiopia: A Comparative Regional Study*:

This book delves into the consequences of federal restructuring in Ethiopia, specifically its impact on ethnic conflict, by closely examining two regions: the Somali and Benshangul/Gumuz regional states. The scholar argues that Ethiopia's adoption of ethnic federalism was directly linked to the challenge of creating a state structure that could effectively manage the nation's complex ethnolinguistic diversity. This restructuring was seen as a necessary response to the failure of the previous nation-building project, which had relied on assimilation and centralization.

A central argument of the book is that the lack of political pluralism, coupled with the use of ethnicity as the sole organizing principle of the state, poses significant challenges to the Ethiopian federal system. This scholar contends that despite federalism being introduced to reduce ethnic conflicts and manage Ethiopia's ethnic diversity, such conflicts persist as critical challenges.

Asnake further argues that restructuring multiethnic states into ethnic federations often results in intra-federal (and frequently violent) conflicts. He also points out that the constitutional guarantee of secession, intended as a safeguard, may instead prevent the development of necessary compromises, thereby encouraging separatist nationalism. Moreover, the scholar concludes that understanding whether a federation succeeds or fails in balancing the competing demands of unity and diversity requires an in-depth analysis of the contextual factors surrounding institutional arrangements. The book's research is meticulously articulated, drawing on extensive evidence and case studies to bolster its argument, offering a comprehensive understanding of the complexities involved in Ethiopia's federalism.

Temesgen Thomas Halo (2016). Ethnic Federal System in Ethiopia: origin, ideology, and paradoxes:

This research explores the historical and normative justifications for implementing ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia. It provides an in-depth review of the

complexities of Ethiopia's political history and the political culture among Ethiopian elites. The study addresses the historical roots of nationality issues and seeks to justify the identity politics that shaped the post-1991 Ethiopian state. It thoroughly examines the ideological and historical foundations that led to the adoption of Ethiopia's current federal system, highlighting both its advantages and disadvantages.

However, the research falls short of offering a clear perspective on the broader social and ideological underpinnings of ethnic federalism. The study suggests that post-1991 federalism in Ethiopia is characterized more by centralized control under a dominant vanguard party than by genuine federalism and power devolution. The scholar questions whether the current federal system has successfully achieved its goals of establishing sustainable peace and laying the legal groundwork for democracy. The conclusion drawn is that ethnic federalism has failed to fulfill its intended purpose and has not proven to be an effective tool for conflict resolution in the country.

Sarah Vaughan (2013). Federalism in Ethiopia Hybridity in Ambiguity?

Sarah Vaughan is an expert in Ethiopian Federalism discourse and has multiple publications on the subject. This article, published as part of Routledge's handbook of regionalism and federalism, is brief yet highly informative writing on Ethiopian federalism, extremely condensed and analytical. It discusses Ethiopian federalism by examining a series of broader factors: political, historical, and institutional. It brings the Ethiopian Federal experiment and its implementation into the spotlight. Vaughan highlights the history of state formation, and it's about this new political phenomenon in Ethiopian polity. The writing attempts to underscore the view of a federal experiment by framing and outlining it in a persuasive manner. The writer justifies Ethiopia's hybrid and asymmetrical federalism by explaining the country's bloody history which is attributed to its highly centralized governance tradition. This article tries to see federalism from a balanced perspective to address the concerns of various political actors within the country. The research details the nature,

composition, and character of the newly formed federal units of the country and explains the framers' reason behind such an arrangement. It also narrates the basic contents of the Ethiopian constitution regarding decentralization and power distribution between the center and the regional units. While expressing her reservations about the risky nature of politicizing ethnicity, she details the rationale behind such a political approach. She analyzes the paradox in Ethiopian federalism between constitutional form and political practice. Finally, she concludes that Ethiopian federalism is not yet meaningfully decentralized. However, this research fails to examine the ongoing political struggle in both the ruling coalition and among the country's political elites. It also fails to capture the changing political dynamics of the country, and hence was unable to foresee the political turmoil that followed only a few years after its publication.

The critical reviews of the scholars on Ethiopian multinational federalism focus on the ethno-federal structure of Ethiopian politics, its practice, and challenges in a complex, multilingual, developing country, in ethnicity and political dispensation within Ethiopian society. They all emphasize the need for improvement of the system. They urge policymakers to adopt the suggestions of their studies for the well-being of the country.

Firstly, most scholars focus on criticizing democracy and its practice, which was not effectively executed by the ruling coalition. Although it is important, it is proper to analyze the evolution of the system from its creation to its implementation by investigating at every step. It has to be helpful to understand where the problems arose, why the problems arose, and how they can be fixed.

Secondly, some of the scholars criticized the EPRDF as a creator of multinational federalism (in their words, ethnic federalism) but did not appreciate the past visible reality that immersed the country into a protracted civil war and created many liberation movements. After the EPRDF seized power, it exploited the situation on the ground that demanded self-rule through federalism. However, there are gaps left to be filled. Thus, comprehensive research with significant data is needed to narrow

down the gap of the studies. Therefore, this thesis investigated the reality of how Ethiopian federalism was created and implemented and what was needed to fill the knowledge gap around this case that was not covered by another research.

2.8. Summary

Chapter two reviewed the important aspects of federalism, federations, ethno-federalism and democracy, federal democracy, and consensus and reviewed publications on Ethiopian multinational federalism. Federalism is a complex idea of compromise through checks and balances aiming towards unity within diversity for shared rule and autonomy between the general government and its subunits.

As King (1982) explained, federalism is a normative concept with an ideological base referring to centralist, decentralist and balancing approaches of federal formation. The ideological propensity has its own impact on the institutional arrangement of the federal system. Ideological identification provides an analytical tool to study federalism, particularly in Ethiopia which has ideological aspects and institutional arrangement.

The other inspirations taken from this chapter were the reasons that make the introduction of federalism salient: historical development and its uniqueness and distinctiveness in every country based on its realities. The review of political reasons to bring independent units together or to hold together already existing polity in this chapter is helpful in understanding the practical interaction of the subject under discussion during later analysis. The procedures of formation of federations, which were reviewed in this chapter, are instructive when evaluating the effectiveness and sustainability of federal polity, especially newly created ones, and to understand how they could avoid the risk of disintegration. Anderson's (2014) consideration of ethno-federation as a solution for the problem of multiethnic or multinational societies as a last resort is well analyzed and can provide a better exit from the deadlock if the existing unitary system cannot work well to maintain the integrity of a country. It also provides insight into the Ethiopian situation specifically.

Finally, this chapter reviewed the concepts of democracy, which gained a central stage in politics, especially after the Cold War, in all aspects of governance. Democracy, reviewed in this chapter includes some of its types or forms, like direct and representative democracies, which gives an analyzing base for this thesis. The exploration of the literature on federal democracy that give insights into the relationship between federalism and democracy can help to investigate and analyze data on the Ethiopian federal system. As discussed above, the experiences of many federations and the success or failure of a federation are dependent on the handling of delicate issues and balancing factors, including democracy, the rule of law, and constitutional promises. As Turton (2015) notes, if there is a risk of disintegration for the Ethiopian federation, it is not because it is too ethnic but rather because it is not sufficiently federated. This explanation supports the importance of maintaining the Democratic Multinational Federalism and the importance of adequately federalizing the existing system. Based on the theoretical and conceptual frameworks and critical reviews discussed in this chapter, the coming chapters present the methodology of the thesis.

CHAPTER THREE: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1. Introduction

The Methodology is a general research strategy that delineates how research should be undertaken. It includes a system of beliefs and philosophical assumptions that shape the understanding of research questions and underpin the choice of research methods (Melnikovas, 2019). This research uses qualitative methodology to present a case study of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia with an emphasis on political decentralization. It seeks a solution for the lack of consensus regarding this governance system. Clough and Nutbrown (2007) state that methodology is concerned with justifying the research process, while methods are constructed for purposes. Hence, the method of this research presented below is supported by methodology.

This research is document-based, focusing on minutes from governmental meetings between 1991 and 2019, decisions and proclamations promulgated by HOPR and HOF, election reports from NEBE along with associated declarations and policy documents, survey results from Ethiopian Statistics Service, and academic and political publications. While most of this data is derived from archival sources, these documents were provided directly to the researcher; therefore, no archival study was involved. The researcher utilized various techniques and steps to select a case, gather data, perform analysis, and ensure the validity and reliability of the results. The main research question of this thesis, *How best to build consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia?* An examination of literature pertaining to federalism, multinationalism, democracy, and related topics was undertaken. The data collected was collated, and the design of this method is directly linked to the research question.

This chapter provides a detailed methodological account, organized as follows: the first part presents the research approach followed by this thesis; the second covers the methods of research; the third deals with sources of data and collection

procedures; the fourth discusses data analyses; and the fifth part discusses ethical considerations, followed by an outline of research limitations. The chapter concludes with a summary of key points.

3.2. Research Approach



Figure 1: Saunders (2012, 2013) Research Onion Approach

The Saunders metaphor of the research onion identifies four key research philosophies (Saunders et al., 2012). The first is positivism, characterized by the using large quantitative data sets and statistical hypothesis testing. When the data analysis does not confirm a theory, the theory must be revised accordingly (Saunders & Tosey, 2012, 2013). The second philosophy, interpretivism, prioritizes obtaining rich insights into subjective meanings over creating broad, law-like generalizations. This approach is particularly relevant to studying social phenomena within their natural environments. It emphasizes the importance of conducting research among people rather than inanimate objects, adopting an empathetic stance that seeks to understand individuals' social worlds and the meanings they

attribute to their experiences from their perspectives (Saunders & Tosey, 2012/2013). By doing so, interpretivism provides a more nuanced understanding of social reality tailored to the specific contexts in which these phenomena occur.

The third philosophy is pragmatism. Researchers who embrace pragmatism focus on the practical implications of their findings, valuing outcomes that have real-world consequences. They believe that no single perspective can fully capture the entire picture and that multiple realities may exist. However, this does not imply that pragmatist research always employs a variety of data collection methods and analysis techniques. Instead, the research design should be structured to gather credible, reliable, and relevant data that supports meaningful action (Saunders & Tosey, 2012, 2013).

The fourth philosophy is realism, which posits that reality exists independently of the human mind. According to realism, what researchers perceive through their senses is the truth, even though their worldviews and personal experiences may influence their perceptions. Realism is divided into two forms: direct realism and critical realism. A direct realist asserts that sensory experiences offer an accurate reflection of reality. In contrast, a critical realist contends that the mind initially receives and interprets sensory inputs subjectively (Saunders & Tosey, 2012, 2013).

In this study, the researcher utilized a qualitative approach to explore and understand the meaning individuals and groups ascribe to social or human problems via a single document-based data collection technique. As John and Creswell (2018) stated, a qualitative approach is an effective method for investigating and comprehending complex human experiences, perspectives, and behaviors.

This present researcher chose from the four philosophies a position characterized as a critical realist, arguing that what is initially experienced through sense is subsequently processed subjectively by the mind. There is a need to find out what is immediately experienced and consider the structure underlying this complexity

(Saunders & Tosey, 2012, 2013). Here, the researcher's involvement in the system under investigation gave him the sense of initial experience that helped him to understand the complexity of the structure that initiated his research question. Using a qualitative approach, the researcher gathered in-depth data through a single mono-method qualitative methodological choice: document-based data collection. Document-based research is used to understand of the motivations and perspectives of key individuals and groups to interrogate the formation of Ethiopian multinational federalism. At the same time, the analytical process by which these documents are examined has been chosen to ensure the results were reliable. It allowed the researcher to capture participants' perspectives and experiences as accurately and comprehensively as possible.

3.3. Research Design

This research is designed around a case study strategy. A case study design examines a case's particularity and complexity, aiming to understand its activities and particular circumstances (Stake, 1995). Moreover, it is an intensive study of a single unit to generalize across a larger set of units (Gerring, 2004). Denscombe observes that case studies are particularly effective for studying detailed insights (Denscombe, 2007). For this research, the chosen case was a single and complex case study to explore the introduction and the implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia in depth from documents found in the libraries of public bodies. This research investigates written documents starting from the system's inception and subsequently through the implementation period of DMF in Ethiopia from 1991-2019.

Case studies allow for a fuller understanding of what research participants believe, and an opportunity to triangulate literary data and contextual information (Ritchie, 2003). This connection with context is especially relevant in the case of Ethiopian multinational federalism, as a lack of contextual understanding during the long development of this system has been one of the major stumbling blocks to its full implementation. Thus, choosing a case study approach is preferable to other

approaches due to the nature of the topic and research question, which is seeking an answer to a political phenomenon that has been applied for a long time. The data studied was recorded and stored in interrelated institutional settings: in the House of Peoples Representatives the special library in the form of hard copy and direct records of the voices of the speakers during the meetings and deliberations, similarly in the departments of HOF as such, the choice of a case study is more applicable to the research question. Furthermore, the purpose of selecting special libraries (that can be accessed on permission of the parliament leaders) was to gather proper data where most of the events (units) of the creation and implementation of DMF have been processed, recorded, and stored in the form of minutes, internal publications, decisions, or progress reports.

This research benefited from this approach as it provides in-depth information about the evolution of the Ethiopian state and the creation and implementation processes of Democratic Multinational Federalism in the country during the period of political decentralization. The creation and evolution of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia involves a long chain of events (units, for the explanation of this case) both from its inception and during its implementation period. Its first phase, as *de facto*, began in 1991 at the beginning of the period of political decentralization and continued up to 2019; the second phase began after the ratification of the Constitution. It had different chains of units or processes. Therefore, single case study was preferred due to the availability of ample data sources from unique libraries of the HOPR, HOF, and NEBE, with chains of interrelated data events (units) that have connected and impacted the federalization and democratization of the Ethiopian state. As discussed, and analyzed in the literature review section of this thesis, all the requirements of federal democratic state creation processes have applied in Ethiopia's case as a series of events or units, in the form of bargaining and negotiation, drafting the important constitutional document and dialogue, evaluation and ratification of the Constitution, elections, and actual implementation steps. These events were continuous and became a complete case to be

interrogated and analyzed since the inception and operation of DMF. It, in turn, helps to identify the impairing factors that made the system of federalization and democratization dysfunctional.

The evolution of the Ethiopian State has been a very long process, unique in its creation, that has resulted in a mosaic country in a multinational setting without the consent of all its ethnic groups. The conquest and expansion from the northern part of the country to the other parts of the country have yielded protracted conflicts and resentments. Thus, this case study research evaluated the creation of the Ethiopian state to understand the necessity of the current federal arrangement and to explain the importance of why Ethiopia attained its current political shape. It is a distinctive state formation process and an unfinished task to build a state based on the consensus of the people in Ethiopia. Moreover, Ethiopia is a country of 120 million people and is an anchor country in East Africa, specifically and Africa in general, as the second largest populated country on the continent. In addition to its population, the country has a history of resilience in many aspects, including defeating the colonizers. However, internally, the country lacks coherence and stability and has suffered from repeated civil wars and ethnic conflicts since its modern union after the conquest of the country by its Northern core state. Hence, taking Ethiopia as a case study is an important step towards the understanding of the case.

A possible problem for a researcher using case studies as a method is that it can be hard to justify generalisations based on the results of a limited number of cases. As Bryman (2008) asks, how can a single case possibly be representative so that it might yield findings that can be applied more generally to other cases? (Bryman, 2008). However, it is intended that first by identifying the specific focus of the investigation and then selecting the relevant documents applicable to the research question, this case study has addressed this possible challenge. Furthermore, the long period from which these documents were taken, a span of over 28 years, allows for a wider view. With such a large amount of data in the present study, the

conclusions derived are not generalisations in the normal sense but rather constitute an analysis of repeating patterns over this period.

3.4. Method of Research

This researcher used a document-based method to collect and analyze data. The term document-based can be used interchangeably with document interrogation, a term Thomas (2013) used to refer to a data-gathering method. Silverman (2006) uses the term document to refer to data consisting of words and/or images that have been recorded without the intervention of a researcher. Ritchie (2003) notes that document-based research is important when a history of events is the focus or where situations cannot be investigated by direct observation or questioning. Investigating multinational federalism in Ethiopia involves looking at documents to obtain a narrative and demonstrate and explain the contexts of the case study data, all derived from sources recorded by prior individuals. It is helpful for this research, as its focus is on the chronological events that took place from 1991-2019, this can be characterised as a document-based historical study.

Thus, the method used in this research was document interrogation from primary and secondary data source documents. The primary data sources were public documents: minutes of the constitution drafting commission (88 minutes which covered the two years long drafting process of the Constitution); minutes of the Council of Representatives (12 minutes debating on the draft Constitution in the Transitional Government of Ethiopia Council of Representatives); minutes of the constitutional assembly (35 minutes captured during the ratification of the Constitution); documents from political parties (the EPRDF regulation, program and manuals, manifesto of Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) for 2005 Election and All Ethiopia Unity Organization documents); election reports (National Election Board of Ethiopia reports of the 1992 elections for regional and local governments; the 1994 elections report for the members of constitutional assembly; elections reports to the House of People Representatives about the elections in 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 for the House of Peoples Representatives, Regional councils

and local administration councils); documents from the House of Federation on budget grant formulae and subsidy criteria; constitutional inquiry and regional and boundary demarcation appeals, from the Ethiopian Statistics Service (ESS) about the success of multinational federalism; and Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa's notes and documents written during his participation in the EPRDF executive committee, including his work time as the head of the office of the EPRDF. These varied documents were chosen as they reflect the engagements in the creation and implementation processes of DMF. These institutions were selected due to their status as direct recorders of the original documents and their position as custodians of the necessary organized documents.

The secondary data sources were books and articles on the Ethiopian state and democratic multinational federalism by Ethiopian and foreign authors, academics, and politicians. The 1991 Transitional Period Charter, proclamation no 7/1992 and the Ethiopian Constitution 1994 were used as data sources. All the minutes, reports of NEBE, ESS, and party documents were stored in the parliamentary library, in the departments of the House of the Federation, the Prosperity Party main office NEBE archives, and within responsible departments of ESS, ensuring their authenticity. Most secondary data came from the Institute of Policy Study and opposition Party Leaders.

After the researcher had collected all the necessary documents from the unique libraries of the institutions indicated above, the data was made ready for translation from Amharic (country's official language) to English. The researcher translated primary data from Amharic to English by himself, attempting to minimize mistakes and errors in translating the language and the participants' intent in the documents. This method enabled the researcher to obtain the perspective of the participants in their own words as written evidence, verbatim, which helped the researcher to understand, analyses, and interpret the thoughts of the actors on the issues of Democratic Multinational Federalism and their decisions and implementations which impacted the processes of democratization and federalization in Ethiopia.

Following the translation, the researcher segmented the data and organized it in chronological order. The researcher identified additional documents during the transitional period related to the Peace and Democracy Conference that created the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE), the *de facto* federal system, the two layers of government (the federal and regional), and the regional administrations together with the constitution and its ratification. Finally, documents related to the creation and implementation processes and the application's challenges were organized. The creation phase data was organized from both sources primary and secondary sources, starting from the Peace and Democracy Conference, the formation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, and the process of preparation and ratification of the Constitution, which covered the time frame 1991 to August 1995. The implementation phase data was organized starting from the new government Inauguration in August 1995 to December 2019, when the EPRDF was dissolved. The data related to the challenges was organized from the sources that show how the challenges evolved from the establishment of the system to the end of the EPRDF era.

3.5. Sources of Data and Collection Procedures

According to Punch (2018). data collection occurs in a various way and at different levels, but he notes that the structuring of data collection tools must be ‘generated in situ’ as the research progresses. In the case of this research, the data collection involved gathering documents from different sources at the federal government level, focusing on documents related to the creation and implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism.

The custodian of the sources of primary data sources used in this research were the Special Library of House of Peoples’ Representatives, the Archive of National Election Board of Ethiopia, different departments of the House of Federation, Responsible departments of the Ethiopian Statistics Service, the Prosperity Party main office, 2005 manifestos of Coalition for Unity and Democracy and Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa’s notes and records from during his participation as EPRDF

executive committee member (2002-1018) . The secondary data used in this research was collected from academic publications, including books and articles written by Ethiopian academics, supporters of the ruling party and multinational federalism and opposition political party leaders, and foreign scholars.

For primary data source collection, the researcher employed a formal request, visited the Honorable Speaker of the House of Peoples Representatives by appointment, and explained the issue under study. The Speaker instructed his special advisor to connect the researcher with the head parliamentary librarian. The head parliamentary librarian and his colleagues then provided the researcher with the minutes of the constitution drafting commission, Transitional Government of Ethiopia Council of Representatives' minutes, and the Constitutional Assembly minutes. For the House of Federation, the researcher spoke over the phone with the Honorable Speaker of the House of Federation. The Speaker then instructed his department heads to make the necessary data available. This researcher finally paid a personal visit to the head of the office of the Speaker of the House of Federation. Both leaders instructed the Grant Subsidy and Joint Revenue departments, Constitutional Inquiry Issues department, and Boundary and Identity-related Issues department to assist. These departments then provided relevant data for the researcher. For the National Election Board of Ethiopia, the researcher sent a formal application request letter for data to the chairwoman of the board, who instructed their archivist to provide the researcher with election result reports from 1992 to 2015, each of which were five-year elections reports except in the cases of 1992 and 1994. For the Ethiopian Statistics Services, the researcher personally visited the executive director of the ESS, explained the nature of the study, and requested data by submitting a formal request letter. The executive director then instructed his colleagues to organize and provide the researcher with the requested data.

For secondary data sources, the researcher approached the Institute of Policy Studies of Ethiopia, whereupon the department generously provided different articles and dissertations from their archive regarding Ethiopian democratic

multinational federalism and related topics. The researcher also acquired books of prominent scholars on federation and multinational federalism, focusing especially on historians whose research was concerned with Ethiopia's history and Democratic Multinational Federalism. Although the availability was limited, the researcher benefitted from the Barrington Library of Cranfield University. The use of multiple sources of data increases the reliability and validity of the findings (Creswell, 2014). Validity is a fundamental issue in any research (Johnson et al., 2016) and is especially relevant here. Accordingly, the researcher took the first step of validation, involving the triangulation of the accounts of foreign historians, academics, and political scholars with their Ethiopian counterparts. The second step in the validation process involved comparing all the minutes of the responsible bodies and their reports with books and articles written to criticize or praise these processes. Based on these methods, the validity and accuracy of the information were established, and the flow of the data structure from both primary and secondary data affirmed the reliability of the results.

3.6. Data Analysis

The researcher used document analysis to analysis the primary and secondary data. According to Patton (2015), the document analysis method is a qualitative research technique used to systematically review and interpret documents to gain insights and answer research questions. Patton emphasizes the importance of contextual understanding and triangulation in document analysis, meaning that documents should be analyzed in isolation and in conjunction with other data sources to enhance validity. According to Patton, document analysis is an iterative process where initial readings lead to deeper levels of interpretation through continuous engagement with the documents. Document analysis is a useful method for understanding phenomena's historical and cultural context and provides rich data sources. Documents relating to the creation, evolution, and implementation of the DMF in Ethiopia were analyzed according to Patton's explanation. The research design, therefore, allows for a progress review depending on the insights obtained

from specific contexts and recognizes that research contexts are not fixed or predetermined. The data collected by this research method became subject to document interrogation or analysis. Crotty (1998) notes that hermeneutics underpins the notions of saying, explaining, and translating from the perspective that there is a shared meaning between text and reader, which can lead to practical applications. The data collected is, therefore, subject to the meaning attached to it by the people generating that data, followed by a subsequent interpretation of that meaning and insight that the researcher provides when interacting with the data. This hermeneutical process is well-represented in this thesis, wherein the analysis of the case study documentation is used to derive conclusions regarding the Ethiopian DMF over the period in question, an explanation derived from the initial speech of the minutes and records under study.

Accordingly, during the presentation of the data, the researcher analysed the data in chapters four and five, and discussed and interpreted the findings by comparing them with the pertinent conceptual discussions and literature review in chapter two. The researcher used ChatGPT to rephrase some texts in some chapters with the permission of his primary supervisor according to Cranfield University Senate Handbook: Research Students' Handbook version 1.6 August 2023.

3.7. Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations are critical components of any research study, and it is important to address them (John, 2014; Denzin & Lincoln, 2018). In this regard, the researcher obtained ethical clearance from the Cranfield University Ethics System (CURES) on 7 July 2021 via the CURES application, reference CURES/14084/2021 before data collection began in Oct 2021 and I obtained title change clearance on 19 August 2024, via CURES reference CURES/23458/2024. The researcher is an Ethiopian national positioned in the country's ministerial-level leadership for nearly thirty years. He has served as a Minister of Education, Minister of Agriculture and Livestock, Chief Coordinator for the Democratic System Establishment Centre with the rank of Minister, Head of the office of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary

Democratic Front (EPRDF), and President of The Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Regional State (SNNPRS). He has also served in many other positions, most recently as a Member of Parliament and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Currently, he is serving as a Commissioner of the Ethiopian Cooperative Commission.

However, the researcher declares from the outset that the research is not commissioned by the Ethiopian government nor funded by its agents, and no other organisation is funding this research. Therefore, there is no undisclosed agenda in those terms, and no commercial incentive was attached, which might expose confidence, breach research ethics, or influence how this research is conducted. When documents were examined, it was only for the academic remit of this research. This researcher nonetheless believes that the knowledge gained from this research can be used for the country's common good. At a personal level, the research examined the country's leadership between 1991-2019, focusing on multinational federalism and democracy and developing a detailed understanding of this period through independent, research-based study. To accomplish this research project, the researcher investigated the documents listed under the Method of Research above. As these documents are public and the roles of the names mentioned were easily identifiable, anonymity was not required.

The researcher provided sufficient understanding for the custodians of primary data sources, primarily public organization leaders, and he provided them with clear information and knowledge about the issue under investigation. The researcher explained his intention of seeking data during his physical visits and written explanations to the leaders of the custodian institutions and their subordinates about the purpose of the research. The researcher elaborated on the types of documents needed from their institutions and why he needed them. Consequently, the researcher was able to obtain the willingness and cooperation of all data source document custodians to provide the necessary data source documents under their

official capacities. This task was undertaken to obtain the required documents without the involvement of interviews or observations regarding the research.

3.8 Limitations of the Study

In discussing the limitations of the research, it was salient to again note the researcher's background to note the possibility and avoidance of personal biases. The researcher served in the system under investigation from April 1993 until the end of the study period (2019). This exposure helped him to access authorities, but it also carries a risk of personal bias, which the researcher was cognizant of throughout the research process and attempted to avoid by analyzing as many official documents as possible. The researcher has minimized bias by providing sufficient time to diagnose and reflect on the system after he left the party, six years ago a time period that, in turn has helped him to freely analyses the data findings in relation with the DMF. The researcher left the EPRDF in June 2018 and willingly resigned from his position, which helped him to diagnose the system (Africa Confidential, 29 June 2018).

In addition to the possibility of personal biases, another limitation was the validity and reliability of the data. This large and interrelated data set was stored for about twenty-eight years at its furthest point, allowing the researcher to check the validity and reliability of the processes. Furthermore, his records and personal notes have helped him check whether the data found in these sources were accurate and consistent, which in turn, assisted in the confirmation of the validity and reliability of the research process.

3.9. Summary

This chapter describes the methodology used in this research, which employs the Saunders Onion methodology model. It outlined a philosophy of critical realism that argues what is initially experienced through sense is subsequently processed subjectively by the mind. The chapter discussed the mono-method qualitative methodological choice, represented by a single document-based case study, and

explained how this strategy of case study design applies to the research question of Democratic Multinational Federalism, focusing on political decentralization in Ethiopia from 1991 to 2019. The researcher employed a document-based qualitative data collection method and the same document analysis method of the data from their primary and secondary sources. All necessary ethical considerations were followed throughout the research processes, and the factors of research validity and reliability were checked.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE ETHIOPIAN STATE TO THE FEDERAL DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

4.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the historical background of the Ethiopian state from the time of Abyssinia to the current Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It is because, first, we need to understand how the Ethiopian empire was built and passed through different challenges due to the century-long instability of the country that resulted in the quest of nations' nationalities and peoples for self-determination. It may justify the reason for doing research on the evolution of the Ethiopian state from its inception to the current Democratic Multinational Federalism that may give important background about why the DMF became salient and how it evolved as a mechanism that is expected to hold the country together. Second, looking at the past challenges and their resilience, helps to understand the impairing factors that are creating obstacles to the success of the current Democratic Multination federalism with the hope of searching for possible propositions that may address the lingering problems.

Therefore, the first part of the chapter presents the historical evolution of the Axumite state and its decline. The second part discusses the ascendence of the emperors and the continuation of the Abyssinian state: the unification and centralization attempts, the third part of the chapter deals with the uprisings and the generation of Ethiopia's revolution, the fourth part discusses military rule, and the fifth part presents the resistance of nationalist armed struggle against the military dictatorship. The final part of the chapter comprises the summary of the chapter.

4.2. The Evolution of the State of Axumite and Its Decline

Figure 2: The Previous and Current Ethiopian Map

The Ethiopian state, known for its ancient origins in the northern region of modern Ethiopia, evolved through a series of significant internal conquests and expansions. These expansions gradually incorporated neighbouring, independent communities into the Abyssinian core, primarily through assimilation efforts. Such attempts at assimilation led to the creation of an empire characterized by stark inequalities, with power highly centralized in the hands of the northern rulers (Addis Alem, 2014). Conventionally, the history of Ethiopia is often said to begin with the legendary visit of Queen Sheba, allegedly from Ethiopia to King Solomon of Israel in the tenth century BC. This event has long been cited to support the notion of Ethiopia's three thousand years of history. However, aside this association having little scientific grounding, it offers a rather limited and overly brief perspective on Ethiopia's extensive past. Recent advances in archaeological and linguistic research have made it possible, and indeed necessary, to adopt a more extended and scientifically grounded view (Bahru, 1991). Archaeological discoveries from the late 1960s and early 1970s have imparted more than national significance to Ethiopia's past. The 1974 discovery of the earliest hominids in Hadar, within the Afar desert, brought international paleontological focus to the country. Named 'Lucy' Australopithecus afarensis by scientists and 'Denqenash' (You are Marvellous) by Ethiopians, this

female ancestor of humanity was dated to three and a half million years ago (Bahru, 1991; Harold, 1994; Assefa, 2009).

Ethiopia, an ancient country located in northeast Africa, stands as one of the few modern empires that resulted from the dynamic empire-building efforts of its indigenous peoples (Mulugeta, 2020). This distinctive process of state formation, rather than resulting from external colonization, saw the country take its current form by the end of the nineteenth century. The Ethiopian state that emerged from the intricate interplay of domestic and external forces was qualitatively different from its predecessors, especially regarding territorial extent and ethnic composition. This transformation led to a more extensive, diverse empire that marked a significantly shifted from earlier iterations. Until the second half of the nineteenth century, the Ethiopian state's core was centred in the Abyssinian highlands, which included most of the northern and central highlands of present-day Ethiopia. These highlands served as the cradle of the Abyssinian civilization, traced back to the ancient Axumite civilization, dating as far back as 100 BC, providing Ethiopia with a long and continuous history of statehood in various forms (Bahru, 1991).

At its essence, the Abyssinian state was a conquest state, marked by cycles of expansion and contraction over the centuries, depending on the military and political strength of the ruling elite at the time. This cyclical pattern of expansion and contraction was a defining characteristic of the state, influencing its territorial and cultural landscape. The Abyssinian state's ability to adapt and reconfigure itself in response to changing internal and external conditions was key to its longevity and resilience (Mulugeta, 2020).

The earliest known specific reference to the term Ethiopia is found in the Greek version of a trilingual inscription from the time of Ezana, the Axumite king who introduced Christianity to Ethiopia around the mid-fourth century AD. This event significantly shaped the cultural and religious landscape of the Ethiopian people, marking a major turning point in the nation's history. The adoption of Christianity made Ethiopia one of the few Christian states in the world at the time, placing it

alongside the Roman Empire (which had adopted Christianity as its state religion in 312 AD) and a few small Christian states scattered around the Eastern Mediterranean region. This early adoption of Christianity not only influenced the religious life of the Ethiopian people but also played a central role in shaping the nation's identity and its relations with neighbouring regions and powers (Paul, 2000).

The continued use of Ethiopia was reinforced by translating the Bible into the official state language, using the written script Ge'ez. This ancient script, which has since fallen into decline, is now used exclusively by the religious leaders of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church. The translation of religious texts into Ge'ez not only helped solidify the Ethiopian state's religious and cultural identity but also served as a means of unifying the diverse peoples within its borders under a common religious and cultural framework. Ge'ez as a liturgical language continues today, linking to Ethiopia's ancient past and its long history of Christian statehood (Bahru, 1991; Paul, 2000).

The Abyssinian kingdom, tracing its origins to ancient Axum, existed for centuries before the arrival of European colonialists on the African continent. As a thriving trading state, Axum engaged in extensive trade with various parts of the world, from Rome to the Far East. By the sixth century BC, Axum had established itself as a key trading partner with other regions, playing a central role in exchanging goods and ideas across vast distances. The kingdom's strategic location along major trade routes allowed it to flourish as a trading state between the first and eighth centuries AD (Levine, 2000, in Addis Alem, 2014).

The wealth accumulated through trade, particularly in ivory, exotic animal skins, and gold, enabled Axum's rulers to establish a centralized state with tight control over its people. This wealth also allowed the state to develop a sophisticated administrative apparatus and maintain a strong military, facilitating further expanding and consolidating of the kingdom's power (Mulugeta, 2020). Paul describes the rise of the Abyssinian Empire as follows:

> Trade was crucial to the development of Aksum [sic]. Indeed, it may have been the key factor in the city's evolution into the capital of an empire and the empire's subsequent expansion. Red Sea trade steadily increased in the late first millennium BC and the early Christian era. Demand for African goods, which could only be supplied in quantity from the interior, grew (Paul, 2000, p. 26).

By the third century AD, Axum had developed its currency and was the first African civilization to mint its coins. This achievement underscored the kingdom's economic strength and integration into the broader network of trade and commerce that connected Africa with the Mediterranean and beyond. The ability to produce its currency was a significant milestone in Axum's development, reflecting its status as a major power in the region and its growing influence on the global stage.

However, Axum began to experience a decline during the seventh century, coinciding with the rise of Islam, which spread westward from the Arabian Peninsula. As political entities in northeastern Africa converted to Islam, they reorganized the traditional Red Sea trade routes, effectively excluding Christian Axum from regional trade. This shift in trade patterns had profound implications for the Axumite state, leading to its economic and political isolation (Tamora, 2005, cited in Mulugeta, 2020). The exclusion of Axum from these vital trade networks cut the state from the Eastern Mediterranean, which had long been a source of cultural and economic influence. The resulting isolation led to a sharp decline in revenues, undermining the state's ability to maintain a strong military and a complex administrative apparatus.

It marked the beginning of the Axum civilization's decline, a process that would ultimately lead to the transformation of the state and its eventual contraction. Harold captures the decline of the Abyssinian Empire as follows:

> As Muslim power and influence grew in the eighth century, Ethiopian shipping was swept from the Red Sea-India Ocean, altering the nature of the Axumite state. It became isolated from the Eastern Mediterranean ecumene, which

> had influenced its culture and sustained its economy for centuries. The coastal region lost economic vitality as trade declined, and Adulis and other commercial centers slowly withered. As a result, the state suffered a sharp reduction in revenue and could no longer afford to maintain a large military, a complex administration, and urban amenities. The culture associated with the outside world quickly faded into memory, and Ethiopia turned inward (Marcus, 1995, p. 12).

After the collapse of Axum, the Abyssinian kingdom continued to exist, although it was confined to inland territories, and its influence was significantly diminished. Despite this contraction, the kingdom occasionally attempted to expand southward whenever it felt strong enough, demonstrating the enduring ambition and resilience of the Abyssinian rulers. Between 900 and 1000 AD the period was marked by overextension, as the kingdom sought to expand its influence further southward and into the northwest. This period also saw a further expansion of Christianity, particularly in the southern and northwestern regions. However, the spread of Islam in the northeast posed a serious challenge to the kingdom's expansion efforts, leading to a complex and often contested relationship between the two religious' communities (Marcus, 1994; Bahru, 1991). Throughout its history, there were moments when the Abyssinian kingdom faced the real threat of extinction. One of the most significant of these was during the Era of the Princes or Zemene Mesafint (as it is called in Amharic), which lasted from 1769 to 1855. During this period, Abyssinia was almost non-existent as a unified state, with its political power increasingly decentralized. The state degenerated into a collection of feudal, regional compartments where local warlords and traditional nobility vied for supremacy. The once-powerful kingdom was reduced to a nominal state ruled by emperors who held little to no real power (Addis Alem, 2014).

In the view of this researcher, the Ethiopian state, created through the conquest of other ethnic communities, led to the formation of a multinational and multilingual empire characterized by significant inequalities. These inequalities have persisted,

contributing to ongoing tensions and challenges within the state. The diverse makeup of the population, coupled with the legacy of conquest and assimilation, has created a complex and often contentious political landscape. As a result, the indigenous state has evolved into a system of Democratic Multinational Federalism, reflecting the new composition of the people encompassed by the Abyssinian state. This evolution represents an attempt to address the historical inequalities and create a more inclusive and equitable political system that acknowledges the diversity of the Ethiopian people.

4.3. Ascendance of the Emperors and the Continuation of the Abyssinian State: The Unification and Centralization Attempts

4.3.1. Emperor Tewodros

In 1855, Ethiopia witnessed the resurgence of a unified imperial rule under Emperor Tewodros II, who emerged as a dominant force by overcoming regional rulers and assuming the title of king of kings. This pivotal moment marked the end of the Zemene Mesafint, a period characterized by fragmented local authority. Tewodros, originally a commoner from Qwara in Western Ethiopia, was crowned Emperor, symbolizing the beginning of modern Ethiopia (Beken, 2007). His reign is notable for his efforts to consolidate power and centralize authority, which was met with mixed results.

Significant military and administrative changes marked Tewodros's rise to power. He sought to undermine the traditional power bases of regional princes and nobility by reorganizing administrative divisions and creating a professional state army. It was a groundbreaking effort in Ethiopian history, representing the first attempt to establish a disciplined and well-equipped military force (Keller, 1981). Tewodros's vision was to unify the various principalities under his rule, thereby ending the era of local fragmentation.

Despite his ambitious goals, Tewodros faced considerable challenges. His attempts to centralize authority and reform the administrative system met with resistance and

eventually led to widespread discontent. One of his major initiatives was establishing of a nationwide system of garrisons, which were to be supplied by heavily taxed peasants. This policy alienated the rural population, already burdened by high taxes. Additionally, Tewodros's decision to confiscate church lands, arguing that parishes were overstaffed, caused a significant backlash from the local clergy. Traditionally a powerful institution, the church condemned Tewodros as an illegitimate ruler, further eroding his support (Marcus, 1994).

