

# The Protection of Publicly Accessible Locations from Terrorism: Towards a Strategic Framework for Kenya

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
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# BACKGROUND

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# Why Kenya

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No overarching F/Work for PALs

## KENYA AS A CASE

- ❑ GTI ranked 20<sup>th</sup>
- ❑ 600 terrorist attacks up to 2019
- ❑ Religiously inspired
- ❑ PALs Vulnerable



# METHODOLOGY

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
## METHODOLOGY

- Qualitative Approaches



# 5 P FRAMEWORK

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# PROBLEM

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“Security is a **multi-faceted issue**. It has a psychological perspective, it has a political perspective, it has the security perspective and the economic perspective.” (P51, practitioner, Nairobi)

“Looking into the future, we **expect security threats to increase in both complexity and frequency** more so with continued advancement in technology. The **vulnerability** of publicly accessible locations is also expected to increase in the future and with it will arise the need to **increase appropriate and futuristic security intervention measures.**”

(P47, Architect, Nairobi)

# PEOPLE

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“Actually, if you talk of terrorism I strongly believe that **everybody** should be involved, everybody. Not just people in the security industry.”

(P2, Private Security provider, Nairobi)



# PROCEDURES/PRACTICES & PROCESSES

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“And at the strategic level I think we also had a lot of engagement particularly at the apex. The National Security Council getting on board and people who have had **experience** in managing security sector who may have retired, but they'd been called just to **add value**. So we were seeing the state acting more with the **local**, I mean the population, who are informed about security issues.”

(P10, security studies scholar, Nairobi)

# PROPORTIONALITY

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Are they appropriate?

Will they cause unintended consequences?

Can you justify resources for mitigations?

Are they cost effective?



# PERFORMANCE

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“Most of the measures are working. The **pace** or the **speed** at which we had anticipated to realize these drastic changes **may vary** but ultimately, we have seen them working”.

(Discussant in FG1, Nairobi)



# IMPLICATIONS

Communication

Professionalizing security

Sensitization & Awareness

A poster for Epuka Ugaidi with a background image of people lying on the floor. The poster is titled "epuka ugaidi" and "Say no to radicalisation". It features three main sections: "RUN", "HIDE", and "FIGHT". Each section provides instructions on what to do in a specific situation. The poster also includes a phone number "0800 722 203" and the slogan "stay vigilant". At the bottom, it says "NO TO TERRORISM".

**epuka ugaidi**  
Say no to radicalisation

**RUN**  
If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises. Be sure to:

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Help others escape, if possible
- Keep your hands visible
- Follow the instructions of any police officers
- Do not attempt to move wounded people
- Call 911 when you are safe

**HIDE**  
If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active shooter is less likely to find you:

- Be out of the active shooter's view
- Lock the door
- Blockade the door with heavy furniture
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager
- Turn off any source of noise (i.e., radios, televisions)
- Hide behind large items (i.e., cabinets, desks)
- Remain quiet
- Remain calm
- Dial 911, if possible, if you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen

**FIGHT**  
As a last resort, and only when your life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by:

- Acting as aggressively as possible against him/her
- Throwing items and improvising weapons
- Yelling
- Committing to your actions

See something, Say something  
Call 0800 722 203

**stay vigilant**

**NO TO TERRORISM**

# CONTRIBUTIONS

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“...but the real value is how it elevates the protection of publicly accessible spaces from a very strategic viewpoint which stakeholders can quite clearly see how they can **improve what they do**. How they can organize to handle better certain things they've been doing, and even how to start if you had not started preparing yet. So, that we're all in an enhanced set of preparedness. This framework should give us an **enhanced state of preparedness** and enhanced capabilities for responding, and enhanced resilience against violent extremist attacks *especially in publicly accessible locations*.”

(P30, independent researcher, Nairobi)

# CONCLUSIONS

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Q & A

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