Tewodros's efforts to build a professional army included hiring European and Turkish military experts to train his troops and providing them with regular salaries, uniforms, and equipment. These measures were intended to enhance his empire's military and administrative capabilities. By early 1856, Tewodros had extended his rule over all of Abyssinia, marking the end of the Zemene Mesafint and the beginning of a new era. He sought to transform provincial politics into a unified national movement, driven by his belief in his destiny to revive the empire. His ambition was matched by his energy and creativity, as he aimed to secure the people's support through justice and economic development (Marcus, 1994).

However, Tewodros's approach to governance ultimately proved problematic. His reliance on violence and military force to maintain control led to widespread resistance. The very methods he used to establish order contributed to the instability of his regime. His attempts to reinforce his administration internally only served to exacerbate external difficulties. The ongoing regional rebellions and lack of financial resources further weakened his position. Despite his aspirations to create a government based on law and order, his rule was characterized by conflict and instability (Beken, 2007).

By 1861, Tewodros attempted to address his challenges by seeking assistance from Western powers. He hoped to gain technological support to modernize Ethiopia and strengthen his position. However, his request for British support was met with indifference. In a desperate move, Tewodros took British envoys hostage, hoping to

pressure the British into supporting him. This drastic action had severe consequences, prompting a military response from Britain.

The British military intervention in response to Tewodros's hostage-taking was decisive. Tewodros's army, weakened by internal problems and ongoing resistance, was no match for the British forces. The military confrontation ultimately led to the downfall of Tewodros. Realizing that his situation was untenable, Tewodros committed suicide in 1868, marking the end of his ambitious but ultimately failed attempt to unify and modernize Ethiopia (Beken, 2007).

The legacy of Emperor Tewodros is characterized by his grand ambitions rather than tangible achievements. Although his reign was marked by significant efforts to centralize power and modernize the military, these efforts were undermined by resistance, internal strife, and external challenges. As Clapham observed, the reign of Tewodros is more memorable for its aspirations than its achievements (Clapham, 1970). Tewodros's reign remains a complex chapter in Ethiopian history, reflecting ambitious reform’s potential and limitations of in a turbulent political landscape.

4.3.2 Emperor Yohannes

After a period of turmoil, Kassa Mercha of Tigray was crowned Emperor Yohannes IV on January 21, 1872. Although the imperial concept revitalized by Tewodros persisted, Emperor Yohannes shared with his predecessor the vision of a robustly unified empire (Beken, 2007). Yohannes pursued the goal of unifying Ethiopia but adopted a more pragmatic approach than Tewodros. His strategy involved tolerating a degree of autonomous governance by regional powers under imperial authority, which reflected a conscious acceptance of regional autonomy. This approach recognized the challenges of establishing a unitary state and fostered the latent centrifugal forces within the Ethiopian polity. In conjunction with his policy of controlled regionalism, Yohannes sought to maintain political and military equilibrium

(Bahru, 1991). Despite these efforts, Ethiopia faced new challenges due to increasing foreign interest (Mulugeta, 2020).

Externally, three significant developments heightened foreign interest in Ethiopia: the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Berlin Conference agreements of 1884-1885, which divided Africa among European powers, and Egypt's expansion under British protection. Yohannes's notable achievements lay in his foreign policy. Unlike Tewodros, who had struggled to secure diplomatic recognition from European powers, Yohannes engaged in patient diplomacy, strengthening his authority and legitimacy with a modernizing military force. This strategy effectively deterred premature European interventions in Abyssinia. Yohannes negotiated a peace treaty with Egypt and established trade agreements with Britain. Additionally, he procured arms from public and private European sources, enhancing his security. Nevertheless, he faced threats from the Sudanese Mahdists on his western border (Keller, 1981).

Despite Yohannes's efforts, British interests opposed the Ethiopian victory over the Egyptians. The British, who had unilaterally occupied Egypt in 1882, began creating obstacles for Ethiopia. The rise of the Mahdists in Sudan, who defeated Egyptian forces and isolated garrisons, led the British to seek Ethiopian assistance. It resulted in the Hewett or Adwa Treaty, named after the British negotiator Rear Admiral Sir William Hewett, and the location of the treaty's signing.

Following the Hewett agreement, Yohannes fulfilled his obligation to provide safe passage for Egyptians stranded in Eastern Sudan due to the Mahdists. This commitment triggered hostilities with the Mahdists, which peaked in 1888. The latent tensions with Menelik II, the King of Shewa, escalated after 1885, culminating in 1888. Yohannes was embroiled in a complex triangular conflict that led to his death and the conclusion of his reign (Bahru, 1991). The Mahdists' activities northwest of the country led Yohannes to prioritize their defeat, culminating in the Battle of Metama in March 1889. Although Yohannes achieved victory in this battle, he was

mortally wounded and died shortly thereafter (Bahru, 1991). His death caused disarray among the nobility and his troops, leading to the abandonment of the battle, and igniting disputes over his succession (Erlich, 1983, as cited in Mulugeta, 2020).

4.3.3. Emperor Menelik and The Establishment of The Current Ethiopia: Its Boarders and Capital

King Menelik of Shewa, one of Ethiopia's most powerful regional lords, declared himself Emperor in 1889 (Beken, 2007). Building upon the strategy employed by Emperor Yohannes IV, who recognized and utilized regional lords' authority to consolidate central power, Menelik established a formidable power base by expanding his dominion over vast territories to the east, west, and south of Shewa. This territorial expansion effectively integrated these regions into his kingdom and, subsequently, into the larger Ethiopian empire (Beken, 2007).

Yohannes IV's decision to grant Menelik considerable autonomy in the southern regions had profound implications, turning Shewa into the central hub of Ethiopian expansionism. Yohannes did not fully understand that the global economic landscape was shifting from a subsistence-based feudal system to a more complex absolutist framework driven by the rigorous exploitation of natural resources and international trade. By Yohannes's reign, the growing demand for commodities in the Western world was crucial role in facilitating Menelik's successful southern campaigns. Unlike Yohannes, Menelik adeptly leveraged Europe's economic interests through the diplomacy of commerce, which helped to mitigate imperialistic pressures. Menelik also effectively used of Westerners attracted to Ethiopia, whether through opportunism or recruitment. Seeking an outlet to the sea beyond Yohannes's reach, Menelik initiated large caravans to coastal areas, which provided him with a steady influx of finished goods and military arms, further bolstering his expansion efforts (Marcus, 1994).

As King of Shewa, Menelik had already embarked on a path of territorial expansion before becoming emperor. Between 1868 and 1876, he successfully conquered the region of Wello and then shifted his focus to the south and west. By 1882, Menelik had extended his dominion over Somali and Oromo territories to the south and east. By the end of 1887, his conquests had included Gurage, Arusi, and Harar. These acquisitions enabled him to control key southeastern trade routes and gain access to the sea, independent of Yohannes's influence. This strategic control allowed Menelik to tap into the wealth of gold, ivory, and coffee in his southern and western territories (Keller, 1981). Upon ascending to the imperial throne, Menelik not only inherited Yohannes's domain but also continued expanding Ethiopia's borders through military conquests and diplomatic negotiations. Between 1890 and 1906, he added the Ogaden, Bale, Sidama, Wolayta, Kaffa, and Illubabora to his empire, effectively shaping the modern boundaries of Ethiopia (Keller, 1981).

Menelik's policies were designed to centralize authority within the empire, often at the expense of regional nobility. His conquests brought diverse peoples into the Ethiopian empire, including various languages, religions (Christianity, Islam, traditional beliefs), cultures, and socio-economic practices. The newly incorporated populations, particularly those from the southern regions, experienced significant political, economic, and cultural dominance imposed by the northern conquerors. This process of unification, driven by Menelik's ambitions, was marked by disparities in the treatment of different regions and peoples. The integration of these diverse groups was prioritized, leading to the expansion of Ethiopia's territory to its present configuration, a shape formalized through boundary agreements established after the Battle of Adwa in 1896 with neighboring colonial powers (Beken, 2007; Bahru, 1991).

The land distribution policy was a significant factor in the oppression of the conquered peoples. Traditional land rights were revoked from the conquered populations, reducing them to mere cultivators who provided goods and services to

the landholders, who were predominantly military commanders and soldiers of Amhara descent—the ethnic group to which Menelik belonged (Beken, 2007).

Menelik's expansionist policies imposed a new political economy on his subjects through land distribution practices. This transformation was enforced through coercion, leading to the displacement of local clergies and the perpetration of widespread atrocities against resisting communities. The brutality of the expansion process and the resulting suffering left a lasting impact on the annexed populations (Shiferaw, 2015, as cited in Mulugeta, 2020). As a result, many individuals were reduced to serfs without land rights, while a new class of gentry and nobility emerged, known as the balabat and neftegna (Addis Alem, 2014).

Menelik undertook significant modernization efforts despite the unequal integration of independent communities into his empire. His modernization initiatives included the establishment of a professional army with regular salaries, the formation of a cabinet, and the construction of a new capital, Addis Ababa (meaning New Flower). Menelik also expanded Ethiopia's boundaries to include previously uncharted territories. Between 1896 and 1906, Ethiopia grew to its present size, incorporating highland regions, key river systems, and low-lying areas surrounding the central core of the state. The revenues from these newly incorporated areas were used to develop Addis Ababa, establish schools and hospitals, build communication networks, and construct the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway. Under Menelik's reign, Ethiopia embraced Western influences and embarked on a path of modernization, which marked a new chapter in the country's history. The transformation under Menelik laid the groundwork for Ethiopia's continued development and modernization in the 20th century (Shiferaw, 2015; Bahru, 1991).

4.3.4 Ascendence of Emperor Haile Selassie to the Throne and His effort to Modernize the Centralized Unitary state.

The illness and eventual death of Emperor Menelik II in 1913 triggered a protracted and complex struggle for succession that reverberated throughout the brief and tumultuous reign of his grandson, Lij Iyasu. The ensuing years were marked by intense political instability, characterized by the conflicting ambitions of various noble factions vying for control of the Ethiopian Empire. This period of uncertainty ultimately culminated in the ascension of Menelik's daughter, Zewditu, to the throne, signaling the beginning of a new chapter in Ethiopia's monarchical history. Zewditu's primary qualification for the monarchy rested on her direct lineage as Menelik's daughter, a connection that carried significant weight in the eyes of the nobility and the general populace. However, her appeal to the nobility, was not solely due to her royal bloodline but also because she was perceived as politically unthreatening and unlikely to challenge the established order. This perception was crucial role in her acceptance as a compromise candidate during a time of considerable factionalism within the empire (Bahru, 1991).

Zewditu's coronation on February 11, 1917, was a momentous occasion in Ethiopian history, as it marked the first instance in which official European representatives were present at such an event. The presence of these foreign dignitaries underscored the growing international interest in Ethiopian affairs and the recognition of Ethiopia's significance on the global stage. During the coronation, Zewditu took an oath to govern justly and wisely through her regent, Tafari Mekonnen, a great-grandson of King Sahle Selassie, Menelik's father, who ruled Shewa. Tafari Mekonnen, who would later be known as Emperor Haile Selassie I, was a figure of considerable political acumen and ambition, and his appointment as regent positioned him as the *de facto* ruler of the empire during Zewditu's reign (Bahru, 1991; Marcus, 1995).

Despite holding the title of Empress, Zewditu demonstrated little interest in the day-to-day political affairs of the empire, preferring instead to focus on religious and ceremonial matters. As a result, much of the responsibility for governing the empire fell to Ras Tafari, who gradually began to consolidate his power and influence. Tafari's strategic acumen and ability to navigate the complex political landscape of the time allowed him to emerge as a dominant figure in Ethiopian politics. Consequently, when Zewditu passed away in April 1930, it was widely anticipated that Tafari would ascend to the throne the new emperor. The Crown Council, recognizing Tafari's contributions to the stability and modernization of the empire, officially proclaimed him as the new emperor. Upon ascension, Tafari adopted the regnal name Haile Selassie I, which means the Power of the Trinity. This title that reflected his belief in the divine right of kings and his commitment to the Christian faith that had long been a cornerstone of Ethiopian identity (Bekele, 2007; Bahru, 1991).

With Haile Selassie I now firmly in control of the Ethiopian Empire, he embarked on an ambitious reform and modernization program. One of his first significant acts as emperor was the formal abolition of slavery, a practice that had long been a stain on Ethiopia's international reputation. By abolishing slavery, Haile Selassie sought to align Ethiopia more closely with the values of the Western world, thereby enhancing the country's standing in the global community. This move also had significant implications for Ethiopia's internal social structure, as it helped to weaken the power of the feudal aristocracy, which had historically relied on slave labor to maintain its economic and political dominance (Bahru, 1991).

In addition to abolishing slavery, Haile Selassie focused on expanding and modernizing the centralized state bureaucracy. His predecessors had initiated this initiative but was now being pursued with renewed vigor. Haile Selassie's early objectives included limiting the powers of the nobility and the church, which had traditionally wielded considerable influence in Ethiopian society. By curbing the power of these institutions, Haile Selassie aimed to consolidate his authority and

establish a more centralized and efficient system of governance. The intent was formally expressed in the first Ethiopian constitution, which Haile Selassie granted to the Ethiopian people in 1931 (Bahru, 1991). The 1931 constitution was a landmark document in Ethiopian history, as it represented the first formal codification of the powers and responsibilities of the emperor, the nobility, and the citizenry.

One of the most significant historical achievements of Haile Selassie I was his successful realization of the unitary state envisioned by Emperor Tewodros II. Despite his lack of economic awareness concerning the feudal system that dominated Ethiopia then, the new emperor positioned himself as an anti-feudal reformer. However, in reality, Haile Selassie's reforms reconstructed the feudal system on a more advanced basis, enhancing the political power of the monarchy while simultaneously guaranteeing the economic privileges of the nobility. This reconfiguration of the feudal system became the essence of Ethiopian absolutism, with the 1931 constitution serving as the juridical framework for this emerging system. While ostensibly modernizing the Ethiopian state, the Constitution also reinforced the absolute power of the emperor, who was now positioned as the ultimate arbiter of all political and legal matters within the empire (Bahru, 1991).

The 1931 Constitution was, in part, designed for foreign audiences, particularly the European powers, to demonstrate Ethiopia's political modernity and its commitment to adopting Western legal and administrative practices. However, many of the constitution's provisions held only symbolic value, as the real focus of the document was on regulating the relationship between the monarch and the nobility. By codifying the powers and privileges of the nobility, the constitution served as a vehicle for national integration, helping to unify the disparate regions and ethnic groups within the empire under a centralized authority (Bahru, 1991). This constitution, the first of its kind in Ethiopia, effectively diminished the church's role in legitimizing the emperor, thereby centralizing more power in the hands of an absolute monarch. National quasi-representative institutions, including the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were created as the part of his centralization effort.

Deputies were chosen by the nobility and local chiefs, while Senators were appointed by the emperor, further entrenching the monarchy's power over the legislative process. The power of the nobility was rooted in a combination of status and wealth, both of which were carefully regulated and preserved by the new constitution (Keller, 1981).

Following their defeat at the Battle of Adwa in 1896, the Italians briefly adopted a policy of retrenchment regarding their colonial ambitions in northeast Africa. The Battle of Adwa had been a humiliating defeat for Italy, marking the first time an African nation had successfully repelled a European colonial power. However, as a colonial power sharing the second-longest border with independent Ethiopia (after British Kenya), Italy could not afford to ignore Ethiopia indefinitely. Soon, Italy began coordinating its actions with the neighboring colonial powers, Britain, and France, to contain and eventually subjugate Ethiopia. The Tripartite Agreement of 1906 was the first significant outcome of this collaborative approach toward Ethiopia, as it formalized the division of influence among the three powers and established the groundwork for future interventions (Bahru, 1991).

The rise of Benito Mussolini's Fascists to power in Italy in 1922 significantly boosted Italian colonial aspirations. He viewed the conquest of Ethiopia as a critical component of his imperial ambitions. To Mussolini, Ethiopia represented not only a strategic asset but also an opportunity to erase the stain of the defeat at Adwa and to demonstrate the might of Fascist Italy. As a result, it was only a matter of time before Italy turned its attention to Ethiopia. This country that had long symbolized Italian colonialism's frustrations and unfulfilled ambitions (Bahru, 1991).

In 1935, Italy invaded Ethiopia from both the north and the south, employing massive air power, modern military technology, and the horrifying use of poison gas against Ethiopian forces. Despite the initial defeat of Ethiopian forces, resistance to the Italian occupation continued in various forms, ranging from organized guerrilla warfare to spontaneous acts of defiance by local communities. Haile Selassie

returned to the capital after several failed attempts to rally his army on the northern front, recognizing the futility of continued resistance, opted for exile in May 1936. His decision to go into exile was a calculated move, as he sought to garner international support for Ethiopia's plight and appeal to the League of Nations, which Ethiopia was a member, to act against Italian aggression (Marcus, 1995).

The outbreak of World War II drastically altered the geopolitical landscape, with Mussolini aligning Italy with Nazi Germany, transforming Italy from a steadfast ally to a moral enemy in the eyes of the British. This shift in alliances had profound implications for Ethiopia, changing the calculus of the British and other Allied powers. The British, recognizing Haile Selassie as a unifying symbol for all Ethiopians against the Fascist enemy, facilitated the emperor's return from exile to the war theater in East Africa. Haile Selassie's return was a significant morale boost for the Ethiopian resistance and provided a focal point for the anti-Italian struggle. In 1941, following the Allied victories in North Africa, Haile Selassie triumphantly re-entered Addis Ababa, marking the beginning of the end of Italian occupation in Ethiopia (Bahru, 1991).

The legacy of Haile Selassie's reign is deeply intertwined with Ethiopia's ongoing challenges of ethnic federalism and national identity. His attempts to centralize power and create a unitary state laid the foundation for the modern Ethiopian state. Still, they also sowed the seeds of ethnic and regional tensions that continue to plague the country today. The policy of centralization pursued by Haile Selassie's imperial government, which was based on the promotion of Amharic as the official language, Orthodox Christianity as the state religion, and a strong attachment to the monarchy, has been identified as one of the factors behind Ethiopia's current multi-ethnic crisis. This legacy of centralized authority and the suppression of regional and ethnic identities has contributed to Ethiopian politics' the complex and often contentious nature today (Mulugeta, 2020).

4.4 The Uprisings and the Generation of the Ethiopian Revolution

The 1942 Tigran rebellion is recognized as one of Ethiopia's most significant peasant uprisings against imperial rule. During this period, the emperor faced serious challenges to his authority. His response was both decisive and forceful. By 1943-44, with support from British air power, the imperial forces violently crushed the Woyane insurrection, a major peasant revolt in the Tigray region. Widespread administrative failures, heavy taxation, rampant corruption, and the consequent rise of banditry fueled this uprising. For the emperor, the central issue was not the fairness of the grievances raised by the rebels but rather the fact that they had dared to challenge his administration (Marcus, 1995). Following this, several other significant uprisings emerged, including the 1960 Gedo rebellion, also known as the Michille war, which marked the onset of the Eritrean secessionist movement, the Bale Oromo rebellion led by Wako Gutu in 1965, and the Gojjam peasant rebellion in 1968 (Gebru, 1991; Paul, 2000).

The Eritrean resistance became a substantial challenge to the imperial regime, ultimately draining its resources and undermining its stability. The regime's decision to terminate the federal arrangement established by the United Nations in 1952, combined with a series of policies aimed at suppressing initial peaceful resistance movements, led to a protracted period of armed conflict and bloodshed. This conflict resulted in the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front in 1961 and, later, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front in 1970, both of which played critical roles in the struggle for Eritrean independence (Addis Alem, 2014).

Urban opposition to the regime began with the failed coup attempt of 1960, led by the commander of the Imperial Guard and his brother. This incident was a precursor to a burgeoning student movement in 1965. The students organized demonstrations in front of the parliament, prominently featuring the slogan Land to the tiller. These protests became common, highlighting the various political and socio-economic issues prevalent at the time. By the late 1960s, the opposition grew increasingly

intense, with more widespread questioning of the monarchy's legitimacy (Keller, 1981).

The most formidable opposition came from the student population. Their resilience and strategic presence in urban centers, particularly in the capital, had a destabilizing impact on the regime (Bahru, 1991). Despite the organized nature of rural protests, these often remained on the periphery and received less media attention than the more visible urban movements. From 1965 onwards, students engaged in annual demonstrations, challenging a regime that had managed to subdue much of the population. As ardent advocates for change, the students played a pivotal role in the Ethiopian Revolution, more so than any other societal group (Bahru, 1991).

The Ethiopian student movement began as a cultural and intellectual forum with the establishment of tertiary education. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, this movement had evolved into a powerful mass revolutionary force. Government repression only escalated the students' resolve, leading to increasingly bold challenges to the regime. The cycle of repression and opposition climaxed with the 1974 Revolution (Bahru, 1991). Both objective and subjective factors drove the radicalization of the student movement. Objectively, the dire conditions of the peasantry, exacerbated by the regime's exploitative policies, the feudal landholding system, and worsening urban conditions due to rapid urbanization and inadequate development, contributed significantly to the unrest. Additionally, feelings of marginalization among non-Amharic nationalists and a strong desire for peace in Eritrea further fueled the discontent (Bahru, 2014)

On the subjective level, various influences played a role in sharpening the students' awareness and radical ideas. Beginning in 1958, exposure to scholarship from other African countries invigorated Ethiopian university students, infusing them with new ideas and perspectives. The failed 1960 coup also played a crucial role in diminishing the imperial mystique and further radicalizing the student movement.

Students built upon the challenge posed by the rebels and amplified their call for change. Additionally, establishing the Ethiopian University Service (EUS) in 1964, which involved students spending a year teaching in secondary schools in rural areas, served as a bridge between campus and society. This initiative brought students into direct contact with the rural populace whose lives they aimed to improve and became an important instrument in discrediting the imperial administration. The EUS also facilitated closer connections between university and high school students, strengthening the overall movement (Bahru, 1991).

Initially, the student movement focused on demanding a free press and union rights. However, by the early 1960s, the scope of debates had shifted towards more fundamental political issues, including the nature of the state and the need for radical change. Bahru captures this in the following way:

> The emergence of a radical core known as ‘crocodile’ in 1964 was pivotal in this transformation. This group, known for staying mostly undercover and avoiding direct leadership roles, advanced their revolutionary ideas through intermediary figures. The students’ staunch opposition to the regime and the growing acceptance of Marxist ideas can be traced back to this period. The achievements and missteps of the Ethiopian student movement are ultimately linked to the actions and ideologies of this radical core (Bahru, 1991, p. 223).

At the peak of the student movement, discussions regarding the nature of imperial oppression and potential paths forward became central issues. Three distinct perspectives emerged, reflecting differing ideological orientations and loyalties (Merera, 2003).

The first perspective, the nation-building thesis, viewed the nation-building process as inherently flawed yet necessary. Proponents of this view acknowledged that while the nation-building process might involve mishaps and oppression, these were seen as expected components of the larger goal. This viewpoint drew parallels with

historical examples, such as France, where harsh assimilation policies and brutal force were employed to forge the French nation. This perspective was primarily held by elites who supported a unitary government and were inclined to overlook or rationalize the associated injustices (Merera, 2003).

In contrast, the second perspective, advocated mainly by students from oppressed nationalities and leftist Amhara students, saw the Ethiopian state as a prison of nationalities. These proponents argued for transforming the Ethiopian Empire into a nation of nations. Ethiopia was a diverse and multiethnic state, home to over eighty languages. Despite this diversity, the imperial regime-imposed Amharic as the official language and Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity as the state religion, leading to the marginalization of non-Amharic speakers and non-Orthodox believers. Consequently, a significant portion of the population faced various forms of linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and religious oppression. The oppression was closely linked to the land question, as these marginalized groups had lost their lands to the expansionist imperial army and, subsequently, to the interests of the emerging elite. This systemic exclusion and exploitation led to widespread revolts among different nationalities.

The third perspective, the colonial thesis, proposed separation as the only viable solution. Radical Eritrean and Oromo students particularly embraced this view. The thesis drew on historical precedents to justify its stance: Eritrea’s prolonged period of Italian colonialism and the subsequent abrogation of its federation with Ethiopia, resulting in its complete annexation into the Ethiopian Empire, were considered valid grounds for advocating separation. Similarly, the late incorporation of most Oromo territories into the empire, coinciding with the European colonial expansion during the scramble for Africa, provided further justification for applying the colonial thesis to the Oromo situation. Adherents of this perspective eventually evolved into the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (Mulugeta, 2020).

Meanwhile, Ethiopia's economic situation deteriorated significantly, impeding the development of essential bureaucracy and programs vital for the urban bourgeoisie. The first major shock came in 1967 with the closure of the Suez Canal following the Six-Day War between Israel and Egypt. This closure increased prices for imported goods and Ethiopian exports, resulting in inflation and a sharp decline in government revenues from tariffs and duties. Although the economy experienced a temporary rebound in 1972 due to high international commodity prices and a favorable harvest, the government struggled to fund the escalating counterinsurgency efforts in Eritrea, and ongoing development programs and education initiatives (Marcus, 1994).

The government faced numerous socio-economic challenges, including an outdated land tenure system, urban unemployment, and shortages of basic commodities. However, it failed to implement effective solutions for these pressing issues. As Paul explains:

> Haile Selassie's long-standing practice of balancing reformist and traditionalist factions persisted, but frustration and pressure were mounting. There were increasing demands for expanded educational opportunities, more rapid development, land reform, greater freedom of expression, recognition of languages other than Amharic, and ethnic and religious diversity. Despite these growing demands, Haile Selassie remained reluctant to address these concerns seriously. He was firmly opposed to the development of political parties. Without legitimate outlets for debate and exchanging ideas, students and intellectuals resorted to distributing leaflets, holding clandestine meetings, and engaging in conspiracies. This environment allowed genuinely subversive indigenous and foreign, forces to exploit existing tensions and foster clashes (Paul, 2000).

The Ethiopian economy faced another major blow in 1973 when oil prices surged following the Yom Kippur War. This crisis was compounded by a severe drought and famine in the same year, further exacerbating the monarchy's downfall (Marcus,

1994). The rural catastrophe resulted in a large number of victims, and the impact on urban areas was equally profound. Inflation, coupled with the ongoing economic turmoil, signaled the approaching end of the monarchy. The situation deteriorated further when unrest began to emerge within the army, with the military joining other opposition groups against the government. This unrest became apparent with a mutiny by non-commissioned officers and enlisted men in a unit stationed in Negele, Sidamo province (Addis Alem, 2014).

As 1974 progressed, the military personnel involved in the February mutiny became increasingly politicized. By the time the new constitution was to be enacted in September, this group, now identifying as the Armed Forces Coordinating Committee, had come under the influence of radical intellectuals. As public unrest grew and debates intensified, the committee exerted significant influence on government policy. Despite professing loyalty to the crown publicly, the committee's internal dynamics and external pressures led to its eventual seizure of power (Keller, 1981).

By September 1974, the Coordinating Committee had evolved into a formidable national political force known as the Derg, adopting the motto Ethiopia Tikdem (Ethiopia First). Although there was no comprehensive new social ideology yet, a revolutionary mission was evident, which was crucial for the Derg's consolidation of power (Keller, 1981).

As the emperor's world collapsed around him, he faced the crisis with a detachment that bordered on fatalism (Bahru, 1991). It was unclear whether he fully understood that he was the primary target of the Derg. Nonetheless, it became increasingly evident as the Derg dismantled institutions closely associated with imperial authority. The ruler, once seen as a benevolent father figure, was now depicted as a tyrant consumed by greed. This marked the end of not only one of the longest and most notable reigns in Ethiopian history but also a dynasty with origins tracing back to King Solomon and the Queen of Sheba (Bahru, 1991).

With the ancient monarchy in ruins, the military, recognizing the regime's weakness and the resulting power vacuum, decided to step in. On June 28, 1974, the military established a committee known as the Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army, or the Derg. This committee swiftly began to strip the emperor of his powers and authority. The emperor faced accusations of embezzlement and hoarding wealth in foreign banks while millions starved. Meanwhile, other interest groups, including students, labor unions, and teachers, lacked the political organization to vie for power. As a result, the Derg, later known as the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC), assumed control on September 12, 1974 (Addis Alem, 2014).

In summary, Ethiopia, like other African societies, was not immune to the fact of conquest. However, rather than being a creation of European colonizers, Ethiopia’s statehood resulted from the conquests and efforts of four indigenous emperors in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating with Haile Selassie I. This consolidation of autocratic rule defined the boundaries of the modern Ethiopian state (Keller, 1981).

4.5 The Military Rule

The Derg issued the Provisional Military Governments Proclamation No. 1 on September 12, 1974, which provided for the dethronement of Haile-Selassie I, a proclamation that also transformed the Derg into the Provisional Military Administration Council (PMAC). The council assumed full state power, constituting a group of 120 soldiers ranging in rank from private to major. Initially, it was not clear which political system the Derg was going to replace the previous one with. Nonetheless, it suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, and banned all strikes and demonstrations. What had started as the slogan Ethiopia First now became a creed; opposing it was judged to be tantamount to treason (Vaughan, 2003; Beken, 2007; Bahru, 1991).

However, soon, the Derg came under pressure from different Marxist-inspired groups, including those of organized Addis Ababa university students, the university teachers group known as Forum, and the Confederation of Ethiopian Labor Union (CELU). Leftist organizations derived notably from EPRP and Me'ison and sections of the military allied to these forces, such as the engineer's crops, the Bodyguard, and the army aviation. All of them rallied behind the call to set up a provisional people's government, as opposed to the military regime that was rearing its head (Bahru, 1991; Addis Alem, 2014; Beken, 2007). Not long thereafter, the Derg showed that it would not tolerate dissent even from within its ranks. The first victim of such intolerance was General Aman Andom, its chairman. With Andom, over sixty detainees were summarily executed, for which the Derg claimed it had made a Political Decision (Marcus, 1995). The day represented a victory for the hard-liners, who opposed the moderate positions espoused by Aman. They believed that the quick establishment of a republic would end the revolution before it had begun, that, for nationalist reasons, it was wrong to yield to the liberation movements in Eritrea, and that officials from the old regime should be executed without trial. In a fiery speech, Mengistu instructed his audience to look to the future: Ethiopia needed land reform, national unity, and revolution (Marcus,1995).

The Derg increasingly became radicalized to weaken these critical voices and to acquire greater support from the people. This radicalization was confirmed by the Ten Points Program, which was proclaimed by the Derg on 20 December 1974. This made clear that Ethiopian Socialism would serve as an ideological principle for Derg's policies. The declaration of socialism foresaw a one-party state, public ownership of the main sectors of the economy, and collective agriculture. The document called for national unity and equal opportunity for all ethnic, religious, and cultural groups. Given this, on 1st January 1975, the Derg decided, and as such, to implement Ethiopian socialism to nationalize private banks and insurance companies. The measure with the largest social impact, however, was the

nationalization of all rural land, which was legally laid down in Proclamation No/ 31 of 4 March 1975 (Beken, 200; Marcus,1995). Bahru captures this as follows:

> On 4 March, the Derg surprised the most vehement of its leftist critics by opting for one of the most radical land reform proclamations that any regime has ever issued. The proclamation abolished all forms of private land ownership and prohibited the sale, lease, or mortgage of rural land. Pleasants were to enjoy usufructuary rights over land holdings and litigation, an all-too-common feature of prerevolution Ethiopia was terminated. The proclamation provided for the setting up of peasant associations, which would assume primary responsibility for the implementation of the proclamation and the administration of the periodic redistribution of land (Bahru, 1991, p. 242).

The major historical significance of the land reform was that it put an end to landlordism. Its greatest beneficiaries were the tenants and the landless. This land reform not only fit the ideological framework of Ethiopian socialism but was also aimed at acquiring support among the people, which was especially welcomed in the southern parts of the country, as many southern peasants' families had lost their traditional land rights during the imperial period. These peasants hoped that land reform would result and the restoration of their control over the lands in an improvement of their economic position. However, in return for the land, the Derg could draw on the vast pool of human resources for the interminable wars that defined their reign. But when it came to improving the lot of the peasants' lives, the proclamation could hardly be judged to have been an unqualified success. Not only did it fall short of making him the master of his plot, but it was also accompanied by a series of unpopular measures that sought to regiment rural life (Bahru, 1991; Beken, 2007).

To expedite these changes, the Derg cleverly decided to use high school and university students and staff in the Development through a cooperation campaign (the Zemach in Amharic). The youth helped to implement land reform and establish the Peasant Association but occasionally had to be restrained from pushing forward

to collectivization and meting out revolutionary justice to ex-landlords and displaced officials of the old regime. Student response to the Zamacha showed that the younger, educated civilian population was more radical than the government. Yet, it was not in the countryside but in the cities where the contradiction was played out (Marcus, 1995).

In April 1976, the Derg issued the Program of the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR) with the help of the All-Ethiopia Socialist movement Me'ison, which claimed that it was giving the Derg critical support. The program stated that the objective of the national democratic revolution was to liberate Ethiopia from the yokes of feudalism and imperialism and to lay the foundations for socialism (PNDR Program of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 1976 as cited in Addis Alem, 2014). In the Program of the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR), a political program that replaced the ten-point program of 20 December 1974, a much more positive attitude toward ethnic diversity came to the fore. The multi-ethnic composition of Ethiopia was no longer denied. The cultural oppression of non-Amhara groups had to be remedied by the equal treatment of the history, culture, language, and religion of each ethnic group. However, as the land reform did not lead to an improvement in the life of the peasants, the rhetoric of the PNDR did not give rise to substantial changes in ethnic relations (Beken, 2007). The PNDR was the Chinese recipe for the socialist transformation in the Third World. It relied on the revolutionary alliance of the Proletariat, the Peasantry, and the progressive Petit-bourgeoisie and targeted the trinity of feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucratic capitalism as the enemies of the people. The ultimate objective of the program was envisioned as the establishment of the People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, which came to be in 1987. The Derg had come very far from its fumbling debut into the arena of revolutionary rhetoric with the slogan Ethiopia First (Bahru,1991).

The emerging political organizations of the post-imperial regime were highly divided in their positions on the state and other timely issues. The two most visible organizations of the time, the EPRP and Me'ison, had diametrically opposite

opinions on the Derg. While Me'ison advocated critical support in the absence of organized political leadership, the EPRP demanded the formation of a provisional people's government.

Me'ison was dominated by French-trained intellectuals led by Haile Fida (presumed executed in 1978), who believed in self-determination within Ethiopia for minorities and nationalities. They believed that the Derg could be so thoroughly tamed to socialism as to transfer power to the party. Since Me'ison stood forthrightly for Ethiopian unity, the military decided to use its ideas for its purposes. Me'ison members, therefore, had a crucial role in developing the rural and urban land reforms, provided reliable men for important government posts, and helped to establish in December 1975 the important Yekatit 66 political school for cadres and the Provisional Office of Mass Organizational Affairs (POMOA) for politicizing Ethiopian broad masses. On top of this, Me'ison's theorists were largely responsible for the Program of the National Democratic Revolution (PNDR) (Marcus,1995).

The top-down management of the revolution greatly distressed the EPRP, whose members were mostly locally schooled or educated in the United States. They sought to accord the peasantry and the proletariat immediate political primacy under a dictatorship of the working classes. In the EPRP's thinking, the military deserved no transitional role and should immediately return to the barracks to prepare itself to accept civilian authority. They regarded the military as opportunists who had stolen their programs, ideas, and ideology. The EPRP sought a state based on elections and popular authority, even at the expense of state sovereignty. The party accepted the theoretical fight of nationalities to secede from Ethiopia, although it preferred to see the Empire's people construct a state based on respect for cultural autonomy (Marcus,1995).

The polemics between the two organizations continued for some time and were then replaced by sporadic encounters, assassinations, and counter-assassinations in urban areas in the autumn of 1976. Since Me'ison had the support of the Derg, it was able to recruit members of the bureaucracy and kebele (lower echelon of

government) leaders. On the other hand, the EPRP was stronger in the student body, the working people, and among other city dwellers (Addis Alem, 2014).

After Mengistu emerged as the undisputed leader of the PMAC, by killing the second chairman of the Derg, General Teferi Banti, and other power contenders on 3 February 1977, he publicly declared the start of Red Terror against counterrevolutionaries. He aimed to wipe out all enemies of the Derg by any means. The government empowered cadres and neighborhood militias to expose EPRP members and sympathizers, and as a result, in March and April 1977, the civilian population in Addis Ababa and other major towns was terrorized by killings, beatings, shootings, and arrests. Parents were not able to mourn or bury their sons and daughters. The killing continued, and young people were assembled and executed summarily (Addis Alem, 2014). Lefort remarks:

> Officially, there were 732 victims. In reality, a thousand, two thousand? No one can say. It was delirious madness. The bodies of the victims were handed over only after payments for the bullets that had killed them. Addis Ababa, the dazed wore mourning for as long as if permitted to do so (Lefort, 1983, p. 201).

This situation, coupled with extremely violent repression, resulted in the regime (from 1977 onward under the tight control of Mengistu Hailemariam) finding itself under increasing pressure from regional and ethnic resistance movements (Beken, 2007). The above-discussed oppression and neglect made the ground fertile for fronts of different nationalities to mushroom all over the country. National fronts such as TPLF, OLF, ALF, EPDM, OPDO, EPLF, ELF, WSLF, SLM, and some other similar organizations were instrumental in the downfall of the military regime. Some of these fronts were able to mobilize a formidable force that contributed greatly to shortening the life span of the Derg. The fronts had varied political programs and agendas. Some were struggling for democracy and national equality, while others were formed for independence and secession (Addis Alem, 2014).

Despite the enormous military resources, the Derg failed to break the resistance of the liberation movements. Because of this, the Derg started to turn its attention to peaceful resolution to various ethnic and regional conflicts. The centralizing policy came under increasing strain in the late 1980s as a part of the reform that ushered in the new constitution that was approved in February 1987, ending thirteen years in which Ethiopia was governed without a constitution (the constitution of 1955 had been suspended when Derg took power in September 1974). This constitution established the PDRE (People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) and the Derg announced the establishment of several autonomous regions in the more recalcitrant parts of the country. The arrangement was premised on the Institute for the Study of Ethiopia Nationalities (ISEN), which had been established on Soviet advice in 1983, to investigate the potential for political structure along the lines of the Soviet model. The regime carried out a population census in 1984, which incorporated inquiries about mother tongue and religious affiliation (Vaughan, 2003; Beken, 2001).

The provisions of the new constitution were, therefore, not able to extinguish the revolutionary fire, and the EPRDF had been established by the TPLF and EPDM in early 1989 in an agreement that formalized the 8-year *de facto* alliance between the two movements. At the beginning of 1989, the TPLF succeeded in gaining control of the largest part of Tigray and, to rally other peoples behind its struggle, it created the EPRDF aimed to form a broad coalition of ethnically based parties (Vaughan, 2003; Beken, 2001). During the liberation struggle, three organizations, besides the TPLF, became members of the EPRDF: EPDM (Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo People's Democratic Organization), and EDORM (Ethiopia Democratic Officer's Revolutionary Movement) (Beken, 2007).

From its early days, the Derg tried to stay in power by bringing the people into submission. The summarily undertaken executions and extensive detentions cruelly perpetuated by the regime were part and parcel of the conspiracy to extend its life span. Massive mobilizations and military campaigns were the order of the day to crush the resistance of liberation movements. In the military sphere, the turning point

came in March 1988, when EPLF scored its most decisive victory up to that point at Afabet, an important government stronghold north of the Eritrean capital, Asmara. About a year later, in February 1989, the government suffered another major debacle in Tigray when TPLF forces scored a major victory at Endasellasie in Shire (Bahru, 1991).

The Famine of 1984/85 also brought another blow to the regime. In the first place, the Derg used the cover-up of the 1973/74 catastrophe by the Haile-Selassie regime to usurp power. However, the same regime, which had used famine to discredit the monarchy, was caught trying to cover up the disaster of Northern Ethiopia so as not to spoil the extravagant celebration for the establishment of the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE). Marcus summarizes the situation as follows:

> In a five-and-half-hour acceptance speech, Mengistu described past achievements and plans, never once mentioning the famine. This was the time when drought-affected Ethiopians started to perish in thousands. Not only did Mengistu attempt to cover up, but he also tried his best to use food aid as a weapon against the rebel-held area population, intending to starve them into submission. The Derg again embarked on a very controversial project of resettlement, which was intended to depopulate the already affected areas that were mainly rebel operation regions (Marcus,1995).

Soon, the theatre of the conflict between the newly established EPRDF and the Dreg's armed forces moved to the adjacent regions and then further southwards. The TPLF's control of Tigray was not only a military and psychological blow to the regime but was a loss of the only ground access to Eritrea and the signal of a near disaster for its war efforts in that region. In 1989, frustration within the armed forces was intensified by successive defeats and culminated in a coup attempt, which failed due to hesitation and lack of organized move. As a result, twelve generals and other high-ranking officers were executed without trial (Addis Alem, 2014).

The regime's last desperate attempts to avert the impending catastrophe moved at a dizzying pace. In February 1990, the port town of Massawa fell to EPLF forces with the simultaneous destruction of the Ethiopian Navy, and the government lost control of the coastline as well as its important lifeline to its forces in the interior (Bahru, 1991). In March 1990, Mengistu declared the end of socialism and replaced the WPE (Workers Party of Ethiopia) with the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party (EDUP), but this contributed little to slow the deteriorating position of the regime (Addis Alem, 2014).

After the EPRDF's first congress in January 1991, it was decided to embark upon the last stage of the offensive against the Derg to topple it from power. In March 1991, it was clear that it was a matter of months until the regime would collapse. At this time, the US government, fearful that a chaotic situation might follow state collapse and hoping to influence the upcoming transition, began a diplomatic initiative to encourage peace talks between the Derg, EPRDF, and EPLF forces. The US government intended to involve the key protagonists, the EPRDF in Ethiopia and the EPLF in Eritrea, in the talks with the government, but both insisted that the OLF be included (Mulugeta 2020).

On May 1991, the president, Col. Mengistu Hailemariam, fled to Zimbabwe, and on May 24, 1991, the EPLF Marched to Asmara the capital of Eritrea. Finally, on May 28, 1991, the EPRDF entered Addis Ababa, marking the end of seventeen years of rule by the military regime and the beginning of a new era of transition in Ethiopia, which initiated the *de facto* Multinational federalism (Mulugeta, 2020; Beken, 2007; Addis Alem, 2014; Bahru, 1991).

4.6 National Armed Struggle Groups

The organizational philosophies of the various rebellions in Ethiopia during the 1974 revolution were as varied as the rebellions themselves. Despite this diversity, these rebellions can be broadly categorized into three groups: the first group comprised separatist movements, including the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and the Eritrean

People's Liberation Front (EPLF), as well as the Somali separatists represented by the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF). The second group consisted of entities organized around centrist and Pan-Ethiopian ideologies, such as the Ethiopia People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and its armed wing, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army (EPRA), as well as the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU). The third group was characterized by nationalist agendas focused on the diverse cultural identities within the country, including the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromo (IFLO), the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), the Afar Liberation Front (ALF), and the Gambela People's Liberation Movement (GPLM) (Mulugeta, 2020).

The collective efforts of these liberation movements resulted in two significant outcomes: the secession of Eritrea and the establishment of a Democratic Multinational Federalism in the remainder of the country. The following sections briefly explore the organizational philosophies and contributions of these rebellious groups, particularly focusing on their roles in the secession of Eritrea and the formation of multinational federalism in Ethiopia post-1991.

4.6.1. The EPLF and ELF

The dissolution of Eritrean autonomy was firmly established in 1962 when the Eritrean Assembly, under considerable pressure from Ethiopia, voted to end the federation. This action sparked a struggle for independence, initially led by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and later intensified by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) (Beken, 2007).

In July 1960, a group of mainly Muslim exiles in Cairo announced the formation of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF). Their manifesto advocated for armed struggle to secure Eritrea's rights, but the organization remained largely ineffective militarily until 1962. At that point, fighters, primarily lowland Muslim pastoralists, began organizing attacks on isolated posts and settlements in the remote Gash and Baraka regions (Marcus, 1995).

Syrian support for the ELF played a crucial role. In mid-1963, following the forced vote to end the federation and fully integrate Eritrea into Ethiopia, Damascus agreed to provide military training to thirty Eritrean students. This support continued, with additional groups receiving training every two years. By 1966, about one thousand fighters were active in Eritrea, mainly in the western lowlands. While they caused disturbances, they did not seriously challenge Ethiopian control. Initially, their efforts were framed in Pan-Muslim terms, but by the late 1960s, rising nationalist sentiments in Eritrea's Christian highlands shifted the movement's focus (Marcus, 1995).

The severance of Eritrea's federation with Ethiopia and its full annexation was viewed by supporters of the colonial thesis as justification for their struggle. This perspective, emerging from radical students in Eritrea, eventually led to the formation of the EPLF (Mulugeta, 2020).

At the beginning of the 1974 Revolution, there was a brief hope among some Derg members that Eritrean dissidents might disarm once the old regime was overthrown. However, this hope proved unfounded as the EPLF and ELF launched offensives targeting the Eritrean capital, Asmara. Simultaneously, a severe anti-Eritrean propaganda campaign was accompanied by brutal executions of suspected infiltrators in Asmara in January 1975. This led to a significant exodus of urban Eritreans, including high-ranking officials and officers, swelling the ranks of the EPLF, which reportedly grew tenfold. Although the Eritrean liberation movement initially aimed to restore the federal arrangement terminated in 1962, escalating hostilities pushed them toward a full independence agenda (Bahru, 1991).

Before independence could be achieved, internal conflicts between the ELF and EPLF needed resolution. Throughout the 1970s, a bitter struggle for dominance ensued between these two fronts. By August 1980, the EPLF felt strong enough to launch a campaign to eliminate its rival, achieving this goal by August 1981 (Bahru, 1991).

After 1982, the EPLF continued to wage a low-level war, eroding the morale of government forces. It cooperated with the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) in February 1983 when the government launched a two-front campaign into Tigray from Eritrea and Wello. Large-scale warfare paused until early 1984 when the EPLF launched a successful attack on Tesenay, capturing armored vehicles, fuel, weapons, and ammunition. In March, the EPLF used these resources to spearhead a campaign against government positions east of Naqfa. One by one, these positions fell, demoralizing thousands of soldiers who either fled to Sudan or surrendered. The EPLF's success emboldened it to rally an increasingly discontented peasantry and to conduct guerrilla operations south of Asmara. In December 1987, the EPLF breached Ethiopian lines before Naqfa and pushed back the enemy. This defeat further demoralized Ethiopian soldiers, who had been led to believe that the new republic with its autonomous zones would quickly win over the rebels. Instead, the EPLF's victory indicated that the conflict would persist (Marcus, 1995).

On February 9, 1990, the EPLF mounted a successful assault on the road linking Asmara to the coast, followed by a surprise attack on Misawa. This victory severed the major supply lines of the Ethiopian Second Army, already isolated by the TPLF, which controlled key supply routes from Ethiopia. The defeat demonstrated that the Addis Ababa government could no longer sustain relief efforts for Tigray and Eritrea. Throughout 1990-1991, the EPLF and TPLF-EPRDF continued to achieve successive victories (Marcus, 1995).

On May 24, 1991, just days before the EPRDF entered Addis Ababa, the EPLF marched into Asmara, ending a war that had lasted over twenty-five years and realizing what had long seemed an unattainable dream: the creation of an independent state in Eritrea. This achievement came despite fierce opposition from one of Sub-Saharan Africa's largest armies, supported successively by major superpowers. Eritreans, having fought for their independence, fully understood its value and were committed to realizing their aspirations (Clapham, 2017). The EPLF's victory not only led to the establishment of the new state of Eritrea but also

marked the end of the bureaucratic centralized state in Ethiopia, a system envisioned by Tewodros and solidified by Emperor Haile Selassie.

4.6.2. The TPLF

The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) emerged in February 1975 as a small guerrilla group in the northern region of Ethiopia, which eventually evolved into a key political and military force within the Ethiopian government. Originally, the TPLF was an ethno-nationalist movement primarily focused on securing self-determination for the Tigray region within the broader Ethiopian state (Aregawi, 2004).

The launch of the TPLF occurred during a period when the Ethiopian regime faced significant challenges to its legitimacy both domestically and internationally. On the domestic front, the regime's legitimacy was eroded due to a variety of political demands from various Ethiopian groups, coupled with resistance from the old ruling class and its associated constituencies. Internationally, the regime's standing was further weakened as the United States, its principal ally, grew increasingly reluctant to maintain its cooperation with the Ethiopian government (Mulugeta, 2020).

The TPLF's origins can be traced back to the Tigraian University Students' Association (TUSA), which was a loose association of radical Tigraian university students. TUSA was formed with the goal of deepening the political consciousness of its members through the exchange of leftist reading materials. Additionally, TUSA sought to spread revolutionary ideas among high school students through organized study circles during the early 1970s (Aregawi, 2009, as cited in Mulugeta, 2020).

In September 1974, after extensive discussions, seven radical Tigraian students from the then Haile Selassie University established an organization known as the Tigrai National Organization (TNO). Upon its formation, the TNO made four critical decisions (Bisrat, 2012):

1. They identified Ethiopia as a prison of nations, where the pursuit of national equality required a national form of struggle as a primary means to achieve democracy. They also argued that the national question could only be adequately addressed by recognizing the right of nations and nationalities to self-determination, including the option of secession.
2. They adopted Marxism-Leninism as the guiding ideology to lead the struggle for national equality while also addressing the broader issues of class oppression.
3. Following the 12 September 1974 decree of Ethiopia Tikdem, which they interpreted as closing off peaceful avenues for political struggle, the TNO determined that armed struggle was the only viable option for achieving democracy.
4. They recognized the necessity of establishing an urban-based clandestine organization that would provide essential information, supplies, and manpower for the eventual launch of an armed struggle.

After laying the groundwork, the TNO group made their way to Dedebit on 18 February 1975 (11 Yekatit 1967 in the Ethiopian calendar). Dedebit, located about 80 kilometers from Shire and 900 kilometers from Addis Ababa, became the initial base of operations for the TPLF. The movement referred to its struggle as Kalai Woyane (second Woyane), symbolizing a fight for national self-determination against an oppressive state (Aregawi, 2004).

The TPLF, which played a crucial role in the eventual overthrow of the Derg regime, was officially launched in February 1975 in the remote and difficult-to-access region of Dedebit in Tigray. The historical roots of the movement can be traced back to a profound sense of marginalization felt by the Tigray region and its elite, dating back to the death of Emperor Yohannes and the ascension of Menelik to imperial power in 1889 (Bahru, 1991). The TPLF framed its struggle within the Leninist doctrine of self-determination up to and including secession, a doctrine that had gained traction among the Ethiopian student movements of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Among

the various leftist organizations that emerged from this student movement, the TPLF was unique in its steadfast commitment to this ideology, both as a matter of principle and because of its effectiveness in mobilizing and organizing opposition (Bahru, 1991).

In its formative years, the TPLF focused on establishing its dominance in Tigray, a region where it had to contend with three other organizations that had already established a presence. These were the Tigray Liberation Front (TLF), which had formed a close alliance with the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) in Eritrea; the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU), which had firmly entrenched itself in Western Tigray; and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP), which had established a base in Asimba, located in the northeastern corner of Tigray. The TPLF found itself locked in intense and often violent confrontations with these groups as it sought to consolidate its power in the region (Bahru, 1991).

Following the first TPLF congress in 1979, the organization's leadership underwent significant restructuring. One of the key outcomes of this restructuring was the establishment of the Hagkfen Military School in 1980. This military school provided essential training in various aspects of warfare, including military tactics, strategies, and the basic use and maintenance of light machine guns and mortars. This training was crucial for preparing the commanders of the TPLF's forces for the armed struggle that lay ahead (Bisrat, 2012, as cited in Mulugeta, 2020).

> The TPLF's journey from a small guerrilla group to a dominant force in Ethiopian politics was marked by its ability to adapt and evolve in response to the challenges it faced. Throughout its history, the TPLF remained committed to its core principles of self-determination and Marxism-Leninism while also demonstrating a pragmatic approach to achieving its goals. This combination of ideological commitment and pragmatic adaptability allowed the TPLF to navigate the complex and often hostile political landscape of Ethiopia,

ultimately leading to its significant role in the overthrow of the Derg regime and the establishment of a new government (Bisrat, 2012).

The size of the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) army saw a significant increase, especially with the recruitment of members from the peasantry. This expansion necessitated a change in the military training provided to new recruits. In addition to the military tactics and techniques that had been previously taught, the new training regimen included basic military drills. These drills were designed with the specific objective of fostering a sense of unity and collective identity among the recruits. Furthermore, the TPLF's Military Committee developed comprehensive guidelines for commanders on how to manage and indoctrinate new entrants, particularly those who came from less educated backgrounds (Mulugeta, 2020). To further enhance the effectiveness of its forces, the TPLF also launched an extensive literacy campaign within its army units, which achieved remarkable success in a relatively short period (Mulugeta, 2020).

Recognizing the need to broaden its objectives beyond the Tigray region, the TPLF decided to extend its actions to other parts of Ethiopia. The ultimate goal was to bring about the complete downfall of the Derg regime. However, the TPLF alone represented only a small fraction of the Ethiopian population. To garner broader support for its struggle, the TPLF established the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). The creation of the EPRDF was aimed at forming a broad coalition of ethnically based political parties, thereby extending the reach and appeal of the TPLF’s struggle (Beken, 2007).

During the liberation struggle, three other organizations, besides the TPLF, became integral members of the EPRDF:

1. The Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM), which later became known as the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM); the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), a movement representing the

Oromo people; and the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (EDORM). The latter was a group composed of former Derg soldiers who had been captured by the TPLF during the conflict. However, EDORM was disbanded after the liberation struggle ended (Beken, 2007).

2. The Ethiopian People's Democratic Movement (EPDM) was originally formed by a splinter group from the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP). The founders of the EPDM were members of the EPRP who had been fighting against the military regime as part of the EPRP's armed wing, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Army (EPRA). After breaking away from their parent organization, 37 former EPRA members engaged in internal discussions and decided to establish a new entity to continue their struggle. Following extensive political preparations, these members held a founding congress in November 1981 in a liberated area of Tigray, where they formally established the EPDM (Hilawae, 2014, as cited in Mulugeta, 2020).
3. After successfully establishing a collaborative relationship with the TPLF, the EPDM encouraged its Oromo members to work towards creating a democratic organization specifically for the Oromo people. This initiative aimed to mobilize the Oromo population to resist the Derg regime under the umbrella of the EPRDF. A small group of Oromo members within the EPDM soon organized a core group, which began working together to form an Oromo democratic organization (Mulugeta, 2020, p. 147).

After a lengthy process of developing a political program and by-laws, the former EPDM members, joined by other volunteers, officially created the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO) in May 1990. The OPDO quickly attracted prominent Oromo individuals from the diaspora. As the war progressed and the conflict moved towards central Ethiopia, many former civil servants of Oromo origin left their jobs and joined the OPDO (Mulugeta, 2020).

In parallel, some former military officers expressed a desire to collaborate in overthrowing the Derg regime. However, they were not inclined to join the TPLF,

EPDM, or OPDO directly. Instead, they formed the Ethiopian Democratic Officers Revolutionary Movement (EDORM) to work towards the regime's overthrow while collaborating with the three existing organizations (Mulugeta, 2020). The TPLF's eventual takeover of state power in Ethiopia in May 1991 was notably smooth. The TPLF's guerrilla army, composed largely of young soldiers, many of whom were barely more than children, entered Addis Ababa and took control of key installations with minimal resistance.

The once formidable Derg army largely demobilized itself, with conscripts selling their Kalashnikov rifles on the streets of Addis Ababa to raise money for bus fare home. The new government's extension of control over the rest of the country, where much of the population had little knowledge of these new rulers, was similarly unopposed (Clapham, 2017). The TPLF-led struggle successfully forged alliances by forming the EPRDF, meticulously preparing for the seizure of power, and managing the transition from war to peace. After three decades of conflict, the civil war in Eritrea was concluded through a referendum overseen by the United Nations. The 17-year-long civil war across Ethiopia essentially came to an end, and a *de facto* multinational federalism was introduced (Mulugeta, 2020).

4.6.3. The OLF

Oromo nationalism first emerged in an organized form through a self-help group called Mecha-Tulama, which was established by Oromo elites from the imperial army and bureaucracy. This organization, named after two major clans, was created to foster self-identity among the Oromo people. In 1966, Mecha-Tulama actively campaigned for the abolition of the feudal landholding system, advocating for the principle of land to the tiller. This stance led the imperial regime to ban the organization and arrest one of its key leaders, General Tadesse Birru, in 1967 (Markakis, 1990, as cited in Mulugeta, 2020).

The clear expression of Oromo nationalist aspirations did not become evident until 1965, when Mecha-Tulama gained widespread support, particularly in the southern region of Arusi. In this area, the Oromo people had been reduced to tenants on land that had once belonged to them. The leadership of Mecha-Tulama consisted of educated Oromo individuals who had been assimilated into Amhara culture but later rediscovered their heritage. They resolved to fight for a fair share of the benefits of modernization for the Oromo nation. By the mid-1960s, Oromo intellectuals were demanding first-class citizenship within Ethiopia rather than advocating for an independent state (Keller, 1995).

Soon after, several smaller clandestine groups of Oromo political elites began to organize and raise political concerns specific to the Oromo people. During the 1974 revolution, two distinct perspectives emerged on how to address the Oromo issue. Some elites viewed the Oromo people's problems as part of the broader Ethiopian context and sought solutions within that framework. Others, however, defined the Oromo struggle as inherently colonial and believed that the solution lay in the establishment of an independent Oromia republic (Bahru, 1991).

In 1976, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) was formed, explicitly advocating for Oromo interests. With considerable support from the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), the OLF carried out successful guerrilla operations in southeastern Ethiopia, particularly in the Hararge province, and from across the Sudanese border into Western Ethiopia (Markakis, 1990 as cited in Mulugeta, 2020; Bahru, 1991).

Despite its initial successes, the OLF struggled to mobilize widespread resistance among the Oromo people. Internal divisions weakened the organization, and it failed to achieve significant mobilization within the country. The OLF’s presence was more prominent in foreign lands than within Ethiopia, and as a result, it was unable to pose a serious challenge to the regime (Bahru, 1991; Addis Alem, 2014). Nevertheless, the OLF continued to fight against the military regime until its final days. Ultimately,

it was the combined efforts of the EPLF and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) that brought down the dictatorship (Gebru, 2009).

As Addis Ababa was on the verge of being encircled, the U.S. government organized a conference in London, bringing together the victorious liberation movements—the EPLF, EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front, led by the TPLF), and the OLF—as well as a shadow government led by Acting President General Tesfaye Gebrekidan. During the weeks leading up to the July conference, the OLF engaged in discussions on various issues, including the distribution of seats among the participating organizations. With the intervention of the EPLF during mediation, the disagreements were resolved, and the OLF accepted its allocated seats (Gebru, 2009; Addis Alem, 2014).

This process positioned the OLF as a historical participant in the introduction of *de facto* federal arrangements in Ethiopia. It marked an effort to address the original demands of Oromo intellectuals for first-class citizenship within Ethiopia, rather than the pursuit of an independent state.

4.6.4. The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)

The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) was a significant threat to Ethiopia's territorial integrity, as it sought the secession of the Ogaden region in Eastern Ethiopia, intending to merge it into the Republic of Somalia (Beken, 2007). The Republic of Somalia strongly supported the WSLF's irredentist agenda, driven by its aspiration to unify all Somali people into one greater Somalia. This ambition led to the 1977 invasion of Ethiopia by Somali troops to bolster the WSLF. The formation of the WSLF by the Somali regime in the lead-up to the Ethio-Somali War of 1976-78 represented a critical moment in the long-standing quest for Somali unification. The WSLF and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) embodied two distinct visions for the Somali region within Ethiopia: Somali unification and Ogaden independence, respectively (Beken, 2007; Vaughan, 2003).

Since Somalia's independence in 1960, the Mogadishu government has been a key driver of the irredentist agenda. However, the collapse of the Somali Republic in early 1991 significantly reduced the challenges the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) faced in maintaining Ethiopian unity. This shift in the regional power dynamic was highlighted by the ONLF, which was initiated by former WSLF members in August 1984 and became publicly known in 1986. Unlike the WSLF, which pursued irredentism, the ONLF identified Ogaden as an oppressed nation under Ethiopian colonization, advocating for the establishment of an independent Ogaden state in line with the desires of its people. This marked a significant departure from the WSLF's aspirations, and the ONLF struggled to emerge from the shadow of the older movement (Markakis, 1993b as cited in Vaughan, 2003).

The EPRDF sought to include veteran Somali leaders in the transitional government. Markakis captures this as follows:

> They requested Sudanese assistance to locate representatives of the long-dormant WSLF, who were found hiding in war-torn Mogadishu. Fearing retribution from the Hawiye clan for their long association with Siad Barre's regime, these leaders were flown to Khartoum, where they met with EPRDF representatives (Markakis, 1993, cited in Vaughan, 2003).

The WSLF participated in the July Charter Conference and was subsequently allocated three seats in the Council of Representatives (COR). Meanwhile, the ONLF hesitated to join but eventually accepted the fourth Somali seat in the COR when its leadership convened in Addis Ababa towards the end of the year (Vaughan, 2003). Over time, Somali organizations with irredentist or independence agendas diminished in influence, and the Somali region, particularly the Ogaden, became integrated into Ethiopia's Democratic Multinational Federal System.

4.6.5 Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM)

The Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM) was primarily established in response to the national oppression that had persisted since the northern conquest of Sidama, reflecting a continuation of historical resistance against the imperial system's oppression (Markos, 2002). In Sidama, this resistance gradually evolved into an organized armed struggle, leading to the formation of the SLM in 1975. The movement was led by Woldeamanuel Dubale, the son of a Balabat (a local official), who had received an education under Haile Selassie's regime. As early as the late 1940s, Dubale had secretly engaged in various tactics to dismantle the oppressive practices of the neftegna (northern landlords) in Sidama. During the rise of the Derg regime, he became a member of Mei'son and was later appointed as the administrator of Sidama Awradja within Sidamo province. However, in 1975, Dubale and a group of radical Sidamas turned against the Derg and founded the SLM (Kinkno, 2013).

While the establishment of an organized liberation movement was a pressing need for the Sidama people, Woldeamanuel Dubale's role and influence were particularly significant. The SLM's objectives were to secure the right to self-determination for the Sidama people, achieve autonomous status for Sidama land within a reformed Ethiopia that treated all nations and nationalities equally, and ensure appropriate proportional representation of Sidama within the Ethiopian political framework (Markos, 2002).

After its formation, the SLM declared war on the military Junta regime and initiated guerrilla operations from its base in Aroressa Wereda, a remote area in Sidama. The movement expanded its activities to the Arbegona, Bursa, Hula, and Hawassa Zuria districts. The intensity of the conflict forced almost all Derg officials to flee Yirgalem, the then-administrative center of Sidama Awradja. In 1978, several thousand liberation fighters traveled to Somalia for military training and to obtain modern armaments (Kinkino, 2013).

Despite its initial successes, the SLM was defeated by the Derg in 1984 due to several factors, including leadership failures, the geographic isolation of the Sidama region surrounded by other ethnic groups, which hindered its ability to move freely to its base area in Somalia, a lack of skilled and educated leaders to guide the ideological aspects of the struggle, and issues related to army discipline, among other challenges (Markos, 2002).

Following the collapse of the military government, the SLM leadership, which had become largely nominal and was based in Mogadishu, was approached by the EPRDF. They were persuaded to participate in the National Conference held in July, recognizing that their objectives could be advanced through this forum, particularly with the issue of self-determination being a key agenda item. Consequently, the SLM took part in the National Conference and the early stages of the transitional government (Addis Alem, 2014). This process led the Sidama people to continue their struggle for autonomous regional administration, which ultimately succeeded in 2020 with the establishment of the Sidama National Regional State following a popular referendum (NEBE, 2020).

4.7. Summary

The Ethiopian state, unlike other African countries, was created indigenously in the northern part of the current Ethiopia and has survived since ancient times. However, the modern Ethiopian state emerged from internal conquest and expansion from the northern core to the rest of the country by engulfing new territories and peoples residing in these territories which were never part of the ancient Abyssinia core. Addis Alem remarks:

> Although it was not a direct creation of European colonizers, its emergence had a lot in common with other created nations. Ethiopian Emperors, especially Menelik and Haile Selassie, had left a strong imprint on the birth of modern Ethiopia (Addis Alem 2014, p. 69).

This chapter discussed the creation, evolution, and decline of the Axumite state of Abyssinia, and it presented the ascendence and end of the four prominent emperors of the nineteenth and twentieth-century Abyssinia and Ethiopia rulers, the military regime which tried to sustain the centralized unitary state which was created during the imperial period without the will of the conquered people. The chapter discussed the resistance from all directions of the country that brought about the demise of the military regime, which resulted in the secession of Eritrea and opened the door for equal participation and ownership for all NNPs of Ethiopia through the introduction of Democratic Multinational Federalism. The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia became the new chapter, promising that all Ethiopians would live in harmony together on an equal basis. However, since the introduction of the new governance system, the expected harmony and unity of all of Ethiopia have not been fully achieved, and new forms of ethnic tension have been recurring frequently, hindering the national consensus. Therefore, this thesis seeks to examine possible ways to tackle these hindering factors to appeal to policymakers to take steps towards consensus and viable implementation of the long-awaited national consensus in Ethiopia.

CHAPTER FIVE: THE ETHIOPIAN FEDERAL EXERCISE AND ITS CHALLENGES

5.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the data from primary and secondary data source documents, policy and execution reports, and academic and political publications on Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia from 1991 to 2019. The chapter is organized into five main sections. The first part of the chapter presents the initial phase of decentralization that created the *de facto* federal government through the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE). The data of this subsection is primarily derived from secondary data sources. It details the processes of establishing TGE, which was created after the adoption of the transitional period charter. The second part of this chapter deals with making the Ethiopian federal constitution. It elaborates on the organization of the constitution drafting commission and the drafting of the constitution, the endorsement of the draft constitution by the Council of Representatives (COR), and the submission of the endorsed draft constitution to the Constitutional Assembly. The data of this subsection came from primary data sources. The third part deals with the *de jure* federal structure and its constitutional ratification. The fourth part of the chapter presents the implementation of the Democratic Multinational Federal system. It also deals with factors that hindered the effective functioning of this federal system. The fifth part of the chapter discusses the crisis that forced the EPRDF to change its leadership and the reforms undertaken after the change up to the end of the EPRDF rule. The final section summarizes the data findings in this chapter about the main and secondary research questions.

5.2. The Creation of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE)

On May 28, 1991, the EPRDF, EPLF, and OLF announced in a joint declaration that on July 1, 1991, a large-scale national conference would be organized. This conference would discuss the details of the transitional period and the formation of a transitional government. They also agreed that in the meantime, the EPRDF would

assume state responsibility pending forming a broad-based government at the proposed conference. Accordingly, the EPRDF formed a provisional government on June 1, 1991, after its forces entered Addis Ababa on May 28, 1991. The provisional EPRDF administration respected its commitment and called for a national conference convened from 1-5 July 1991 in Addis Ababa (Beken, 2007; Tewfik, 2010).

The conference was attended by representatives from 27 liberation movements, ethnic organizations, prominent individuals, and delegates of national political movements and armed groups that had opposed the military dictatorship. Additionally, representatives from 22 international organizations and other professional groups were present. The conference was also observed by 20 representatives from various countries and regional organizations, including major religious institutions, with EPLF representatives participating as observers. Although representatives from Addis Ababa University, labor unions, and pan-Ethiopian political parties advocating for a unitary government took part in the conference, the majority of participants were representatives from ethnically organized political groups who had been summoned by the EPRDF (Beken, 2007; Tewfik, 2010;).

Table 5. 1: List of Participants on the (PDC)

No.	Name of Organization	No of Seats
1	Adere (Harari National League)	1
2	Afar Liberation Front (ALF)	3
3	Benishangul People's Liberation Movement	2
4	Ethiopian Democratic Action Group (EDAG)	1
5	Ethiopian Democratic Coalition	1
6	Ethiopian Democratic officers' revolutionary movement (EDORM)	2

7	Ethiopia Democratic Union (EDU)	1
8	Ethiopian National Democratic Organization	1
9	EPDM	10
10	GPDM	2
11	Gurage People's Democratic Organization	2
12	HNDO (Hadiya)	2
13	IFLO (Islamic front)	2
14	ISLM (Issa & Gurgura)	1
15	KPC (Kambatta)	2
16	Ogaden National Liberation Front	2
17	OALM (Abbo)	1
18	OLF	12
19	OPDF (Omotic)	2
20	OPDO	10
21	SLM	2
22	TPLF	10
23	Higher education representatives	1
24	WPDF (Wolayta)	2
25	Worker's representatives	2
26	WSLF	2
27	UOPLF	1

1-5 July 1991 (Mulugeta, 2020, p. 183).

Initially, the EPRDF made efforts to be inclusive and accommodating toward opposition parties, representatives of various ethnic groups, and the country's elites. However, among the political groups known to the EPRDF, only the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF)—formed from the EPRP and AESM (Mei'son)—was not invited to participate, as the Coalition refused to renounce violence.

As the convener and chair of the conference, the EPRDF initiated discussions with the acceptance of the Transitional Period Charter (TPC) as the first item on the agenda. In preparation for the conference, the EPRDF re-framed the program it had originally proposed during the peace talks of March 1991 and presented it for discussion as part of the PDC agenda. The proposal sparked extensive debate, leading to several amendments and modifications.

The deliberations initially centered on the structure of the forthcoming transitional government. An amendment was adopted to ensure that the President, Prime Minister, Chairperson, Vice Chairperson, and Secretary for the Council of Representatives would be elected from different nationalities. There was also an extensive discussion on whether principles of economic policy and economic rights should be included in the charter. Still, this issue was deferred for further discussion and decision by the Council of Representatives (Mulugeta, 2020).

Another potentially contentious issue was land ownership. While several groups had advocated for the privatization of land in their economic programs, the EPRDF's economic policy favored maintaining public land ownership. The conference agreed to leave discussions and debates on economic policy to the Council of Representatives and only included a reference to the need for post-conflict reconstruction activities as part of peace-building efforts in the charter (Addis Alem, 2014).

Appropriation of seats to participant's political organizations and groups was another thorny issue requiring extensive negotiation. Although the proposal for the seat allocation came from the EPRDF, it had to be discussed with the organization to ensure the successful formation of the transitional council. Each organization was pressing to secure more seats than offered, as each claimed to have a bigger role than the others, with the OLF being particularly demanding. In the interview with Addis Alem, Seyoum Mesfin, the then-foreign Minister, remembered how the process of negotiation went, as follows:

> The organizations assembled within one month of the EPRDF's rule complained they did not receive the number of seats they deserved. The OLF also insisted on sharing seats on equal terms with the EPRDF. It was difficult to convince, particularly the OLF, and therefore, we asked the EPLF to intervene and help make its leaders understand that they were securing more seats than the TPLF. The OLF also requested to recommend personalities of their liking for cabinet and ambassadorial appointments. We generally had difficult and time-consuming negotiations before and during the National Conference (Addis Alem, 2014, p. 90).

During the conference deliberations, significant debate arose around t establishing an independent judiciary, specifically whether it should have the jurisdiction to interpret the charter itself. Some delegates advocated for appointing a specialized group of lawyers to take on this responsibility. However, the EPRDF argued that the charter was primarily a political framework. As such, its implementation and interpretation should be overseen by the political body of the Council of Representatives (Vaughan, 1994).

The final and most contentious issue discussed at the transitional conference was the future status of Eritrea. At that time, Eritrea was entirely under the control of the EPLF, which was firmly committed to securing independence and had no interest in joining the Ethiopian government. During a tri-party meeting in London, it was agreed that the EPLF would establish an interim administration, refraining from declaring independence until the Eritrean people could decide their fate through an internationally supervised referendum. Consequently, Eritrea became independent in May 1991 (Beken, 2007).

After five days of thorough deliberation and intense debate, the conference adopted the transitional charter for Ethiopia, establishing a new legal framework that would serve as the nation's supreme law throughout the transitional period (Beken, 2007; Tewfik, 2010; Vaughan, 1994). The national conference, which brought together a

diverse array of political organizations and groups, was organized within a one month. One of the most challenging aspects was persuading the liberation fronts from southern and southeastern Ethiopia, such as the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), the Sidama Liberation Movement (SLM), and the Oromo Abbo Liberation Front (OALF), to participate. It was crucial to convey to these groups that the transition represented more than a mere change in power between northern groups (Tigray and Amhara). Instead, it was an opportunity for a fresh start marked by reconciliation, national unity, and promoting of equality for all ethnic groups.

The other Liberation fronts, such as the Afar Liberation Front (ALF), the Benishangul People's Liberation Movement (BPLM), and others, which were struggling for the recognition of the right of self-determination, had to be convinced that their interests would be served by participating in the conference. Furthermore, the decision made by the EPRDF provisional government to encourage new political groupings to flourish made it possible for them to participate, which widened the conference base by allowing diverse groups of interest to be represented. After extensive efforts, many political parties agreed to participate (Addis Alem, 2014).

Following the adoption of the Charter scholars both appreciated and critique the conference. Some, such as Tewfik, and Leeco Lata, applauded the conference's organizers and its outcomes. In their opinion, the provisional government of the EPRDF and the transitional conference organizers had been able to make the conference most participatory for the different liberation movements and organized political parties, for inviting ethnic groups and prominent individuals, for the invitation of regional and international multilateral and bilateral organizations and religious leader on the conference. Their greatest appreciation was aimed at its outcome, the Transitional Period Charter. This outcome was registered while the organizers worked towards maintaining law and order and facilitating the representation of groups with varying opinions and diverse nationalities and cultures (Leeco, 1999; Tewfik, 2010).

In an interview with Vaughn, Meles Zenawi, then the EPRDF Secretary General, described the criteria for approaching varying political groups for participation:

> The issue was to have all the various opinions represented, and so we wanted to have as many opinion makers as possible represented in the process. It had two dimensions: geographical spread and differing opinions not only nationalities; it was all sorts of opinion makers that we tried to include (Vaughn, 1994).

While some scholars applauded the conference, others criticized both the conference and the transitional period on various grounds. Many ethnic parties that participated in the conference and the council of representatives lacked a clear political mission. The exception was the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), a potentially influential force capable of mobilizing significant Oromo support. Most other parties were small, newly established under the EPRDF's tutelage, and led by urban elites with limited connections to the countryside, thereby weakening their political effectiveness (Lyons, 1996).

Secondly, the conference alienated key opposition groups that had historically opposed the military regime and the EPRDF, including the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement (MEISON). The exclusion of these influential multiethnic organizations further strengthened the role of various ethnic parties, particularly the EPRDF and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). Thirdly, many of the smaller parties that participated were created hastily by the EPRDF specifically for the conference and the transitional period. This process was criticized as discriminatory, concentrating excessive decision-making power within the EPRDF (Kassahun, 1995). Fourthly, while numerous ethno-national parties engaged in the conference and the transition, the EPRDF remained the dominant force. Although the National Conference initially suggested an intention by the EPRDF leaders to incorporate a diverse range of political groups, in practice, the victorious EPRDF controlled the proceedings. They managed the conference,

determined participation, set the agenda, and ultimately shaped the outcome to align with their objectives (Lyons, 1996; Samatar, 2004, as cited in Bizuneh, 2021).

Ethnonationalism played a central role in shaping federalism in Ethiopia (Bizuneh, 2021). As reflected in the National Conference and the Transitional Charter, the EPRDF aimed to build a new political structure based on ethnicity. This emphasis was largely influenced by the presence of other political movements in 1991, the national/ethnic issues, and the civil unrest that led to the downfall of the old regime. The National Conference's decision to favor ethnically defined regions significantly influenced the patterns of political competition and the character of politics in the following years (Lyons, 1996).

One of the most significant outcomes of the charter was the establishment of two parallel systems of government for the transitional period: a central government and ethnic-based regional/national self-governments (TGE Charter Article 13). The central government was composed of a non-elected Council of Representatives and a Council of Ministers (Beken, 2007). The Council of Representatives included representatives from national liberation movements, other political organizations, and prominent individuals. However, major Pan-Ethiopian opposition forces with a history of resistance against the military regime, such as the EPRP, MEISON, and the Ethiopian People's Democratic Association (EPDA), opposed the transitional process and were not part of the transitional government.

Table 5. 2: Political parties and groups represented in the COR.

No.	Political Organization/Group	Attended/not attended/ on the National Conference	Base of Nationalist	Remark
1	ALF	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
2	BPLM	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
3	IFLO	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
4	IGLM	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
5	Horiale (Ogaden)	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
6	OLF	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
7	UOPLF	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
8	WSLF	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions

9	TPLF	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
10	EPDM	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
11	OPDO	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
12	EDORM	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
13	Hadiya	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
14	Harari (HNL)	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
15	Kambatta	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
16	Gurage	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
17	Omotic Group	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions

18	Wolayta	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
19	OALF	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
20	SLM	Attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
21	EDAG	Attended	Pan-Ethiopian	Oppose Ethnic regions
22	EDC	Attended	Pan-Ethiopian	Oppose Ethnic regions
23	EDU	Attended	Pan-Ethiopian	Oppose Ethnic regions
24	ENDP	Attended	Pan-Ethiopian	Oppose Ethnic regions
25	Agew	Not attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
26	Burji	Not attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions

27	Gedeo	Not attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
28	Kaffa	Not attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions
29	Yemi	Not attended	Ethnonationalist	Support Ethnic regions

Participation during the transitional government of Ethiopia (Vaughan, 2003).

The Charter functioned as a quasi-constitution during the transitional period until a new constitution could be established, recognizing the right of every nation, nationality, and people to self-determination, including the right to secession (Rock, 1996; TGE Charter 1991 Article 18). This Transitional Period Charter laid the foundation for establishing a *de facto* federation in Ethiopia. It guaranteed the right to self-determination and self-governance for the Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (NNPs). It ensured their active participation in the central government based on freedom, fairness, and proper representation (TGE Charter Article 2). The Charter aimed to provide the people of Ethiopia with the opportunity to rebuild the country and restructure the state along democratic lines (Preamble of TGE Charter 1991).

The Council of Representatives was composed of 87 non-elected members. The EPRDF, through its member parties, secured the majority of seats, controlling 32, while the OLF held 12 seats, making it the second-largest group (Bizuneh, 2021). The remaining seats were distributed among various ethnonational parties (Young, 1998). Although the involvement of numerous political organizations in the Council

of Representatives during the Transitional Period represented a promising start for democratic practices, this did not persist (COR Minutes 1994).

The Charter also mandated the creation of laws to establish local and regional councils for administrative purposes based on nationality (Tewfik, 2010). Consequently, in 1992, the country's internal administration was restructured, forming 14 regional administrations, including the Addis Ababa city administration, which was not ethnically based (Article 3 Proclamation No. 7/1992).

A national election commission was established, legislation for regional and local elections was drafted, and the first regional and district elections were held in June 1992. This period saw the decentralization of authority, the federalization of government structures, and the empowerment of regional and local governments with a popular mandate (Tronvoll, 2000, as cited in Aalen, 2002; Vaughan, 2003; Asnake, 2013).

Additionally, a boundary commission was appointed to create an ethnic map that delineated the borders of the new political units. National governments were established and commenced their operations (Vaughan, 2003). The regional governments were granted comprehensive legislative, executive, and judicial powers within their designated areas, overseeing all matters not explicitly assigned to the central government (Tewfik, 2010). It facilitated the transition from a unitary state to a *de facto* federal system through a process of power devolution from the central authority to regional self-administrations and a corresponding decentralization of resources, as outlined in the charter and Proclamation No. 7/1992 (Tewfik, 2010). The right to self-determination was recognized and actively implemented, enabling communities to form their self-governments within their regions. As a result, the previously centralized unitary state was replaced by a system characterized by decentralization, shared governance, and regional self-administration (Tewfik, 2010).

While the Transitional Government of Ethiopia (TGE) successfully introduced *de facto* federalism, there were also limitations and challenges. The EPRDF exploited the transitional period to consolidate its position, relying on the military power it had gained from guerrilla warfare and disbanding one of Africa's largest armies (Lyons, 1996; Mulugeta, 2020). Similarly, the EPRDF dominated the agenda, setting the rules of political competition and pushing small ethnonational parties towards its goal of power consolidation (Bizuneh, 2021).

The regional and local election were a significant challenge during the 1992 restructuring process. Initially scheduled for an earlier date, these elections were delayed due to transitional government's political instability (Beken, 2007). The conflict primarily revolved around the OLF's political influence at the central and regional levels. Despite being granted 12 seats in the Council of Representatives and several ministerial positions, the OLF was dissatisfied with the operation of the Oromo People's Democratic Organization (OPDO), the Oromo component within the EPRDF, as the OLF saw itself as the sole legitimate representative of the Oromo people and did not tolerate competition (Tesfaye, 2002). Consequently, a few days before the elections, the OLF decided to boycott the elections.

Meanwhile, the All-Amhara People's Organization (AAPO), established in January 1992, presented itself as a Pan-Ethiopian party but primarily defended Amhara interests and strongly opposed the EPRDF's ethnic policy (Beken, 2007). Despite having radically different political objectives from the OLF, the AAPO agreed with the OLF in boycotting the elections (Beken, 2007). The OLF's withdrawal from the transitional government and relinquishing of its 12 seats in the Council of Representatives further solidified the EPRDF's dominance at both the central government and central regional levels. Thus, the *de facto* federal system effectively came under the control of a dominant one-party rule (Beken, 2007).

To sum up this subsection, this researcher would like to analyze the Peace and Democracy Conference and the creation of *de facto* federalism as follows: firstly, the convening of the Peace and Democracy Conference, which was the first to achieve

a long-held common goal in the country, with the participation of the representatives of most ethnic groups, liberation movements, and other multiple actors, was a commendable achievement. However, the absence of major Pan-Ethiopian political groups at the conference resulted in a protracted lack of consensus throughout the implementation of the DMF. Secondly, even though it was acceptable to respect the right of independence for Eritrea and Eritreans after they fought for thirty years for freedom, Ethiopia's right to access the sea was not legally and logically discussed at the conference, leaving the country landlocked at great cost (economically, military, diplomatically and politically) and ultimately becoming the source of a perennial lack of consensus in the implementation of the DMF. Thirdly, the EPRDF introduced *de facto* multinational federalism and created autonomous regional governments based on ethnic lines that addressed the desire for self-administration and self-determination. However, it was intolerant when opposing the actions of the OLF, which was expelled from the COR, and similarly in the case of the AAPO. It also became one of the sources of a lack of consensus for DMF.

5.3. The Creation of the Ethiopian Federal Constitution.

In line with the commitments outlined in the Transitional Charter, the Transitional Government's Council of Representatives (COR) formally established a Constitutional Commission (CC) through Proclamation No. 24/1992. This proclamation specified the mission, tasks, membership, and general working procedures of the CC. The Commission was tasked with drafting a constitution that reflected the principles of the Charter. Once the Council of Representatives approves, the Commission was also responsible for presenting the draft constitution for public discussion. After gathering and incorporating significant feedback from these public consultations, the Commission would submit the revised draft back to the Council of Representatives for final consideration (Mulugeta, 2020).

The 29 members' commission comprised different small political parties, the EPRDF representatives, civic organizations, trade unions, the chamber of commerce, and social groups. After its formal establishment, the Constitutional Commission

reorganized itself into an executive committee of 11 members, including the chairman, vice chairman, secretary, and other members. Other committees, namely a legal issues committee, foreign relations committee, and public relations committee, were also formed (minutes of` CC No 4, February 1993). Following its restructuring, the CC examined developed and underdeveloped countries and democracies to draw lessons and share experiences on constitution drafting processes (minutes of CC No 6 March 1993). The commission prepared training and lectures by renowned professionals in the field, such as Samuel Phillip Huntington (minutes of CC No 9 March 1993). The commission also organized panels of intellectuals and different groups of people from all walks of life and tried to include indigenous wisdom (minutes of CC No 10 March 1993). The drafting was ultimately based on historical experience and the country's realities. After consultations with the stakeholders, the commission identified important topics and issues before drafting the constitution (minutes of CC No 14 April 1993). Based on this selection, the finalized document was then made ready for public presentation upon the approval of the Council of Representatives (minutes of CC No 14 April 1993).

However, two pertinent issues should be addressed before organizing public discussion forums: identifying how the commission could reach the public and how to gather and compile comments. Two approaches were considered:

1 Following the existing structure of the Transitional Government.

2 Creating a new structure that is accountable to the commission (Minutes of CC No 15 April 1993)

The debate aimed to select the right approach to reach the public and obtain credibility by distancing itself from the Transitional Government. After thorough debate and deliberation, the Commission voted on organizing the participation platform. The decision was made to create an open discussion platform at the kebele level (neighborhood association) (minutes of CC Nos 15-19, 1993). It was also to organize platform facilitators and elections of organizers directly at every kebele

through free, fair, and open votes. The Commission also proposed an idea to COR that aimed to prevent the interference of government authorities at all levels except administrative facilitations. At the same meeting, the commission discussed the role of political parties during the public decisions and agreed that political party members could participate at all kebeles according to their residence but not as organized political parties because, at this time, there were no legally registered political parties who had licenses from the election commission that was mandated to do so (minutes No 15-19 of the CC, 1993).

The other major issue for debate was who would present the proposed constitution drafting concepts and issues that would be included in the constitution to the public. The commission considered five options:

1. Political parties
2. Directly elected persons from the public
3. Delegates of the commission itself but not its members
4. Regional administration delegates
5. Directly by the commission members themselves

After a back-and-forth discussion, the Commission agreed that directly elected platform organizers from the public would be responsible for presenting the points that would be incorporated into the draft constitution (minutes No 15-19 of the CC, 1993). Based on these proposals, the Council of Representatives approved public discussion (minute of CC No 19, 1993). The discussions were held from December 25, 1993, to January 1, 1994, throughout the country. The comments and concerns with feedback from the people were collected and compiled, organized, and returned to the commission from all regions, including Addis Ababa (minutes of CC No 65-67, January 1994). During the drafting of the constitution, there were serious differences between the commission members, which created majority and minority members of the commission (minute of CC No 82, March 1994). The first contentious issue was incorporating a secession clause in the draft constitution (minute of CC No 85 March. 1994). The supporters of the incorporation of the secession clause argued

that if any nation, nationality, or people of Ethiopia felt oppressed, then there should be constitutional room to leave the union without any bloodshed. The group who opposed this idea argued that the issue of secession arose not only out of oppression or disagreement but could be due to an economic reason, such as regions rich in natural resources showing unwillingness to share their resources with poorer areas and choosing to secede from the union. Therefore, instead of incorporating the secession clause in the constitution, it would be better to give the moral right to regional governments for veto powers to nullify federal Law on specific matters (minute of CC No 85-87 March. 1994).

The other points of contention were land ownership, the adoption of the flag with a new emblem on it, and the jurisdiction of the HOF to interpret the constitution. The majority of the commission members supported the public ownership of land, the placement of a new emblem on the existing flag, and the mandating of the HOF to interpret of the constitution. A minority group was opposed to the proposal of public land ownership, and it favored ownership of land by the private, opposed placing an emblem on the tricolor flag, and supported the interpretation of the constitution by the constitutional court instead of leaving it to the HOF (minutes of CC No 85-87, March 1994). After the draft constitution was prepared, it was presented to the Council of Representatives (COR) and then to the people at large before the COR endorsed it as a draft constitution (minutes of CC No 87, April 1994). Then comments and concerns were gathered and incorporated into the draft (minutes of CC No 88, April 1994).

After the Commission submitted its draft Constitution to the Council of Representatives, the COR debated it for 12 consecutive days (minutes of COR No 1-12). There were several articles in which heated debates took place in the COR. For the benefit of this thesis, this researcher chose article 37, which became article 39, sub-article one, for analysis (minutes of COR No 5, April 1994).

As it was in the Constitutional Commission, there was a division between the members of COR on the incorporation of a secession clause with the same type of

majority and minority views and debate on the inclusion of the clause (minute COR No 5, April 1994). The minority view was represented in the Council of Representatives by the Gurage People Democratic Front (GPDF), Ethiopian Democratic Coalition (EDC), and the Burji People Democratic Organization (BPDO). In contrast, the majority view was represented by the EPRDF, including the chair of the COR and the president of the transitional Government of Ethiopia Meles Zenawi, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF, Horyal), the Kaffa People Democratic Unity (KPDU), and Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) (minutes of Council of Representatives page 108-125, April 1994).

Those against the incorporation of the secession clause argued as follows:

> The expansion of Menelik 2nd to the south and western part of the country created oppression and exploitation of nations, nationalities, and peoples and their resources by the ruling class of the Northern ruling classes and their agents in every nation and nationalities and peoples of Ethiopia. Of course, this was the fact of the time but that does not mean any nation or nationality of the country was oppressed or exploited by the other nation or nationality of the country by any means. Therefore, it would not be a solution to grant the right of secession in the constitution; instead, it would be important to democratize the country's governance system, creating equal rights for all groups and citizens without prescribing secession. The interest of the Ethiopian people is to achieve democratic rights while living in harmony; it is not the prescription of a recipe for disintegration. On top of this, the concept of secession accepted by the UN does not include cases like ours; rather, it is for countries and nations under colonial rule. Therefore, we must not incorporate the secession clause in our constitution, which would induce the disintegration of our country (minutes of COR page 108-111, April 1994).

The supporters of the incorporation of the secession clause argued that:

> We believe in the importance of having larger political communities and a strong economy; we understand the bad consequences of secession, which can sometimes lead a country and its people to poverty. We believe that, besides Ethiopia, it would be commendable to bring the Horn of Africa or the whole of Africa together. However, incorporating the right of self-determination, including secession does not mean supporting secession. Still, it would be important to offer an alternative solution for people to decide on their matter when the need arises. When we talk about the right of secession, we are not talking about a historical past or geographic issues. Still, we are taking it as a right of the people, and we are considering the democratic right of the people as people's unfettered sovereignty. Therefore, we strongly recommend incorporating the article in the constitution (minutes of COR, pages 111-116, April 1994).

After they debated, the COR voted to incorporate the secession clause in the draft constitution (minutes of COR, page 111-116, April 1994). In this researcher's opinion, the points of the minority group were sounder than the majority group. In these debates, the majority did not refute the importance of having larger political units, which can create larger common markets, stronger economies, and a more secure society. However, it was only the issue of political ideology, thinking about leftist democracy, that forced the incorporation of the secession clause into the Ethiopian constitution, which then became a perennial challenge for implementing Democratic Multinational Federalism.

The draft constitution was sent to the Constitutional Assembly after the COR voted with explanations on every article clarifying the intentions of the framers of the draft constitution and the decision of the majority and minority vote position in the Council of Representatives. The Constitutional Assembly members were expected to be elected from 548 district (Woreda) constituents of the country, established by the COR (Proclamation No 64/1992). Of 548 seats, 543 were elected to the Constitutional Assembly and summoned on Oct. 28/1994. The members did not fill

five seats due to the boundary disagreements of two regions on election constituencies and another three by NEBE mistakes (NEBE report to Constitutional Assembly, Oct 28/1994). To elect 543 constituent candidates, 16.8 million voters were registered to elect their representatives, and out of the total registered electorates, 87.6% of the registered voters cast their votes (NEBE report Oct. 28/1994). According to this report, out of 543 Assembly members elected, 509 members won the seats aligned with political parties, while the remaining 34 were independents (NEBE report Oct. 28/1994).

Table 5.3: NEBE Report, October 28/1994,

No.	Party	No. seats	Allegiance	Remark
1	TPLF	37	EPRDF member	Except for a few members of independent members of the Assembly, all other assembly members elected by party ticket supported multinational federalism
2	ALF	6	Affiliate to the EPRDF	
3	ANDM	134	EPRDF	
4	OPDO	179	EPRDF	
5	ESDL	13	Affiliate	
6	WSLF	2	Opposition	
7	GPLM	3	Affiliate	
8	BPLM	4	Affiliate	
9	SEPDF	109	EPRDF	
10	SDRM	3	Opposition	
11	GPLP	2	Affiliate	
12	HNL	1	Affiliate	
13	EPRDF	13	Addis Ababa, led by EPRDF Front	
14	GDU	1	Opposition	
15	APDO	2	Opposition	
16	ANRO	1	Affiliate	

17	Independent	34	The Mix of supporters and Opposition	

NEBE report shows the political parties who won the seats and their affiliation (October 28/1994).

According to Table 5.3, the candidates who won the seats for Constitutional Assembly by party ticket were either the EPRDF member parties' members or its affiliated parties' members, along with a few ethnic-based opposition parties' members who had broadly the same view as the EPRDF on the issue of the form and structure of the government expected to be established.

The constitutional assembly started its regular session on October 28, 1994, in Addis Ababa. It elected its leadership to deliberate on the draft constitution sent to it from the COR through the vice chairman of the Council of Representatives, H.E Dr. Fikade Gedamu. The Ethiopian National Election Commission Chairman Kemal Bedri made his report about the election results and process of the election of Assembly members (Constitutional Assembly minute vol 1, Oct 19/1994:1-88).

The draft constitution sent to the Constitution Assembly had 95 Articles with detailed explanations about the intention of the framers of the draft of the constitution (Draft constitution and explanations Oct. 1994). For this thesis, three pertinent articles of the constitution, mainly the point of contentions in the public since the Constitution's ratification (Articles 1, 3, 39 of the FDRE constitution) related to the creation of federal structures, are considered for analysis.

The two main issues under Article One in the draft constitution were the type of government that the constitution aimed to establish and the nomenclature of the state that would be established by the will and election of the people (Draft Constitution Article 1.1). The framers of the Constitution intended to create a federal and democratic government that would be established by the people's will via elections. Thus, the Council of Representatives decided to have a federal structure and democratic system as basic pillars of the draft constitution. If one of them

(federal structure or democratic system) failed to exist, then the form of government would be different and unable to serve its purpose (Draft constitution Article 1).

Furthermore, the Council of Representatives had accepted federalism as a political system where different Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of the country would establish their independent regional states or governments in line with the concept of self-determination, governed under one federal state and leaving some responsibilities, such as defense, foreign affairs, and monetary issues to this federal government. Except for the common issues that can affect the country, anything that affects a region's internal interests would be decided by individual regions. It declared that the new federal system would completely differ from the hitherto unitary and centralized government (draft constitution, Oct. 28/1994).

Moreover, the draft sent to the Constitutional Assembly emphasized that the idea of democracy in the constitution had two main indicators to test its applicability: first, any office holder for an elective position at every level of government, from local councils to federal parliament, must be elected to represent the free will of the people, and second individual and group rights as well as human and democratic rights of the people must be fully respected (draft constitution explanation Article on page 2).

The draft constitution also expresses that federalism must be considered as one part and indicator of the democratic system in the constitution. After Article One, the draft constitution named the nomenclature to the government that would be established as the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. This part of the draft concluded the framers' intent by stating that the country became a federal political system and government instead of a centralized unitary, and it became democratic instead of a suppressive and oppressive political system (draft constitution explanation Article on page 2).

The debates in this article (about the nomenclature) in the Constitutional Assembly can be classified into three groups. The first was the majority of the EPRDF, its

affiliate party members, other small ethnic-based opposition party members, and some independents from NNPs with similar views on this matter with the EPRDF. They argued that:

> Today is a long-awaited result of the Ethiopian people's struggle. Therefore, the Constitution Assembly should discuss how it should help the Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples to decide on self-determination and how the people could build a new Ethiopia based on cooperation. In this regard, the government of this country should have to be a federal government, and its nomenclature should be the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. It can give leverage to the country to build a strong union based on diversity that would serve a common interest in living respectfully and being managed by democracy. Without fully-fledged democratic practice, the country cannot be a country with people's sovereignty, where people express their interests unfetteredly. It enables people to make self-determination decisions without any hindrance. Therefore, the government should be a federal democratic government, and its nomenclature should be the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (minute of the Constitutional Assembly page 88-91, Oct 1994).

The second group, although very small in number, was strongly opposed to multinational federalism (terming it ethnic federalism) and supported geographic federalism instead of an identity-based federal structure. The central debate of this group was opposing the form of state that the Constitution aimed to establish. In their view, this format may lead the country to disintegration and instigate conflict between ethnic groups. They argued that:

> In principle, we accept the federal government structure, but we are against the type of federal arrangement based on ethnic identity and naming its regional government/state after the name of ethnic groups. We strongly believe that this type of arrangement would create distance between the relationship of brotherly people and dismantle the hope of living together and

> it would disintegrate the country. Therefore, we support geographic federalism based on provinces like Emperor Haile Selassie's time (minutes of Constitutional Assembly, page 93, Oct 1994).

The third group opposed a federal structure and requested to form a unitary democratic state with provincial administration. This group argued:

> We completely oppose this nomenclature because it undermines the glorious history of Ethiopia, which its unity has respected. Even though the country has no history of good and balanced common administration, the problem of our people is not an administrational structure but a ruthless administration that has failed the country and its people and who did not lead them on an equal basis and democratically. Therefore, to avoid this type of leadership's ascension to power, it is important to create a strong democratic central government and name it the Ethiopian Central Democratic Republic (minutes of the Constitutional Assembly page 93, Oct 1994).

The researcher of this thesis believes the debates of these groups in the Assembly show the importance of bargaining based on compromise and reciprocity according to the principles of federal formation. According to the federal principle, it is essential to solve differences in the type of government and its nomenclature through bargaining and negotiation to create amicability for the future betterment of the country and its people (Burgess, 2012). The three groups' members of the Constitutional Assembly asserted their positions as righteous. Still, they failed to understand each other, and compromise based on the reality of the country on the ground. Democratic Multinational Federalism requires compromise and reciprocity to create a middle ground for different opinions to avoid mistrust and disagreement.

Another debated article in the Constitutional Assembly was Article Three, regarding the flag and its meaning for the Ethiopian federal system. Flags are important symbols, but their exact roles in political expression are complex and, like identities, are situationally defined. Flags embody imagined political communities' presumed

unity, comradeship, and harmony (Anderson, 1991, cited in Goshu & Castro, 2016). Flags are deeply tied to definitions of the sovereign state and nationalism (Neumann, 2007). In Ethiopia, the nature of sovereignty and nationalism changed over a brief period, from the supposed timelessness of the imperial regime, which failed in 1974, to revolutionary socialism under the Derg, to the defeat of the latter and its subsequent replacement by the EPRDF. Each regime used flags representing its identity and agenda (Goshu & Castro, 2016).

The critical debate on the issue of the flag in the Constitutional Assembly was not on the basic tricolors of the Ethiopian flag. The explanatory note sent with the draft constitution from the Council of Representatives to the Constitutional Assembly explains the intention of the framers of the constitution, the objective that the flag had to serve as a symbol of freedom for all Ethiopians. However, previous regimes had t emblems representing their interpretations of the green, yellow, and red stripes. Thus, the new federal flag would have an emblem that symbolizes the vision of multinational federalism unity in the diversity of nations, nationalities peoples, and religions (draft constitution explanation Oct/1994, p. 4). However, two major debates about the emblem, would be put on the flag in the middle of the green, yellow, and red color stripes. The supporters of the emblem were the absolute majority, the EPRDF and its affiliate parties, and ethnic-based oppositions. This group had expressed their view that the previous regimes had oppressed identities (nations, nationalities, peoples, and religions) in the name of unity and by preaching the importance of being under one flag. Furthermore, in the previous regimes, people from the ruling class thought of themselves as liberators and modernizers of other NNPs under their flag. Conversely, the people in the traditional south thought were conquered and colonized under the previous regimes and their flag (Constitutional Assembly minute Nov/1994 Vol 1 and Vol.2).

The second group debated about the role of the flag as a uniter of the country and its people, and they opposed the placement of any emblem in the name of hope and unity on the tricolor flag. If this emblem is placed on the tricolor (red, yellow, and

green), then it would be a recipe for differences and disintegration of the country and its people (Constitutional Assembly minute Nov/1994 Vol 1 and Vol.2).

This researcher believes that these debates between the absolute majority of the EPRDF and its affiliates in the Constitutional Assembly and very few independent members of the Assembly did not conclude in the meeting according to their majority vote in the assembly hall. The difference became a perennial issue, especially with opposition and diaspora Ethiopians about the emblem on the flag. Opponents continue to fly the flag without an emblem, with only the green, yellow, and red colors (Goshu & Castro, 2016). The EPRDF government appreciated the problem and tried to promulgate a national flag day through Proclamation No. 654/2009 It was amended with Proclamation No. 863/2014 to garner support for the flag with a national emblem. However, this does not bear fruit, and the flag issue is still a contested issue that is contributing as an impairing factor for implementing Democratic Multinational Federalism. It is because the opposition to the flag with the emblem openly rejects DMF by stating that it is a betrayal of the historical past of the country (Goshu, 2016).

The other most critical Article on the issue of federalism was Article 39, particularly sub-Article one. This Article regards the rights of NNPs, stating:

> Every nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia have an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to secession (Ethiopian Constitution Article 39/1).

In this Article, the issue of contention was not the issue of self-determination of NNPs. It was the unconditional right to secession. As it was discussed earlier, the Council of Representatives had a serious debate before it endorsed and sent the draft constitution to the Constitutional Assembly for ratification. The debate was between the supporters of the unconditional right of the secession clause when the need arises, the majority, and the minority opinions to incorporate this type of article in the constitution. After fierce arguments and debates, the council decided to vote

and sent the draft to the Constitutional Assembly with the justification of both groups (draft constitution explanation, Oct/1994:96-98).

After hearing the explanations, the Constitution Assembly established a committee from its members to analyze and investigate the reasons why this Article was contentious in the COR and to understand the points of differences in this Article in the COR during the endorsement of the draft that came from the constitution drafting Commission (Constitutional Assembly minute, Nov/1994: Vol.3). The established committee thoroughly analyzed:

1. The explanation of the Council of Representatives, which was organized by explaining the ideas of majority and minority voters and sent to the Constitutional Assembly by denoting the differences,
2. Documents from public discussions on the draft constitution in all regional administrations,
3. Open-source discussions, collecting petitions on the topic from different segments of the society,
4. Data from the Institute of Nationalities Study of Ethiopia during the Derg regime; and
5. The minutes of the Constitutional Commission and Council of Representatives.

After investigation and analyzing of the information, the committee members voted on their findings regarding the importance of incorporating the secession clause in the constitution. Except for Major Admase Zeleke, an independent member of the Constitutional Assembly, others were convinced of the importance of incorporating Article 39 sub-Article One in the Constitution. Major Admase Zeleke voted against it and asked to register his difference with his alternative idea, similar to the minorities in the Constitutional Commission and Council of Representatives. Then, the committee reported its findings and conclusion to the Constitutional Assembly for the final verdict (Constitutional Assembly minute, Nov/1994: Vol.3).

According to the committee's investigation, the minority voters in the COR opposed incorporating of a secession clause in the constitution because they strongly believed that the article would induce disintegration of the country. However, the minority voters accepted the moral right of secession for every nation, nationality, and people if they wanted to take advantage of this right. Although minority voters accepted the right as a moral right, they opposed incorporating the article in the constitution as it stood. They insisted instead on the following preconditions:

1. The right of secession should not be granted to people who do not identify themselves first as a nation.
2. The request for secession should not be asked for and endorsed by the lawmaking council of the NNP which shall request the secession.
3. There would be no set timeline for holding a referendum in the constitution to answer the request for secession.
4. Any referendum should be endorsed by the majority of the people in need (Constitutional Assembly minutes Nov/1994, Vol 3).

The majority voters of the COR, contrary to the minority voters, accepted putting the unconditional right of secession clause in the constitution and its implementation by simple procedures. The Constitutional Assembly, after hearing its committee explanations, then undertook a fierce debate on the importance of incorporating sub-article one in the constitution between the absolute majority supporters and very few minorities who were independent members. The majority members, who were the members of the EPRDF and its affiliates and opposition from ethnic-based parties, explained the importance of incorporating the secession clause in the constitution in the following way:

> We believe the importance of incorporating the right of self-determination, including secession, could attain the goal of respecting Ethiopian NNPs to each other, not infringing the right of any NPP by the other, and avoid the attempt of superiority from any NNP on the others. It brings equality between NNPs and guarantees that they live together as equal citizens and nations,

> nationalities, and peoples in the country. It can bring change and relief from our past injustices and make the spirit of equality and confidence for Ethiopians available. Accepting this right means respecting people, trusting people, respecting people's wisdom so that they can decide freely in a responsible way about their future, holding the country together, and building it with confidence (Constitutional Assembly minutes, vol 3 page 90-126, Nov 1994).

The minority group who was the members of the constitutional Assembly as independent argued that:

> First of all, can the question of secession be a constitutional question? For the people, it is not a constitutional question. Therefore, we do not believe this article must be part of our Constitution. When a country enacts a constitution, it must enact a constitution that can guarantee the unity and sovereignty of a country. It should not be a constitution that leads a country into disintegration of national unity. Despite all their evils, the past Ethiopian regimes defended the glorious Ethiopian unity. Therefore, we should capitalize on our good records, and not allow a divorce of its people. The glorious past of our country was not only built by the ruling classes but it also by Ethiopian people. Therefore, we should not promote the recipe of disintegration of our history. We want to condemn this act of insisting on separating our people by incorporating the clause that allows division in our constitution (Constitutional Assemble minutes, vol 3, Nov 1994).

After listening to the committee debates, the Constitutional Assembly accepted and endorsed the position of the majority, putting the article that allows an unconditional right for secession in the constitution with simple procedures when the need for secession arises by any nation, nationality, or people (Constitutional Assembly minutes Nov/1994 Vol 3).

According to some scholars, the main purpose of multinational federalism in Ethiopia was to achieve ethnic and regional autonomy while maintaining the state of Ethiopia as a political unit. Ethiopia's multinational federal system is significant when set alongside other federal systems because it provides the secession clause as a right of NNPs (Alem, 2005). However, since its establishment, the secession clause has become one of the most controversial issues in Ethiopia and its diaspora communities. Opponents of multinational federalism argue that it invites ethnic conflicts and risks the country's disintegration. Conversely, an ethnonationalist persuasion doubts the government's real commitment to self-determination: they support the multinational federal constitution per se, but they claim that it has not been implemented. The third group, which considers Ethiopia a colonial empire, sees the federal exercise as yet another colonial trick and advocates decolonization (Alem, 2005).

The other pertinent issue in the constitutional process was the lack of participation of major political parties in creating the Constitution. According to the NEBE report to the Assembly (table 5.3 above), the EPRDF, its affiliates and small parties with similar views to the EPRDF on basic constitutional matters controlled 98% of the Assembly's seats. The few independent members tried to reflect the general views of the other political organizations not attending the Assembly. For example, the All-Ethiopia Unity Organization (AEUO), the major pan-Ethiopian and Amhara-defending party, was not a member of the Constitutional Assembly but had put forward the same view as independent members of the Assembly to form a geographic-based federal system focusing on the economic integration of regions and psychological proximity of their people (Assefa Habtewold, 2008,). This organization supported a popular referendum instead of ratifying the draft constitution by the constitutional assembly. Thus, AEUO opposed the federal structure because, in its view:

1. The popular referendum did not endorse the Constitution.

2. The existing federal structure stifled the free labor movement in the country due to language and ethnic differences.
3. It had the potential to generate ethnic conflict.
4. It would create migration to other countries looking for jobs because the system blocks the free movement of labor from one part of the country to the other (Assefa Habtewold, 2008, p. 1-5).

Furthermore, the second biggest party in the country at the time, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), promised in its manifesto to change or amend the constitution if it won the 2005 election. The CUD had opted to restructure the system based on the will of the people, culture, and language proximity (CUD manifesto, 2005). Although the difference from the existing federal structure was not clear from their manifesto, they and all Pan-Ethiopian political parties and elites opposed the existing federal system by labeling it as too ethnic, and some of them intended to have a unitary system even though its possibility seemed remote. However, the EPRDF and most ethnic-based parties have consistently supported existing multinational federalism (minutes of Constitutional Assembly, Oct/1994 Vol. 1).

For members of the Assembly who supported the unitary government, the country faced a major problem not the structure and the form of government but a lack of democracy and good governance. However, the EPRDF members and members of affiliated parties argued that the successive regimes of the country had imposed an imperial and military centralized unitary form of government on the country's people by conquest and military coup without their knowledge and consent. Therefore, the country should be restructured from a unitary system to a federal structure, and its system should be democratized (Constitutional Assembly minutes, Oct/ 1994 Vol 1).

From the above debates, the researcher drew the following analysis: the polarized views toward multinational federalism by opposition and support for the idea during the debate, which created the TGE and in the drafting and ratification process of the constitution in the Constitutional Assembly led the system into persistent disagreement that in turn widened the gap between political elites in the country.

Moreover, this confusion has hindered the effective implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia due to a lack of dialogue and negotiations on common issues to bring cooperation and compromise, the major principles of self-rule and shared rule. These differences the preparation and ratification of the constitution in this article have become one of the major challenges in the implementation process of the multinational federal system. Thus, they continue to hinder the effective implementation of the democratic multinational federal system and require an amicable solution.

Generally polarized debate, unbalanced group participation in the Council of Representatives and Constitutional Assembly, and a lack of open deliberation in the process have allowed some of these issues to persist and continue as points of contention, leading to an ongoing lack of consensus.

5.4. *De jure* federal structure

The Ethiopian constitution was ratified after 6 weeks of deliberation by the Constitutional Assembly (Constitutional Assembly minutes, Dec/1994). This event declared the commencement of Ethiopia's *de jure* federal system (Constitution, 1994 preamble). In federal systems, there are always at least two orders of government, whose existence is firmly entrenched in a written constitution that is subjected to specific amendment procedures and judicial review. However, the specific form and allocation of the distribution of powers have always varied according to the specific circumstances of each federation (Burgess, 2006).

The Ethiopian federal constitution satisfies the above explanation of power distribution to the federal and its constitutional units by assigning specific forms and power distribution. Both levels of government have legislative, executive, and judicial power. All powers have not been given expressly to the federal government alone or concurrently to the federal government, and the regional states are reserved to the regional states (Ethiopian Constitution Article 51,52).

After the ratification of the *de jure* federal constitution, the second phase of devolution in Ethiopia began with its most significant and unique feature, which was to recognize and institutionalize the right of ethno-linguistic communities to self-determination. The constitution, which was drafted and ratified with the spirit of the Transitional Charter, asserted Ethiopia's federal system, underlined by the right of Ethiopian ethno-territorial communities (or Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples) to self-determination (Tewfik, 2010). The Constitution established a federal and democratic state structure composed of two distinct entities: the federal government and regional member states. According to Ethiopian constitution article 47, NNPs within the states enumerated in sub-articles of article 47/2 have the right to establish their state at any time. There were nine Ethiopian regional member states at the beginning of the *de jure* federal system, and they are currently comprised 12 regional states and two city administrations. These member states are:

- The state of Tigray
- The state of Afar
- The state of Amhara
- The state of Oromia
- The state of Somali
- The state of Benshangul/Gumuz
- The state of Sidama
- The state of Gambela Peoples
- The state of Harari People
- The state of Southwest Ethiopian peoples
- The state of South Ethiopian Peoples
- The state of Central Ethiopian Peoples
- Addis Ababa City Administration
- Dire Dawa City Administration

As self-determining ethno-territorial polities, the component states are entitled to use and promote their respective language, cultures, and histories (Tewfik, 2010; Eth-constitution Article 39/2). The role of Ethiopia's federal state in this regard is limited to the delineation and implementation of country-wide standards and basic policy criteria for public health, education, science, and technology, as well as the protection and preservation of cultural and historical legacies (Con. Article 51/3).

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia has a parliamentary system composed of two different assemblies, the House of Peoples' Representatives, and the House of Federation (Article 53). Like other parliamentary governments, the HOPR elects the Prime Minister from among members of the House of Peoples' Representatives (Article 73/1). The political party shall assume this power of government a coalition of political parties that constitutes the majority in the House of Peoples' Representatives (Article 73/2).

The members of HOPR are elected by the people for a term of five years on the basis of universal suffrage by a first past the post-voting election system through secret ballot (Article 54). The maximum number of the members of the House, based on population, comprises 550 seats, including at least 20 seats for special representation of minorities (Article 54/3). The second House is called the House of Federation (article 53). For the interest of this thesis, data related to the HOF is presented in detail below.

5.4.1. The House of Federation: The Upper House

The second chamber's status and role in federations have always been a kind of identity bracelet for this kind of state. Put simply, every federation must have a second chamber in the legislature to be an authentic federal state. This much is self-evident. However, this still leaves plenty of scope for huge variations in composition, powers, and functions, and it is important to note that this question is not simply one of institutional arrangement alone (Burgess, 2006). This distinction refers to the important difference between functional divisions of authority (e.g., the separation of

powers and checks and balances) and the territorial distribution of authority, which today is the predominant pedigree of federation (Burgess, 2006).

In this regard, there are two types of representation of member states to fill their second chambers. The first group has equal representation of each state at their federal second chamber, like Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Nigeria, and the USA. The second is an asymmetric representation of constituent units in the second chamber. Austria, Germany, India, Malaysia, and Switzerland (Watts, 2005, cited in Bizuneh 2021). The Ethiopian federal arrangement is unique in the format of the second chamber. The second house the House of Federation (HOF), is composed of representatives of nations, nationalities, and peoples from each regional state who represent their NNPS (Constitutional Article, 61) by equal and asymmetric representation. Sub article two of article 61 of the constitution states this explicitly, as follows:

> Each Nation, Nationality, and Peoples shall be represented in the HOF by at least one member. Each Nation or Nationality shall be represented by one additional representative for each one million members of its population (Article 61/2).

The first part of the article shows that there is equal participation or representation of any NNPs, only for being NNP *per se*. In contrast, the second part of the article shows a proportional type of representation by applying one more representative for every additional one million population of NN in Ethiopia. It implicitly indicates that Peoples means a community with a population below a million because communities identified as Peoples are not illegible for proportional representation as they are only NNs (Article 61/2). This type of representation in the second chamber makes Ethiopia's upper house unique because regional states are not directly represented in this house; instead, NNPs who are indigenous residents or ethnic groups of the regional states are represented in the HOF (Article 61/20). The nature of the representation became the point of contestation between elites on how the HOF works and became a source of lack of consensus. Pan-Ethiopia supporters and

elites believe that the EPRDF uses the House of Federation as an instrument for manipulation.

The next thing that makes the Ethiopian House Federation unique is its mandate. Its major mandates are the interpretation of the constitution, as organized by the Council of Constitutional Inquiry (CCI), and, by the constitution, decisions on issues that are related to the rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples to self-determination, including the right to secession Article 62/1-2). It shall promote the equality of the Peoples of Ethiopia enshrined in the constitution and promote and consolidate their unity based on mutual consent (Article 62/3-4). The HOF shall exercise the powers concurrently entrusted to it and the House of People's Representatives (Article 62/5). It shall strive to find a solution to disputes or misunderstandings between states and determine the division of revenues derived from the joint Federal and State tax sources and subsidies that the Federal Government may provide to the states (Article 62/6-7). The HOF shall determine civil matters that require the enactment of law by the HOPR and order federal intervention if any state, as a violation of this constitution, might endanger the constitutional order. The House shall establish permanent and ad hoc committees, elect the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the House, and adopt rules of procedure and internal administration (Article 62/8-11).

The Council of Constitutional Inquiry is entrusted with the following powers and functions: it shall have the power to investigate constitutional disputes; should the Council, upon consideration of the matter, find it necessary to interpret the constitution, it shall submit its recommendations thereon to the House of Federation (Article 84/1 of 1994 Constitution). The Council shall consider the matter where any Federal or State law is contested as unconstitutional, and such dispute is submitted to it by any court or interested party, submitting the matter to the HOF for a final decision. When issues of constitutional interpretation arise in the courts, the Council shall:

(a) Remand the case to a concerned court if it finds a need for constitutional interpretation; the interested party, if dissatisfied with the decision of the council, may appeal to the House of Federation.
(b) Submit its recommendations to the House of Federation for a final decision if it believes there is a need for constitutional interpretation.

The Council shall draft its rules of procedure, submit them to the House of Federation, and implement them upon approval (1994 Constitution article 84/2-3).

The interpretation of the constitution in most countries is the responsibility of constitutional courts (Elazar 1987). However, in the Ethiopian case, it has been given a constitutional mandate to the House of Federation, representing each Nation, Nationalities and Peoples in Ethiopia (Article 62/1 of 1994 constitution). The genesis of this decision is determined in the preamble of the Constitution:

> We, the Nations, Nationalities, and peoples of Ethiopia, are strongly committed, in the full and free exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a political community founded on the rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, and advancing our economic and social development (Preamble of FDRE constitution, 1994:75).

This part of the constitution explicitly shows that the pact of the constitution is between the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia as a group. If the constitution allocates the power of interpretation of the constitution to the constitutional court, then it cannot be feasible to preside over Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples. In my opinion, this is why the framers of the Constitution intended to delegate the task of interpreting the Constitution to the HOF. It, in turn, became the central part of the long-awaited answer to the quest for self-determination of the Ethiopian people since the establishment of modern Ethiopia by Menelik's expansion. Thus, this researcher believes the Constitution aims to make the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia equal owners of the country by regulating any

change, amendment, or interpretation of the constitution by political representatives of NNPs instead of leaving this to a legalistic constitutional court.

The Ethiopian Second House's third unique nature is its members election. In Ethiopia, members of the House of Federation can be elected directly by the people or by the council of regional governments:

> Members of the House of Federation shall be elected by the state councils. The state councils may elect representatives to the House of Federation or hold elections to have the representatives directly elected by the people (Article 61/3).

However, as the experiences of the last three decades have shown, all regional councils have elected representatives from their council members who have been elected for regional mandates from every Nation, Nationality, and People. In no instance have direct elections taken place.

5.4.2. The Structure and Division of Powers

The ratified constitution by the Constitutional Assembly in December 1994 divided the structures and power between the federal government and regional states (Article 50). The structure of the Ethiopian federation has two layers of government: federal and regional states. The regional states were delimited based on the peoples' settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent (Article 46).

The regional governments also have their layers; Ethiopian federalism has five levels of government: the federal, regional state, zonal administration with and without legislative, woreda (district)/special woreda/ and kebele (neighborhood association). Each level of government has more or less the same structure of legislative, executive, and judicial branches (Keller & Smith, 2005).

Table 5.4: Administrative layers and their respective number of administration structures.

No.	Regional State	No of Zone /special zone/cities	Woreda/special woreda	Kebele	Remark
1	Tigray	7	52	829	No zonal council
2	Afar	6	38	415	No zonal council
3	Amhara	15	201	4021	3 zones with zonal councils and 12 zones without zonal councils
4	Oromia	40	344	7424	No zonal councils
5	Somali	11	106	1540	No zonal councils
6	Benishangul Gumuz	4	21	490	No zonal councils
7	South Nations, Nationalities, and peoples	18	138	2839	All have zonal councils
8	Sidama	4	41	634	No zonal councils

9	Southwestern Ethiopia region	6	46	884	All have zonal councils
10	Gambela	4	14	265	All have zonal councils
11	Harari	-	9	36	No zonal councils
12	Addis Ababa	11	141	-	All have Sub City councils
13	Dire Dawa	-	-	47	No woreda and no zonal council

(Ethiopian Statical Service, 2023).

Based on this, constitutional Article 51 defines the powers and functions of the federal government: the federal government is responsible for protecting and defending the constitution; sets national standards; administers national defense and public security forces as well as federal police forces; regulates the national bank to print and borrow money, mint coins, regulate foreign exchange and money in circulation, dictates foreign policy, international agreements, postal and telecommunication services; regulates air and rail travel, waterways and major roads linking two or more regions; handles federal tax, inter-state and foreign commerce; declares and lifts national states of emergency; and oversees immigration and citizenship issues (Article 51).

The constitution also provides power to the regional governments. Regions have the following powers and functions: to establish a regional state administration that best advances self-government and democratic orders on the rule of law; the responsibility to protect and defend the federal constitution, to enact and execute the regional state constitution and other laws; to formulate and execute economic, social and development policies, strategies and plans of the regional state, to administer land and other natural resources by federal laws, to levy and collect taxes and duties on revenue sources reserved to the regional state and to draw up and administer the regional state budget, to enact and enforce laws on the regional state civil service and their condition of work, to establish and administer the regional state police forces, and to maintain public order and peace within the regional government (Article 52).

The above data reveal how the process of re-establishment of an inclusive federal state of Ethiopia from the ancient expansionist unitary states of Ethiopia was constitutionally concluded. However, this long journey was not completed without limitations, which left the country and its people with a lack of consensus on the nature and form of state stipulated in the constitution.

After the constitution was ratified, donor groups from 18 Western embassies praised the Constitutional Assembly for its open debate and the expression of dissenting views, marking the process as a significant step toward establishing democracy in Ethiopia (Lyons, 1995). Despite this, concerns arose that the Transitional Government of Ethiopia's (TGE) limited support base might lead to instability. It prompted efforts to renew dialogue with various opposition groups. In February 1995, the Congressional Task Force on Ethiopia hosted leaders from major opposition movements in Washington, and a special TGE envoy. The TGE envoy insisted that opposition groups accept the existing constitutional framework as a condition for future negotiations in Ethiopia. However, three out of four opposition parties demanded negotiations without preconditions and rejected the framework they had not helped to create (Lyons, 1995).

The above discussions between the ruling party and the opposition reveal a lack of flexibility from both sides that widened the already increasing gap between the country's elites and became one of the lingering factors that affected the effective implementation of a Democratic Multinational Federal system due to a lack of inclusiveness for negotiation, bargaining, and competition for upcoming elections. The same vicious cycle of discontent and mutual mistrust among elites has continued negatively impacting consecutive elections since then (Merera, 2011).

5.4.3. The Federal and Regional Elections: The End of Transitional Period

After a month-and-a-half-long deliberation, the constitutional assembly ratified the constitution on 8 December 1994 (Constitutional Assembly minutes Nov/1994. Vol 6). The constitution established a National Election Board independent of any influence to conduct impartially free and fair elections in federal and state constituencies, whose members were to be appointed by the House of Peoples Representatives upon recommendation of the prime Minister, particulars to be determined by law (Article 102). The Board had conducted elections for the HOPR, Regional councils, zonal councils (where it was applicable), woreda/special woreda/ councils, and Kebele/neighborhood associations/ councils (NEBE Report HOPR Sep. 1996:1). Ethiopian national election law (111/1994 Chapter three article 15/2) declares every constituency can have one representative. Out of 548 constituencies designated earlier, 525 seats were assigned for regular constituencies, meaning every one hundred thousand people could elect one representative to the Federal House of People's Representatives.

The constitution decided to have at least 20 seats for minority Nationalities, and NEBE maintained the Transitional Council of Representatives decision in its 89th regular session to establish 22 constituencies for minority Nationalities. The National Board of Election accepted these number of seats as a permanent decision and still operate. Thus, 547 constituencies have been functional out of 550 maximum seats decided in the constitution for HOPR (NEBE Report, Sep/1996).

Further, every regional government has a right to decide the number of its consistencies for the election of regional and other councils under the region and the number of candidates from each constituency. Therefore, regions have 2-18 seats for each regular or special constituency (NEBE Report, Sept/1996). Voting centers and election procedures were set up in every constituency at the kebele level, at least one or more based on the number of inhabitants in the kebeles (NEBE Report, Sept/1996).

Based on the ratified constitution, the NEBE held elections on May 7/1995, and May 18/1995, for HOPR and regional councils. Following the 1995 elections, which were held throughout the country to establish a new government structure at all levels, the EPRDF member parties and their affiliates took every elective office throughout the country (NEBE, Set/1996).

Table 5.5: The 1st Elections Results 1995.

No	**Region**	**No. Constituents**		**Political Party**	**HOPR seat**		**Regional Councils seats**	**Remark**
		Regular	Special		Regular	Special		
1	Tigray	36	2	TPLF	36	2	152	EPRDF
2	Afar	8	-	APDO ALF APDM ANLF	3 3 1 1		23 13 1 11	Affiliate Opposition Opposition Opposition
3	Amhara	136	1	ANDM ENDP	132 1 3	1 -	273 -	EPRDF Opposition EPRDF

				OPDO independent			1	independent
4	Oromia	177		OPDO Independent ONUF	172 1 4		354	EPRDF Independent Opposition
5	Somali	23		ESDL WSDP ONLF Independent	15 2 3 3		76 11 31 20	Affiliate Opposition Opposition Independent
6	Benshangul/Gumuz	7	2	BGEPDP Independent	5 2	2	51 6	Affiliate independent
7	SNNPRS	108	15	SEPDF SEPDU SPDP Independent	105 1 1 1	15	343 2 2 1	EPRDF Opposition Opposition
8	Gambela	2	1	GPLP GPDRP Independent	2	1	21 5 13	EPRDF Affiliate Opposition
9	Harari	1	1	HNL OPDO	 1	1	18 18	Affiliate EPRDF

1 0	Addis Ababa	23		EPRDF Independent	21 2		92	EPRDF Independent

National Election Board of Ethiopia Report Sept. 1996.

As shown in table 5.5, the EPRDF Won 492 seats for the federal HOPR, and its affiliate parties won 26 seats at the HOPR. The rest were won by opposition and independents, who won 28 seats. One seat from Harari was not filled. The regional councils were also filled by either EPRDF member parties or its affiliate parties in their respective regional government (NEBE Report Sep./1996). Next to federal and regional houses, the National Election Board of Ethiopia held zonal, woreda/special woreda/ and kebele councils as part of the devolution of power and *de jure* introduction of Federal structure (NEBE Report Sep/1996). 21 August 1995 the four years of transitional government in Ethiopia officially ended and launched a new era in Ethiopian history and politics (Leenco, 1999). The new constitution came into effect under the new government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and declared the end of the TGE (proclamation No.1/1995).

However, there were three pertinent opinions on the conclusion of the transitional period and commencement of the Democratic Multinational Federalism by pronouncing the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). The first came from the members and supporters of the ruling party, the EPRDF. The opinion of this group on the commencement of the new system was:

> On this day a new era dawned in Ethiopia's long history. Indeed, August 21, 1995, was the day on which the arduous task of bringing both peace and democracy to Ethiopia was brought to a successful conclusion. Ethiopia has entered a new era of elected government, determined by democratic contest and the final verdict of the ballot box. The federal set-up has, once and for all, resolved the lingering question of self-determination (Leenco, 1999).

The second opinion was from those who had been in the transitional process at initially, mainly the ethnonationalist groups that left or were expelled from the coalition transitional government. They were former members of the TGE as signatories of the transitional charter, and they believed that the political course charted by the TGE was essentially correct. Their position is summarized in the following passage:

> If adhered to, such a course could have led to the dawning of a genuinely democratic era in Ethiopia's history. However, they asserted that this possibility was aborted because of later developments that diverted the country's political process from the course originally designed to lead to democracy and the genuine exercise of self-determination. Hence, they emphatically rejected the official view regarding the consummation of these political rights. Their conviction that neither individual liberties nor the rights of nations to self-determination were being respected under the new government seemed as strong as the ruling party's opposite belief (Leenco, 1999, p. xii).

The third wing of Ethiopian political opinion, for a different reason, rejected the Federal Democratic Republic inauguration because they took issue with the very first steps taken to launch the transitional period. They challenged the wisdom of some of the Charter's fundamental precepts. The rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples enshrined in the charter and the Constitution, were viewed as a negation of a single Ethiopian patriotism and identity. They contended that the resulting politicization of ethnicity threatened to serve as a recipe for the balkanization of Ethiopia (Leenco, 1999).

The above views of the three groups that were reflected after the inauguration of the new government and convening of the new parliament on August 21, 1995, can be summarized thus: the first group saw that the Ethiopian state accomplished the desire of its people to live in harmony and peace towards democracy and development through the process of constitutionalism and elected government by the people. This group applauded the federalization process as righteous and

successful. The second group saw that the right political course had been started during the transitional period. Still, it claimed that it had been diverted in the wrong direction and aborted by the EPRDF's stubbornness. They suggested bringing back accommodative and compromising politics to manage different needs before it would be too late. The third group saw no hope of empowering ethnic identities through a multinational federalism that challenged a single Ethiopia's patriotism and identity.

In the researcher's opinion, there were achievements and limitations in the processes of ratifying the constitution and establishing new governments at the federal and regional levels. The effort made to prepare and ratify the constitution, the organization of an election body, the conducting of the election, the final inauguration of the new government, and the ending of the Transitional period are all commendable achievements that represented a positive start to democratization. However, some limitations affected the effective implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism. These included the absence of Pan-Ethiopian political groups throughout the processes of preparation and ratification of the constitution, during the election process and inauguration of the new government, and a lack of negotiation with the middle groups who were part of the TGE. These groups ultimately left or were expelled from the system. These limitations have impaired the implementation and became one of the sources of lack of consensus.

This researcher believes it was indeed a new era for Ethiopia and its people, representing the most major change since the modern Ethiopian state was created through expansions and conquest from the northern core of the Abyssinian highlands to the center and peripheries of the rest of the country. The country's people and its elites' quest were to establish a country and a state that could equally deliver peace, liberty, stability, democracy, freedom, and development as a home for all Nations, Nationalities, Peoples, and citizens. However, after the enactment of the constitution, the aspired democratic processes and related aspects have not been materialized as they are written in the constitution. The failures in implementing

democratic elections and a lack of equal opportunity participation have made the lack of consensus a lingering problem.

5.5. Implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism

As mentioned in previous sections, the jurisdictions of the federal state and the regional states are distinctly delineated. However, they are interdependent in various areas, such as economic, social, and developmental matters. The federal state is authorized to formulate and implement the overall policies and strategies of the country. In contrast, the jurisdiction of the regional states is limited to specific policies and strategies in their particular regions (Tewfik, 2010). To properly examine the implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism, the researcher examined three relevant indicators of the implementation of this system. These are the implementation aspects of the HOF and the role of the ruling party, the EPRDF, and the issue of minorities outside their mother regions between the establishing of *de facto* federalism and ending the EPRDF rule in December 2019.

These three indicators were selected due to their impact on the implementation of DMF. The HOF was given many mandates, including the interpretation of the Constitution. Therefore, examining the role of this House can draw important lessons about the impairing factors of the implementation of DMF and may help to provide a future proposition after this thesis. The ruling party's role, the EPRDF, during its introduction and implementation was huge. Every aspect of the DMF depended on the EPRDF's positions and decisions. Thus, it is important to examine the role, beliefs, and by-laws (programs and regulations) of the EPRDF in detail to understand the execution process of the DMF in Ethiopia. One cannot understand the Ethiopia's DMF without understanding the EPRDF and how it operated.

The Movement of people mostly from the northern part of Ethiopia and from all other parts of Ethiopian ethnic group members outside their home regions has been creating a mix of life in different parts of the country and new minorities in regions outside their mother regions. This mix has been a major challenge in the

implementation processes of DMF. It is why it is important to examine the system by taking these three indicators. Therefore, this chapter subsection focuses on identifying the impairing factors to find possible solutions based on the investigations of these selected indicators.

5.5.1. Implementation Aspects of the HOF

After the ratifying the 1994 constitution, the HOF was established following the inauguration of the new government. Since its establishment, the house strived to execute its mandate, focusing on three pertinent areas. These are constitutional interpretation, formulating budget subsidy criteria, and decision-making on the demands to be acknowledged as independent ethnic groups within different communities (Cost/Article 62).

5.5.1.1. Implementing the Mandate of the Interpretation of the Constitution

The House of Federation was granted a mandate to interpret the constitution in article 62/1 of the 1994 Constitution and subsequent proclamation no. 251/2000. The HOF interprets issues related to the constitution based on the investigation of the Constitutional Council of Inquiry. The Constitutional Council of Inquiry submits issues to the House according to its findings, with the council's opinion on whether to interpret or not to interpret (Manual of HOF, 2020).

Accordingly, the HOF has passed decisions on aspects of constitutional interpretation since its establishment. For illustrative purposes, the current researcher examined a sample of decisions from successive reports of the house from its journals.

Table 5.6: Decisions of the HOF

No.	Type of case	Case applied by	Previously decided by	Proposal by CCI	Decision of the HOF	Remarks
1	Group rights violation	Political parties denied election rights in Benshangl u Gumuz due to a mother region issue	NEBE, according to its Proclama tion No. 11/1995, that mentions about election participan ts should speak regional language /s/	The proclamation breaches the constitutional rights of citizens and requires interpretation/pr oposal /	Reversed the NEBE's decision and allowed the political parties to participat e in elections in the Benshan gul Gumuz region	
2	Individu al Plaintiff s	Individuals who had complaints regarding the decision of regular	All levels of courts, including the Federal Appeal Court	Some of the issues were proposed for interpretation; some were rejected proposals by CCI	Most interprete d; some rejected interpreta tion	In some cases, the HOF reversed the proposals of the CCI and

		and sharia courts				interpreted against the proposals
3	Ethnic identity	Silte people demanded to be acknowledged as Silte and not Gurage	SNNPR Council	Proposed interpretation according to the constitution	The house revised the SNNPR decision and allowed a referendum	This jurisdiction is not mandated by the House of Federation. It has been decided by extending article 62/2/
4	Jurisdiction of the court	Persons accused of corruption charges who were ministers and officials	Federal high court	No need to interpret the Constitution in this case	Endorse the proposal of the CCI	The then-existing proclamation said the ministers' case should be seen at the Federal

						Supreme Court, not at the high court, but the decision was political
5	Retired president	Directly to the HOF	It was not decided	No need for interpretation	Endorsed the proposal of CCI	The retired president, who was the chair of the Constitutional Assembly, wanted to participate in an election by organizing a political party after his retirement

						, but he sought to keep his privileges
6	Transfer of election period	HOPR	Existing law and constitution	Proposed interpretation	Approved the transfer of the election period	No article has given this mandate to the HOF

(Journals of Constitutional Decisions of the HOF, Vol 1-4, 1995-2022).

According to Table 5.6, the HOF tried to handle the issues of interpreting the constitution to maintain group or individual rights. It implies a commitment from the system to strengthen Democratic Multinational Federalism by advocating to maintain both group and individual rights concurrently. However, the balance between the Supreme Court's jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the House of Federation needs attention and may require further amendments to some of the articles.

5.5.1.2. Budget Subsidy Decisions

According to Article 62/7 of the Ethiopian Constitution 1994, the HOF shall determine the division of revenues derived from joint federal and state tax sources and the s that the federal government's subsidies to the state (Article 62). Based on this mandate, the HOF has been trying to prepare efficient, just, and practical budget subsidy transfer criteria subject to continuous improvements (Budget Subsidy Manual HOF, 2012).

According to this mandate, the House of Federation prepared different criteria since its establishment aimed at improving its efficiency and acceptance based on improving the country's development progress, regional revenue generation capacities, incremental government expenditure demand, and implementation

efficiency. The following subsidy criteria have been developed since 1994/1995 (Budget Subsidy Manual HOF, 2012).

Table 5.7: Regional government budget subsidy Criteria.

Subsidy criteria indicators	**Criteria Based on Budget Years**				
	1994/95	1995/6-1996/7	1997/8-1998/9	1999/0-2000/1	2001/2-2002/3
Population	30%	33.3%	60%	55%	65%
Revenue generating capacity of regional government	20%	33.3%	15%	15%	10%
Last year**'s** capital Budget of the regional government	15%	-	-	-	-
Regional area size	10%	-	10%	-	-
Development variation	25%	33.3%	15%	20%	25%
Poverty level	-	-	-	10%	-

(Regional government budget subsidy Criteria report to HOPR May 2018)

Based on the assigned criteria, the share of the regional governments in those budget years is detailed in the following table:

Table 5.8: Regional governments' budget subsidy criteria share.

No.	**Region**	**Regional share & population by percentage**				
		94/5-95/96	96/7-97/98	98/9-99/002	2002-2006	population
1	Tigray	8.33	7.67	8.29	7.18	6.04
2	Afar	3.61	5.04	5.47	3.15	1.97
3	Amhara	20.73	19.20	21.40	23.65	26.65
4	Oromia	27.48	25.29	27.97	33.28	36.70
5	Somale	4.22	7.57	8.12	7.27	6.04

6	Beneshangul/G	2.63	3.63	4.12	2.00	.88
7	SNNPR	16.58	15.9	17.97	18.61	20.58
8	Gambela	2.2	2.8	3.16	1.45	.34
9	Harari	1.01	1.78	1.54	1.12	0.27
10	Addis Ababa	12.28	7.34	-	-	-
11	Dire Dawa	0.93	3.378	1.96	1.69	.53

(Regional government budget subsidy criteria share report to HOPR May 2018)**.**

After evaluating the efficiency of the past criteria, the HOF designed new criteria to balance fiscal matters between the regions. This approach considers the following assumptions:

1) If regional governments have a balance in fiscal capacity, they can deliver balanced services for their citizens.

2) Analyzing regional expenditure demands and revenue-generating capacity helps to balance regions' fiscal demand.

Based on the assumptions, the following budget subsidy criteria were set.

Table 5.9: Expenditure indicators decided by the HOF.

No.	**Expenditure indicators by regions**		
	2007-2009	2010-2012	2013-present
1	Administrative expenditure	Administrative expenditure	Administrative expenditure
2	Education	Education	Education
3	Rural road	Rural road	Rural road
4	Potable water	Potable water	Potable water
5	Health	Health	Health
6	Agriculture	Agriculture and natural resources	Agriculture and natural resource
7	-	Small and Micro Enterprises	Small and Micro enterprises

8	-	Urban works	Urban work
9	-	Regional price variations	Environment

(Expenditure indicators decided by HOF Manual subsidy criteria April 2012).

According to the HOF interpretation, the above budget subsidies show that the criteria set by the HOF became more practical to the life-improving budget allocation for residents of regional governments. It tried to capture the increasing expenditure demand according to the responsibility of the constitution to deliver fair development for citizens.

As a result of the new criteria, regional governments have been getting the following subsidy percentages for the years identified.

Table 5. 10: Percentage of latest regional budget share.

	Region	2007-2009	2010-12	2013-present	Population
1	Tigray	7.04	7.18	6.03	5.83
2	Afar	3.34	3.15	3.02	1.99
3	Amhara	23.33	23.17	21.6	23.53
4	Oromia	32.53	32.5	34.46	38.87
5	Somale	8.43	8.14	9.98	6.29
6	Beneshangul/G	1.96	2.1	1.83	1.16
7	SNNPR	19.9	20.1	20.11	21.08
8	Gambela	1.57	1.5	1.33	0.47
9	Harari	.89	1.00	0.76	0.27
10	Dire Dawa	1.01	1.16	0.88	0.51

(Expenditure indicators decided by HOF Manual subsidy criteria, April 2012).

The task of the HOF, in line with budget subsidy criteria development, shows an incremental change toward strengthening the federal system in a transparent and

trust-developing manner between the federal government, regional states, and their people.

5.5.1.3. Decisions on issues of nationalities and regional boundaries

Since its establishment, the House of Federation received multiple issues related to requests to be identified as an ethnic group (Nation, Nationalities, or peoples) by different communities from regional governments. On top of these demands, the HOF handled issues related to regional boundary delineation and the movement of ethnic groups from one region to adjacent regions to go to their mother regions. These tasks were carried out by referendum or consensus among the people or the regional governments. However, multiple cases have not yet been addressed or according to the HOF records, demands that seem unrealistic and cannot be addressed. The following table shows these requests and their responses (HOF Report, 2022).

Table 5.11: Requests for identity recognition and their decision status.

No.	Applicants	Regions	Response mechanism		Study and response		No response	Remarks
			Referendum	Consensus	Not responded	Year of application		
1	Silte	SNNPR	√			2001		
2	Qimate	Amhara	√	√		2015		
3	Argoba	Amhara		√				
4	Dentadubamo	SNNPR			√	2016		
5	Kontama	SNNPR			√	2015		
6	Menja	SNNPR			√	2015		
7	Dube	Somale			√	2003		Waiting for the

								decisio n of the HOF
8	Qucha community	SNNPR				2013	√	Waiting for the decisio n of the HOF
9	Wolene	SNNPR				2006	√	Waiting for the decisio n of the HOF
10	Dorze community	SNNPR				2013	√	Waiting for the decisio n of the HOF
11	Zaye community	Oromia				2017	√	Waiting for the decisio n of the HOF

Request and their decision status of identities to be acknowledged as independent ethnic groups since establishing the HOF (HOF Report, 2022).

Although the HOF addressed many identity claims, some issues that were not addressed after submission to the House of Federation. It implies the existence of unequal treatment between demands from sensitive areas before concluding them according to their presence in the house.

Table 5.12: Transfer of communities to adjacent regions.

No.	Regions carried boundary demarcations		No of Woredas or Kebele Merged	Mechanism of Decision	Year	Remarks
	Previous region	New Region				
1	SNNP Silte zone lanfro woreda	Oromia Adami Tulu Jido combolcha	1	Consensus	2008	Sub Kebele
2	SNNPR Alaba special woreda	Oromia Adami Tulu Jido Combolcha	1	Consensus	2008	Kebele
3	Oromia Adami Tulu-Jido Combolcha	SNNPR Gurage zone Marko woreda	4	Consensus	2008	4 Sub Kebele
4	SNNPR Sidama zone Wondogenet woreda	Oromia western Arsi zone	4	Referendum	2009	4 Kebele

Transfer of communities to adjacent regions because of the similarity of ethnic groups (HOF Report, 2002).

The HOF has been working to respond to issues from different ethnic groups and communities. However, the data shows an inconsistency in responses and long

delays. These delays and inconsistencies may create mistrust in the application of the HOF and represent a failure to execute its mandates properly.

5.5.2. The Role of the EPRDF

Historically, the EPRDF was created by a group of people who had two programs. The Marxist-Leninist (ML) organization members who ran the Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Party (EWRP) and people with no ideology of Marxist-Leninism, predominantly peasants, were best understood as revolutionary democrats. The purpose of the EPRDF was to bring about the success of the democratic revolution by overthrowing the military regime through armed struggle (Meles, 2000 Unpublished document The Meaning of Revolutionary Democratic system).

Most EPRDF members were peasants who considered themselves revolutionary democrats but were not members of ML and did not have the goal of building a socialist revolution. The overall aim of revolutionary democrats was the success of the democratic revolution, no more, no less. However, the goal of the Marxist-Leninist group in the EPRDF was to build a socialist revolution in Ethiopia after the change of military regime by the leadership of the Ethiopian Workers Revolutionary Party. These two different parties' members, were ready to sacrifice themselves for the success of the democratic revolution created as a front called the EPRDF (Meles, 2000).

The EWRP in the EPRDF had two roles: leading the peasantry army for the success of the democratic revolution and creating a conducive environment for their program's evolution through the EWRP's leadership. To fulfill this mission, the EWRP prepared two maximum and minimum programs. The maximum program was for attaining a socialist revolution, and the minimum was the EPRDF program (Meles, 2000). However, after the end of the Cold War, the EPRDF completely muted its Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and focused on promoting its revolutionary democratic or minimum program. The Marxist-Leninist party was unceremoniously abandoned without formal closure at the end of the civil war and the ascent of the

EPRDF to power. It was because the leadership saw the difficulty of achieving international legitimacy by attempting to implement the ML program, indicating the flexibility and responsiveness of the leadership to a change in their political environment.

After abandoning the Marxist-Leninist program, the EPRDF leadership articulated the EPRDF program and moved their struggle to a higher level. The change in the global political environment at the end of the Cold War also led the EPRDF to recalibrate its political objectives and communication strategies. Despite its military upper hand, its openness to negotiation with regime, opened doors for international legitimacy later. It is how the organization managed the transition from war to peace toward democratic governance (Mulugeta, 2020).

The minimum EWRP program became the EPRDF's main program, the major program of the front, and was further recrafted after evaluating its ten years' achievements in government performance. The focus of the revised EPRDF political program was detailed as follows:

The EPRDF Political Program

> The strategic political objectives of the EPRDF were to create a conducive environment for the full exercise of democratic and human rights according to the constitution, working towards building democratic institutions and democratic cultures, respecting active participation and free will of the people in the democratic process, building the unity of the country based on the free will of the people, and strengthening the democratic multiparty system.
>
> For the accomplishment of these purposes, the EPRDF was dedicated to implement the following measures:
>
> *a) Building Democratic Institutions and Cultures to Ensure Respect for Citizens Rights*
>
> The party dedicated itself to ensuring all the democratic and human rights of citizens enshrined in the constitution and to enhance participation in democratic

system building. This program captures the objectives of promoting a multiparty democratic system and legal electoral competition between political parties.

b) *Building Democratic Systems Based on Free Will and the Participation of the People.*

The party dedicated itself to a struggle for the sustainability of self-determination and the rights of nations, nationalities, and peoples, including secession according to the stipulations of the constitution. It is also committed to promoting self-determination in every nation, nationality, and people, the right to administer themselves in their localities, and creating national unity and consensus at the federal level. On top of this, it dedicated itself to the nurture the cultural development of every ethnic group (EPRDF Program, 2002, p. 12-17).

The EPRDF came to power at the advent of a US-led unipolar world guided by the Washington Consensus, which promoted free market and democratizing transformation under liberal principles (McCleery and De Palis, 2008). Realizing the change in the international environment, the EPRDF muted its leftist rhetoric and dissolved the Marxist-Leninist Party it had created. It also reconfigured its political objectives to instill a free-market economy and a pluralist federal political system in Ethiopia with developmental objectives. However, it fell short of articulating the particular model of market economy and the democratic political system it wanted to install. The late PM of Ethiopia, Meles Zenawi, in de Waal (2015) captured the state of the confusion in the following way:

> For the first ten years, we took over, we were bewildered by the changes. The new world order was very visible, especially in this part of the world. The prospect of an independent line appeared very bleak. We sent delegates across Africa to ask how to handle the IMF. They said, say what they want you to say and do what they want you to do so that you can find something

> you can get away with. We said we are a mass movement, and we cannot mislead the masses (de Waal, 2015, as cited in Mulugeta, 2020, p. 197).

The source of the initial confusion of the leadership partly emanated from its earlier leftist conceptualization of the democratic revolution. It conceived democratic revolution to end once the public could freely choose its government through free and fair elections. It did not matter whether the elected government had a capitalist or socialist political and economic program. It is assumed that once such a political environment is achieved the leftists within the EPRDF would bring about a socialist transformation. For this reason, its political objectives were limited to enabling the people to choose. Such a conceptualization prevented it from developing long-term socio-economic programs as socialist transformation, which was impossible due to the newly evolved domestic and international political environment (Mulugeta, 2020).

As mentioned, the EPRDF cleared every confusion and stipulated a regulation to lead all its members and affiliated ethnic-based political parties. It then registered significant progress in making the institutional changes required by the newly developed normative frameworks. Alongside institutional changes, the EPRDF developed new regulations for its member parties clarified its relations with affiliate parties on the same set of regulations, endorsed by its fourth general congress and revised at the 6th general congress in 2006 (EPRDF Regulation, 2006).

The front had a general organizational principle as a national front, and every ethnic-based member party had a right to organize itself according to the interests of its members and the realities of its locality. However, every member party had a responsibility to implement the revolutionary democratic program in its locality if it wanted to be a member of the national EPRDF front (EPRDF regulation, 2006). According to this regulation, the following were the major organizing principles of the EPRDF:

1) The front believes in fully implementing a revolutionary democratic program to bring fast economic development and social transformation.

Thus, a member organization must fight rent-seeking practices and honestly commit itself to implementing the program.

2) Ethiopia is a multinational country, and any political member organization must resemble Ethiopia's reality. Therefore, the EPRDF is a front of political parties organized with an ethnic background.
3) Any new organization interested in joining the EPRDF coalition should have a revolutionary democratic program or be willing to adopt a revolutionary democratic program and commit itself to implementing the program accordingly.
4) In any nation, nationality, or people, the EPRDF can have only one member party that can run its program, and the economic base of that specific community should have independent economic ownership by individual citizens, contrary to a clan-based society.
5) The EPRDF demands its member parties be democratic, inclusive for women and youth, and have the conviction to create and accept equality with other sister political organizations in the EPRDF and must accept and implement the EPRDF regulations and program within the freedom in its area (EPRDF Regulation, 2006).

The EPRDF implemented democratic centralism with the following organizational structure:



(EPRDF Regulation Translated by the author, 2006)

Figure 3: ERRDF Regulation

The EPRDF Congress had the mandate to establish all necessary political and economic policy directions for the country that would be applicable between the Congress's sessions and within two and a half years following the gathering of the Congress. The Congress would be established by equal representation of four member parties and fewer representatives from affiliate parties without voting rights. The Congress used to elect the members of the EPRDF Council in equal numbers from the central committee of each member party by nomination of the parties themselves and no representation for affiliate parties in the Council. The Council used to elect the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the EPRDF and Executive Committee members from the Council members. The Council had a tradition of meeting twice biannually to follow the implementation of Congress's decisions through all member and affiliate parties in the country (EPRDF Regulation, 2006).

Through these processes, cascaded to household levels, the EPRDF ruled the country. Although the Constitution is committed to regional and local autonomy, the EPRDF firmly

monopolizes political representation, decision-making processes, and democratic public spaces. This dominance of the party apparatus behind the regional and local autonomy has severely hampered the practical democratization of the multiparty system and the political participation of opposition political parties. It hindered the full application of a Democratic Multinational Federal system (International Crises Group, 2009).

Further to the centralization and monopolies of the democratic process by the EPRDF, five elections every five years negatively impacted the much-promoted democratic transition and genuine participation of opposing views in building Democratic Multinational Federalism (Merera, 2004). The first multiparty regional and district elections were organized and held on 21 June 1992, but they failed to offer an alternative. The two major transition time opposition parties, the OLF and AAPO, and other ethnonational parties from the transition government decided to boycott at the last minute. They complained about the military and political dominance of the EPRDF and judged that this prevented a free and fair election. The EPRDF received 96.6% of the seats (International Crisis Group, 2009; Beken, 2007).

As mentioned earlier, in 1995 the EPRDF and its affiliates won the second general election with 94.6% of the seats of the HOPR and all regional councils (NEBE, Sep/1996). These elections continued the pattern of non-participation by the main opposition parties. The EPRDF secured a sweeping victory in an election that became the final act in a four-year process of political closure (Lyons, 1996).

The next election, which took place on 14 May 2000 for federal and regional parliaments, resuscitated multiparty competition due to the opposition's decision to contest. However, the EPRDF and its affiliates took 94.7%, the same seats as in previous elections. In contrast, the remaining insignificant seats went to the opposition and independents at the federal HOPR and regional councils (Ethiopia Election Archive, 2000).

The third general elections for the HOPR and regional councils were held on 15 May 2005 and proved a historic watershed. At this time, the population for election turned into an enthusiastic electorate in a moment of near revolutionary quality. Citizens could choose between candidates from various competing camps for the first time. Unprecedented excitement levels marked the campaign (International Crisis Group, 2009).

Table 5. 13: 2005 Election results.

No.	Parties	HoPR Seats	Regional Council Seats	Remarks
1	EPRDF/its members	327	1013	EPRDF
2	CUD	109	328	Opposition
3	EDFU	52	142	Opposition
4	OFDM	11	10	Opposition
5	BGPDRF	8	86	Affiliate
6	ANDP	8	84	Affiliate
7	GPDM	3	81	Affiliate
8	HNL	1	18	Affiliate
9	ESPDP	24	172	Affiliate
10	ANDO	1	3	Affiliate
11	Sheko People party	1	-	Opposition
12	Independent	1	11	

2005 Election results for HOPR and regional councils (NEBE, 2006).

The result of this turn of elections saw the EPRDF and its affiliates lose meaningful seats at both the HOPR and regional councils. They secured 68.2% and 74.5 % of seats in the HOPR and regional councils, respectively (NEBE, 2006).

To the surprise of many, the combined opposition won 173 seats in the HOPR. However, the opposition leaders were convinced they had been cheated, and the CUD leaders called upon its sympathizers to engage in civil disobedience. It was followed by protests that quickly degenerated into violence and a major government crackdown. On Nov 9, 2005, the government announced that the political and civil society leaders would be charged with treason and genocide (the Carter Center Final Report, December 2009).

At the subsequent 2010 House of Peoples Representatives and regional council elections, 32 million voters were registered, and out of the total registered voters, about 30 million voters cast their votes. Following this election, the EPRDF won 499 seats for the House of People's Representatives and 1349 or 100% of regional council seats. The

remaining votes went to its affiliates: 46 for the House of Peoples Representatives and 554 for regional councils. Two opposition parties won one seat for the HOPR and one for the regional councils. One independent won one seat for the HOPR. Thus, the EPRDF and its affiliates took 99.6% of seats in the HOPR (NEBE, 2010 report to the HOPR). Likewise, 2015, the fifth general election, generated 100% results for the EPRDF and its affiliates for the federal HOPR regional councils (NEBE, July 2015 report to the HOPR).

These results suggest that there was no room for alternative ideas. However, the effective implementation of democratic representation requires alternative views. Multinationalism also needs consensus on common matters to accommodate reciprocity according to federal values. The researcher believes the lack of these federal values and the absence of free and fair elections were the major impairing factors during the implementation of DMF. This situation requires an urgent proposition to rescue the country from disintegration.

5.5.3 The Issues of Minorities Outside their Mother Regions

The other factor tested about implementing multinational federalism was the issue of new minorities who reside in other regions created by the introduction of multinational federalism based on ethnic identity. This new form of minority situation happened because citizens have been living outside their mother region (Clapham, 2017). In Ethiopia, there is a mismatch between the constitutionally sanctioned view of ethnic groups as territorially bounded and population mobility, accompanied by inter-group marriage, which has been a feature of life in the Horn and Africa for thousands of years (Clapham, 2017).

This mix of populations has been increasing in Ethiopia because of drought and famine, the need for better opportunities by families and individuals, resettlement policies, and the growth of heterogeneous urban centers. These realities created the presence of a mother state opposed to different minorities of different ethnicities or by an ethnic minority opposed to a multiethnic regional state (Turton, 2006).

The federalization of the country has further transformed the ethnic relations between indigenous and non-indigenous communities and brought to the fore not only new minority situations but also new dynamics of ethnic conflict (Beza, 2016). It is important to discuss the political participation rights of minorities in a few regions, like Benshangul Gumuz and the previous SNNPR.

In these two regions, the political participation of the new minority has a different pattern. For example, in the Benshangul Gumuz region, the local indigenous population accounts for 58% of the total and the new minority who have come to the region at different times and in different situations account for 42%. However, out of 9 seats of representatives from the Benshangul Gumuz region at the HOPR at the federal level, all the seats go to the regional indigenous representatives. As such, the 42% of inhabitants of the regional population in this region who have created a new minority do not have representatives at the Federal level (Beza, 2016).

In the previous SNNPR, which is now separated into four new regions, importantly, two of Ethiopia's populous ethnic groups (Oromo and Amhara) have moved throughout the nation, and these two ethnic groups' combined presence in SNNPR based on the 2007 population census is more than half a million. However, the non-indigenous regional minorities do not have any right to political participation in any form in the region, and those two non-indigenous to the former SNNPR have no representation from the region (Beza, 2016).

The above discussions reveal that the non-indigenous citizens in regions that are not their homeland have no right to participate in political discourse as citizens, which is their basic right. This situation currently challenges the implementation of democratic multinational federalism and has resulted in distrust in the constitutional system as it is not equally delivering rights for all citizens. It has created distrust of DMF as a system that can serve all Ethiopians equally, no matter where they reside. It has further exacerbated the lack of consensus on the implementation of DMF.

In Ethiopia, politics are intensely contested. At stake are fundamentally opposing views of Ethiopian history, problems, and the way forward conceived by different ethnopolitical constituencies. The absence of a consensus regarding multinational federalism results

from contradictions that date back to the formation of the modern state in the 19th century and have become especially virulent since 1991 (International Crisis Group, 2009).

In this regard, Pan-Ethiopians see DMF policy as a deliberate ploy to undermine national identity, pride, and self-esteem flowing from the exceptional history and continuity of the Abyssinian Empire and Ethiopian state. They see the constitutional granting of self-determination to ethnic groups as a deliberate step backward from the nation-building process (International Crisis Group, 2009). These groups vociferously and persistently condemn EPRDF leaders for introducing the politicization of ethnicity by embracing this policy (Leenco, 2019). A second group, supporters of the EPRDF, celebrate multinational federalism as the panacea for holding multi-ethnic Ethiopia together (International Crisis Group, 2009).

A third view believes that circumstances existed already that made adopting a multinational federation necessary instead of the alleged noble or ignoble intentions of the now-ruling group. Multinational federalism is simply the latest step in Ethiopia's political development, and it has resulted from neither generosity nor nefarious aspirations of any group (Leenco, 2019). These different views have not been used to refine and polish Democratic Multinational Federalism but have become a perennial impediment to effective implementation. This researcher believes that this lack of consensus and accompanying inability to come together in debate and dialogue on major problems is impairing the implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism.

5.6. The Crisis and the End of the EPRDF

Ethiopia made international headlines in 2018 for several reasons. Making peace with Eritrea, freeing political prisoners, inviting back home exiled opposition political parties and their leaders and armed groups, opening the political space for opposition parties and the media, making significant political changes within the ruling party, and drawing plans for free and fair elections (Bahru, 2019). According to Bahru, the changes' background originated from two components. The first was a long-term perspective, as follows:

> These are long-overdue responses to the quest of the Ethiopian people for democracy, human rights, and human dignity. A good example of this was the holding of sham elections: after 2005, Ethiopia had only sham elections in which the ruling party won 90 plus or 100 percent of the electorate, despite contradictions within the ruling party, especially the ANDM, and OPDO with the TPLF – leading to general public disgust and youth unemployment (Bahru, 2019, p. 3-4)

In the short term, there were several further factors. There was the Addis Ababa Master Plan on the outskirts of the city that was perceived by the Oromo youth as being put forward at the expense of Oromo farmers on the periphery of Addis Ababa, leading to Oromo protests, followed by the Amhara youth and southern regional state (Bahru, 2019).

Following these protests, the EPRDF Executive Committee held serious and lengthy internal evaluations focused on two main problems of the system. These were also problems of balance between national unity and ethnic identity and power struggles in the party (EPRDF executive committee minute Nov 2017).

According to the executive committee evaluation, the above major challenges had their specific branches, such as corruption in the party and government, patronage networks inside the front, and leadership failures to deliver democracy and economic development. Under these major topics, the executive committee of the front undertook a critical and detailed evaluation. These focus on federal system implementation and practical interpretations of democratic unity, the challenges of corruption, and patronage networks regarding the danger to the sustainability of the front and stability of the country (EPRDF executive committee minute December 2017). The following sections explain the discussions of the executive committee in detail.

5.6.1. Federal System Implementation and Democratic Unity Interpretations

The EPRDF executive committee underlined the system's, strength which was created by organizing a cooperative federal system and applauded for its coordinated democratic system building. As a result of the introduction of this system, the country has registered speedy economic development for over 25 years (Ethiopia National Bank Annual Report 2016/2017). The committee also applauded fair investment in infrastructure and capital

accumulation for future investment and development. The committee noted that the system was able to draft and rectify a strong and progressive constitution by the leadership of the EPRDF and appreciated the decision of the front to have an interventionist government economic system through lifelong learning practices of the front, based on the document called Deepen Renewal and Danger of National Existence (the document prepared for the EPRDF executive committee, November 2017).

The convened EPRDF executive committee underlined that even though those strengths are valuable as the treasures of the EPRDF, the last three consecutive years' failures of the party and its government were leading the country towards deadlock due to the degeneration of the party's implementation activities. The executive committee ultimately identified and concluded the following pertinent evaluation points about the situation (EPRDF executive committee minute December 2017).

Table 5.14: EPRDF executive committee Evaluation result.

No.	Category of Weaknesses	Manifestation of Weaknesses	Grade	Conclusion
1	Weak implementation of the federal system	All EPRDF member parties are losing common ground and only talking about their home area as victims and starting to betray each other. Unfair distribution of resources from the federal government through development programs (like METC, the Electrification program, Telecommunication	Leading to a stalemate (critical)	There was major misunderstanding and mistrust between member parties and regions, and there was the possibility of balkanization if it would not be reversed urgently. There was minimal chance of

		distribution, and the construction of industry parks) pushing the federal system to be competitive while it is cooperative, unfairly financing investors and development programs in some regions (like Tigray through government Development and Commercial banks). Non-value-adding intervention by the federal government in regional affairs mismanagement of the federal system. Unbalanced thought between national (ethnic) identity and Ethiopian identity or citizenship.		survival as an organization.

No.	Category of Weaknesses	Manifestation of Weakness	Grade	Conclusion
2	Undemocratic practice	Has become a monolithic party, with no political space for participation of any opposition, lack of internal democratic	Severe	Approaching state collapse and the status of

		discourse, little freedom of expression, severely hampered human and democratic rights, misuse of group rights for superiority of self-nation or nationality, serious power struggle in the leadership especially at the federal level in higher government positions, closed door for multiparty system grabbing all elective seats of parliament and councils leaving nothing for others, prevalence of torture, unlawful killings and imprisonment of opposition and dissenting voices, repression.		a failed state, from crisis to crisis, creates dramatic and catastrophic conflict.
3	Corruption	All types of major and petty corruption, including land grabbing in rural and urban areas, (particularly in Addis Ababa and its vicinity). All sorts of rent-seeking nepotism, bribes, money trafficking, illicit financing, and financing projects through patronage networks for embezzlement to elevate oneself or a group to a higher position.	Severe	The opportunity for a transparent and accountable government to transform society was missed.

No.	Category of Weaknesses	Manifestation of Weakness	Grade	Conclusion

4	Leadership failure	No readiness to appreciate all the mistakes that endanger the party and the country, lack of leadership ability, skill to lead transitional society, lack of command on specific policy areas (like agriculture, industry, etc.) Lack of skill to identify growth drivers, unwise management of emerging leadership, wastage of capability, not implementing the party's deployment and punishment manuals, but deploying patronage revenge among individual members to each other or one member party to the other. Mishandling of youth, culminating in leadership failure.	Severe	Approaching state collapse and the status of a failed state, from crisis to crisis, leads to dramatic and catastrophic conflict.

EPRDF executive committee Evaluation result (Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa note, December 2017).

According to the evaluation document of the meeting and Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa's notes on that meeting as the head of the EPRDF office, the EPRDF executive committee evaluated the situation of the country and the party, and it concluded that the EPRDF was able to build the constitutional system that cut the umbilical cord of the previous regimes. However, this evaluation demonstrates that this admirable constitution may be torn down if these problems persist unaddressed. Therefore, the committee concluded:

> Every member organization should make a detailed evaluation internally and adequately to mobilize its members and regional government and people to reverse the danger; we should pack all the limitations (weaknesses and their solutions) to transparently inform the public and request amnesty from the people; we should divide the tasks into two parts: developmental and good governance packages and political tasks and implement all the reversal of our mistakes, and we should make frequent evaluation of the performances (Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa note, Dec 2017).

However, things did not change according to the efforts of the EPRDF executive committee. The committee evaluated these issues again and concluded that there were severe human rights violations, tortures, extrajudicial killings of protesters, and stifling of all democratic trials against the constitution. Thus, the executive committee of the EPRDF concluded the following points:

1. For the last five years, we have been in a war-like situation that would lead us to complete collapse.
2. The level of crisis (political and economic) has reached the terminal stage.
3. The crisis has made us vulnerable to any attack from inside or outside at any time.
4. Therefore, we have missed a great opportunity to transform the country, bringing economic and social development to its people, and creating sustainable democracy and multinational federalism that we have been striving to make federalism practical for the last 27 years (Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa note taken at the meeting of EPRDF executive committee Dec 13-29/2018).

The Oromo protests culminated in the resignation of PM Hailemariam Desalegn in February 2018 and the selection of Dr. Abiy Ahmed as the first Oromo PM from the Oromia region (Aljazeera, 2018, cited in Bizuneh, 2021). Despite over two decades of practice with federalism, the quest for genuine self-rule, political inclusion, protection of citizenship rights, social cohesion, and transition to democracy remains far from realized. The federal system rested in practice on three pillars: (i) a ‘big man’ – Meles Zenawi (the powerful Prime Minister); (ii) democratic centralism; and (iii) the vanguard party (Assefa,

2023). At the beginning of the federal system, many people hoped that the country would transform into a fully democratic system, but the century-long instability and disagreements on the mode of governance ended. However, the expectation did not bear fruit, and the vicious cycle of mistrust continued.

The ‘big man’ has passed on, democratic centralism is gone, and with the withering away of ideology, power struggle continues along fault lines. Federalism and devolution to manage diversity and conflict distract effective institutions from the day-to-day political business. Constitutionalism and the rule of law require political institutions that ultimately submit to the guardianship of the Constitution. Ethiopia failed to build these institutions, and the EPRDF, rebranded as the Prosperity Party (PP) after the TPLF withdrew from it, relied on its party machinery (Assefa, 2023).

The centralized practice of the EPRDF was one of the major factors that made the self-rule exercise a failure and hindered the effective implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism, exacerbating the lack of consensus, which has been lingering since the introduction of Multinational Federalism.

5.7. Summary

This chapter dealt with data presentation from primary and secondary sources on the issues of the introduction and implementation of *de facto* and *de jure* Democratic Multinational Federalism. It dealt with the success and limitations of the system and tried to identify impairing factors that deprived consensus on the implementation of this system. The successes of the system, according to the data findings, were the organization of the Peace and Democratic Conference and the adoption of the Transitional Period Charter, the creation of TGE and its structures, the creation of regional administration, the delineation of regional boundaries along ethnic lines and the ratification of the constitution and conclusion of the transitional chapter by inaugurating the new government. It culminated in the continued implementation of the Democratic Multination Federalism, though there were significant drawbacks.

The limitations of the system, according to the data generated, were fundamentally from the absence of adequate participation of the opposition and other elites to negotiate the

introduction and implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism and the failure of Democratic Multinational Federalism under effective centralization and control of the EPRDF. These failures resulted in resentment and conflict, culminating in reforms that dissolved the EPRDF itself. The causes of these limitations were the results of insufficiently embracing the values and principles of federalism. These shortcomings have cost the country and its people, immersing them in conflict between ethnic groups and wars between the government and different armed groups. As a matter of urgency, the country's situation requires critical intervention as remedies for the past and answers to the existing problems of consensus. Thus, the next chapter deals with discussing and interpreting these findings in comparison with conceptual and theoretical frameworks and the literature review presented in chapter two to work towards a proposition that might reverse the existing stalemate.

CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION

6.1. Introduction

The optimism that advocates for Ethiopia's DMF notes that it has granted self-determination, including secession, to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples, hoping it would lead to a stable and peaceful democratic union, the primary reason behind the new system restructuring in 1991. The outcome of such a union has ultimately mixed. This research attempted to delve into one of the less investigated federal system creation processes, based on data from documents found in archives and available evidence about the political decentralization since the beginning of *de facto* federalization in Ethiopia in 1991 and its implementation up to 2019, aiming to seek a solution for the lack of consensus on the system as mentioned earlier.

This research examines the context of a process of political decentralization that lacked consensus and hindered the proper evolution of Democratic Multinational Federalism in the country. It investigated the *de facto* federal creation processes during the Transitional Government of Ethiopia, the drafting of the federal constitution, and the reviewing and ratification of the Constitution (Chapter 5 of this thesis 5.2 and 5.3) based on the analysis of available data in line with the research question: *How best to build consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia?*

This chapter focuses on discussing and interpreting the data presented in previous chapters to answer the research question of the thesis. It also examines findings compared to with existing literature presented in chapter two and the Ethiopian federal system.

6.2. Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia

This part discusses and interprets multinational federalism in general and Ethiopian federalism in particular in line with existing literature and political opinions. establishing a federal system emanates from the unique nature of a country's historical and political circumstances to create a new common state by bringing together the existing distinct states or holding together the hitherto existing old state to stave off the risk of

disintegration (Asnake, 2009). In the case of Ethiopia, the factors that propelled the EPRDF to construct multinational federalism were primarily a consequence of political necessity and ideological orientation. Thus, it responded to the widely recognized discontent of various ethnic identities in the country with centralized and oppressive government structures. It also had an ideological basis (Stalinist ideology) traced back to the movement among the country's university students of the 1960s and 1970s (Mengisteab, 2008).

This research investigated the unique evolution of Ethiopian federalism from the country's indigenous dynamic state. According to this research, there were/are demanding and driving factors that necessitated a new arrangement for Ethiopian polity as a federal system of governance. The literature generally suggests that the formation of federal systems depends on the nature and historical uniqueness of a specific country's situation (Davis, 1978). Thus, this research asserts that Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism is unique, as it contravenes the country's previous political systems. The Imperial and the military regimes had ruled the country without recognizing the self-administration rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples and their identity and ethnic rights. They did not try to accommodate the country's diversity, which confirms the uniqueness of the federal demand in the case of Ethiopia. On top of this, the socialistic ideological orientation of Ethiopian student movements that evolved among Addis Ababa University students and abroad by Ethiopian scholars and students in Europe and the United States of America also informed the armed groups who demanded self-rule, including secession. It was the unique historical basis for the new form of government (Bahru, 1991).

However, most Pan-Ethiopian groups and some foreign scholars claim that the EPRDF deliberately created multiethnic federalism to belittle the heroic patriotism of unified Ethiopia and to enforce the divide-and-rule system of governance (Bekalu, 2017; Siraw, 2016; Mohamood Mamdani, 2019). Nevertheless, the data obtained in this research underlines numerous rebellions organized during the imperial era in different parts of the country. The first Woyane-rebellion in Tigray, the Bale Oromo uprising, the Gojjam farmers' uprising, and the Michelle war in Gedeo were some of the documented rebellions

against the highly centralized regime of the time (see 4.4 in chapter four). During the Derg regime, around seventeen organized armed groups fought for self-determination, regional autonomy, or secession in the country (Bahru,1991; Addis Alem, 2014; Mulugeta, 2020; see 4.5 in chapter four). So, it seems clear that the EPRDF was not the noble and singular creator of the federal demand in Ethiopia. The data from this study suggests that the EPRDF was very committed to ending the century-long subjugation of identities and violations of NNP's rights by the attempts to assimilating them to one nation, one country, under one flag. The EPRDF's intervention has facilitated the unique historical background of the Democratic Multinational Federalism formation in Ethiopia (Leenco, 1999).

One of the basic principles of federalism is that it represents a political system in which the division of jurisdictions and functions between central and geographically defined regional governments. It is constitutionally guaranteed, precluding the total subordination of one to the other (William, 1964; Watts, 1966; Elazar, 1976; Lijphart, 1979; Osaghae, 2004, cited in Mengisteab, 2008). As it was discussed in chapter two of this thesis, federalism refers to a mode of political organization that unites separate polities into an overarching political system while allowing each to maintain their respective autonomy or decentralizing the existing unitary government to hold the country together from disintegration and empowering identities or centrifugal forces (Simeon et al., 1990).

This research argues that the Ethiopian federal arrangement was a type of federal formation decentralized from a centralized unitary state to socio-cultural and linguistic identities. In the beginning, the Transition Government Charter, a quasi-supreme law of the country at the time, restructured the unitary government as a *de facto* federal state of fourteen regions. The decentralization aimed to hold the country together by devolving the concentrated power at the center to NNPs. The 1994 Constitution then became a guarantee for the new Democratic Multinational Federalism. The Constitution clearly defined the federal structure, divided the jurisdictions between federal units and the federal government, and reserved the residual power to the regional governments (1994 ETH. Con Articles 51 and 52; Tewfik, 2010). Although all federations have their unique nature of federal structural establishments, many holding together federal systems preserve residual power to the federal government (Baldi, 1999). Unlike the many holding

together federal arrangements, the Ethiopian federal system gives residual power to the regions (1994 Eth. Cont. Article 52/1). The assignment of residual power in holding together federalism in Ethiopia is a new insight that the data proves the Ethiopian federal arrangement resembles the coming together arrangement while it is a holding together federal arrangement.

Theoretically, most federations and unions are born through either coming together or holding together, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis (Fabre, 2009; Daniel, 1999). A coming together federal formation involves two or more independent units joining to form a common federal state by federal bargaining. The federal aggregation is a voluntary union for political, economic, or diplomatic stability or some other reason based on their specific circumstances (William, 1964; Elazar, 1987; Stepan, 2005; Rokkan & Derek, 1982; Burgess, 2006). In this type of federal formation, power distribution tends to help regions. A constitution details the powers of the federal and regional governments, and the residual powers, which are the powers that are not otherwise listed, are generally assigned to the regions (Fabre, 2009; Daniel, 1999; Stepan, 2005).

In this regard, the present findings place Ethiopian federalism in a mixed position. The Constitution's preamble shows that it was born as a coming together through bargaining of Nation, Nationalities, and Peoples as they were not together under one country for years (1994 Eth. Constitution preamble). In addition to the Constitution, some Ethiopian scholars like Andrease Eshete, who was a participant during the drafting of the Constitution as an advisor, argues that the Ethiopian federation is the result of coming together. He bases his two arguments on the Constitution. First, the leading political actors during the transition were, by and large, ethnic-based liberation movements or parties that either fought for or politically asserted the right to self-determination, including independence. Second, his strongest argument was that when the new political actors were ready to assume state power, the unitary state had ceased to exist. Therefore, Ethiopian federalism is a coming together federalism, and its advent resulted from a revolutionary overthrown of a unitary state (Andrease Eshete, 2003, cited in Yonatan, 2010).

However, the data from the current research findings shows that Ethiopian statehood is ancient and that its modern expansion lasted for more than a century (Bahru,1991; Mulugeta, 2020). The existing decentralization was a form of restructuring from an existing state to Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples (Tewfik, 2010; Ethiopian Transitional Charter,1991). Therefore, endorsing the Ethiopian federal system as coming together according to either the preamble of the Constitution or Andreas Eshete's explanation is a distortion of history because he portrayed the Ethiopian state as it was ceased and created in the new federal structure after 1991.

The second type of federalism is holding together federalism. It involves a constitutional devolution of power to sub-national units or entities in the state. In this case, regionalist movements or parties pressure a unitary state to decentralize/devolve power to regions or sub-state levels. The central government is more likely to hold on to its prerogative, and the regions are less powerful than the regions of an aggregated federation (Baldi, 1999; Fabre, 2009; Daniel, 1999; Stepan, 2005).

In Ethiopia, as the data in Chapter Five reveals, the transitional period charter provided for promulgating the law, establishing local and regional councils for administrative purposes, and being defined based on nationality. Accordingly, 1992 saw country's internal administration restructuring and the formation of 14 regional administrations, including Addis Ababa (Tewfik, 2010:6; Proclamation No 7/1992). The Ethiopian restructuring was a typical form of holding together that aligned with the theoretical feature of holding together federal formation. In this process, powers were devolved to the newly established regional administrations based on the self-rule rights of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples to decide on their matters by themselves that had been asserted by the Transitional Period Charter (proclamation no 7/1992).

However, in both approaches, the coming together implicit in the preamble of the Constitution or the clear of holding together approach during the charter, the victorious EPRDF dominated restructuring processes that did not satisfy the bargaining principle of federalization between two or more forces, especially the centripetal and centrifugal forces. The representatives of previous regimes, either the monarchial or military regimes, were not allowed to participate in the Peace and Democracy Conference. On top of that,

the center-oriented group, the leftist organizations coalition (COEDF), was not invited to attend the conference and to the subsequent platforms of constitution drafting, reviewing, and ratification (Lyons, 1996). Therefore, there was no representation from the supporters of unitary state during federal formation. The lack of the representation created a mutual mistrust between the new center of the federal system and the old unitary approach.

The outcome of the current research asserts that there were fears that the TGE's narrow base might create instability both within Ethiopia and outside to push for another series of talks aimed at restarting dialogue with various opposition groups. In February 1995, the Congressional Task Force on Ethiopia, consisting of representatives Harry Johnston and Alcee Hastings, Ambassador David Shin, and former Assistant Secretary of State Herman Cohen, brought leaders from the major opposition movements to Washington, and special envoys from the TGE. The latter insisted that opposition groups accept existing constitutional framework as a precondition for participation and future talks back in Ethiopia. Three of the four opposition parties argued for negotiation without preconditions. They refused to accept a framework as they had not participated in drafting and designing the constitutional framework in the first instance (Lyons, 1996). Thus, whether it is coming together or holding together, Ethiopia's federalization process lacks bargaining and negotiation. Thus, it resulted in a lack of consensus on the type of federalism implemented in the country. This problem is still lingering and has become a perennial cause of the lack of consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism.

Regarding federalization as a part of democratization and decentralization, various members of Ethiopian communities have supported the federal system and agreed to maintain unity by granting autonomy to subnational units. Such supports originated from either the lessons of democratic federations or the presumption that formal decentralization grants a genuine autonomy to the constituent units (Bizuneh, 2021; Merera, 2004). The data from this research proves that the framers of the Constitution intended to consider the federal system as one of the indicators of a democratic system in the Constitution. In the conclusion regarding article one, the draft Constitution decided that the nomenclature of the country would be the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. This nomenclature and the framers' intention took federalism as an instrument

of democratic practice that could accommodate diversity in unity by empowering the NNPs of the country (draft constitution explanation article on page 2). However, its implementation lacked comprehensiveness in accommodating different views at all levels in participation, which resulted in a lack of consensus in the federal system building.

After the conclusion of the Peace and Democracies Conference, there was a monolithic drive to create an ethnic-based autonomy structure in the COR due to the absence of Pan-Ethiopian or unitary government supporters in the Council of Representatives. Few opposition COR members had different views on the newly introduced *de facto* federal system. As it was presented in the findings of this thesis in chapter five, no single opposition with differing opinions to the majority had a seat in the Constitutional Assembly (NEBE Report, October 28/1994). Only nine independent assembly members had seats from Addis Ababa with different views from most of the Assembly Members. These few members reflected their views focusing on center-periphery relations and tried to bargain in the opposite direction of most Constitutional Assembly Members. However, there was no common intersection between the two sides to compromise on the significant differences that later impacted the system and became perennial challenges during the implementation phase of Democratic Multinational Federalism. So, the lack of democratic participation stifled the opportunity to make the federal arrangement as one of the foundations of a democratic system. This shortcoming exacerbated the lack of consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia between the contending elites.

Regarding the political-ideological nature of federalism, King (1982) provided a comprehensive analysis of the ideological underpinning of federalism. He argued that federalism is a set of political ideologies based on core values and principles, including protecting an individual's liberty, distributing power between central and local authorities, and promoting democratic governance. Accordingly, Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism concurs with the political ideology and nature of the King's federalism. The findings discussed in chapter five showed that the Ethiopian federal constitution Article 17, regarding the right to individual liberty, states:

> No one shall be deprived of his or her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established by the law, and no person may

be subjected to arbitrary arrest, and no person would be detained without a charge or conviction against him (Article 17/1-2/).

However, the EPRDF executive committee, which had been the highest political organ to make decisions regarding the country's affairs, affirmed that there had been a violation of individual liberty during the implementation of the federal system. According to the data found from different academic publications and Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa's records from the EPRDF executive committee evaluation, there had been extra-legal killings, tortures, and detentions that prohibited citizens from exercising their constitutional liberty. This type of implementation hindered the development of a consensus on the kind of government the country desired.

According to King's argument, the power distribution between the central government and regional authorities has been assessed in this research. The power distribution between the federal government and regional state was detailed and distributed under chapter five of the Constitution, which comprehended the structure and division of powers (Art 51and 52). Following the Constitution's ratification, the federal government was structured into the House of Peoples Representatives, House of Federation, Judiciary, and Executives. These all-detailed descriptions of duties and responsibilities emanating from the Constitution (Articles 53-85).

The regional states were also established based on the Constitution and developed their own State Councils, Judiciaries, Executives, and other necessary organs according to each region's specific circumstances. The regional states granted the power of legislation on matters under state jurisdiction, including the power to draft, adopt, and amend the state constitution consistent with the provision of the Federal Constitution (constitution. Art. 50/5). Thus, the interpretation of multinational federalism in Ethiopia shows mixed results and successes combined with a lack of consensus on the format of Democratic Multinational Federalism.

6.2.1 Ideological Foundations of Ethiopian Federalism

According to King (1982), various ideological factors have shaped federalism, including classical liberalism, republicanism, and populism. He argues that these ideologies have

influenced the development of federalism in different ways, with some emphasizing individual rights and others emphasizing the importance of collective identity and community.

Accordingly, the current research proves that the Ethiopian federal system follows King's (1982) explanation of ideological classical liberalism in its Constitution; the framers of the Constitution intended to install a republican system (explanation sent from COR to Constitution Assembly Oct 1994). Therefore, Ethiopian federalism is based on classical liberalism and republicanism, but in practice, there have been gaps between constitutional provisions and actual implementation. It has been revealed during elections that the people's will has been hindered from electing their government due to a lack of free and fair elections as per the Constitution. There were several sham elections except for the 2005 election, which brought different political alternatives. According to NEBE reports, in the 1994 Constitutional Assembly elections, the EPRDF and its Affiliates won 98.2%; in the 1995 elections, the EPRDF and its Affiliates won 94.4%; in the 2000 elections the EPRDF and its Affiliates won 94.6%; in 2005 elections the EPRDF and its Affiliates won 68.2%; in 2010 elections EPRDF and Affiliates won 99.6% and in 2015 elections the EPRDF and its Affiliates won 100%. These consecutive election results reveal few democratic contestations in the implementation processes of DMF. These absences of democratic contestations have created a lack of consensus and lingering problems of implementation, which prevented the evolution of Democratic Multinational Federalism towards a full-blown system that could bring peace and stability to the country (Bahru, 2019).

According to King (1982), federalism reflects three different orientations: centralist, decentralist, and balanced models, as discussed in chapter two of this thesis. In this regard, the Ethiopian system of federalization at the start followed the decentralist form of government. As covered in chapter five of this research, one of the most significant effects of the charter was the establishment of two parallel systems of government, consisting of a central government and ethnic-based regional/national self-governments for the transitional period (TGE charter Article 13). As proved by the data findings in Chapter Five, the charter provided for promulgating of the law, which would establish

local and regional councils for administrative purposes defined based on nationality (Tewfik, 2010). Accordingly, 1992 saw the restructuring of the country's internal administration and the formation of regional governments. Further, the regional boundaries were drawn up, and their borders were delineated. The regional governments were vested with legislative, executive, and judicial powers within their geographic areas in all matters not expressly assigned to the central government (Tewfik, 2010).

Moreover, this research affirms that the ratification of the new Constitution declared the distribution of powers to the federal government and its constitutional units. It was done by assigning specific forms that both levels of government have (legislative, executive, and judiciary power) and by allocating all powers not given expressly to the federal government alone or concurrently to the federal and regional governments to the regional states (Ethiopian constitution Article, 51, 52).

It is clear from the Charter and the Constitutional provisions that both documents tried to answer the ideological and political orientation that was initially motivated by the Ethiopian Student Movement (ESM) for self-determination of the NNPs and released the Ethiopian Nations, Nationality, and Peoples from the assimilation attempts, starting to create a nation of nations (Merea,2004; Bahru, 1991). In this regard, the EPRDF leaders who played a significant role in the creation of the federal structure and leaders of most ethnic-based organizations evolved from the ESM, whose ideological genesis originated from the Stalinist architecture of the Soviet Union (Mohamood Mandani, 2019). Therefore, the ideological mobilization of the decentralist approach outlined by King, which is the devolution of a unitary state to its federal units, appears to have similarities to the findings derived from data in this thesis.

According to the data findings in Chapter Five, the regional states were delimited based on the people's settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent (Tewfik, 2010; Beken, 2007; Vaughan, 2003). This right-granting action was a direct responded to the ESM, which carried an agenda of self-determination for nationalities to administer themselves in every area they reside in (Mulugeta, 2020). The regional governments, in turn, also have layers of governmental structure (ESS, 2023). Accordingly, the Ethiopian brand of federalism has five levels of government: the federal, regional state, zonal

administration with and without a legislative mandate, woreda/special woreda, and kebele and city government, which are synonymous with regional state structures (Keller & Smith, 2005).

The findings of this study reveal a new insight that shows the creation of structures of government, top-down, all the way to grass root or neighborhood administrations with all legislative, executive, and judiciary powers to empower people at all levels and to avail the power to exercise their rights and decide on their matters. In the case of numerically small nationalities, the decentralized approach helps people to engage in their matters, making them the ultimate decision-makers to finalize issues within their scope.

However, when it came to implementing decentralized power distribution, the ruling party, the EPRDF, controlled every agenda at all levels of government, be it in its member parties or affiliated parties. Therefore, it can be concluded that the ruling party controlled all activities of the constituent units through the democratic centralism of its member parties or affiliate parties (EPRDF regulation 2006, Figure 3 in Chapter 5).

Although the official and legal documents show the decentralist of empowerment approach for federal units and their residents in an ethnic-based approach, the implementation was not in line with constitutional rhetoric. The EPRDF's organizational behavior, organizational culture, principles, and decisions cascaded from the EPRDF congress secretariat levels to the grassroots settings at a household level. In later years, there were one to five individual organizational setups at the neighborhood level to enforce the control mechanism on members, supporters, and even other civil servants, and one person used to be assigned to lead five neighborhood residents. The data from the EPRDF members' mobilization manuals proves that the purpose of the organization was for developmental activity mobilization, but at the same time, every resident used to be requested to be a member of their local EPRDF member party or affiliated party (unpublished EPRDF members' manual). The organization, in turn, was the agenda circulation mechanism from the party center down to the household. Therefore, citizens had no room to think in a different way than the ruling party. This tight control created dissatisfaction and resentment, which led to a lack of consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism.

Unlike the imperial and military regimes, the EPRDF made all Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples believe themselves to be the equal owners of the nation via their federalist structure and by legal codification (preamble of the 1994 constitution). This aspect of codifications can be seen as an achievement for the EPRDF and all Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia who had been struggling for a century or more for equality (Leenco, 2019). It empowered all ethnic communities to create their governing geographic areas to decide their matters, develop their cultures, and use their languages as a medium of official interaction and instruction in schools. It also enabled every NNP to elect their leadership and to be represented at all levels of government, from the neighborhood to the federal level (Article 39 of the 1994 Constitution). Thus, these achievements need not be diminished by any means, but the major challenge here is that these achievements were implemented through one party, one agenda, and with no room for flexible thinking. Thus, this process created distrust towards implementing a Democratic Multinational Federal system.

Ethiopian federalism has strived to be more accommodative in legalizing the union of centripetal and centrifugal forces (fourth paragraph of the preamble of the 1994 Constitution). However, a new centripetal force was initially centrifugal and transformed into a new center through this ruling party monopolization. The previous liberation fighter, the EPRDF, became a central force that dominated the whole agenda of its member parties and affiliates to control the decision-making process, sometimes in contradiction with the constitutional provisions and other laws (EPRDF Regulation Translated by the researcher, 2006; International Crisis Group 2009; Aalen, 2002).

This dominance of the ruling party created a concentration of power in the hands of party leadership originally leaders of the TPLF. That, in turn, led to mistrust between the Front's leadership. This process went steadily for a while (though not without friction) but ultimately prompted protests and leadership changes in the EPRDF (Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa's notes, Dec 2017; Bahru, 2019). Following the change, the new leadership pushed to dissolve the front to create a new unified party called the Prosperity Party (Assefa, 2023). The TPLF, the founder of the EPRDF, refused the dissolution of the EPRDF. As a result, the Tigray region led by the TPLF, entered a civil war with the federal

government. So, the findings of this thesis show that undermining the codified constitutional provisions in practicing the federal system endangers the unity of the country. Therefore, balancing power between the central, regional, and local authorities in line with the constitutional provisions is essential to ensure the needs and interests of different regions in Ethiopia, including protecting individual rights and liberties. The application of an ideological aspect also brought about mixed results again on the implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia.

6.2.2 Institutional Aspect of Ethiopian Federalism

Federation is conceived as an institutional arrangement, as it was discussed in chapter two, taking the form of a sovereign state, and distinguished from other states solely by the fact that its central government incorporates regional units in its decision-making procedures on some constitutionally entrenched basis (King, 1982, as cited in Smith, 1995). In this regard, the insights from this research show that during the transitional period, the established regional administrations had no formal participation at the central government level. However, there were non-elected representatives of ethnic parties and prominent individuals from regions representing their home regions who played a significant role in the decision-making process of the central government (Bizuneh, 2021; Young, 1998; Tewfik, 2010).

Since ratifying the 1994 Ethiopian Constitution, two federal houses have been established by the party and ethnic representatives from the regional governments. As the findings of this research reveal, the HOPR is the power base of the federal government, elected from each constituent representing political parties or independent candidates (1994 Constitution Art. 54). Furthermore, the findings reveal that the elected representatives of political parties or independent candidates automatically represent their ethnic groups. This is because as it was shown by the findings of this study in chapter five, every representative should speak the language of the constituency they represent (proclamation No. 11/1995).

The language of a specific ethnic group to which the constituents belong is usually the working language of the regional or local government, as well as the language of service provision including school instruction (Article 39/2). The House of Federation reversed

the law promulgated in Proclamation 11/1195 that precluded candidates from election participation those would like to contest as a candidate in constituencies where they did not speak the language of the specific constituency (Journals of Constitutional Decision of HOF, Vol 1-4, 1995-2022; see chapter five). However, demanding a candidate to speak the local language to be an eligible for political office and representation is still mandatory. Regions elect representatives from their constituency to the HOPR to represent and participate in decision-making practices at the federal level. Thus, aligning the institutional arrangement of Ethiopia's federal system allows its federal units to participate at federal level through their parliamentarians.

The second house is the House of Federation, which is composed of ethnic representatives, as discussed in chapter five of this research. Regions are indirectly represented in the House of Federation by electing the House members from their Councils elected from ethnic groups or groups in particular regions (Article 62/3). In this case, the members of the HOF espouse their decisions on behalf of their regions, not on behalf of their ethnic background. However, in both houses, any agenda against the ruling party's interest cannot be adopted by any means (Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa note, Dec 2017). Therefore, when the Ethiopian institutional arrangement is critically evaluated, it does not allow regions a real decision-making process on federal issues, including participation in resource allocation except on the budget subsidy division through HOF, contravening the principles of federalism which emphasize the independence of the two parallel governments at the federal and the regional level, one should not be subordinate to the other. This process negatively impacted the evolution of a genuine democratic federation in Ethiopia that expected to bring peace and stability to the country.

Full autonomy of independent federal units from the federal government requires a firm determination to maintain diversity and unity through a continuous process of mutual adaptation; otherwise, a federal system cannot last (Carl J, 1968). In this regard, federal loyalty and comity are essential government features under a federal order. The first of these ideas, federal loyalty, refers to the fundamental commitment of the constituent units and their representatives to the overall need for a more extensive federal system. In contrast, the second concept, federal comity, requires both federal and local officials to

have to sense of fair play. Indeed, without these, federal systems became simply unworkable (Carl J, 1968, as cited in Burgess, 2012).

The insights from chapter five of this thesis show that the two houses, the HOF, and the House of Representatives, only endorse the agendas that agree with the interests of the ruling party at the center. The members of houses were either higher officials or rank-and-file members of the EPRDF and affiliate parties. The decisions of the Houses have not been in the form of comity or fair play of both entities, leading constituent units to be less sympathetic to the federal loyalty that Democratic Multination Federalism requires within its institutional arrangement (Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa note, Dec 2017).

6.2.3 Constitutionalism and the Making of the Ethiopian Constitution

Federalism means a fully constitutional government where citizens and regions are genuinely represented on the central level of government. A fully constitutional government implies that the government must be subjected to the law and committed to the principle of constitutionalism (Elazar, 1995; Wheare, 1963; Sawer, 1969; Aalen, 2002).

The Transition Period Charter initiated the Ethiopian federal system, which granted partial power to regional administrations based on quasi-constitutional law (Transitional Charter Article 18). At the end of the transition, the federal Constitution was ratified and established as the basic framework of the federal system (the 1994 Constitution article 9). All powers and authorities have been addressed and distributed between the two parallel governments: the federal and regional governments (Articles 51 &52). The formal constitutional requirement of the federal setting has been structured in the Ethiopian federal system, which can be seen as an achievement in a multinational situation. The data from this study proves that establishing a decentralized political system is a commendable achievement for the country's NNPs.

Furthermore, constitutionalism underscores the presence of an independent agency or constitutional court (Kenneth, 1963). The Ethiopian federal system gave the power of interpretation of the Constitution to a political house (the HOF) instead of to a judicial body (Article 62/1). It illuminates how the Ethiopian system differs in its constitutional setting

from most federal systems. Two significant attributes made the HOF unique from other similar federal systems. The first one is its representation. The house members represent their ethnic identity directly and their home regions indirectly. The system of election of these members follows both symmetric and asymmetric representation. Article 39/5 of the 1994 Ethiopian constitution defines NNPs as follows:

> A Nation, Nationality, or People, for this constitution, is a group of people who have or share a considerable measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or related identity, a common psychological makeup, and who inhabit an identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory (Ethiopian Constitution Article 39/5).

This provision clearly shows that the three notions of Nations, Nationality, and People have equal value in constitutional implementation. However, in representing the members in the HOF, the group called People can elect and be represented in the first stage of sending one representative as a group to the chamber. The groups called Nation and Nationality can add one more representative for every additional one million people in their population in a proportional manner (Article 61/2). Therefore, the representation of NNPs is symmetric at the beginning and asymmetric after one million people, which does not include the group called people. It is a unique aspect of the Ethiopian federal system. This type of uniqueness can explain the peculiar behavior of federal formation based on the reality of a country during the formation of a federal system.

The second significant difference between the Ethiopian Federal House and other Houses is its mandates. This House has a range of mandates, and for the benefit of this thesis, two issues are considered. The first is its constitutional interpretation mandate and decisions on the matters related to the rights of NNPs to self-determination, including the right to secession (Article 62).

Regarding the mandate of the HOF related to the interpretation of the Constitution, the data from documents obtained from the House of Federation proves that numerous issues and appeals have been presented to the HOF. Most of these issues are related to individual rights, whereas some are to group rights (Journals of Constitutional Decision of HOF, Vol 1-4, 1995-2022). Although the HOF has been deciding on the matter based

on Article 9 of the constitution, most issues were not political. The objective of granting the mandate of interpretation of the constitution to the HOF is to address the complex situation of identity issues by ethnic representatives to address their comprehensive rights. However, the data reveals that the HOF engaged in detailed matters that ordinary courts could otherwise address.

The last 30 years of experience of interpreting the Constitution by the HOF shows that granting the power of constitutional interpretation does not require a political body to interpret the Constitution. A constitutional court may be established and takeover the day-to-day interpretation of individual and group rights.

Regarding the mandate of the HOF to decide on the issues related to the rights of NNPs, the house has made decisions on the issues surrounding the acknowledgment of ethnic identity and boundary delineation between two regions, including where an ethnic group in one region is adjacent to another with a similar language, culture, and identity (Journals of Constitutional Decision of HOF, Vol 1-4, 1995-2022). In this case, except for the inconsistency in making a timely decision, the HOF has taken tremendous strides to strengthen the federal system and develop trust between regions and ethnic identities.

The data from Chapter Five reveals that there has been no question of secession from any ethnic group (NNPs) to the House of Federation to break away from the Ethiopian state. Fierce debates in the Constitutional Commission and Constitutional Assembly have asserted that different Ethiopian Nations, Nationalities, and People do not have a question of breaking away from the country (minutes of CC, COR, and Constitutional Assembly). The only driving push of the secession clause was the ideological background of the EPRDF, which evolved from a student movement motivated by the Stalinist ideology of the former Soviet Union. However, the incorporation of the secession clause has been a contributing factor to the lack of consensus in the implementation of DMF.

6.2.4 Symmetry and Asymmetry in Ethiopian Federalism

Both symmetry and asymmetry are ideal types in the analysis of political science. No perfectly symmetric or asymmetric federation exists in the world (Burgess, 2006). The notion of symmetry refers to the extent to which component states share in the condition

and thereby concerns more or less familiar to the federal system as a whole (Tarlton, 1965). In this respect, the Ethiopian Constitution granted *de jure* symmetrical self-determination rights for all ethnic groups of the country. The data in chapter five of this thesis shows that every regional government has a right to decide on its internal matters, serving as a symmetrical right for all the members regardless of the demographic and socio-economic differences of the regional governments (Article 39).

The asymmetry of federalism, meanwhile, is an instrumental device for accommodating differences in a way that adds to the overall political stability of a federation (Burgess, 2006). In this regard, the Ethiopian federal system, which has constitutional symmetry, is asymmetrical in many aspects. The *de facto* asymmetry of the Ethiopian federal system has numerous differences in population size, territorial disparities, socio-economic conditions, and cultural differences (Ethiopian Statical Service, 2023). Embracing these differences has been attempted via constitutional mechanisms (Preamble of 1994 constitution, 1st paragraph). However, the ruling party's dominance over every constitutional right and hindering equal participation of members with affiliates in the regional parties has become a source of a lack of consensus and created mistrust (International Crisis Group, 2009; Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa, note Dec 2010).

Moreover, regions which were led by the affiliate parties, and some of the EPRDF member parties have a lowland and less densely populated, and relatively big free land areas. Following this reality, people from densely populated highland areas move to these areas for better opportunities and to seek fertile land for subsistence. These citizens have become a new minority in these regions and their political participation has been restricted. Therefore, they cannot participate in elections as candidates if they want to participate, but they are allowed to participate as an electorate. The legal framework does not prohibit them from participating as candidates. Still, the customary requirements that requires candidates to speak local languages if they want to participate in elections restrict them from being elected if they do not speak the languages of the areas in which they live. The asymmetric situation of minorities in new homelands created a lack of consensus in a country that requires elites' negotiation to create a conducive environment for citizens to trust the system and exercise their rights (Beza, 2016).

6.2.5 Multinational Ethno-federalism Aspects of Ethiopian Federalism

Multinational federalism is designed to accommodate the diversity of different national groups within a country while maintaining a unified political system (Burgess, 2012). Conversely, multinational ethno-federations are federations where individual ethnic groups have a separate national identity. The success of multinational federations depends on whether the individual nations are linked together by a common, long-lasting political interest (Jozsef, 2005). In this regard, the Ethiopian federal arrangement constitutes the pact of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethiopia for the fulfillment of the right to self-determination, to build a political community founded on the rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, and advancing economic and social development (Preamble of 1994 constitution).

The full implementation of multinational ethno-federalism demands multiple levels of government, each with its responsibilities and powers. In this respect, the findings in chapter five show that the Ethiopian system has five layers of government, each with legislative, executive, and judiciary branches (ESS, 2023). Theoretically, the expectation was to create maximum accommodative participation in decision-making opportunities for the people on their matter, providing experiences and empowerment for ethnic identities to exercise their rights. However, the challenge here is that overcentralized party agendas have hindered transparency and accountability, leading to mistrust in the system and a lack of consensus (EPRDF regulation, 2006).

The data findings in chapter five prove that ethnic identities are more prioritized for ethnic groups than Ethiopian identity. According to Jozsef (2005), borderline cases can be considered between multi-ethnic and multinational forms in those ethno-federations where integrative national political consciousness and strong separate identities are simultaneously present. Examples are Belgium, Canada, Serbia-Montenegro, and most African and Asian ethno-federations. In this regard, ethnic identities in Ethiopia strongly entertain both Ethiopian and individual-ethnic nationalism simultaneously. However, the data findings in this thesis show that the balance between ethnic identities and Ethiopian nationalism was seriously affected, with political leaders moving their inclination and

sympathies toward their ethnic background. As a result, the committee at the time evaluated this as a serious drawback (Table 5:14 in Chapter 5).

The data from this thesis reveals competing and sometimes conflicting interests between ethnic identities and common national and political consciousness. In this aspect, the two numerically largest ethnic groups (the Oromo and Amhara), and to a lesser extent, the Tigrayans, are competing to dominate the country's political arena.

TPLF, the principal architect of the Federal system, was previously the centripetal force through EPRDF dominance but has now been pushed out after the end of the EPRDF rule (Assefa, 2023). It has now become a peripheral force after initially being the leader of centrifugal forces. It is not only competing or conflicting with the centripetal forces, but it has engaged in a bloody civil war after it left the EPRDF coalition, at which point other members formed a new party (the Prosperity Party). The southern areas are primarily out of competition for dominance and still seeking balanced centripetal and centrifugal forces, bargaining for true and accommodative multination federalism. The problem with these peripheral forces is that they are numerically fewer in number and less organized, and this is a factor that limited their balancing power between the northern and central forces.

The traditional centripetal forces are now disorganized, according to the findings from this research. The dominant EPRDF, which had created a new center, dissolved in Dec 2019, and the pro-center forces are too weak to negotiate toward a genuine center-periphery relation. The Pan-Ethiopian forces advocated first for strengthening Amhara and then Ethiopia. For these groups, Ethiopia is secondary to the agenda, and they want to build Ethiopia on their terms. Thus, this approach has deprived the country of having a genuine Ethiopian identity. Pan-Ethiopian forces have challenged the wisdom of appreciating the rights of nations, nationalities, and people enshrined in the Constitution. They saw the view of NNPs as a negation of a single Ethiopian patriotism and identity. Their view has resulted in the division of the traditional centripetal forces into Amhara defenders and a new centripetal force, the Prosperity Party, which has formed from the previously dominant party, the EPRDF. This situation significantly diminished the existence of a strong centripetal force that could bargain for the center meaningfully. These realities are

creating fears of disintegration of the country, which is going beyond the lack of consensus on the implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism.

On the other side, there are other major but latent forces. Once the promoters of a decolonization thesis, the OLF and parties with similar views are pro centrifugal forces but acting latently without offering support towards strengthening the center. Thus, the equilibrium between the centripetal and centrifugal forces has become a real threat to the country's stability. The strong bond of the federal system, the EPRDF, has gone. The Constitution is still intact, but many opposing forces have shocked it. The likelihood of dominance is increasing from numerically large ethnic groups. Therefore, strengthening multinational federalism by getting rid of the weaknesses that have adversely affected its implementation and hindered consensus is crucial now more than ever. The strength of DMF can come through candid and genuine discussion to create an equilibrium of the center and periphery, equally recognizing the rights of all ethnic identities on an equal basis, and working towards strengthening common political and national consciousness to attain the long-standing objectives of the constitution.

6.3 Democratization in Ethiopia

Theoretically, democracy is an instrument used to design a set of rules and principles to achieve certain common ends through a constitution that will determine how the association's decisions are made (Dahl, 1998). In this respect, Ethiopian federal democracy was started as a *de facto* system through the Transitional Period Charter. The Charter's enactment allowed people with similar views to convene around the major content of the transition that was used in restructuring a unitary state where many ethnically motivated political groups participated. Nevertheless, the strongest pro-center groups in political opposition were not allowed to participate or engage in decision-making either for or against the restructuring (Mulugeta, 2020). Dahl (1998) stresses that a constitution must conform, with one elementary principle being that all members are to be treated as if they are equally qualified to take part in making decisions about the policies of the association.

In this regard, the pro-center opposition during the transitional period was not considered equally qualified to make decisions on the common project of restructuring or rebuilding

the country after the demise of the then-most-recent centralized government, the Derg. Only pro-restructuring and newly established parties accompanied the EPRDF, the victors of the war in the transition. The OLF, previously a strong balancer of the EPRDF, had a similar stance to the EPRDF about restructuring the country along ethnic lines. Other old and new parties organized after the names of specific ethnic groups also had similar thoughts to those of the EPRDF and the OLF. The strong opposing force that was pro-center, the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces (COEDF), and the party of the former Derg regime, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), were not allowed to participate as either supporting or opposing the restructuring of the country as equally qualified members (Mulugeta, 2020). This restriction at the beginning of the government restructuring became the starting point of a lack of equal participation, which led to a lack of consensus on the process of democratization in the country.

The current study's findings show that the Council of Representatives was established after the launch of the Transitional Period Charter, where seats were appropriated for attendees of the Peace and Democracy Conference and some other groups with similar views. The OLF, which had better seats in the COR, withdrew from the transitional government due to the disagreement with the EPRDF on the issue of Oromia region governance. Thus, drafting the Constitution was essentially guided by one party, EPRDF. The transitional charter was derived from the EPRDF program as the pact for discussion at the Peace and Democracy Conference. It was adopted as the supreme law of the transitional period with minimal amendments (Mulugeta, 2020). Afterward, it became the fundamental leading supreme law to establish a new government to promulgate laws restructure the unitary government and set up regions according to ethnic lines.

In addition, non-elected members of the Council of Representatives were organized to lead the country and to deal with most issues, including those related to the making of the Constitution. The council also organized the Constitutional Commission to draft the constitution (Vaughan, 2003). The Constitutional Commission was mandated to draft the Constitution based on the spirit of the Transitional Charter. This decision of the COR to draft the Constitution based on the spirit of the Charter shows that the Constitution was

derived from the EPRDF program. The EPRDF chairman and the late Prime Minister Meles Zenawi wrote the following regarding this period:

At the outset, the renaissance journey of our country started as a joint venture project for the new Ethiopia. We made all Ethiopians the founders and the owners of the new project. We confirmed this by our special Constitution (Meles, 2011).

Thus, the finding of this study proved that the existing Constitution is fundamentally derived from the EPRDF political program by incorporating major internationally accepted human and democratic rights and principles. Some Political groups in Ethiopia argue that the Constitution was derived from the TPLF political program. The EPRDF program and the late chairman of both the EPRDF and TPLF, Meles Zenawi, endorsed it as a joint venture project of the new Ethiopia; then, the argument resulted in the same conclusion as the opposition. Therefore, as a common association of decision-making, the then pro-center organizations, and parties expelled from or abandoned the Council of Representatives were not part of the decision-making process during the drafting of the Constitution. Although the Constitution incorporated modern thought and attempted to address the peculiar realities of the country, its codes were not sufficiently accepted by all stakeholders as a common guideline for all groups. This lack of acceptance led to resentment, which can be considered as one of the potential reasons for a lack of consensus. The data findings in chapter five explicitly show the need to accommodate all the pro-center and periphery elites, to negotiate on common terms to amend, endorse, or change the Constitution for the benefit of a national union that needs to be established as a national democratic union of the federation. Being accommodative can bring all together as equally qualified to take part in decision-making.

The existence of democracy has to be tested through control over government decisions and policies, which are constitutionally vested in elected officials, those are chosen frequently in fairly conducted elections (Dahl, 1998). The findings of this research show that periodic elections have been made to democratize the country. The first interim election took place in 1992 to establish the regional administrations and local councils (Tronvoll, 2000; Vaughan, 2003). However, the election was marred by conflict between the OLF and the EPRDF. The OLF boycotted the election because of conflict with the

OPDO in Oromia, and the All-Amhara People Organization followed it. The process thereafter was predominantly left to the EPRDF (Beken, 2007; Aalen, 2002). Thus, the system started with a lack of trust in the mechanism, which was expected to test the start of democratization.

The next interim election took place in 1994 to elect the Constitutional Assembly Members instrumental in ratifying the constitution through discussion. The then-ruling party entirely dominated the election of these officials, and there was no room for the opposition (NEBE report, Oct 18/1994). This incident led the government to take control over decision-making on the Constitution via elected assembly members to suppress the opposition or other independents who might put forward another view than the centrifugal forces. This process again lacked consensus on the ratification, creating a perennial problem for democratization and leading to disagreements and riots.

A constitution is a basic document for a country that needs a minimum consensus on the major issues it enshrines. In this regard, the ratification of a constitution requires a true representation of regions and citizens at all levels of the central government to have consensus on the form of the federal government, as the constitution provides an institutional framework for the division of power between the central and regional governments (Sawer, 1969; Wheare, 1963). Ninety eight percent of the Ethiopian Constitutional Assembly was dominated by the ruling bloc member parties and members of the affiliate parties from the then-so-called emerging regions. Only nine members of the independent winners of the election with the view of opposition debated on the bargaining and ratification process.

The Constitutional Assembly election was held after two relatively large political parties boycotted the election: the South Ethiopia Peoples Coalition for Democracy (SEPCD) and the All-Amhara Peoples Organization (AAPO). This aggravated the problem of the lack of credible opposition on top of the aggressive closure of political space (John M, 1995, p. 162-163). The data from the findings of this research show that the EPRDF leaders, whose priority seemed to be the consolidation of their hard-won civil war victory, had selectively invited weaker political organizations, most of which were instantly created. The EPRDF excluded the actual or potential real contenders for power from the process.

The bargaining process between the real contending elites of the country from the left and right wing became weak and resulted in a lack of consensus on the Constitution. The EPRDF became the only champion of the terms of the Constitution. Because of this, the relationship between multinational federalism and democracy has remained tense and problematic (Aalen, 2006; 2008). Multinational federalism does not work well and evolve properly if it continues without consensus at all levels, be it in regions or at the federal level (Jon, 2009).

According to the findings from this thesis in chapter five, it was deduced that federalism is one part of a democratic system, and this can be reflected through the distribution of power to nations, nationalities, and peoples represented via periodically elected officials. So, to consider a system as federally democratic, both pillars have to be implemented equally to bring the expected change of the systems from unitary to federal and from authoritarian to democratic (Explanation of the draft constitution Page 2). However, according to the findings of this thesis, during the ratification of the Constitution, the already-implemented restructuring of the unitary government to a federal form during the transitional period was strengthened, with clear power distribution between the federal government and the regions. The promises of democracy through a multiparty system were also made clear in the Constitution. Nevertheless, there was a one-party state without the participation of any strong contending parties. Although most of the Constitution's pacts are internationally accepted, the debatable ones (like the flag issue and secession clause and format of federal structure) still create a lack of consensus. This is because there was no sufficient negotiation and bargaining during the Constitutional Assembly deliberations. Therefore, the amendment of the Constitution seems inevitable and necessary.

The first regular election was conducted in May 1995 for the election of the new HOPR, Regional Councils, and other local administration councils. This election produced 94.7% of the seats for the EPRDF and its affiliates at the federal parliament that established the new Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. At this point, the political parties created by the EPRDF support or old pro-ethnic parties did not participate in the election or win seats in the Federal Parliament. The room for alternative voices was narrowed, not only

for those parties initially opposing the restructuring of the country along ethnic lines but also for the supporters of periphery ideas with a different approach in mind. Thus, the support for the new Democratic Multinational Federalism was withheld by a significant part of the population due to a lack of real contending opportunities at Federal House and Regional Council elections. The data findings from this research reveal that these challenges created three different opinion groups after the new government's inauguration.

The first group was the supporters of the new system. They thought Ethiopia had entered a new era of elected government, determined by the democratic contest and the final verdict of the ballot box (Leencho, 1999). The verdict of the ballot was 94.7% to one ruling party and its affiliates, who took every corner of the votes to its members at all levels. Many questioned how a democratic contest could produce this type of result. The opposing view was completely dominated, which in turn led to mistrust and a lack of consensus on government policies. The second group challenged the new governmental inauguration by asserting that the transitional course, which appeared to lead to the dawning of a genuine democratic era, had been aborted and redirected. Hence, the democratic exercise was not yet underway. The third group rejected all the efforts of the transition process and the legalization of the federal system through the Constitution and election of the new government. The third group's rejection originated from the previous unitarist culture, and they, therefore, advocated rejecting the new federal Constitution because they saw it as a negation of Ethiopian patriotism and a single Ethiopian identity.

This debate reveals that there would have been an opportunity to bring different thoughts to the middle ground through dialogue and democratic contestation of the election process to bring representatives of different elite groups with different views to common political platforms that could manage differences democratically. The failure of this process led the country to a perennial lack of consensus in all political matters that require attention to implement true Democratic Multinational Federalism.

The second regular election took place in 2000 when the opposition decided to contest. The ruling party took the same number of seats as in the last election, including the regions (Ethiopia Election Archive, 2000). The result further increased the degree of

mistrust between the opposition and the ruling party. However, the third regular election moved the country in a different direction. The data findings show that the electorate moved in large numbers: for the first time, citizens could choose between candidates from a variety of competing camps (International Crisis Group, 2009; NEBE, 2006).

The campaigns of this election centered between pro-centripetal forces and pro-centrifugal ones, the EPRDF and its affiliates. The result was significantly different from past election results. The ruling party lost many seats. The largest opposition, the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) won many seats at both the federal HOPR and regional councils. As it declared in its election manifesto, it advocates for the change of constitution and the type of the federal system. This election revealed the need for real bargaining demand between the two diametrically opposite forces, the centripetal and the centrifugal forces. However, the hope of a new, balanced Ethiopian building project was aborted for two reasons. The miscalculation and ambition of the opposition to grab all powers immediately led to protest and disobedience. The second was that the EPRDF lost patience and used excessive force to crack down on their opposition following these protests (Shiferaw Shigutie Wolassa, note March 2006 EPRDF executive committee and EPRDF council evaluation). This moment was an important opportunity for all Ethiopians to discuss the fate of the country's future and engage in political negotiation to cement the already erected decentralized political structure, balance the central and peripheral ideas and build consensus on DMF.

The 2005 election laid a framework that demonstrated the importance of having a national political organization that based its thoughts on the country' reality. The data findings from chapter four of this thesis revealed that the Ethiopian state has evolved via a back-and-forth interaction from the Northern core to the current borders and peoples. It incorporated numerous people who were not part of the original Abyssinian empire. The expansion and conquest to the south brought a mosaic of people to the current Ethiopia. The latter ESM brought a new ideological approach to revising the conquered empire to balance it. The ESM ideology created armed struggles that yielded an opportunity to transform an ethnically dominated empire state of inequality into an ethnically egalitarian state of equals (Merera, 2004). These movements aimed to bring change from an absolute,

autocratic, totalitarian feudal state to an accommodative democratic state. However, the new ruling party, the EPRDF, which became an agent of the new center, originally evolved from the ESM, and adopted the agenda of the ESM, grabbed all the power in the newly restructured federal state, has ultimately institutionalized the power base around its dominant party.

Meanwhile, the opposition has lacked the coherence and courage to organize themselves around a common national agenda. The data from the current study show that these oppositions were fragmented around individual ethnic camps or groups advocating for a more central focus and avoiding the self-determining structure of federalism. The lesser appetite of nations and nationalities towards this center-advocating opposition gave ample advantages to the EPRDF and its affiliates. Thus, the EPRDF maintained its grip on power for the subsequent two elections by winning practically all the seats at a federal and regional level. Further, the lack of consensus on the result of non-participatory elections after the 2005 election widened resentment and pushed the youth, in particular, towards nonstop protests, which later forced the EPRDF to change its leadership and introduce new reforms.

The insights from the data findings demonstrate the need for the organization of national parties with a balanced view of center and peripheries that could strictly embrace democratic practice, followed by genuine elections via the will and participation of citizens. The organization of national parties could help to maintain the multinational democratic union based on the agreed constitution by those who currently have differences on how to bring about sustainable economic and social change, peace, and stability without endangering national sovereignty and violating the regional autonomy of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples.

Furthermore, this research shows that the new minorities in new regions are deprived their constitutional right to political participation. The minorities in these regions who do not speak the home region’s languages are not allowed to participate in elections. On top of this, their children are obliged to learn the language spoken by most of the people of the home regions ethnic group where they reside. It violates the international human right to mother tongue education of a child. The UNCRC (1989) Article 30 stipulates the right

of indigenous people to use their language in schooling. It implies that the new mother regions have the right to teach their children in their language. The children from families of new minorities living outside their mother regions have equal rights to learn in their mother tongue, which requires consideration. Furthermore, the right to political participation of a new minority in new majority regions needs to be respected; they should be able to elect their representatives at different levels of government to reflect their voices and positions. The empowerment of the minority group may help to neutralize the current tensions that brought a lack of consensus on the Democratic Multinational Federal system in Ethiopia and strengthen the potential for harmony and peace in the country, further contributing to the stability of the national democratic union.

6.4 Summary

This discussion illustrates the achievements and the limitations of Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism. This chapter draws comparisons and connections between the data findings, the literature review, and previous studies on federalism, democracy, and their implementation in multinational settings.

The discussions of the data findings revealed the achievements of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia by comparing it with classical federalization in liberal democracies. The data demonstrates the promulgation of liberal constitutions with a proper codification of liberal human and democratic rights, except the extreme secession clause incorporation in the Constitution, the presence of a clear distribution of power and functions between the federal and regional states, the establishment of all legislative executive and judiciary branches of government at the federal and regional levels and the delineation of regional boundaries. The discussion of the data findings also revealed the achievements of the EPRDF and its government as it addressed the century-long awaited self-determination aims of Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples in Ethiopia via restructuring the hitherto centralized unitary state into regional self-rule governments. It asserted the granting of self-determination to all NNPs through a codified Constitution, and subsequently created national and regional institutions and mechanisms of participation and representation. It set up the necessary checks and balancing mechanisms at all five government layers.

The system introduced a multiparty parliamentary democracy and periodic elections conducted during the study period. However, the findings also reveal the existence of serious limitations in Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism, which hindered its progress toward a more accommodating and consensual system. These limitations include the lack of proper participation on the part of the country's elites from the right and the left in democratization, as well as from the supporters of the system and its opponents, manifested via the absence of participation of the political elites who oppose the introduction and implementation of DMF. The introduction and implementation of DMF had been mostly dominated and led by the then-ruling party and its political agenda; the ruling party defined the terms of the game by its program and goals, and no significant dissenting voices were allowed to bargain or challenge its introduction and implementation. Moreover, the ruling party has not demonstrated sufficient internal democracy by itself, and its strict principle of democratic centralism has stifled alternative thought against the establishment of DFM. The elections that took place can largely be classified as ceremonial, without strong and organized contending political parties, with the only exception of the election of 2005.

Therefore, this interpretation reveals a mixed result compared with the literature and previous studies' often one-sided analysis of achievements or drawbacks. The major drawback of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia, according to this study, was the inapplicability of constitutional practice, which has equal importance within a system of constitutionalism. It has not been fully implemented according to the written Constitution.

The insights from this discussion show that there have been changes in position by centripetal and centrifugal forces. The hitherto centripetal forces gradually changed to forces defending Amhara, in contrast, the traditional centrifugal force, the EPRDF, became the centripetal force as the dominant party at the center, overruling all other national agendas. The introduction and implementation processes of DMF lacked participation, transparency, and reconciliation between the elites, therefore, it could not bridge differences. This overruling of all national agendas culminated in a major lack of consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism. As of 2024, the EPRDF has

dissolved; the Constitution is still intact (albeit under immense pressure). The country is in a stalemate and requires an urgent consensus regarding its fate and the future.

CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Objectives 1- 4

This research examined the impact of consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism, taking political decentralization in Ethiopia as a case. It delved into the processes of federalization and democratization. The thesis sets a clear research question, aims and objectives, and research contribution in the first chapter. It has explored detailed conceptual frameworks and relevant literature reviews, and appropriate methodology has been considered and discussed. The thesis allocated two chapters to present historical and recent data from document-based sources. The discussion and interpretation of the data in comparison with the conceptual framework have taken place. This final chapter provides conclusions and reflections on the establishment and implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism, proposing possible solutions to build consensus in the future.

Theoretically, federalism and federations require the involvement of partners through a covenant to produce common ends, with a combination of self-rule and shared rule without the subordination of one to the other (Elazar, 1987). This research showed that the formation of Democratic Multinational Federalism aligned with the theoretically federal formation by producing the federal and the federation member states that combined shared rule at the federal level and self-rule by establishing regional governments along ethnic lines. However, there have been limiting factors that made the regional governments subordinate to the federal government.

The key limiting factors were/are insufficient dialogue and negotiations on federal formation and the absence of adequate participation by dissenting and competing forces, as the ruling party was unwilling to democratize or widen the system. Forming any democratic federal system requires sufficient bargaining and negotiation to bring centripetal and centrifugal forces to a common ground for stable nation-building processes. It demands a compromise and accommodation of ideas from both sides of the axle. In Ethiopia's case, this was either nominal or nonexistent, which resulted in a lack of consensus. The second point is that the participation of the dissenting and competing forces throughout the system building is equally salient for the health evolution

of a federal system. Ethiopia has very nominal political party participation, during elections or state-building processes. These situations deprived the consent of contending partners from the centripetal forces for negotiation and bargaining on how the country's future could be decided. The victorious EPRDF, the then centrifugal force with its similar thought groups, led the processes of federalization based on the pact of its political program (the Revolutionary Democratic Program). The will of the EPRDF brought federalism as a solution for the discontent in the country, which had lasted for more than a century and was created due to an over-centralization of the unitary state. The pro-center dissenting groups (EPRP, MEi'Son, and EWP) were not involved during the establishment of the federal state and were not involved in negotiations on common goals.

At the beginning of chapter one of this thesis, this research set four interconnected objectives to address the research question, and the findings the research revealed the results as follows:

Objective 1, the critical assessment of the alignment and uniqueness of Ethiopian Democratic Multinational federalism against the conceptual and theoretical formation of federalism in a multinational setting, revealed mixed results. Although it had vital flaws in the quality of negotiations and participation of the dissenting forces, the procedural processes of federal formation largely applied. The research also affirmed the uniqueness of the Ethiopian system from many other federal systems around two major issues: the incorporation of the secession clause in its Constitution and mandating the HOF to interpret the Constitution, which is the mandate of the constitutional courts in most other federal systems.

Objective 2, the data finding from documents of this research on creating a *de facto* Multinational Federal system during the first phase of Federalization (1991-1995) and the second phase of the federal system, which is its implementation, again revealed mixed results with regards to the robustness of the system. The findings of the data interrogations were mixed because the system has able to stand firm with shared rules and self-rule for the last three decades, and it lacks consensus resulted in a lack of peace and instability making life very difficult for the country.

Objective 3, the third objective of the thesis, was addressed by identifying the impairing factors from the data findings, which showed a lack of true negotiations and bargaining and an absence of genuine participation by all contending ethnic and political elites due to the monopoly of agendas by the ruling bloc in every aspect of the lives of the citizens and the political affairs of the country. This monopoly stifled consensus on the system of governance. It became a missed opportunity to democratize the country and bring harmony and unity for all Ethiopians instead of conflict and war.

Objective 4, the fourth objective of the thesis, was addressed by the findings of the data that shows the implementation of the political program of the EPRDF. The EPRDF over-regulated and monopolized the government either during the elections or functional governance. It acted above and beyond the constitutional promises which hindered the full implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia. The domination was implemented through its vanguard party and democratic centralization system, procedures of the Congress, the Council, and the procedural practices of institutional arrangements. Overall, the findings of this thesis show that the three-decade experience of introduction and implementation of the Ethiopian Democratic Multinational Federalism has had a mixed outcome of achievements and severe limitations that need to be improved to maintain the Democratic Multinational Federalism.

7.2. Propositions

To address the aim of searching for optimum propositions, the insights and proposition from this thesis are presented as follows: although this research argues that Democratic Multinational Federalism is a viable option to hold the country together, the lack of participation by pro-center dissenting groups has led to complications in its implementation. It has yielded a lack of consensus on the prevailing mode of the federal system that has established. Thus, a balanced approach is required to re-negotiate and seek re-agreement on the federal system. It requires future implementation by embracing genuine democratic participation between the county's ethnic, political, academic, and economic elites. The renegotiation and re-agreement processes are contingent on committed action to take democracy as a condition for federalism. Given the country's multiple identities, adopting one of the variants of federalism in Ethiopia is not a matter of

making one choice from many alternatives. Rather, it requires committed leadership to transform the country's future into a unified federal government and regional states, a polity with fully transparent democratic governance. The variant chosen in Ethiopia is a type of ethno-federation established along ethnic lines. It should be maintained by improving all the lingering problems with the participation, and the Ethiopian people's will through constitutional amendments, conducting fully transparent elections and accepting the sovereignty of people's decisions.

Conceptually, ethno-federations (as discussed in section 6.2.5 above) possess an integrative national political consciousness and strong self-determination that provide a basis for their identities. This type of ethno-federation, with both multiethnic and multinational elements, is called borderline ethno-federation (Joze, 2005). This research proved that there is no strong secession interest in Ethiopia's Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples. Therefore, the Ethiopian federal system provides the theoretical background of the ethno-federation established with a dual interest of integrative national political consciousness and self-determination along ethnic lines as a borderline ethno-federation. Therefore, this researcher would like to offer the following propositions for the policymakers:

Proposition 1: There is a need for urgent measures to curb the ongoing segregation of identities. These measures might begin with educating the public about the importance of being in a union democratically by respecting each other to bring about mutual trust. This education may be provided through formal training institutions for public leaders and opinion makers in short- and long-term training, dedicated media service via government and civil society organizations supported by government policy decisions, and/or informal training and education practices.

These actions might focus on indoctrinating the benefits of a federal framework that advocates self-rule and shared rule, and the importance of respecting oneself and equally respecting others. It is also salient to advocate the benefit of being in a union that can be accommodative for all citizens and ethnic groups and facilitate the formation of a larger economic space that can equally service all NNPs in the country. This action demands a

genuine and candid renegotiation by elites to address misunderstandings and correct past mistakes.

Moreover, this research showed that the polarization in the last three decades seriously weakened the strong pro-center forces and pushed them towards a new periphery, as in the case of the Amhara defending parties. The new center, which was created around the dominant ruling front, the EPRDF, dissolved. The current situation is uncertain with weak pro-center forces. The latent and hitherto peripheral forces such as the OLF, ONLF, and SLM waiting in the wings for the result of this friction between the old pro-center and the new center forces.

Proposition 2: Therefore, there is a need for urgent national reconciliation, and amendments of some of the constitutional provisions based on elite consensus and public endorsement via popular referendum are becoming inevitable.

This thesis (as discussed in section 6.3 above) emphasis the importance of the participation of all relevant political and economic elites and socio-cultural academics in the processes of renegotiations to bring about national consensus on major issues. The absence of genuine political participation during the *de facto* and *de jure* federalization has negatively impacted the country and resulted in a perennial lack of consensus on the system under construction.

Proposition 3: Therefore, the engagement of meaningful, contending dissenting groups may facilitate a national reconciliation between all groups and create mutual understanding, which in turn may help to bring about trust between different ethnic identities and prompt a greater balance between the priorities of national citizenship and ethnic identity.

The 1994 constitution asserts the importance of the incorporation of the secession clause in relation to the right of NNPs (see section 6.2.3). However, this research could not verify its importance by investigating the experience of the last thirty years since its implementation. No ethnic identity group has opted for secession in any form. Rather, the research proved that the incorporation of the secession clause in the Constitution seriously lacks support and has become one of the sources of disagreement regarding

the Constitution and the federal system itself. Many scholars have also criticized the Ethiopian Constitution by mentioning it as the only Constitution that has a provision of secession clause clearly stated within it.

Proposition 4: This researcher suggests that the amendment of this provision and the removal of the secession clause from the constitution may prompt trust and understanding between the nations, nationalities, and people of the country.

Furthermore, federal systems demand transparent and accountable interactions between the two levels of government (as discussed in section 6.2.2). Resource mobilization and allocation mechanisms are the main areas of contention. In this regard, the Ethiopian system has two ways to share resources from the federal government to its regional units. According to the findings of this research, firstly, the federal government unilaterally pursues a block grant to regional governments and sends it to the House of Federation to set the allocation criteria to distribute to each region without any discussion on the amount of allocation by the federal government to regions. This criteria-making process must be progressive and participatory, undertaken alongside regional governments, and there is no evidence showing the allocation mechanism has been fair and transparent.

Currently, regions have no mandate to negotiate with the federal government on the amount of resources to be distributed, which has become an area of mistrust towards federal authorities that requires improvement. Secondly, the federal government has been directly investing in infrastructure and development projects in regions. Even though these types of projects have similarities in each region due to the balancing of equity, regions currently have no significant say in decision-making beyond sending applications for projects. This resource allocation may be another source of mistrust, as regions often believe (rightly or wrongly) that federal authorities favor resource allocation toward their home regions.

Proposition 5: Resource sharing transparency is an important criterion for a federal system, and in Ethiopia, this area also requires attention to be improved and work to include regions in the resource allocation processes fully.

Another important question regards who taxes what and at what level. The federal government currently collects the major share of tax revenue, while regions collect less and look to federal support for their expenditure needs.

Proposition 6: Enhancing the devolution process and creating a real execution capacity for policy implementation at the regional level may require revisions of tax mandates. Moreover, leaving some aspects of project management to the market may help improve accountability and minimize the risk of corruption, another aspect that is currently resulting in mistrust towards the union's leadership.

Regarding the devolution of power to the regional governments after *de facto* and *de jure* federalization, this research showed that there had been a clear constitutional provision of devolution of power from the federal government to the regions and from regions to their subordinate local governments (as discussed in section 6.2.3). This devolution has taken place in the areas of legislation, judiciary, and executive organs at all levels of the five layers of government. The implementation of devolution has been encouraging, as it can contribute to the implementation of true multinational federalism. However, the problem here is that the ruling party's domination of agendas at all levels precluded the implementation of decentralized power independent of the people's will. Thus, it has been simply a façade for the ruling party while the power has been controlled at the central level. Federalism is incompatible with authoritarian, totalitarian, or 'big man' approaches. As such, the domination of the EPRDF has stifled the opportunity to exercise decentralized power in the regional governments and their lower echelons. The democratic centralism culture of the ruling party has mostly focused on development with limited political participation, resulting in a lack of consensus. Dissenting voices have not been present in Ethiopia's political space, which has weakened and fragmented political parties into small factions and led to resentment and protests.

Proposition 7: After the proper renegotiations, the constitutional decision-making capabilities of the regional government need to be enhanced and respected, and in the future, authoritarian or 'big man' approaches need to be avoided.

Furthermore, in the future, the renegotiations and national dialogues should draw experience from the strengths and weaknesses of the Transitional Period Peace and

Democracy Conference, the establishment of a non-elected Council of Representatives, and the participation in the Constitutional Assembly. Drawing proper lessons from past strengths and weaknesses may help to make future renegotiations and dialogue more practical and robust with the participation of contending forces for the betterment of the country and its people.

Although the transitional period brought about landmark reforms and successfully broke the vicious circle of hitherto centralized totalitarian systems, it did not bring about the expected fully-fledged democratic state due to the absence of adequate participation and lack of sufficient tolerance towards different views. This failure allowed fragmented political opposition blocs to portray all the achievements of the EPRDF as a betrayal of the country towards the interest of the TPLF for its desire to secede in the long run. However, this research did not discover evidence of a betrayal attempt towards the nation; rather, these findings assert a strong commitment to decentralization, albeit with less commitment to democratization, for the above-mentioned reasons. Thus, it is imperative to document all past experiences while going forward without dwelling on them but without forgetting these lessons for the coming generation.

Another important requirement for establishing a democratic system is the aspiration of free and fair elections, a priority for strengthening federalism (as discussed in section 6.3). There were seven different elections during the EPRDF reign. The first election established regional and local governments after the restructuring. The second election took place for the election of Constitutional Assembly Members. The remaining five elections were conducted for periodic government establishment contestations. All elections conducted in the last thirty years have lacked credibility according to international observers and opposition blocs, except for the prelection processes of the 2005 election, which were applauded as a standard election by many. Although the ruling party has dominated these elections, the fragmented nature of the opposition blocs and local ethnic parties, along with a strong dislike of the pro-centric parties more generally, has hampered the vibrancy of these electoral contests.

Proposition 8: Organizing national parties with branches in regions and conducting fair and free elections that reflect the will the people that may enhance trust and mutual understanding for the continuity of the multinational project.

The EPRDF had achieved many things, including drafting, and ratifying the Constitution, establishing regional government along ethnic lines, codifying electoral rules, and establishing institutions such as election proclamations and NEBE (as discussed in section 6.2.3). However, the political space has been extremely narrow. Usually there were no free democratic contestations and no free elections, a circumstance that stifled people's decision and their free will. Democracy requires free government and free elections in which people can make informed decisions regarding by whom their interests would best represent. Democracy makes the elected officials accountable to their electorate and the public. This research showed that periodic elections over thirty years produced the average results of over 90% of seats won by the ruling bloc. It was the complete domination by the ruling bloc, which controlled the life of the people from the center down to the household. Whilst the system is theoretically and constitutionally a federal and democratic multiparty system, it has been dominated by one party. These processes have been one of the major sources of discontent towards the implementation of Democratic Multinational Federalism.

Proposition 9: The doors for democratization need to be widened based on the rule of the law. Codifying the rules of the law *per se i*s not enough, and smoothing the system, especially for a democratic state that is still in its infancy, requires more determination and readiness to accept and respect the decisions of the people and their free will.

The aims of the ESM were comprised of three major questions. The first two questions, the land to the tiller and self-determination right for NNPs, were mostly addressed by the successive governments of the Derg and the EPRDF (as discussed in section 6.3). The quest for democracy has been there for many years unfulfilled. It is progressing in some ways by codifying the rules of the game, but the full implementation of democracy is still a long way off. This research has shown that urgent attention is required to reverse the current mistrust and lack of consensus. The values and objectives of forming a federal system are to embrace and accommodate diversity, reduce tensions and conflicts in

multicultural settings, and resolve organized political demands. Accommodation of all can only begin with negotiation and bargaining for power distribution. Still, it can be nurtured by creating pluralized thoughts in the public sphere through continuous education substantiated by a commitment to democratic values and fairness.

Another important reflection of this research regards the rights of minorities outside their mother region (as discussed in section 6.3). The unique dynamism of the Ethiopian state has created new minorities following the establishment of the federal system. The basic principle of federalism is accommodating diverse identities according to the principle of comity. However, the new minorities in the Ethiopian system lack the benefit of full participation due to the fact that they are outside their home regions. Therefore, it is one of the most important areas that require attention of the system, as well as the emplacement of new provisions in the Constitution regarding the political rights of new minorities and participation at all levels in the regions where they reside. Moreover, the rights of regional minorities need to be respected and reinforced in federal and regional constitutions to respect their political representation and social rights, including developing and using their languages and cultures to promote national trust in the Ethiopian Union.

Federalism is a constitutional system where the division of jurisdiction is clearly defined by horizontal checks and balances and vertical powers and functions distributed between federal and regional governments (as discussed in section 6.2.3). Theoretically, the legal approach to federalism emphasizes the role of law and legal institutions, which are concerned with the interpretation of a constitution and statutory law, as well as the interaction of legal and political actors in the operation of federal systems. The Ethiopian federal system assigned the interpretation of the constitution to the House of Federation. The last thirty years of experience show that the House has been interpreting many individual and group-related cases that could be handled in regular courts without the intervention of this political body. The interpretation of the Constitution by independent agencies or courts may enhance trust and confidence in the system and limit the potential of political parties to intervene in their interests. It is also equally important to consider the mandate of the HOF, which is currently not successfully balancing the federal

government's power on behalf of the regional government. Establishing a senate model with the legislature's mandate and law-making could endorse and decide where the interests of regional states' cases are addressed. The Senate might also handle issues of identities, which usually occur at a regional level. There needs to be clear decision-making processes and laws to acknowledge new identities and regulate the unjustified multiplication of ethnic groups. The existence of a clear decision-making process about nationalities identification might contribute to consensus-building in the federal system.

This research advocates maintaining the existing Democratic Multinational Federalism (as discussed in section 6.2). The data in this thesis has shown that most ethnic regions comprise a greater majority of single identities with very clear administrative boundaries and can easily be identified one from the other, possessing sufficient territories and resources to establish regional governments. In those territories, the ethnic identities speak their language and have distinct cultures but share similar psychology with other regions in the country, such as one unit built over many years and regimes. There are several issues that might be considered to strengthen the national union of the federation in Ethiopia. However, there should not be an attempt to relinquish the federal system; and doing so might invite chaos and the country's disintegration.

7.3. Conclusions

This research reflects the potential for Ethiopia to fully federalize into an ethno-federal state, and nurture democratic principles that could resist any form of authoritarianism (discussed in section 6.3). It demands a national union between all Ethiopia's elites and the establishing a commonly agreed constitution on major issues after renegotiation and open discussion. Federalization aimed to transform the country from a centralized unitary government into an ethnically egalitarian federal state. The Constitution and formal processes enacted in the last three decades were real achievements and must be viewed as such. The limitations and failures mentioned in this research, occurring since the beginning of the federal system, have unfortunately stifled the practical nurturing of democracy and threatened the system's sustainability. These have also placed the country at a state stalemate. Thus, implementing democratic practices via the methods suggested in this chapter may maintain the country's diversity and potential for

togetherness through true Democratic Multinational Federalism. To conclude this research, this researcher believes that if the above propositions are properly adopted and given attention by all stakeholders in Ethiopia's political system, the research question of this thesis; *How best to build consensus on Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia?* Can be addressed, and the country might be able to finally build a major national consensus.

This research makes an empirical contribution by interpreting the existing knowledge around federalism and democracy to enhance the understanding of policymakers, academics, and practitioners. It also contributes by establishing propositions that, if enacted, will contribute to building consensus in a multinational setting to promote inclusion and resolve impediments.

7.4. Possible Future Work

This thesis establishes a method for seeking consensus to maintain Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia to bring peace and stability to the country through renegotiation and national reconciliation between contending forces. The data from document sources, found in special libraries presented in this thesis, provided ample information for analysis in future work. The researcher suggests future areas of research:

1. Constitution-making and endorsement procedures for sustainable state building in multinational settings to set fair and just rules in a detailed manner.
2. The format of federal creation in multiple identities to compare the suitability of territorial or ethnic-based federal formation.
3. Constitutional interpretation, comparing the Ethiopian experience with traditional constitutional court systems to derive new knowledge for future benchmarking.
4. Further research on how to create a federation inside a federation in a diverse society may generate new knowledge.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aalen, L. (2002). Ethnic federalism in a dominant party state: The Ethiopian experience 1991-2000. Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights.

Addis Alem, B. (2014). Democracy and Economic Development in Ethiopia. The Red Sea Press.

Agranoff, R. (1999). *Accommodating diversity: Asymmetry in federal states*. Nomos Verlag gesellschaft.

Alem, H. (2005). *Multiethnic federalism in Ethiopia: A study of the secession clause in the Constitution*. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism*, *35*(2), P 313-335.

Aljazeera. (2018). *Abiy Ahmed was Sworn in as Ethiopia's Prime Minister*. *Aljazeera, 2 April 2018*.

Alonso, S. (2011). *Representative Democracy and the Multinational Demos*. In the Future of Representative Democracy. Edited by Alonso, S., John K., and Wolfgang, M. P (169–90). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (2nd ed.). London: Verso.

Anderson, L. (2014*). Ethnofederalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement...?* The MIT Press.

Andreas, E. (2003). *Ethnic federalism: new frontiers in Ethiopian politics, in First national conference of federalism, conflict, and peace building*. Addis Ababa: United Printers.

Aregawi, B. (2004). The Origins of the Tigray People's Liberation Front. *African Affairs*, *103*(413), p. 569–592.

Asnake, K. (2009). Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. *A comparative study of the Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. Leiden University Press*.

Asnake, K. (2013). *Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia: A comparative regional study*. First Published by Routledge 2 Park Square Milton Park, Abingdon Oxon Ox144RN, Simultaneously Published in the USA and Canada by Routledge.

Assefa, F. (2009). *Federalism. Justice Research Institute.* Addis Ababa University Press.

Assefa, F. (2023). *Federalism, devolution, and territorially based cleavages in Africa Does institutional design matter?* Routledge Taylor & Francies Group London & New York.

Bahru, Z. (1991). *A history of modern Ethiopia, 1855-1974 (2nd ed.).* James Currey Oxford, Ohio University Press Athens, Addis Ababa University Press.

Bahru, Z. (2014). *The Quest for Socialist Utopia: The Ethiopian Student Movement 1960-1974.* Addis Ababa University Press. In Mulugeta G, B. (2020*). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building*. First Published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Bahru, Z., & Logan, C. (2019). *Discussing the 2018/19 Change in Ethiopia Podcast.* https://www.researchgate.net/publication/332392891_Discussing_the_201819_Changes_in_Ethiopia_Bahru_Zewde.

Baldi, B. (1999). *'Beyond the Federal-Unitary Dichotomy', Working Paper 99-7. Institute of Governmental Studies*, University of California, Berkeley.

Bednar, J. (2005). *Federalism as Political Good. The USA*. University of Michigan. Springer Science +Business Media, Inc. Jenna, B. (2011). *The Political Science of Federalism.* Department of Political Science University of Michigan.

Bednar, J. (2011). The Political Science of Federalism. Department of Political Science University of Michigan.

Bekalu, A. T. (2017). *Ethnic federalism and conflict in Ethiopia.* Kotebe Metropolitan University, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Beken, C. V. (2007). Ethiopia: Constitutional protection of ethnic minorities at the regional level. *Afrika Focus*, *20*(1-2), p. 105-151. Ghent University Faculty of Law, Department Public Law Universiteitstraat 4 9000 Gent Belgium.

Benz, A and Sonnicksen, J. (Eds.). (2021). *Federal democracies at work: Varieties of complex government*. University of Toronto Press.

Beza, D. (2016). *Ethnic Federalism and The Right to Political Participation of Regional Minorities in Ethiopia.* Addis Ababa University.

Bisrat, A. (2012). *The Rise of the TPLF and its First Ten Years (1975-1985) (Written in Amharic)*. Mega Printing Addis Ababa. In Mulugeta, G. B. (2020). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building. First Published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Bizuneh, G. (2021). *Implementing Federalism in a Developing Country: The Case of Ethiopia, 1995–2020*. University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom.

Braun, V. and Clarke, V. (2013). *Successful Qualitative Research: A Practical Guide for Beginners.* London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

Breton, A. (1998). Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public Finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In Benz, A and Sonnicksen, J. (2011) Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government –Toronto University Press.

Bryman, A. (2008). *Social Research Methods, 3rd ed. ed*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Bunce, V. (2004). Federalism, Nationalism, and secession. The Communist and Post-communist Experience. Quoted in Amoretti, U. and Bermeo, N. The Johns Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London.

Burgess, M. (2006). *Comparative Federalism: Theory and Practice*. London and New York: Routledge.

Burgess, M. (2012). In Search of Federal Spirit: New Theoretical and Empirical Perspective in Comparative Federalism. UK, Oxford University Press.

Burgess, M. And Gagnon, A-G. (2010). Federal Democracies. London and New York, Routledge Taylor & Francies Group

Burris, A. (2001). *'Federalism', in N.J. Smelser (ed.), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences.* Oxford: Elsevier Science.

Carl Friedrich. (1968). Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice. Praeger Publishers.

Carter Center Final Report. (2009). *Observing the 2005 Ethiopian National Elections* (Georgia 30307). One Copenhill 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta. www.cartercenter.org

Clapham, C. (2009). *Post-War Ethiopia: The Trajectories of Crisis*. Review of African Political Economy 36 (120): p. 181–92.

Clapham, C. (2017). *The Horn of Africa state formation and Decay*. UK, C. Hurst & Co. (publishers) Ltd.

Clough, P. and Nutbrown, C. (2007). *A Student's Guide to Methodology: Justifying Enquiry, 2nd ed.* (London: SAGE)

Constitutional Assembly minutes. (1994). Oct 19, 1994 - Dec 8, 1994. 35 Minutes [Review of *Constitutional Assembly minutes.* Oct 19, 1994 - Dec 8, 1994. 35 Minutes].

Constitutional Commission of Ethiopia minutes. (1993-1994). No 1-88 [Review of *Constitutional Commission of Ethiopia minutes.* 1993-1994. No 1-88]

Coppedge, M et al. (2011). *Conceptualizing and Measuring Democracy:* A New Approach, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/232026394.

Council of Representatives of the Transitional Government of Ethion minutes Discussion of the Draft Constitution. (1994). No 1-12 April to May 1994 [Review of Council of Representatives of The Transitional Government of Ethion minutes Discussion of the Draft Constitution 1-12 April to May 1994].

Crotty, M. (1998). The foundations of social research. *Meaning and Perspective in the Research Process. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.*

Dahl, R. (1983). Federalism and the Democratic Process. Nomos 25, 95–108. – 1994. A Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation. Political Science Quarterly 109 (1): 23–34. https://doi .org/10.2307/2151659. In Sonnicksen, J. and Benz, A. (2011). Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government –Toronto University Press.

Dahl, R. (1998). *On Democracy*: Yale University Press, New Haven & London Yale Nota Bene.

Dalton, R. et al (2007). *Understanding Democracy*: *Data from Unlikely Places*. Journal of Democracy, Vol 18 by The John Hopkins University Press

Dardarnelli, P. (2010). *Federal Democracy in Switzerland*. As cited in Burgess, M. and Gagnon, A-G, eds. Federal Democracies. Routledge Series in Federal Studies. Routledge, London

Davis, S. R. (1978). The Federal Principle: A Journey Through Time in Quest of Meaning, Berkeley: University of California.

Denscombe, M. (2007). The Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Research Projects, 3rd ed. (Maidenhead: Open University Press)

De schutter, H. (2011). *Federalism as Fairness.* Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (2): 167–89. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9760.2010.00368.x. In Benz, A and

Sonnicksen, J. (2011). *Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government*. Toronto University Press.

De Tocqueville, A. (2010). *Democracy in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.* First published 1835–40. Quoted in in Benz, A and Sonnicksen, J. (2011). Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government Toronto University Press.

De Waal, A. (2015). The Theory and Practice of Meles Zenawi 10.1093/afraf/ads081. In Mulugeta, G. (2020). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building. First Published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing Democracy, Toward Consolidation*. The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore & London.

Dickovick, J. T. (2014). Federalism in Africa: Origins, operation and (In)Significance. *Regional & Federal Studies*, *24*(5), 553-570. quoted in Bizuneh, G. (2021). Canterbury, UK, University of Kent PhD Thesis.

Doyle. M. (2004). 03 Foreign Affairs. 135 (2024) Why They Don't Fight: The Surprising Endurance of the Democratic Peace.

Draft Constitution and Its Explanation, (1994). [Review of Draft Constitution and Its Explanation 1994].

Duchacek.I. D. (1971). *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winstin, Inc.

Dunner, J. (1964). Dictionary of Political Science. New York. Philosophical Library. As cited in Thomas, P. (1965). The Role of Consensus. The Western Quarterly vol. 18, No 3.

Elazar, D. J. (1979b). *Why Federalism? in 64. Elazar, D. J. (ed.),* Federalism and Political Integration. Israel: Turtledove Publishing.

Elazar, D. J. (1987). Exploring Federalism. University of Alabama Press.

Elazar, D. J. (1995). *From Statism to Federalism: A Paradigm Shift. The Journal of Federalism*. Volume 25, Issue 2, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a038195

Elazar, D. J and Kincaid, J. (2000). Federal Democracies at Work: Varieties of Complex Government. University of Toronto Press. Quoted in Benz, A. and Sonnicksen, J. (2021).

EPRDF. (2002). *The EPRDF Program*. Birhan and Selam Printing

EPRDF. (2006). The EPRDF Regulation. Printed in the Office of the EPRDF.

EPRDF (Dec 2017). *The EPRDF Executive Committee Evaluation Paper.* Un Published.

Erlich, H. (1983). Ras Allula and the Scramble for Africa: A Political Biography: Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1875–1897. The Red Sea Press. Quoted in Mulugeta, G. (2020). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building. First published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Ethiopian Constitution. (1994.). 1994. [Review of Ethiopian Constitution. 1994].

Ethiopian Statistics Services. (2023). 2023.[Review of Ethiopian Statistics Services. 2023 report]

Fabre, E. (2009). Belgian federalism in a comparative perspective. Research Centre for Regional Economics. VIVES Naamsestraat 61 bus 3510 3000 Leuven – Belgium.

Fasil, N. (1997). Constitution for Nation of Nations: The Ethiopian Prospect. Lawrenceville, New Jersey: The Red Sea Press.

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE). (1994). The Proclamation No. 1 of the FDRE Constitution. Addis Ababa Berhanina Selam Printing Press.

Frenkel, M. (1986). *Federal Theory. Canberra: Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations*. *The Australian National University.*

Follesdal, A. (2018). *Federalism. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Summer ed., edited by Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford .edu/archives/sum2018/entries/federalism/.* Quoted in Benz, A. and Sonnicksen, J. (2011). Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government –Toronto University Press.

Gebru, T. (2009). *The Ethiopian Revolution*. War in the Horn of Africa. Yale University Press New Haven & London.

Gerring, John. (2004). Single-Outcome Studies: A Methodological Primer https://doi.org/10.1177/0268580906067837.

Goshu, W. T. and Castro, A. P. (2016). *Flag Politics in Ethiopia and the Ethio-American Diaspora.* Journal of International and Global Studies Volume 8

Hale, H. E. (2001). *Ethno federalism: Lessons for Rebuilding Afghanistan, Preserving Pakistan, and Keeping Russia Stable,* Policy Memo, No. 208 (Washington, D.C.:

Program on New Approaches to Research and Security in Eurasia, Quote in Anderson, L. (2014). *Ethno federalism: The Worst Form of Institutional Arrangement...?* The MIT Press.

Heffernan, R. (2001). A Theory of Consensus Politics. New Labour and Thatcherism (pp.139-158).

Henze, P. (2000). *Layers of Time: A History of Ethiopia.* C. Hurst & Co., London. in Mulugeta, G. (2020), *Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State- Building.* First Published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Hilawae, Y. (2014). Art and History of the Struggle: Compendium of Liberation Era Poems. (Written in Amharic) Central Printing Press. Cited in Mulugeta, G. B. (2020) Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building. First Published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Hiwot, T. (2014). *The Tower in the Sky*. Addis Ababa University Press. In Mulugeta, G. B. (2020*). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building.* First Published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co

HOF. (2020). Manual.

Horace, M. (1930). Consensus in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York, Mac Millan. As cited in Payne, T. (1965). The Role of Consensus. The Western Political Quarterly Vol.18, No 3.

Horowitz, D.L. (2006). The many uses of Federalism. Darke Law review vol. 55.

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/4/2/abiy-ahmed-sworn-in-as-ethiopias-primeminister [Accessed 14/07/2020]. In Bizuneh, G. (2021). *Implementing Federalism in a Developing Country: The Case of Ethiopia,* 1995-2020. University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom.

Hueglin, O. T. (2013). *Federalism and Democracy: A Critical Reassessment. In the Global Promise of Federalism.* Edited By. D. Cameron, G. Skogstad, M. Papillon, & K. Banting (Eds.). 17–42. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Quoted in Benz, A. and Sonnicksen, J. (2011). Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government –Toronto University Press.

Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy's Third Wave. Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, Number 2, Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.1991.0016.

International Crisis Group. (2009). *Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Its Discontents*. Africa Report N°153 – 4 September 2009.

Jon, A. (2009). *The Ethiopian Second Republic and the Fragile Social Contract* Africa Spectrum 44(2).

Jonsen, P. et al (2016). The Internal Validity of Discrete Choice Experiment Data: A Testing Tool for Quantitative Assessments.

Jozsef, J. (2005). *Ethno-federalism: Challenges and opportunities.* UDK 342.24, Vol. LVII, br. 3, Izvorni naučni rad.

Keller, E. (1981). *Ethiopia: Revolution, Class, and the National Question*. African Affairs, Oct. 1981, Vol. 80, No. 321 (Oct. 1981), Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal African Society.

Keller, E. (1995). *The Ethnogenesis of the Oromo Nation and Its Implication of Politics in Ethiopia.* The Journal of Modern African Studies, 33,4. Cambridge University

Keller, E. and Smith, L. (2005). *Obstacles To Implementing Territorial Decentralization: The First Decade of Ethiopian Federalism*. Institutions After Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press

Kincaid, J. (1995). Values and value tradeoffs in federalism, Publius 25(2). Quoted in Sonnicksen, J. and Benz, A. (2017). Patterns of federal democracy: tensions, friction, or balance between two government dimensions. European Political Science Review, http://journals.cambridge.org/EPR

Kincaid, J. (2010). Democracy versus Federalism in the United States of America Case Study. Quoted in Burgess, M., & Gagnon, A. (2010). *Federal Democracies*. Routledge Series in Federal Studies. Routledge, London.

Kincaid, J. (2019). *A Research Agenda for Federalism Studies*. UK, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

King, P. (1982). Federalism and Federation. Quoted in Watts, R. (1998). Federalism, Federal Political System, and Federation. Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, Kingston.

King, P. (1982); Elazar. (1987,1993,1994b); Burgess & Gagnon. (1993). quoted in Watts, R. (1998). Federalism, Federal Political System, and Federation. Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, Kingston.

Kinkino, K. (2013). The right to form one's regional state under the Ethiopian Federation: *The Case of Sidama People.* Hawassa University College of Law & Governance School of Law.

Kymlicka, W. (1998). Finding our way: Rethinking ethnocultural relations in Canada.

Kymlicka W. (2001). *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Lapiso, G. D. (1991). *The Ethiopian Peasant System and the Rise of Capitalism: 1900-1966 (written in Amharic).* Commercial Publishers, Addis Ababa. Quote in Mulugeta, G. B (2020*). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State- Building*. First Published in UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Leenco L. (1999). *The Ethiopian State at The Cross Road. Decolonization and Democratization or Disintegration*. The Red Sea Press

Leenco, L. (2019). The origin of ethnic politics in Ethiopia

Levy, J.T. (2007). Federalism, Liberalism, and the Separation of Loyalties. American Political Science Review 101 (3): 459–77. https://doi.org/10.1017 /s0003055407070268. Arthur, B. and Jared, S. (2011) Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government –Toronto University Press.

Levine, D. (200). Greater Ethiopia: The Evolution of a Multiethnic Society

Second Edition. The University of Chicago press.

Lijphart, A. (1999). *Patterns of democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Livingston, W.S. (1952). *A note on the nature of federalism*. Political Science Quarterly 67 (1), In Mengisteab, K. (2007). *Identity, Politics, Democratization and State Building in Ethiopia's Federal Arrangement*. African Journal on Conflict Resolution 4 (2)

Livingston, W. (1956). Federalism and constitutional change. Oxford: clarendon press. In Michael, B. (2012). In search of federal Spirit: New Theoretical and empirical Perspectives in comparative Federalism.

Lupia, A. & Matsusaka, J. (2004). *DIRECT DEMOCRACY: New Approaches to Old Questions*. Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2004. 7 :463–82. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.7.012003.104730.

Lyons, T. (1996). *Closing the Transition: The May 1995 Elections in Ethiopia. The Journal of Modern African Studies.* March 1996, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 121-142. Cambridge University Press.

Marc, A. (1987). *New and old Federalism: Faith-full to the origins*. Quoted by Watts, R. L. (1998). *Federalism, Federal Political System, and Federation.* Institute Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, Kingston.

Marcus, H. G. (1995). *History of Ethiopia.* The Journal of African History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (1995). Cambridge University Press

Markakis, J. (1993). *Conflict and the Decline of Pastoralism in the Horn of Africa.* Palgrave Macmillan London.

Markakis, J. (1990). National and Class Conflict in the Horn of Africa. Zed Books, London. In Mulugeta, G. (2020). *Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building*. First Published in the UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Markos, T. R. (20020. National oppression and resistance of sidama people and sidama liberation Movement. Department of Political Science and International relation Addis Ababa University Martyn, D. (2007). *The Good Research Guide: For Small-scale Social Research Projects, 3rd ed*. (Maidenhead: Open University Press).

Matsusaka, J. G. (2005). *Direct Democracy Work*s. Journal of Economic Perspectives. Volume 19, Number 2.

Mcfaul, M. (2004). *Democracy Promotion as a World Value. The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology*. The Washington Quarterly.

McGarry, J. and O'Leary, B. (2005). *Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*. Published by Forum of Federation. https://Www.forumfed.org.

Meles, Z. A. (2000). *What Is Revolutionary Democracy. Unpublished (Written in Amharic).*

Mengisteab. K. (2007). *Identity Politics, Democratization and State Building in Ethiopia's Federal Arrangement*. African Journal on Conflict Resolution Vol. 7 (2)

Merera, G. (2003). The Elite and the Quest for Peace, Democracy, and Development in Ethiopia: Lessons to be Learnt. Northeast African Studies, New Series, Vol. 10, No. 2.

Merera, G. (2004). Ethiopia: Constraints to Transition and Democratization. Quoted in AG Nhem (Ed); The Quest for Peace in Africa: Transformation, Democracy and Public Policy; Published by [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. OSSREA, Addis Ababa. p 245-267.

Merera, G. (2011). Elections and Democratization in Ethiopia, 1991–2010. Journal of Eastern African Studies, Volume 5 (4): 664–80.

Mohamood, M. (2019). *The Trouble with Ethiopia's Ethnic Federalism Opinion*. The New York Times.

Mulugeta, G. (2020). *Laying The Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State Building*. UK, C. Hurst & Co. (publishers) Ltd.,

NEBE Reports. (n.d.). Election: (1992, 1994, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015).

Negarit Gazeta 34th. (1975, March 11). Year 22 Selam Printing Press.

Negarit Gazeta. (1992, 14 January). Transitional Government of Ethiopia Proclamation No. 7/1992. A Proclamation to Provide for the Establishment of National and Regional Self-Governments. Addis Ababa.

Nigussie, A. A. (2016). *The Ethiopian Constitutional Promises to the Nation and Nationalities: The Myth and the Operational Reality*. Bahir Dar University Journal of Law. Vol.6, No.2.

O'Leary, B. (2001). *An iron law of nationalism and federation? A (neo-Diceyian) theory of the necessity of a federal Staatsvolk, and consociational rescue.* Government Department, London School of Economics, London, WC2A 2AE.

Patton, M. (2015). Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Payne, T. (1965). The Role of Consensus. The Western Political Quarterly Vol.18, No 3.

Punch. (2018). www.punchng.com. https://punchng.com/bowen-university-appoints-ogunwole-as-new-vice-chancellor/

Rehfeld, A. (2005). The concept of constituency. Political representation, democratic legitimacy, and institutional design. Cambridge University Press. In Urbinatti, N. (2010). Representative democracy and its critics.

Rene', L. (1983). *Ethiopia: A Heretical Revolution*. Zed Books.

Ritchie, J. (2003). The Application of Qualitative Methods to Social Research, in Qualitative Research Practice, ed. Lewis, J. and Ritchie, J. (London: SAGE Publications Ltd)

Rock, J. (1996). *Ethiopia elects a new parliament.* ISSN: 0305-6244 (Print) 1740-1720 (Online). Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/crea20

Roeder. P. (2009). Ethno federalism and the Mismanagement of Conflicting Nationalisms, Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 19, No 2 Princeton University. As cited in Anderson, L. (2014)

Rokkan, S. and Derek. U. (1983). Economy, Territory, Identity: Politics of West European Peripheries, London: Sage.

Rothchild. (1966). Quoted in Asanke, K. A. (2009). *Federalism and ethnic conflict in Ethiopia*. Leiden University PhD Thesis.

Samatar, A. I. (2004). Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy versus Control in the Somali Region. Third World Quarterly 25(6): 1131–54. In Bizuneh, G. (2021) Implementing Federalism in a Developing Country: The Case of Ethiopia, 1995-2020. University of Kent, Canterbury, United Kingdom.

Saunders, M et al., (2012). Research Methods for Business Students. 6th (ed.). Pearson. As cited in Thomas, P. (1965). The Role of Consensus. The Western Political Quarterly vol. 18, No 3.

Saunders, M. and Tosey, P. (2012/13). Winter Report. The Layers of Research Design.

Sawer, G. (1969). *Modern Federalism.* London: C.A. Watts and Co.

Schmitter, P. and Karl, T. (1991). What Democracy Is and Is Not, Journal of Democracy 2. Quoted in Lyons, T. (2010, Spring/Summer) Ethiopian Elections: Past and Future International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1.

Scott, K. (2011). *Federalism: A Normative Theory and Its Practical Relevance*. London: Continuum International Publishing Group. Quoted in Benz, A and Sonnicksen, J.

(2011). Federal Democracies at work- varieties of Complex Government Toronto University Press.

Seymour, M. and Gangnon, A-G. (2012). *Multinational Federalism Problems and Prospects.* First published by Palgrave Macmillan

Sharman, C. (1987). 'Second chambers' in Bakvis, H. and Chandler, W.M. (ed.) Federalism and the role of the state. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Quoted In Aalen, L. (2002). Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience,1991- 2000. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.

Shiferaw, B. (2015). Monarchal Restoration and Territorial Expansion: The Ethiopian State in the Second Half of the Nineteenth century. Quoted in Mulugeta, G. B. (2020). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building. First Published in UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Shiferaw, S. (2017). Personal Note on the EPRDF Executive Committee Evaluation Meeting.

Shiferaw, S. (2006). Personal Note on the EPRDF Council Meeting.

Simeon, R. and Robinson, I. (1990). State, Society, and development of Canadian Federalism. University of Toronto Press

Smith, G. (1995). Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge Routledge

Snape, D. and Spencer, L. (2003). The Foundations of Qualitative Research, in Qualitative Research Practice ed. Ritchie, J. and Lewis, J. (London: SAGE)

Silverman, D. (2006). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for Analyzing Talk, Text, and Interaction (3rd ed.). SAGA Publications. London.

Siraw, M. T. (2015). Weaknesses of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia. International Journal of Humanities and Social Science Invention. ISSN (Online): 2319–7722, ISSN (Print): 2319 – 7714 www.ijhssi.org ||Volume 4 Issue 11/

Stepan, A. (1999). Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the US Model. Journal Democracy (Vol. 4)

Stake, R. (1995). The Art of Case Study research. - APA PsycNet research. Sage Publications, Inc.

Stepan, A. (2001). Arguing comparative politics. OXFORD University Press.

Stepan, A. (2005). *Federalism and democracy: Beyond the U.S. model*. *Journal of Democracy, No. 4*, *10*(1999), P 19-34.

Steytler, N. (2019). *Non-centralism in Africa is search of federal idea.* Edited by John K. (2019). UK, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Swenden, W. (2002). *Asymmetric Federalism and Coalition-Making in Belgium*. The Journal of Federalism, Volume 32, Issue 3. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004960

Swenden, W. (2004). *Is the European Union in Need of a Competence Catalogue Insights from Comparative Federalism*? JCMS 2004 Volume 42. Number 2.

Tadesse, K. (1999). *The Generation: The Storm of Change in Ethiopia. (Written in Amharic)*. Unversity Press of America Lanham, MD. Quoted in Mulugeta, G. (2020). *Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State- Building.* First Published in UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Tamara, V. (2005). *Axum, Africana, The Encyclopedia of the African & African American Experience.* Oxford University Press. Quoted In Mulugeta G. (2020). *Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State-Building.* First Published in UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Tarlton, C. (1965). *Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation,* The Journal of Politics 27.

Tasew, T. (2016). *Ethnic-Based Federalism in Ethiopia and its Impact on National Integration*. Addis Ababa University Institute for Peace and Security Studies.

Tekletsadik, M. (1958). *History of Ethiopia: Nubia, Aksum, the Zagwes up to the reign of Emperor Yakumo Amlak*. 1st book Addis Ababa.

Temesgen, T. H. (2016). *Ethnic Federal System in Ethiopia: origin, ideology, and paradoxes.* International Journal of Political Science and Development. Vol. 4(1), pp. 1-15, http://www.academicresearchjournals.org/IJPSD/Index.html.

Tesfaye, A. (2002). *Identity Politics, Citizenship, and Democratization in Ethiopia*. International Journal of Ethiopian Studies. Summer/Fall 2005-2006, Vol. 2, No. 1/2, pp. 55-75, Tsehai Publishers.

Tewfik. H. (2010). *Transition to Federalism: The Ethiopian experience*. Forum of Federations p. 700 – 325. Dalhousie Ottawa, Ontario (Canada) k1n 7G2

Thomas, G. (2013). *How to Do Your Research Project*: A Guide for Students in Education and Applied Social Sciences, 2nd ed. (London: SAGE)

Thorlakson, L. (2003). *Comparing Federal Institutions: Power and Representation in Six Federations*. West European Politics 26(2).

Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia (1991, July). Negarit Gazerta, Addis Ababa

Tronvoll, K. (2000). *Ethiopia: a new start?* London: Minority Rights Group International. Quoted In Aalen, L. (2002) *Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991-2000*. Chr. Michelsen Institute Development Studies and Human Rights

Trudeau, P. E. (1968). *Federalism and the French Canadians, Toronto, Macmillan of Canada*. Quoted in Michel, S. and Alain-G, G. (2012). *Multinational Federalism Problems and Prospects.* First published by Palgrave Macmillan

Truman, D. B. (1955). The Government Process. New York. As cited in Thomas, P. (1965). The Role of Consensus. The Western Political Quarterly Vol.18, No 3.

Turton, D. (2006). Introduction. In D Turton (Ed); Ethnic Federalism: The Ethiopian Experience in Comparative Perspective; Published James Currey, pp 1-31.

Urbinati, N. (2010). Representative democracy and its critics

Vaughan, S. (1994). *The Addis Ababa Transitional conference of July 1991*. Occasional paper No. 51 Edinburgh University, Edinburgh.

Vaughan, S. (2003). *Ethnicity and power in Ethiopia*. A PhD Thesis. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh.

Vaughan, S. (2013). *Federalism in Ethiopia Hybridity in ambiguity?* Routledge Handbook of Regionalism & Federalism.

Venn. A. (1908). *Introduction to the Study of the Law of The Constitution Kessinger*. LLC (October 27, 2008).

Wallellegn, M. (1969). The Question of Nationalities quoted in Yonatan, T. and Kar, K. (2022). Intergovernmental Relations in Divided Societies. Cape Town, South Africa. Palgrave Macmillan.

Watts, R. (1994). Contemporary Views on federalism, in B.D. Villiers (ed), Evaluating federal systems, Cape Town: Juta and Co. Ltd. Quoted in Asanke, K. A. (2009). Leiden University PhD Thesis.

Watts, R. (1998). Federalism, Federal Political System, and Federation. Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Queen's University, Kingston.

Watts, R. (1999). Comparing Federal Systems Third Edition. Published for the School of Policy Studies, Queen's University by McGill-Queen's University Press Montreal & Kingston • London • Ithaca.

Watts, R. (2008). Comparing Federal Systems. Monreal & Kingston: McGill-queen's University Press.

Weinstok, D. (2001). *Towards a normative theory of federalism*. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.

Wheare, K. (1962). Federalism and the Making of Nations, in A.W. McMahon (ed.), Federalism: Mature and Emergent, New York, Russell & Russell, in Michel Seymour and Alain-G. Gagnon (2012) Multinational Federalism Problems and Prospects First published by Palgrave Macmillan

Wheare, K. (1963). Federal Government, Fourth Edition, London: Oxford University Press.In Michael, B. (2012). In search of federal Spirit: New Theoretical and empirical Perspectives in comparative Federalism.

Whitaker, R. (1992). *Federalism and Democratic Theory.* In A Sovereign Idea: Essays on Canada as a Democratic Community, edited by Reginald, W., 165–204. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press. Quoted In Benz, A. and Sonnicksen, J. (2011). *Federal Democracies at work-varieties of Complex Government.* Toronto University Press.

William, R. (1964). Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown and campany. In Michael, B. (2012). In search of federal Spirit: New Theoretical and empirical Perspectives in comparative Federalism.

William, R. (1975). *Federalism: In Handbook of Political Science, eds*. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby Vol. 5.

Yohannes, G. (2019). *Ethiopia's Survivalist EPRDF Coalition and Recent Political Changes: Any Hope for Democracy*? International Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 2018 Special Issue'. Tsehai Publishers.

Yohannes, G. (2021). *The Politics of Contemporary Ethiopia: Ethnic Federalism and Authoritarian Survival.* Routledge Publishing, London, UK

Yohannes, G. (2022). *The Politics of Contemporary Ethiopia. Ethnic Federalism and Authoritarian Survival.* First published 2022 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158.

Yonatan, T. F. (2010). *Ethnic Diversity and Federalism. Constitution making in south Africa and Ethiopia.* Published by Ashgate Publishing limited Wey court East Union Road Farnham surrey, GU9 7Pt England.

Yosef, H. (2014). Art and History of the Struggle: Compendium of Liberation Era Poems. (Written in Amharic). Central Printing Press. Quoted in Mulugeta, G. (2020). Laying the Past to Rest: The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopia State- Building. First Published in UK by C. Hurst & Co.

Young, J. (1998). *Regionalism and Democracy in Ethiopia*. Third World Quarterly 19: 191-204

Zuber, C. I. (2011). Understanding the multinational game: Toward a theory of asymmetrical federalism. *University of Cologne, Seminar für Politische Wissenschaft, Gottfried-Keller-Strasse 1, D-50 931 Cologne, Germany*.

Appendix A Ethical approval letter

7 July 2021

Dear Mr Wolassa,

Reference: CURES/14084/2021

Title: Federalism in Post 1991 Ethiopia: Ethnicity and Democracy.

Thank you for your application to the Cranfield University Research Ethics System (CURES).

We are pleased to inform you your CURES application, reference CURES/14084/2021 **has been reviewed. You may now proceed with the research activities you have sought approval for**.

If you have any queries, please contact CURES Support.

We wish you every success with your project.

Regards, CURES Team

19 August 2024

Dear Mr, Wolassa,

Reference: CURES/23458/2024

Project ID: 26851

Title: Consensus: A Matter of the Continuation of Democratic Multinational Federalism in Ethiopia.

Thank you for your application to the Cranfield University Research Ethics System (CURES).

We are pleased to inform you your CURES application, reference CURES/23458/2024 **has been reviewed. You may now proceed with the research activities you have sought approval for**.

If you have any queries, please contact CURES Support.

We wish you every success with your project.

Regards, CURES Team